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Use of UAVs by non-state actors to grow in scope, potentially pose greater risk to civilian infrastructure in coming year: MENA Analysis

MENA Analysis: Use of UAVs by non-state actors to grow in scope, potentially pose greater risk to civilian infrastructure in coming year

Executive Summary:

  • As part of a global phenomenon, there has been a recent increase in the scope and frequency of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks by non-state actors in the Middle East. This trend has most manifestly been spearheaded by Iran, which has strategically developed UAV technologies and transferred arms and knowledge to its regional allies and proxies.
  • UAV capabilities will continue to be disseminated to Iran-backed groups in the region, particularly in territories with strong Iranian influence and/or weak governance, such as Iraq, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Syria, and Yemen. This poses an increased threat towards Iran’s regional adversaries, including US allies Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which may extend to civilian and commercial infrastructure as well as military assets.
  • To combat this threat, prominent Western states, including the US and its allies, will prioritize the investment and development of more sophisticated air defense systems that can mitigate the risk posed by UAVs. This is particularly because these devices boast various advantages, such as being relatively inexpensive and flying at low altitudes, which challenge aerial defense systems.
  • Other regional militant groups, such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and jihadist organizations, will continue to engage in efforts to locally develop improvised UAV capabilities. These efforts are likely to remain limited in scope, in part due to these groups’ diminished capabilities and their lack of prominent supporters at the state level.
  • Those operating at strategic civilian infrastructure and military bases in the MENA region are advised to review security protocols and ensure the provision of suitable shelters that can sustain the impact of combat UAV attacks. Conduct awareness training for employees on the risks and threats of UAV attacks. Consult with us at operations@max–security.com.

Saudi Arabia & Yemen

Houthi forces in Yemen have been using combat UAVs to launch cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia in a growing capacity over recent years. This project is directly supported by Iran, as widely established by international actors and by the resemblance of some of the Houthi UAVs to Iranian-made UAVs. The most commonly used Houthi UAV, the “Qasef-2k”, resembles the Iranian “Ababil-T”. Direct Iranian support to the Houthis also enables the Yemen-based movement to periodically exhibit new types of UAVs. On the most recent occasion, on March 11, 2021, Houthi forces introduced for the first time the “Waid”, a suicide UAV with an alleged range of 2500 km, far greater than the declared ranges of the rest of the Houthi fleet. They also introduced the “Samad 4”, the first UAV in the Houthi arsenal that would be used as a UCAV, namely a bomb-dropping aircraft, which can be used for repeated attacks, as opposed to suicide UAVs. At the same event, the Houthis also introduced the “Rujum”, a mortar-dropping multi-copter.

Iraq

The use of explosive-laden UAVs against US-linked interests in Iraq has been an emerging trend since April. On April 14, an explosive-laden UAV targeted the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Erbil International Airport, reportedly damaging a CIA-linked hangar at the site. On April 15, explosive-laden UAVs targeted Anbar Province’s Ain al-Asad airbase, which hosts US troops and private security firms. On June 21, UAVs targeted the Victory Military Complex base, a cluster of US military installations in and around Baghdad International Airport. On June 26, explosive-laden UAVs hit a civilian area in relative proximity to the new US Consulate compound in Erbil. This prompted the US to launch airstrikes against Iran-backed Shiite militias stationed on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border. Washington maintained that these Iran-backed militias were engaged in “UAV attacks against US personnel and facilities in Iraq.” During the night hours of July 5, the US Embassy in Baghdad activated its aerial defense system, the counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) system, and eliminated an “airborne threat.” The following day, a UAV attack targeted Erbil International Airport and on July 7, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) troops stated they had foiled a UAV attack targeting US-led coalition forces near al-Omar Oil Field in Syria’s Deir Ezzor.

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) factions, some of which are financed and armed by Iran as well as taking orders from Tehran, held two different military parades in June during which they presented various UAVs that are either Iranian-made or resemble Iranian drones. This indicates that these have become part of the PMU’s inventory. Most notably, images published from the parade on June 26 showed an Iranian “Qods Mohajer-6” UCAV, which can carry up to two air-to-ground precision-guided munitions, particularly Iran’s “Qaem” missiles. Some UAVs also resembled the Houthis’ “Samad” series of combat UAVs, some of which have a reported range of between 1500-2000 km. This underscores that Iran is the architect of a wider project likely involving the transfer of knowledge and drone technology, which is being exported to its various regional proxies and replicated for use in the specific arenas in which they operate.

 

Israel & Palestinian Territories

Gaza Strip: Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), both of which are also supported by Iran to varying degrees, have dedicated efforts to establishing combat UAV capabilities over recent years. The latest conflict between Israel and the Gaza-based militant factions during May highlighted that Hamas seeks to enhance its UAV capabilities with assistance from Iran. This included the introduction of the “Shehab”, which also bears resemblance to the Iranian “Ababil” series, and by extension, to the Houthis’ “Qasef-2k”. Hamas attempted to target Israel’s “Tamar” offshore natural gas platform with the aircraft before it was downed by the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Hamas launched additional UAVs towards Israeli territory in the immediate vicinity of the Gaza Strip during the 11-day conflict.

Northern Israel: During this conflict, on May 18, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it had downed a UAV that crossed the Jordanian border area into Israel’s Emek HaMaayanot. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the UAV was launched by Iranian forces from either Iraq or Syria.

Turkey

On May 18-19, two “model planes” targeting southeastern Turkey’s Diyarbakir Airport were downed by Turkish air defense systems. In the subsequent days, the authorities announced the closure of the airport for a month-long repair period, indicating that the UAV attack caused damage to the facility. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) military sites were also targeted with such devices in Batman and Sirnak provinces on May 19-20. On May 11, a “model plane” was downed by TSK forces in northern Iraq’s Metina region. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) occasionally claims and publishes video footage of similar attempted attacks, particularly in northern Iraq and Turkey’s southeastern provinces. Most of these attacks include explosives-dropping multicopters.

 

Other global examples:

All of the abovementioned incidents and trends point towards a growing willingness by non-state actors to acquire and bolster UAV capabilities. This is a global phenomenon, which is not limited to the MENA region. For example, in Mexico, on April 21, members of the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) reportedly attacked a police convoy with an “aerial-borne explosive” in the town of El Aguaje, highlighting the diversification of cartels’ techniques to attack security forces. In India, on June 27, multiple UAVs targeted the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Jammu Air Force Station in Jammu & Kashmir, constituting the first such use of UAVs against Indian military assets. In the Lake Chad Basin region, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) has utilized UAVs for the purposes of surveillance and reconnaissance, particularly to gather intelligence on the Nigerian Army’s movements. However, this report will focus on the proliferation of UAVs in the MENA region, the impact and future outlook of which will now be explored.

Assessments & Forecast:

Iranian effort to equip regional allies, proxies with attack UAV capabilities to increase

  1. Iran has dedicated significant efforts in recent years to investing in and developing UAV technology, underscoring that this dimension constitutes a strategic priority for Tehran. This is illustrated by Iran’s January 5 unprecedented military drill, which was dedicated to UAVs, wherein military forces presented 154 UAVs of varying models. In a testimony delivered to the US House Committee on Armed Services in April, General Kenneth McKenzie, the commander of the US Central Command, stated that due to Iran’s development and use of small- and medium-sized UAVs “for the first time since the Korean War, we are operating without complete air superiority.” This highlights the level of concern within the US’s security establishment pertaining to the threat posed by these types of arms and indicates that the US military upper echelons have identified gaps with regards to US troops’ ability to mitigate this threat. FORECAST: Such assessments are likely to embolden Iran and its proxies to invest further in this field, as part of the prolonged effort to diminish the military superiority of the US and its allies in the Middle East and bolster Tehran’s influence in the region. This is particularly because UAVs pose multiple challenges to established militaries and defense systems that can partially change the balance of power:

  1. The emerging security situation in Iraq in particular highlights that Tehran is actively engaged in transferring domestically-made UAVs to its backed forces and providing them with the knowledge to manufacture similar devices independently, many of which resemble original Iranian models. The Iraqi arena serves as an example of the wider threat posed in areas in which Iran has proxies or influence. The proliferation of UAVs to its proxies, as well as the transfer of technology and knowledge required to independently construct them, meets several objectives for Iran. As well as bolstering its allies and proxies to become a greater threat to the US and its allies in terms of military capabilities, it empowers them to proactively launch attacks and advance common interests with Iran. In Iraq, for instance, this is primarily to force the US to completely withdraw its troops from the country, which would allow Iran to increase its foothold in the country. In Israel and Saudi Arabia, both traditional US allies, this includes asymmetric warfare aimed at overcoming sophisticated air defense systems and attacking strategic infrastructure such as energy installations, which would constitute a symbolic blow to these countries.
  2. On a geopolitical level, the ability to partially challenge US interests militarily can potentially grant Iran some leverage over Washington and force it to make concessions, particularly amid ongoing indirect talks to revive the nuclear agreement. Furthermore, should Iran seek to order or encourage attacks without being held directly responsible for their consequences, the empowerment of proxies also enables Tehran to adhere to a policy of plausible deniability. This allows Iran to distance itself from attacks by insisting they were conducted by autonomous military actors, which can reduce the likelihood of international actors successfully holding Iran as culpable for perceived acts of aggression and thus retaliating in kind.
  3. FORECAST: Iran will thus invest further in expanding UAV capabilities to its regional allies, particularly in the Gaza Strip, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where governance is weak and/or the ruling authorities (or some of them) are either receptive to Iranian support or actively seek it. All of these territories also share borders with countries that are Iran’s foes or that have considerable ties with the US and the West. By enhancing the capabilities of the US’s adversaries, Tehran can undermine the interests of Washington’s allies in the region, one of the primary motivations for this elevated UAV capacity. This is especially due to the ability of non-state military actors, such as the Houthis and some PMU factions, to vastly increase the range of their UAV attacks, as shown by the increasing number of incidents where these devices have successfully penetrated enemy airspace for a significant time and distance. The quality and number of combat UAVs in the region will likely increase over the coming year in these countries. This will pose a growing threat to US forces and their allies in the broader region, given that areas within Syria, Iran, and Lebanon, may be used as launching pads for UAV attacks into other states, such as Gulf countries where the US has strong ties, especially military ones. This could include the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, although Iran will tread cautiously with such actions as it seeks to refrain from increasing broader regional tensions that can exacerbate its economic crisis.
  4. FORECAST: The expansion of UAV technology to additional non-state actors, which reduces the level of accountability attributed to the producer of arms, is liable to also increase the risk posed to strategic civilian infrastructure. This may potentially expose firms that operate in the region to damage and casualties. This is given that members of the Iran-led “axis of resistance” have targeted such installations in the territories of their adversaries. This was most notably demonstrated by the September 14, 2019 attack against a Saudi state-owned oil distribution facility in Saudi’s Eastern Province’s Buqayq, which involved a swarm of at least 18 GPS-guided UAVs. The attack was claimed by the Yemen-based Houthis, who periodically claim attacks against civilian and government-linked infrastructure within Saudi territory. However, international actors accused Iran of responsibility for the largely unprecedented attack.
  5. Regardless, the extension of UAV capabilities to both well-established Iran-backed militias and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF)-linked elements as well as less known and emerging Iran-affiliated front groups across the region, increases the risk to commercial entities, infrastructure, assets, and personnel. This could include airports, especially those that have a dual civilian and military purpose, military bases that host the personnel of security forces, oil and gas infrastructure, seaports and maritime activities, logistical hubs, embassies/diplomatic missions, and communication hubs. Furthermore, the launching of UAVs towards strategic areas, such as airports, can cause significant disruptions to aerial activity and lead to considerable economic damage. Lastly, it cannot be ruled out that organized criminal groups with ties to militants and militias within these countries will try to acquire and operate UAVs against their rivals. This could also pose a risk to commercial and civil infrastructure.
  6. FORECAST: In the context of all the countries that are broadly at risk of UAV operations by the Iran-led axis, Saudi Arabia will continue to be the most vulnerable to such attacks. This is partially given its proximity to Iran and its prominent allies, ongoing leading role in the campaign against the Iran-backed Houthis, and its vast territory, which is difficult to cover by radars and aerial defense systems. Israel will be the most suitable to successfully respond to the challenge, given that the country is small and is extensively covered by radars and aerial defense systems. In addition, Israel is currently pioneering anti-UAV technology that is already being implemented on the ground and internalized in several operational systems. In Iraq, where Iran-backed forces have started to more extensively launch UAV attacks against US-linked sites, the US military establishment will possibly try to deter the militias by conducting more extensive strikes than those previously recorded.

Locally initiated channels of development in UAV capacity, mainly in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, to remain limited in scope compared to state-sponsored channels

  1. The PKK in southeastern Turkey has attempted to use UAVs, mainly commercially available ones, in attacks against Turkish authorities as early as 2017. Thus far, the PKK’s use of these devices has been limited in scope and did not lead to an increase in the militants’ ability to inflict casualties and damage on Turkish targets. This is indicative of the limitations that militant groups are facing while attempting to develop such a capacity when they do not receive technical support from a state actor. The years-long phenomenon, however, highlights the manner in which commercially available UAVs are acquired and then modified to be used for military purposes, as was once done by the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. For instance, IS used improvised UCAVs frequently in the battle over northern Iraq’s Mosul in 2017 and established a unit called “Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahideen”. In general, militants use multicopters and fixed-wing model planes, which are strapped with mortar shells or IEDs, and are occasionally reinforced by scrap metal and nails to form shrapnel. The latest attacks in southeastern Turkey, including against the main airport in Diyarbakir, which is used for both civilian and military purposes, indicate that the PKK is trying to develop its ability to use this modus operandi. This will increase the risk of collateral damage to civilians in some parts of southeastern Turkey.
  2. The PKK’s strategic decision to resort to the use of UAVs will also be compounded by another years-long trend, which is the TSK’s greater ability to target militant hideouts in southeastern Turkey, including through the use of Ankara’s own growing fleet of sophisticated UCAVs. These operations have significantly diminished the PKK’s ranks and have led to a marked decrease in the threat that the group poses within Turkey, as illustrated by the persistent downtick in PKK-perpetrated attacks in the country.

Over the past year particularly, Turkey has extended its operation against Kurdish militants through air operations and ground incursions into northern Iraq’s border areas. This also exacerbated tensions between the PKK and the KRG in northern Iraq, which has further constricted the PKK’s freedom of movement across the region. FORECAST: With the aim of preserving its ranks, the use of explosive-laden UAVs may allow the PKK to carry out long-range attacks without forcing its operatives to gather in large groups and exposing themselves to either direct confrontations with the TSK or surveillance operations by Turkish UAVs. This in order to preserve their ranks. By extension, the militants may use UAVs in order to target civilian infrastructure in the region. The main one is the 970 km-long Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline exporting crude oil from the KRG into Turkey, which was already attacked by the PKK on October 30, 2020.

  1. FORECAST: However, the pressure on the PKK by both Turkey and KRG authorities will continue to inflict casualties upon the militants. In addition, amid tensions with the KRG, the PKK will face challenges in establishing secure channels for the acquisition of civilian UAVs to be converted, given that militants likely need to import some of the devices from abroad and then smuggle them into their areas of operation. For these reasons, and as the PKK does not enjoy direct support from a state actor, the PKK’s UAV capacity will remain limited in scope over the coming months.

 

Recommendations:

  1. Those operating at strategic civilian infrastructure and military bases that host US personnel in the MENA region are advised to review security protocols and ensure the provision of suitable shelters that can sustain the impact of munition-dropping and/or explosive-laden UAVs.
  2. Conduct awareness training for employees on the risks and threats of UAV attacks.
  3. Western companies, particularly US firms with a military/security orientation, are advised to refrain from exposing the specific coordinates of the facilities they operate in to unknown figures due to the potential that such sites could be attacked by GPS-guided UAVs.
  4. In general, in the event that an explosion is heard or if sirens are sounded, immediately seek cover. Remain cognizant that even if a UAV is intercepted, falling debris constitutes a significant risk. If a designated shelter exists, immediately go there. If not, go to a room, preferably on the lowest level of the building, with as few external walls, windows, and openings as possible. Close all openings, sit on the floor below the window line and near an internal wall. In an open area, seek cover in a robust structure. If impossible, lay down on the ground and cover your head with your hands. When driving, safely pull over and follow the above instructions.
  5. Remain in position for at least ten minutes unless instructed otherwise. UAV attacks may be carried out using multiple swarms of several devices to overwhelm aerial defense systems.
  6. Following attacks, stay away from any debris and remnants of UAVs as they may entail unexploded ordnance which may be triggered upon contact.

Heightened unrest and disruptions at protests to outlast COVID-19 restrictions as groups increase activity across the region : Europe Analysis

Executive Summary

  • 2020 witnessed a surge in large-scale protest movements, despite the imposition of lockdowns.
  • The implementation of COVID-19 restrictions on gatherings, including demonstrations, led to a surge in anti-government and anti-police sentiment, increasing the associated risk at demonstrations, as well as the prevalence of more extremist activists at protests.
  • While these restrictions are being lifted regionwide, the potential for unrest at protests is expected to remain elevated.
  • Controversial protest groups are expected to capitalize on heightened anti-government sentiments, increasing the potential for more violent protests regionwide.
  • With that, governments have become increasingly interested in enacting legislation prescribing demonstrations.
  • Those operating or residing in Europe are advised to maintain vigilance in the vicinity of public gatherings due to the potential for unrest.
  • Organizations are advised to monitor protest groups within their sector due to increased direct targeting of companies.

Current Situation

  • 2020 saw a surge in anti-government protest movements related to the implementation of restrictions on gatherings, including demonstrations, in an attempt to contain the spread of COVID-19. Large-scale anti-lockdown protests have been recorded regionwide, with protests in Germany and the UK attracting turnouts in the tens of thousands. These protests have witnessed high levels of unrest, including clashes between protesters and police and subsequent arrests for breaching COVID-19-related restrictions.
  • Anti-lockdown protests have been attended by numerous groups, including far-right, neo-Nazi, anti-vaxxer, far-left, anti-fascist, and other anti-establishment groups. These protests have contributed to an increase in far-right extremist activity regionwide, with Germany recording a four percent increase in the number of far-right extremists in the country in 2020 compared to 2019.
  • Following the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, MN, USA, in May 2020, large-scale protests were recorded across Europe in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, with many witnessing clashes with police and counter-demonstrators. Protests on the same issue in 2016 were significantly smaller and largely peaceful. For example, in London, the 2016 protests saw attendance in the high-hundreds to low-thousands and transpired peacefully. In 2020, protests regionwide saw attendance in the high-thousands and lasted for several weeks. As these protests were staged during the pandemic, they violated restrictions on gatherings, resulting in significant levels of unrest and hundreds of arrests.
  • While environmentalist groups initially slowed their protest actions in the first half of 2020, groups such as Extinction Rebellion (XR) became increasingly active in the second half of the year. In September 2020, thousands of XR activists participated in the group’s “Week of Action” in the UK. Additionally, XR offshoots, namely Animal Rebellion, Money Rebellion, and Ocean Rebellion, became active in 2021. In April 2021, Money Rebellion launched a campaign targeting banking, causing disruptions in London and Paris. In June, XR and its offshoots Animal Rebellion and Ocean Rebellion launched multiple protest actions targeting the G7 Summit held in Cornwall, UK.

Assessments & Forecast

Anti-police sentiments surged in 2020, resulting in clashes between security forces and protesters being a latent risk

  1. The enforcement of COVID-19 restrictions on gatherings, including protests, has resulted in an increase in anti-government sentiment across Europe. With regard to demonstrations, protest movements that have previously been peaceful, have witnessed instances of unrest at demonstrations due to the enforcement of COVID-19 restrictions and subsequent breaking up of gatherings.
  2. The emergence of the BLM protests in Europe attracted turnouts in the high thousands and frequent instances of unrest in the summer of 2020. This included the controversial destruction of monuments associated with European countries’ colonial past, including the defacement of a Winston Churchill statue in London’s Parliament Square. Consequently, while not related to COVID-19, the BLM protest movement intensified the already growing frustrations towards law enforcement, particularly in Western Europe, increasing the risk of clashes at other protests.
  3. The alleged crackdown on protest movements has intensified anti-police and anti-authority sentiments, as evidenced in France, where protests against the National Assembly’s decision to pass a controversial amendment to France’s global security bill, which intends to make it an offense to show the face or identity of a police officer on duty online, witnessed significant levels of unrest. On November 28, 2020, a protest against the bill in Paris, attended by 46,000 people, resulted in protesters throwing projectiles at police and setting fire to multiple cars. Police responded by firing tear gas at demonstrators.
  4. This trend of heightened unrest reiterates the fact that perceived heavy-handed police enforcement generally results in more unrest, due to heightened feelings of disaffection and, consequently, violent reactions. FORECAST: Given that more protests have witnessed instances of unrest, including vandalism and clashes, countries are liable to deploy more police at future protests, even as restrictions on gatherings are lifted. This, in turn, is likely to increase a sense of uneasiness and tensions among protesters, thereby increasing the potential for unrest due to heightened anti-police sentiments, even at unrelated demonstrations.

COVID-19 anti-lockdown protests served as a platform for different types of protest groups to mix

  1. Considering that anti-lockdown protests across the region were attended by activists from various groups, they have resulted in an unprecedented intertwining of ideologies and consequent breeding ground for extremism. In Germany, protests organized by the far-right Querdenken group were attended by COVID-19 deniers, neo-Nazis, far-right activists, as well as anti-Vaxxers and more moderate groups focused on the economic impact of the restrictions. The increase in anti-government sentiment regionwide has resulted in more moderate individuals who normally would choose not to attend protests, joining demonstrations alongside groups holding extreme or anti-establishment sentiments.
  2. These protests, coupled with the widespread dispersion of misinformation, have allowed more extreme groups to mix with more centrist and mainstream groups, allowing them to gain supporters who otherwise would likely not have been involved. Germany’s federal intelligence agency, the Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (BfV), found that the number of far-right extremists in 2020 was numbered at 33,300, a four percent increase from 2019. This increase has been primarily attributed to anti-lockdown protests, citing that protesters generally did not distance themselves from far-right extremists. As such, the anti-restriction protests have provided an unprecedented recruiting opportunity for protest movements who otherwise would have difficulties projecting their message beyond a niche target audience.
  3. In addition to an increase in extremist activity, the anti-lockdown protests have resulted in activists from more traditional protest backgrounds adopting the tactics of more extreme groups, including throwing projectiles at police, violating bans on protests, protesting without permits, and carrying out acts of vandalism.
  4. FORECAST: In light of this, traditionally mainstream protest groups are liable to continue utilizing more extreme tactics in the near-to-medium-term, as they have become normalized, increasing the likelihood of unrest at protests that would have previously transpired without incident. With that, the risk posed to bystanders in the vicinity of demonstrations is liable to remain heightened in the coming months, even as protest issues begin to diversify again.

Authorities likely to seek further legislation governing protests

  1. The level of unrest witnessed at protests regionwide may push countries to enact legislation restricting protests, citing disruption and risk posed to the general public. This is supported by the UK Parliament’s expected enactment of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, which will provide police with more powers regarding protests. The bill follows severe disruptions in London resulting from the Extinction Rebellion protests carried out in 2019, with XR’s two-week-long campaign of civil disobedience in October costing London approximately 21 million GBP in policing and disruptions, on top of 16 million GBP spent on policing the group earlier in 2019. If passed, the legislation is liable to exacerbate anti-government sentiments, as evidenced by large-scale nationwide Kill the Bill protests in recent months.
  2. Given that countries already passed temporary laws restricting protests due to the pandemic, the potential for further restrictive legislation remains. In particular, countries in Central and Eastern Europe where governments are already restricting freedom of expression, notably Hungary and Poland, are more likely to pass stringent laws on protests in the near-to-medium-term, under the premise of avoiding unrest and disruption at protests.
  3. Considering that several NGOs, including Amnesty International, have claimed that governments acted beyond the permissible bounds for limiting rights during health emergencies, with blanket bans resulting in arrests and fines, the enactment of such legislation is liable to result in significant backlash.
  4. FORECAST: Considering that potential legislation is likely to provide police with more powers with regard to demonstrations, police may be more likely to utilize forcible dispersal methods, including tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and mass arrests. This would not only increase the risk of clashes between protesters and police as well as associated violence at protests but also raise the risk posed to bystanders who are in the vicinity of protest locations, as the abovementioned dispersal methods could inadvertently harm bystanders.

Groups that have been largely dormant during the pandemic will return through 2021

  1. While the start of the pandemic saw controversial protest groups reduce their public activity, including the French Yellow Vest movement, Germany’s Patriotische Europaer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (PEGIDA), Spain’s Catalan independence movement, and Extinction Rebellion (XR), these groups have begun to resurface as restrictions are eased.
  2. Considering that anti-government sentiment has increased regionwide, particularly in France, Germany, and the UK, groups like XR and the Yellow Vest movement are expected to capitalize on this. In France specifically, the Yellow Vest movement is likely to regain traction ahead of the 2022 elections, with future protests liable to witness high levels of unrest, as evidenced by the ten fatalities and thousands of injuries linked to the protests in 2018.
  3. Moreover, as discussed above, groups previously viewed as fringe are entering the mainstream. With groups like Querdenken 711 becoming more visible, the presence of even more extreme groups, such as neo-Nazis, is also growing. That 800 people attended a neo-Nazi protest in Milan, Italy in April 2021 supports this. While previous protests organized by far-right extremists in recent months have focused on the lockdown and pandemic, the protest in Milan was held in commemoration of the death of a member of the fascist Fronte della Gioventu, in 1978. With that, the protest in Milan highlights how far-right movements are now reverting to more traditional issues, rather than focusing on COVID-19. This trend is expected to be echoed by other groups and protest movements from across the political spectrum “returning” to their traditional issues.

Anti-government, environmentalist groups to increasingly shift to smaller-scale, more disruptive tactics

  1. While large-scale protests are likely to renew regionwide, groups are expected to adopt small-scale, more disruptive tactics, particularly if legislation restricting larger protests is adopted.
  2. Such civil disobedience tactics are already at the forefront of groups like XR and Greenpeace’s strategies. While these protests are generally small, they can be extremely disruptive, with activists blocking entrances to major roads and buildings, such as banks, factories, and distribution centers. That XR frequently blocks access to means of public transportation and uses mass arrests as a tactic, with over 1,100 arrests during XR’s action in April 2019, is reflective of the deliberately disruptive nature of the group.
  3. As lockdowns are eased and groups like XR restart activities, the potential for “offshoots” is likely to increase, with new groups adopting similar tactics. This is supported by XR offshoots, such as Animal Rebellion, Money Rebellion, and Ocean Rebellion. Most notably, Money Rebellion carried out disruptive protests in April 2021, outside banks regionwide under the banner ‘Global Money Rebellion Wave,’ resulting in multiple cases of vandalism, particularly in London. In May 2021, 50 protesters belonging to Animal Rebellion blockaded four UK distribution centers of a major fast-food chain, affecting over 1,300 restaurants and 3.5 million customers.  In June 2021, XR staged protests in Cornwall, where the G7 summit was held. Also in June, Animal Rebellion activists held sit-ins at multiple of the chain’s branches. Activists occupied all seats in the restaurants, stopping other patrons from entering due to COVID-19 restrictions. These sit-ins have been organized on a weekly basis and highlight the alternative methods used by such groups to disrupt operations.
  4. That these groups purposely carry out multiple small actions and organize in closed local groups makes it difficult for authorities to monitor. Considering that activists remain highly disruptive despite protesting in small numbers suggests similar actions will continue going forward.
  5. FORECAST: Anti-government and environmental protest groups are expected to carry out further civil disobedience campaigns in the coming months, consisting of numerous smaller-scale protests over extended periods of time. Such campaigns are liable to target businesses viewed as detrimental to the environment and society, including oil corporations and, as witnessed in April 2021, banks and other sectors. With that, these protests will continue to impact the public, in addition to targeted businesses, as widespread disruptions can be expected in major cities. Indeed, XR is planning major protest activities in multiple countries, including Germany and the UK, throughout August 2021.
  6. FORECAST: Given the media attention attained by these types of protests, as well as the abovementioned increased willingness to adopt more extreme protest methods, other groups, and protest movements may attempt to replicate these tactics. Therefore, the potential targets and subsequent disruptions are likely to increase going forward, as these small-scale but high-impact demonstrations become increasingly popular.

Recommendations

  1. Those operating or residing in Europe are advised to maintain vigilance in the vicinity of all large gatherings due to the potential for unrest at protests.
  2. Companies are advised to monitor protest groups related to their sector, as businesses are liable to be targeted through protest actions.
  3. Contact Max Security for coverage of upcoming protests in Europe.

Threat of militancy in North Sinai Governorate to gradually diminish in coming months as Wilayat Sinai loses ranks, capabilities – Egypt Analysis

Executive Summary

  • There has been a gradual decrease in the number of attacks conducted by Islamic State (IS)-affiliated Wilayat Sinai in the North Sinai Governorate in 2021. This indicates that the Sunni jihadist militant group is coming under increasing pressure, both in terms of its ranks and capabilities.
  • There has been a gradual shift in Wilayat Sinai’s targeting of local Bedouin tribesmen perceived to be collaborating with the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAAF) in North Sinai in 2021. This is liable to further alienate the local population and diminish the militant group’s recruitment base.
  • As Wilayat Sinai comes under increasing pressure, it will attempt to regroup and may launch a symbolic attack in the region in order to garner media attention and project that it still poses a major threat to Egypt. Such an attack could either be more sophisticated in terms of its planning and execution or it could be relatively small-scale but attack a target of a higher value.
  • The anticipated decrease in threat of militancy in the North Sinai Governorate will allow the Egyptian government to redeploy troops to mainland Egypt and project President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s policies as effective. Sisi will use this to gain international recognition of his legitimacy as the ruler of Egypt, especially considering recent concerns regarding human rights in the country.
  • Avoid all travel to the North Sinai Governorate due to the persistent risk of militancy, kidnappings, and general lawlessness in the region. If conducting essential business in the region, it is advised to travel in armored vehicles with trained security personnel.

Latest Trends

  • There has been a gradual decrease in the number of attacks conducted by Islamic State (IS)-affiliated Wilayat Sinai in the North Sinai Governorate in 2021. The militant group conducted 17 attacks in January, nine in February, six in March, eight in April, and seven in May. In contrast, in 2020 between ten and 18 attacks were recorded per month, with the exception of October when only six attacks occurred.

  • There has been a gradual increase in Wilayat Sinai’s focus of operations targeting local Bedouin tribesmen perceived to be collaborating with the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAAF) in the North Sinai Governorate in 2021, at the expense of attacks against the EAAF itself. About six percent of attacks in January targeted such individuals, followed by about 22 percent in February, 33 percent in March, 38 percent in April, and 57 percent in May.

  • There was a slight uptick in attacks around al-Arish beginning from the end of April up until the end of May. Wilayat Sinai conducted no attacks in the al-Arish area between January and March. One attack was recorded near the al-Arish Airport, located south of al-Arish, on April 30. This was followed by three attacks in areas located either west or east of al-Arish in May. These attacks took place at the expense of other Wilayat Sinai strongholds, primarily Bir al-Abd and Rafah.

Notable IS Media Publications

  • On January 9, IS released a video that started off by deriding the Egyptian government for its inability to defeat Wilayat Sinai in the North Sinai Governorate. The rest of the video focused on three main themes: IED and sniper attacks, locally-made weapons, and the kidnapping and execution of EAAF soldiers and their collaborators.

  • On April 18, IS released a 13-minute long video titled, “Epic Makers 2”. The video depicted the militants carrying locally-made shoulder-launched electrically-fired rockets as well as planting pressure-plate IEDs along roads in the North Sinai Governorate. Most notably, it depicted the execution of civilian prisoners, two of whom belonged to a local tribe and were abducted on Central Sinai District’s Mount Maghara in February. One of the victims was a Coptic Christian who was abducted from Bir al-Abd in November 2020.

  • IS released three series of photographs between May 4-15 that depicted Wilayat Sinai militants during the Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr period. The photographs showcased the militants engaged in prayers as well as preparing and partaking meals in a camp in an open desert area in the North Sinai Governorate in broad daylight. One set of photographs also showed militants carrying automatic weapons and RPGs.

  • The IS-linked media agency also released several other photographs over the course of March and April which depicted the execution of local Bedouin tribesmen, primarily from the Maghara and Tarabin tribes, in the North Sinai Governorate for collaborating with the EAAF.

Assessments & Forecast

Wilayat Sinai’s declining ranks, capabilities in North Sinai Governorate to prompt it to conduct more symbolic attacks to raise morale of fighters, attract support

The overall trend of a gradual decrease in Wilayat Sinai-perpetrated attacks in the North Sinai Governorate in 2021 indicates that the Sunni jihadist militant group is coming under increasing pressure in the region, both in terms of its ranks and capabilities. This is underscored by several factors:

  1. The majority of Wilayat Sinai attacks in the North Sinai Governorate have primarily involved the use of roadside IEDs and sniper fire. This type of modus operandi allows Wilayat Sinai to inflict casualties upon targets without engaging in direct confrontations, thus reducing the risk of losing its own fighters and weaponry during battle. This indicates that Wilayat Sinai’s ranks are likely currently limited and, therefore, while it wants to maintain the pace of its attacks, it cannot afford to suffer losses to its personnel.
  2. Wilayat Sinai’s recent shift in its focus of operations away from the EAAF and towards local Bedouin tribesmen indicates that the group is prioritizing softer targets as this increases the possibility of success of their attacks without unnecessarily risking their fighters’ lives. Such attacks also serve to deter cooperation between local Bedouin tribesmen and the EAAF, thus diminishing the effectiveness of the latter’s counter-militancy campaign.
  3. The time lag between Wilayat Sinai attacks and the date of release of IS claims has been increasing in recent weeks and months. The most prominent example of this is the IS claim that was released on May 6, in which IS took responsibility for large-scale clashes with the EAAF in El Gorah, located south of Sheikh Zuweid, over a three-day period between April 29-May 1. In the past, the militant group used to almost immediately release claims for its attacks in the North Sinai Governorate, sometimes even within hours of the attack itself. This indicates that Wilayat Sinai militants may be deliberately refraining from using electronic communication devices immediately following an attack as this makes them vulnerable to detection by the EAAF through the use of signals intelligence (SIGINT) techniques. This is likely part of an overall effort to maintain a low profile in order to avoid detection by security forces and preserve its ranks.
  4. A report from an independent local media outlet indicates that the Egyptian government launched an initiative towards the end of 2020 according to which it would grant amnesty to militants who turned themselves into the EAAF, although they would be subject to extensive interrogation by security forces. This reportedly prompted a significant number of militants to voluntarily surrender in December 2020. This was partially corroborated by the EAAF Spokesperson on March 9, when he released a video titled, “Sirat Shaheed”, which featured confessions of three Wilayat Sinai militants who surrendered to security forces in Sheikh Zuweid and Rafah after they found themselves besieged by the EAAF and short on food. If confirmed, this policy would also partially explain the significant downtick in Wilayat Sinai attacks in the North Sinai Governorate in 2021 as compared to 2020.
  5. Wilayat Sinai was once known to be in possession of more sophisticated weaponry, including Kornet anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs). Therefore, the fact that the militant group focused its April 18 video on locally-made shoulder-launched electrically-fired rockets indicates that the group is facing supply line constraints, which is compelling it to become increasingly reliant on modifications of existing weaponry. While this shows that at least some of the militants within the group’s ranks have a high knowledge and technical expertise of weapons systems, it is indicative of the current pressure on the group in terms of rebuilding its capabilities. This is further underscored by the fact that Wilayat Sinai has recently not conducted any attacks using relatively sophisticated modi operandi, such as vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), which were once commonly used by the militant group in the region. Moreover, the last claimed use of an ATGM by the group was in December 2017, when the group targeted a helicopter at the al-Arish Airport. This may indicate that Wilayat Sinai is either no longer in possession of such weapons or that it does not have fighters who have the technical capabilities to use such sophisticated weaponry. The militants could also be saving their limited arsenal of such weapons for future attacks against more high-profile targets.

 

Increasing focus of attacks against civilians to further alienate local Bedouin tribes, reduce Wilayat Sinai’s base of recruitment

  1. The trend of an increase in the focus of operations against civilians perceived to be cooperating with the EAAF is not only based on Wilayat Sinai’s local operating constraints but is also part of a larger strategy of intimidating the local population of the North Sinai Governorate. This is because the increasing collaboration between the EAAF and local Bedouin tribesmen, primarily those from the Tarabin and Maghara tribes, has likely diminished Wilayat Sinai’s ability to operate freely in the region. Local Bedouin tribesmen are more familiar with the local terrain and population of the North Sinai Governorate and thus likely provide valuable information to the EAAF regarding the location of militant hideouts in the region.
  2. Furthermore, some of these tribesmen are actively engaged in counter-militancy operations along with the EAAF, which has led to major losses within the militant group’s ranks. For example, on March 21, the Sinai Tribal Federation, which is a group of local Sinai tribesmen involved in anti-IS operations, reported that it had killed a local Wilayat Sinai Emir in a joint operation with the EAAF in an unspecified area of the North Sinai Governorate. Therefore, through its attacks against such local tribesmen, Wilayat Sinai aims to deter locals from cooperating with the authorities by conveying the message that this would make them legitimate targets for attacks. This threat carries some weight as the militant group does not indiscriminately target civilians in the North Sinai Governorate.
  3. This assessment is supported by the fact that almost all of IS’s publications that have been released since the beginning of 2021 have focused on the kidnapping and execution of tribesmen working against the militant group. Aside from this, almost every time that IS has released a claim of responsibility for killing a civilian in recent months, it has released pictures depicting the execution itself. This is meant to create a strong psychological impact upon the local population of the region and bolster Wilayat Sinai’s message.
  4. FORECAST: However, based on precedent, this strategy is likely to backfire as it will further turn the local population against Wilayat Sinai and increase their determination to completely dislodge the militant group from the region. This is also because the decade-long militant campaign, which started off as a local insurgency in 2011, has led to wide-scale destruction of infrastructure and private property in the North Sinai Governorate. The EAAF’s consequent counter-militancy campaign to secure the region has severely restricted the locals’ civil liberties and freedom of movement, which has negatively impacted their livelihoods and standards of living. For instance, up until mid-March 2021, the city of Sheikh Zuweid had reportedly been under a complete lockdown since July 2015 with fortified army checkpoints that controlled all movement.
  5. FORECAST: As more and more tribesmen join the EAAF in its counter-militancy campaign, Wilayat Sinai’s ability to operate within the North Sinai Governorate will diminish significantly. This will reduce the group’s profile, and with it, its ability to attract recruits from among the local population. Locals who may be sympathetic towards the militant group may also be deterred from lending support to it as this could put them at risk of detention by security forces. A decline in Wilayat Sinai’s image may also incentivize demoralized militants to voluntarily turn themselves in to the authorities under the reported amnesty program. This would trigger a vicious cycle by impacting Wilayat Sinai’s overall capabilities and ability to recruit fighters.
  6. That said, Wilayat Sinai has shown the ability to adapt to the changing security landscape of the North Sinai Governorate on several occasions in the past few years. FORECAST: Therefore, the militant group is unlikely to completely cease to exist in the coming months. It is more likely to reduce the pace of its attacks in certain areas during certain periods to maintain a low profile, which would allow it to regroup and resume its activity at a time when the security environment is more favorable. This strategy is underscored by the significant decline in Wilayat Sinai attacks in the Bir al-Abd area from January to May. Bir al-Abd had become one of Wilayat Sinai’s primary areas of operations towards the second half of 2020. Between January and May 2021, the militant group shifted its operations slightly eastward towards al-Arish, possibly to increase the EAAF’s perception of the threat of militancy in this area and compel it to divert resources away from Bir al-Abd. This would relieve some of the pressure on Wilayat Sinai’s fighters in Bir al-Abd and allow them to regroup. Overall, Wilayat Sinai’s ability to evolve according to the dynamic security environment of the North Sinai Governorate will enable it to remain entrenched in the region in the coming months.

 

Wilayat Sinai likely to attempt to launch symbolic attack in North Sinai Governorate in coming months to project it still poses threat to Egypt

  1. As Wilayat Sinai continues to come under increasing pressure in the North Sinai Governorate, it will attempt to regroup and possibly launch a symbolic attack in the region in order to garner media attention and project that it still poses a major threat to Egypt. This would be partly motivated by an effort to elevate the morale of its remaining fighters and possibly even attract some support and recruits from among the more disenfranchised segments of the local population of the Sinai Peninsula.
  2. FORECAST: Such an attack could either be more sophisticated in terms of its planning and execution so as to inflict high casualties among the target or it could be relatively small-scale but target something of a higher value, such as an oil pipeline. Wilayat Sinai has attempted both types of attacks from time to time. For example, the militant group recently claimed large-scale clashes with the EAAF in El Gorah, located south of Sheikh Zuweid, over a period of three days between April 29-May 1. Although the exact number of EAAF casualties remains unspecified, IS claimed that several EAAF soldiers were killed and wounded and four EAAF vehicles were destroyed in the attack. IS also claimed IED detonations against oil pipelines near al-Arish on three separate occasions in 2020 (February, November, December). These attacks did not cause extensive damage to the pipelines but were symbolic as they underscored the threat to strategic infrastructure in the North Sinai Governorate. Nevertheless, such attacks are liable to remain infrequent and become increasingly rare over the coming months as the militant group will be constrained by its declining ranks and capabilities.
  3. FORECAST: Wilayat Sinai may also attempt to conduct attacks in areas located on the western edges of the North Sinai Governorate. This is because an attack in this region would garner major media attention for the militant group due to the proximity of the Suez Canal. Although the militant group does not maintain a significant operational presence on the northwestern edges of the Sinai Peninsula, it has in the past demonstrated some ability to infiltrate this region. For instance, on December 13, 2020, IS released footage showcasing the execution of an alleged army “spy” in Sahl al-Tina, located approximately 35 km southeast of Port Said and about 25 km east of the Suez Canal. Prior to that, security forces arrested armed Wilayat Sinai militants in Gelbana on three occasions in 2019-20 (September 2019, June 2020, October 2020). Gelbana is administratively part of Ismailia Governorate but is geographically within the Sinai Peninsula and is located only about 12 km east of the Suez Canal. While Wilayat Sinai currently does not have the capabilities to launch a large-scale attack in areas located close to the Suez Canal as these are heavily fortified by the EAAF, even a small-scale attack of low sophistication in this region, such as the one in Sahl al-Tina, would be symbolic enough to raise the militant group’s profile. Therefore, as Wilayat Sinai’s overall capabilities in the North Sinai Governorate diminishes and the group becomes more desperate to preserve its image, the underlying risk of militancy in areas near the Suez Canal may increase slightly.
  4. FORECAST: The changing trends in jihadist militancy in the North Sinai Governorate are unlikely to have any impact upon the security environment in mainland Egypt. This is because while IS may maintain some sleeper cells in mainland Egypt, the capabilities of its fighters in this region have been significantly depleted as a result of the success of the Egyptian security forces’ years-long counter-militancy campaign. This is underscored by the fact that IS has not even attempted to conduct an attack in mainland Egypt since February 2019. Moreover, there have been no reported indications of attempts by IS to regroup and reestablish its operational presence in mainland Egypt over the past two years. However, this does not indicate that the underlying risk of IS militancy in mainland Egypt has been completely eradicated. It rather suggests that IS’s ability to operate in mainland Egypt is bound by the operational constraints of capabilities within the security environment of the region, especially considering that Wilayat Sinai has shown no interest in expanding its operations to areas beyond the Sinai Peninsula since its inception.

 

Anticipated decrease in threat of militancy to allow government to redeploy troops to mainland Egypt, project President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s policies as effective

  1. The Egyptian government has heavily invested in its counter-militancy campaign in the North Sinai Governorate over the past five to six years. This investment increased drastically upon the launch of Operation Martyrs’ Right in 2015. The fourth phase of this operation, which was launched in mid-2017, was the most extensive. It included the creation of a buffer zone along the Sinai-Gaza border, deployment of combat troops to Egypt’s borders with Libya and Sudan, deployment of naval assets to the Mediterranean Sea north of the Sinai Peninsula, and an increase in security protocols along the Shahid Ahmed al-Hamdi tunnel that links mainland Egypt to the Sinai Peninsula. This was aside from the counter-militancy measures undertaken within the North Sinai Governorate. With the launch of Operation Sinai 2018 in February 2018, the Egyptian government further increased its investment in the counter-militancy campaign in the North Sinai Governorate by authorizing the EAAF to engage in construction and development projects in the region. While the Executive Sinai Reconstruction Agency is the main authority responsible for overseeing development projects in the Sinai Peninsula, the EAAF is also known to either have a stake in or completely own several construction companies engaged in development projects in the country.
  2. FORECAST: With a decrease in the threat of militancy in the North Sinai Governorate, the Egyptian government will be able to at least partially redeploy forces from the Sinai Peninsula to mainland Egypt. This will also allow the government to invest some of the resources that had earlier gone into its counter-militancy campaign towards the redevelopment of the North Sinai Governorate. The Egyptian government has already reportedly allocated 275 billion Egyptian pounds (approximately 15.3 billion USD) towards development projects in the Sinai Peninsula until 2022. This includes road expansion projects in al-Arish and Sheikh Zuweid to improve transport connectivity between mainland Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula.
  3. FORECAST: A decline in the risk of militancy in the North Sinai Governorate will moreover allow President al-Sisi to project himself and his administration to the domestic populace as well as all international stakeholders as the only viable option for a safe and secure Egypt. Sisi will likely capitalize upon this to reinforce his position as an important Western ally in the fight against jihadist militancy in the Middle East and North Africa in order to gain access to advanced military technology, as he has often done in the past. He will also use this to gain international recognition of his legitimacy as the ruler of Egypt. This is especially considering recent concerns among Cairo’s Western allies, primarily the US, regarding the poor human rights record of the al-Sisi-led administration. This will allow the current Egyptian administration to continue to clamp down on opposition activists and political leaders in the country under the guise of national security without the risk of any major international censure. The government’s strict control over both social media platforms and local traditional media outlets will allow it to censor any criticism of its policies, particularly those pertaining to civil liberties, and thus control the narrative presented to the international community.

Recommendations

  1. Travel to Cairo and Alexandria may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary and contingency support options.
  2. Avoid all travel to the North Sinai Governorate due to the persistent risk of militancy, kidnappings, and general lawlessness in the region. If conducting essential business in the region, it is advised to travel in armored vehicles with trained security personnel. Furthermore, take prior permission from the Egyptian authorities as several parts of the governorate are currently under complete lockdown.
  3. It is advised to keep identification and travel documents on your person at all times due to the prevalence of military checkpoints across the North Sinai Governorate. When coming in contact with a security checkpoint, comply with the instructions of security personnel and avoid behavior that may be viewed as threatening. Photographing military sites and checkpoints is prohibited and may lead to arrest.
  4. As a general security precaution, remain vigilant in areas surrounding and avoid the immediate vicinity of government and other strategic energy installations, police stations, and religious centers, particularly churches, as these locations remain under elevated threat of militant attacks. When traveling in central squares or in areas with persistent police deployments, avoid the immediate vicinity of security forces, particularly fixed traffic booths, as such personnel and facilities have come under attack by militants.
  5. Avoid making any statements critical of President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, government policies, and ongoing trials as legal measures, including deportation and detention, have been taken regardless of nationality. This applies both to public spaces and online social media platforms.

Security situation remains volatile following 11-day conflict between Israel, Gaza-based militant groups – Israel & Palestinian Territories Analysis | MAX Blog

Israel & Palestinian Territories Analysis: Security situation remains volatile following 11-day conflict between Israel, Gaza-based militant groups

Executive Summary:

  • On May 21, Israel and Hamas agreed to an Egypt-mediated ceasefire following 11 days of hostilities. Over 4,360 rockets were fired towards Israel. 13 Israelis and at least 242 Palestinians are reported to have been killed. Since the ceasefire, no major hostilities have been recorded.
  • Hamas emerges from the latest escalation with several strategic gains. It won the “hearts and mind” of the Palestinian street by portraying itself as “protector of Jerusalem”, overshadowing the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA).
  • However, following the conflict, the PA has gained increased international legitimacy, particularly from the US, as the legitimate political representatives of the Palestinian people. Over the coming months, international actors will seek to embolden the PA and sideline Hamas.
  • Israel re-established its military deterrence vis-a-vis the Gaza-based militant groups in the short to medium term by landing a significant blow to their capabilities and thwarting all attempts at surprising Israel through the militants’ diversification of military tactics and maneuvers.
  • Civil unrest within Israel has subsided since the ceasefire and the prior deployment of Border Police to mixed cities. However, the high-level unrest recorded between Jewish and Arab citizens magnified the existing gaps between segments of these populations and drew attention to the animosity between elements in both societies. Tensions will remain, particularly in Jerusalem and mixed Arab-Jewish cities, given that many of the underlying factors for this discord prevail.
  • A long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is unlikely to materialize over the near-term due to significant gaps in the parties’ demands. To exert pressure on Israel, Hamas may instigate or actively launch small-scale attacks into Israeli territory, such as incendiary or explosive-laden balloons. Israel is currently trying to refrain from provoking the Palestinians, as can be seen by its hesitancy to permit a controversial right-wing flag parade in Jerusalem’s Old City.
  • Regardless, the current underlying conditions, coupled with the parties’ long-term disagreements over core issues, render it likely that another round of conflict between Israel and Gaza-based militants will be recorded in the medium to long term.
  • Remain abreast of developments in Israel and the Palestinian Territories due to the ongoing volatile security situation.

MAX Security has strong on-ground capabilities in Israel, including contingency planning and consultation. Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434. 

Outcome of the conflict

Hamas emerges from latest round of hostilities with Israel having achieved several strategic gains:

Protector of Jerusalem, al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount Compound

  1. Hamas attained the image of “protector of al-Quds [Jerusalem]”, at least temporarily, by following through on its threat of responding to Israeli “aggression” in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, namely, the potential eviction of Palestinian residents from the area against the backdrop of a decades-long property dispute. Hamas military commander, Mohammed Deif, warned on May 4 that Hamas “will not stand idly by… and [Israel] will pay a heavy price”. This came amid rising tensions over Israeli security operations at the al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount Compound and several weeks of tensions in Israel during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, particularly in Jerusalem and at the Old City’s Damascus Gate. Subsequently, on May 10, Hamas fired seven rockets towards the Jerusalem area.
  2. The firing of rockets on Jerusalem Day, an Israeli Jewish holiday commemorating the reunification of the city under Israeli control in 1967, was symbolic as it signified Hamas’ rejection of Israeli sovereignty in its declared capital amid the long-standing battle over ownership of the city. This enabled the militant group to project itself as the defender of both the Palestinian people and pan-Muslim interests in Jerusalem, particularly at one of Islam’s holiest sites, the al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount Compound.

Winning ‘hearts and minds’ of Palestinians

  1. Despite suffering significant personnel and infrastructure losses, by projecting a picture of victory vis-à-vis Israel as the “protector of al-Quds [Jerusalem]”, a unifying Palestinian issue, the armed conflict allowed Hamas to raise its profile among Arabs within Israel as well as the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In this way, it succeeded in overshadowing the Palestinian Authority (PA) within the “Palestinian street”. This is particularly significant given that PA President Mahmoud Abbas had announced the indefinite postponement of the Palestinian elections on April 29, which was perceived as an act of weakness by Hamas due to the divisions within Abbas’ Fatah party. Hamas therefore took advantage of the opportunity to engage in clashes with Israel in order to increase its level of support among Palestinians amid Abbas’ failure to unify the Fatah party or curtail rival factions from emerging.
  2. Hamas has managed to strengthen its support base in the West Bank and East Jerusalem at the expense of the PA by projecting itself as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. However, the relatively large-scale destruction within the Gaza Strip likely diminished some of the group’s support base within this territory, especially among those who do not share the group’s Islamist ideology.  FORECAST: Nevertheless, among Israeli Arab citizens and Palestinians in Jerusalem and the West Bank, Hamas will seek to cement its support over the coming months by portraying that its strategy of armed resistance against Israel is far more effective than the Fatah-led PA’s cooperation with Israeli security forces, which Hamas considers treacherous.

Inflamed ethnic tensions within Israel

  1. An increase in localized civil unrest was recorded in Israel between Jewish and Arab citizens amid the hostilities between Israel and Hamas, which has since been contained. This manifested in attempted lynchings, vandalism, lootings, and assaults by both Jewish and Arab individuals against members of the other community. For example, on May 12, a group of far-right Jewish Israelis attempted to lynch an Arab citizen while he was driving his vehicle in Bat Yam, located just south of Tel Aviv. On the same day, far-right Jewish individuals vandalized an Arab-owned store in the city. There were also various instances of synagogues being torched by Arab citizens in central Israel’s Lod and mass vandalism by Arab protesters in northern Israel’s Akko during the week of May 10-14. The unrest was primarily recorded in mixed Jewish-Arab cities and towns and other areas with a large Arab population.
  2. The eruption in violence on the Arab side was a result of the long-standing perceptions of discrimination held by segments of this population as well as renewed Palestinian nationalism among parts of the community, particularly surrounding the recent tensions at the al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount Compound. It was also a consequence of the anger harbored over the perceived use of disproportionate and excessive violence against Israeli-Arab citizens and Palestinians by Israeli security forces. The armed conflict between Israel and Gaza-based militants further elevated this perception. Hamas utilized this anger to mobilize swathes of the Israeli-Arab population by leveraging the developments in Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Hamas has a profound interest in gaining inroads in the wider Palestinian population beyond the Gaza Strip, particularly among Arab citizens within Israel, and thus sought to fan the flames by calling for this population to rise up against Israel.

Perpetuating anti-Israel regional and global sentiment as well as hindering, at least temporarily, normalization trends between Israel, Arab states

  1. In 2020, Israel signed normalization agreements with several Arab countries, namely, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. However, during the latest conflict, large-scale anti-Israel demonstrations were staged throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. For example, in Morocco, numerous demonstrations were held in Rabat and Casablanca to express support and solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and to condemn any form of normalization with Israel. FORECAST: The annulment of any of the normalization agreements remains highly unlikely at present, as shown by recent cooperation between Israeli and Emirati authorities on taxation, for instance. However, the latest round of hostilities elevated the level of anti-Israeli sentiments in the region, thereby decreasing the probability of future normalization agreements in the coming months as this will be deemed highly unfavorable by large parts of the population in the Arab world.
  2. Hamas also proved adept at arousing anti-Israel sentiments in neighboring countries, which translated into attacks on Israeli territory. For example, the IDF reported that three rockets were launched from Syria toward Israel’s Golan Heights on May 14. Additionally, on three separate occasions, rockets were launched toward Israel from southern Lebanon, and multiple violent gatherings, including infiltration attempts, were reported along the Lebanese-Israeli border fence near northern Israel’s Metula. These incidents highlighted Hamas’ ability to garner support for its cause from Palestinian militant groups in neighboring countries, which in the Lebanon context, were likely conducted with the explicit approval of Hezbollah.

Israel dealt a blow to Hamas’ military capabilities over the medium-term through the following ways:

Restoration of deterrence:

  1. Israel has re-established military deterrence in the short to medium term vis-a-vis Hamas by inflicting a blow to the militant group’s capabilities through the killing of high-ranking personnel and destruction of large segments of its rocket production facilities and underground infrastructure. Hamas gambled on its attack against Jerusalem and underestimated Israel’s willingness to retaliate with force. This is illustrated by Hamas’ desire to secure a ceasefire from the outset of the conflict, with the Islamist group immediately attempting to project victory. Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, stated on May 11 that Hamas had “achieved victory in the battle for Jerusalem” following its firing of rockets toward the city, indicating that Hamas sought to consolidate its gains vis-a-vis Israel and project victory after only 24 hours of hostilities. This suggests that Hamas miscalculated Israel’s response, which provided the latter with an opportunity to strike over 1,200 targets in the Gaza Strip, thereby diminishing the capabilities of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other Gaza-based militant factions.
  2. Despite the significant damage inflicted upon both militant groups, they still possess a significant rocket arsenal, capable of striking territory in southern and central Israel. FORECAST: Taken together with Hamas’ proven ability in the past to regroup and rearm following bouts of conflict with Israel, the resumption of hostilities is likely over the longer term. Moving forward, Israel has stated that the equation with regard to dealing with Hamas has changed. Israel has vowed to forcefully respond to any attacks emanating from the enclave. The implementation of such a strategy would represent a shift from its policy in recent years, whereby it largely refrained from conducting meaningful strikes against Hamas following rocket attacks or the launching of incendiary balloons targeting Israel’s peripheral southern communities. Within this context, the proposed policy change symbolizes Israel’s desire to create long-term deterrence vis-a-vis the militant group.

Thwarting of Hamas’ military ‘surprises’ 

  1. Since the conclusion of the last prolonged period of conflict with Israel in 2014, Hamas has invested a great deal of its resources in the diversification of its military arsenal, particularly through the development of relatively rudimentary naval and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) weapons. This is illustrated by Hamas’ development of submersible drones that the IDF reportedly believes are GPS-guided and are able to carry a warhead of at least 30 kg as well as the creation of its explosive-laden “Shebab” UAVs. Hamas periodically attempted to utilize its naval and aerial capabilities to launch attacks during the recent escalation, which highlighted the group’s efforts to target Israel in an environment it perceived to be more vulnerable to attack.
  2. The Israeli security apparatus successfully thwarted all of the militant group’s naval and aerial attacks, which illustrates Israel’s ability to identify and destroy potential threats to its territorial integrity, including at sea and by air. It also underscored the significant intelligence possessed by the IDF and other Israeli security agencies on the Palestinian militant groups’ operations. This was also evidenced by Israel’s ability to eliminate high-ranking Hamas and PIJ militants during the operation despite the latter’s tendency to hide in bunkers during such rounds of conflict. The recent conflict thus underscored Hamas’ failure to successfully diversify its military operations in the face of Israel’s heightened vigilance and advanced intelligence on such maneuvers.

Implications of May 2021 escalation

PA’s international legitimacy likely to be boosted by renewed focus on Israeli-Palestinian conflict, efforts to sideline Hamas

  1. The PA emerges from the conflict having gained increased international legitimacy, particularly from the US, as the legitimate political representatives of the Palestinian people. This is highlighted by a statement by US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken,  on May 25, wherein he reiterated that the US is committed to beginning the process of reopening its consulate to the PA in Jerusalem. The planned reopening of the US consulate, which has been closed since March 2019, will signify a positive shift in US-PA relations following several years of deteriorating ties during former US President, Donald Trump’s tenure. Within this context, the slated consulate reopening represents a diplomatic gain for the PA, albeit one that requires Israeli approval and may therefore be stalled.
  2. There have also been increasing calls from the international community for the funds pledged towards the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip to be distributed at least partially via the PA. This is aimed at mitigating the risk of this capital being siphoned off by Hamas and being used to rebuild its weapon stockpiles and military infrastructure. The desire for a greater role for the PA in Gaza’s reconstruction underscores the fact that both regional and international actors view the entity as the most trusted and reliable partner in the Palestinian arena. This view has been somewhat echoed by leading figures in the Israeli security establishment. Defense Minister Benny Gantz stated on May 23 that “the most desirable change…is to strengthen the PA as much as possible, and not to let Hamas be the one that sets the agenda..in Gaza.”
  3. On a regional level, the conflict has elevated the importance of the PA in the eyes of neighboring countries, most notably Egypt. Egyptian delegations have held several discussions with the PA regarding ways to bolster the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement as well as stressing the importance of reviving the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic process. Domestically, Israel has a vested interest in bolstering the Fatah-dominated PA’s control, at Hamas’ expense, both within PA-administered territory within the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The goal of strengthening the PA, which has shown itself willing and capable to cooperate with Israel in the security sphere, diminishes the influence of the militant factions in these areas, thereby decreasing the overall security threat to Israel.
  4. FORECAST: US-PA relations are expected to strengthen in the coming months as the Biden administration seeks to stabilize the region and kickstart the Israel-Palestinian peace process. On a domestic level, Israel is likely to increase backchannel diplomatic and security engagement with the PA in the immediate future in an effort to bolster the latter’s control in the West Bank in an effort to reduce the influence of Hamas in the Palestinian arena. However, such activity is highly unlikely to result in the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process given the significant differences that remain on both sides, most notably the relinquishment of Israeli control over parts of Jerusalem as well as disagreements over Palestinian refugees and borders.

Hamas to remain diplomatically isolated

On a domestic level, the militant group increased its support base in the Palestinian street during the conflict by projecting itself as the protectors of Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount Compound. However, the damage inflicted upon the Gaza Strip during the 11-day conflict further tarnished Hamas’ reputation on the international stage as it bolstered the perception that the militant group prioritizes armed conflict with Israel over improving the lives of the citizens living under its rule. Hamas is increasingly viewed by both the West and prominent regional Arab leaders as an impediment to regional stability and security. FORECAST: Hamas will therefore remain heavily reliant for diplomatic and financial support in the coming months on its primary state backers, Iran and Qatar, and to a lesser extent, Turkey. Hamas will not forgo its violent resistance against Israel and thus will continue to be regarded by much of the West as a militant group. As a result, Hamas will continue to remain largely diplomatically isolated.

Reconstruction efforts

International community to seek supervision over Gaza’s reconstruction

  1. Hamas has long been accused by Israel and Western powers of misusing humanitarian aid to upgrade its weapons arsenal and tunnel infrastructure, rather than investing in much needed civil infrastructure. Within this context, both regional and international donors are wary of providing financial support directly to Hamas for the reconstruction of the enclave. For example, US President, Joe Biden, stated on May 24, that international coordination was needed to ensure that “immediate assistance reaches Gaza in a way that benefits the people there and not Hamas”. Consequently, there have been increasing calls for such funds to be distributed via the PA as opposed to Hamas. However, given the absence of PA control or support in the Gaza Strip, the proposal is unlikely to come to fruition. Another obstacle to the reconstruction efforts is Israel’s demand that such activities be dependent upon Hamas releasing two IDF troops’ bodies and two other Israeli citizens held captive in the enclave. The militant group has stated it rejects linking the reconstruction of the enclave to any prisoner exchange deal.
  2. FORECAST: Therefore, concessions will be required by both Israel and Hamas if significant reconstruction efforts are to begin in the immediate future. In the meantime, international organizations and foreign actors will aim to alleviate the humanitarian situation and start the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip without strengthening Hamas financially. For instance, on June 4, various bulldozers, trucks, and cranes from Egypt arrived in Gaza to “prepare the ground for reconstruction”. Egypt has dedicated 500 million USD in funds to reconstruction in the enclave, although it will seek to carry out this endeavor by funding its own personnel to directly work in the territory as in the June 4 event, rather than risking the funds ending up in Hamas’ possession.
  3. FORECAST: Despite the international community’s desire to avoid providing financial aid directly to Hamas, the militant group will likely still be able to siphon off some funds towards restocking its rocket arsenal and rebuilding its tunnel infrastructure. This is largely due to the fact that Hamas is the uncontested ruler in the Gaza Strip and is therefore able to take advantage of its control over civil bodies to redirect funding towards its military wing. Israel is expected to maintain its position vis-a-vis the prisoner swap and therefore reconstruction efforts will likely remain limited until such an exchange occurs. Moreover, given the precedent of previous conflicts between Israel and Hamas, a large part of the funds that are pledged by international actors ultimately fails to reach the enclave.

West Bank

Greater coordination anticipated between Israel, PA

  1. An uptick in Palestinian-perpetrated militant attacks targeting Israeli security personnel and Israeli civilians was recorded in the West Bank during “Operation Guardian of the Walls”. At least 26 militant attacks were recorded in the West Bank during the 11-day conflict as compared to 19 such attacks during the whole month of April. The surge in militancy is indicative of Hamas’ ability to inflame tensions and lead its supporters in the West Bank to conduct lone-wolf attacks. However, a drop in militancy has been recorded since the cessation in hostilities, with only nine such attacks being recorded. The reduction is a result of a concerted effort by the Israeli security apparatus to prevent Hamas from establishing infrastructure in the West Bank. This is evidenced by the IDF’s arrest of several senior Hamas operatives in recent weeks, including Nayef Rajoub and Sheikh Jamal Tawil, on May 20 and June 2 respectively. Overall, these arrests are indicative of both Israel and the PA’s effective efforts to clamp down on the militant networks and particularly the PA’s ability to consolidate its power.

  1. Hamas capitalized on the tensions in Jerusalem to overshadow the PA and project itself as a legitimate alternative in the Palestinian arena. The militant group’s actions in Jerusalem endeared itself to segments of the Palestinian population, who had become disillusioned by the PA’s inability to stop Israel’s perceived violations in the Old City and at the al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount Compound during the month of Ramadan. Conversely, the PA understood that it had a vested interest in containing the violent unrest in the West Bank due to the knock-on effect that the destabilization of the security environment has on its own rule in the West Bank. Within this context, the Palestinian security apparatus is reported to have partially prevented several protests in the West Bank during the conflict. Such efforts were aimed at de-escalating tensions and mitigating Hamas’ influence in the area. However, the PA’s efforts to contain the unrest were inconsistent at times, as illustrated by Fatah, the dominant party in the PA, calling for a day of rage on May 18.
  2. FORECAST: Greater security cooperation and coordination between Israel and the PA is anticipated in the coming months, given both parties’ desire to combat Hamas’ expansion in the West Bank. This is evidenced by Israeli Defense Minister, Benny Gantz, stating his desire to “strengthen the Palestinian Authority as much as possible, and not to let Hamas be the one that sets the agenda”. Both the IDF and the Palestinian security apparatus will likely conduct periodic arrest operations targeting Hamas and PIJ operatives in an effort to weaken Hamas’ influence in the area, thereby increasing the stability and security in the West Bank. Nonetheless, given tensions between Palestinians and Israeli security forces will remain high over the short term, sporadic low-sophistication acts of militancy will likely be recorded in the West Bank over the coming weeks. These include attacks such as vehicular-rammings, stabbings, and the hurling of Molotov cocktails and rocks.

Outlook

Downtick in civil unrest within Israel anticipated due to increased law enforcement, tensions to remain due to underlying factors

  1. Civil unrest within Israel has subsided, particularly following the May 21 ceasefire and the prior increased deployment of Border Police and Israel Police officers to mixed cities within Israel as well as the involvement of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet). Nonetheless, the civil unrest magnified the existing gaps within Israeli society and illustrated the levels of animosity harbored by fringe elements of both Jewish and Arab societies towards the other. From an Israeli-Arab perspective, the outburst of violent unrest was not spontaneous but rather a result of years of neglect and the authorities’ failure to address long-standing grievances held by large segments of Arab society, particularly perceived political and social exclusion. On the part of the far-right Jewish Israeli protesters, these elements engaged in unruly violent protests and vandalism against Arab-linked property to project their efforts to “restore Jewish honor and pride”. Overall, the recent intercommunal violence between Israel’s Arab and Jewish communities increased mutual distrust and suspicion among some segments of Israeli society.
  2. FORECAST: The Israeli Police are likely to maintain a more significant presence in the country’s mixed cities as it seeks to maintain law and order in these areas. Additionally, the involvement of the Shin Bet in detaining elements partaking in intercommunal violence will further bolster the investigative capacity of the Israeli Police over the coming weeks and months, which will result in further arrests of individuals within both Arab and Jewish sectors of society. Israeli authorities will also likely seek to prosecute those involved in inciting violence online, such as on social media platforms. Nonetheless, localized instances of violent unrest may be recorded in mixed and Arab-dominated cities across Israel over the coming months. This is evidenced by incidents in northern Israel’s Binyamina and the mixed city of Lod on May 27. In Binyamina, an Arab driver was moderately wounded after reportedly being attacked by a group of Jewish-Israelis. Meanwhile, in Lod, Molotov cocktails were thrown into the home of a Jewish family. These incidents will likely remain isolated, although they will contribute to the tension within the country. This is because the underlying factors that contribute to these grievances have not been resolved.

Jerusalem to remain continued source of contention

  1. The city will remain a contentious issue and a continued source of tensions between Israel and the Palestinians. This is due to both Jerusalem’s religious significance in both Judaism and Islam as well as the fact that both Israelis and Palestinians claim the city as their capital as part of their current and potential states, respectively. Within this context, any perceived Israeli violations of the al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount Compound are likely to exacerbate the already heightened tensions surrounding the city. Additionally, any court rulings pertaining to the slated eviction of Palestinian families in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan neighborhoods are also liable to elevate tensions. The Israeli court system may consider further postponement of its adjudication over these matters in the short term in an effort to de-escalate tensions.
  2. Another possible catalyst for violence is if right-wing Israeli activists conduct marches or protests in contested areas of Jerusalem’s Old City, such as the Muslim Quarter, which will be considered to be provocative by Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. FORECAST: While the Israel security cabinet on June 8 announced that it will allow right-wing Israelis to march in the Old City on June 15, this remains subject to permission by the Israel Police, which will also decide the route of the march. If the event avoids Arab-populated areas of Jerusalem, the risk of unrest will be lesser. Regardless, some fringe far-right Israeli politicians and their supporters are intent on marching on June 10, the original requested date for the mark, which the police refused to approve. Overall, these events will increase tensions in the area. The Israeli security establishment’s reluctance to permit the march, especially through contested parts of the Old City, indicates Israel’s current hesitation to provoke the Palestinians. This also presents a dilemma for the government as it does not want to appear to be actively caving to Hamas’ demands.
  3. FORECAST: Sporadic low-sophistication “lone-wolf” attacks are likely to occur in the coming weeks and months as radicalized individuals seek to play their part in the “protection of al-Quds” (Jerusalem). This is evidenced by the May 24 stabbing attack on Jerusalem’s Shlomo Zalman Street, which resulted in the wounding of one civilian and an IDF soldier. Hamas will also utilize the discourse over Jerusalem to inspire future incidents in Jerusalem and as justification for launching attacks against Israel. This is bolstered by the fact that senior Hamas leaders, including Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, have reiterated that it reserves the right to respond to any perceived Israeli aggression in the city, particularly in relation to the al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount Compound.

Long-term ceasefire between Israel, Hamas unlikely to materialize over near-term due to significant gaps in demands

  1. Israel has informed Egypt that any long-term ceasefire negotiations with Hamas must include the subject of a prisoner exchange. However, the militant group is unlikely to agree to such terms given its strategy of using Israeli hostages as bargaining tools to secure the release of militants held in Israeli jails. For example, in October 2011, Hamas secured the release of 1,027 militants, including its current leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, as part of a prisoner exchange deal involving a captive IDF soldier. Therefore, Hamas will be determined to not relinquish control over the four Israelis it holds without extracting significant concessions from Israel.
  2. The militant group has consistently said it rejects linking the reconstruction of the enclave to the prisoner exchange deal. Another impediment to the negotiations is Hamas’ demand for the removal of the blockade on the Gaza Strip. Israel has maintained tight restrictions on the Gaza Strip since 2006, a blockade it says is necessary to prevent the flow of weapons from reaching the enclave’s militant factions. Israel is highly unlikely to yield to such a demand as doing so would enable the militant factions, including Hamas, to upgrade their weapons capabilities, thereby posing an increased risk to Israel’s security. Israel is also highly unlikely to adhere to Hamas’ demands on Jerusalem, such as operations at the al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount Compound or regarding property disputes in East Jerusalem. FORECAST: Thus, a long-term ceasefire agreement is unlikely at present, given both sides’ desire to extract major concessions from the other. Moreover, the current underlying conditions and prevailing causes of friction, together with the parties’ long-term disagreement over core issues in the conflict, rendering it likely that another round of conflict between Israel and Gaza-based militants will be recorded in the medium to long term.

Recommendations

Recommendations following escalation:

  1. Remain abreast of developments in Israel and the Palestinian Territories due to the ongoing volatile security situation.
  2. Due to their sensitivity, it is advised to refrain from engaging in conversations regarding politics and the IDF’s recent operation in Gaza with unfamiliar individuals, particularly as tensions remain relatively high within both Israeli and Palestinian societies.
  3. Maintain heightened vigilance in mixed Jewish-Arab locales, such as Lod, Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, and Ramla, due to the continued volatility in these areas and underlying risk of unrest.
  4. It is advised to avoid nonessential unaccompanied travel to Jerusalem’s Old City and Arab-populated areas of East Jerusalem due to the ongoing risk of militancy and civil unrest. Consult with MAX to arrange secure transportation and on-ground support.
  5. Avoid nonessential travel to Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank at this time given the current underlying threat of civil unrest as well as ongoing travel restrictions.

In general, MAX Security has strong on-ground capabilities in Israel, including contingency consultation and planning. Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434. 

General Recommendations

  1. Travel to Israel may continue at this time while adhering to security precautions regarding militant attacks and civil unrest.
  2. In major Israeli cities, remain vigilant in crowded commercial areas or public transport hubs, as these locations have been targeted by militant groups in the past. Alert authorities to suspicious, unattended packages in these areas.
  3. Avoid the immediate vicinity of the borders with Lebanon and Syria given the persistent risk of cross-border violence.
  4. Avoid the immediate vicinity of the border with the Gaza Strip given the persistent risk of cross-border violence.

Upcoming legislative elections on June 12 to perpetuate political instability, trigger further nationwide anti-government protests in coming weeks, months Algeria Analysis | MAX Blog

Executive Summary

  • On February 18, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune dissolved the People’s National Assembly (APN) and called for early legislative elections, slated for June 12. The announcement came ahead of the two-year anniversary of the anti-government protest movement on February 22.
  • This measure was aimed at appeasing the public’s anti-government sentiments. However, protesters will perceive the upcoming elections as a means for former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s allies to remain in power, which will therefore result in a low voter turnout.
  • While interdependent “Hirak” candidates are participating in the elections, as the movement lacks clear organization or leadership, it will only divide the votes of the public, preventing one group or individual from earning a significant majority and result in a polarized parliament. This will challenge the legislative process following the elections and negatively impact the economy. The ensuing political instability will undermine public confidence in the government.
  • Overall, nationwide “Hirak” demonstrations will persist in the weeks leading up to and following the elections. In major cities, including in Algiers, these will generally garner turnouts in the mid- to high-thousands. A significant security deployment will thus be recorded at key focal points in Algiers in the coming weeks to prevent the mobilization of protesters.
  • Travel to Algiers may continue while adhering to security precautions regarding civil unrest. It is advised to maintain heightened vigilance in the vicinity of the Grand Post Office, Martyrs’ Square, Place Maurice Audin, and Didouche Mourad Street as these locales serve as focal points for anti-government protests.

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Assessments & Forecast

Legislative elections unlikely to alleviate widespread anti-government sentiments, low voter turnout likely

  1. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s decision on February 18 to dissolve the People’s National Assembly (APN) and hold early legislative elections on June 12 instead of in 2022 came ahead of the two-year anniversary of the “Hirak” movement on February 22. It was aimed at appeasing the public’s grievances with the political system, which had persisted despite the election of a new president in December 2019 and the revision of the constitution after the national referendum in November 2020. This is because large segments of the local population continue to perceive these measures as symbolic rather than effective political reform. This is evidenced by the relatively low participation rates in both the presidential elections (39.93 percent) and the national constitutional referendum (23.7 percent) as well as the large-scale nationwide anti-government protests and instances of unrest recorded in the weeks leading up to and following these events. While the momentum of these anti-government protests had subsided in the year prior to the two-year anniversary of the “Hirak” movement, this was primarily due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic rather than a decrease in anti-government sentiments.
  2. By holding early legislative elections, Tebboune likely seeks to project a meaningful change in the current political hierarchy. This is because in the previous legislative elections in 2017, the National Liberation Front (FLN), the Democratic National Rally (RND), and the Movement for the Society of Peace (MSP) together won a plurality of seats at 25.99 percent, 14.91 percent, and 6.09 percent, respectively. These parties formed the “Presidential Alliance”, a three party political alliance that was created in 2005 and was close to former President Bouteflika. Hence, by calling for early legislative elections, Tebboune aims to showcase his willingness to implement mechanisms for change and the overhaul of the previous hierarchy. This is further evidenced by the fact that he announced that two civil society blocks will prepare the electoral lists for the upcoming elections as part of an effort to open up the legislative elections to the public.
  3. An electoral law was included in the revised constitution of 2020 for the first time. This law includes stipulations for candidates’ finances, such as the possibility of state reimbursement for part of the expenses of the electoral campaigns. This would allow independent, particularly younger, candidates with fewer financial resources to also take part in the elections. In line with this, Tebboune has reduced the number of parliamentary seats from 462 to 407 to reduce public spending. The reduced number of parliamentarians could also potentially allow for larger reimbursement for successful candidates. The law further stipulates that any donations greater than 1,000 Algerian Dinar (DZD) must be made by cheque, bank transfer, or debit or credit cards, ensuring greater transparency of campaign funding. These measures overall show Tebboune’s efforts to project that money is not a determining factor for entering politics and that he is responsive to the protesters’ demands for a change in the political status quo in Algeria.
  4. However, anti-government protests have persisted since February 22, gradually becoming more unruly over recent weeks. Thousands of protesters have also rejected the upcoming legislative elections as they perceive that political parties, such as the FLN and the RND, which were strong supporters of former President Bouteflika, will continue to retain influence within the political system. FORECAST: Hence, protesters will continue to regard the upcoming election process as a means for former President Bouteflika’s allies to remain in power. This is further given that President Tebboune has himself been denounced by large segments of the public for his ties to the former administration, despite his efforts to distance himself from the ruling political parties in Algeria. Against this backdrop, the turnout in the upcoming elections will likely be low, which will undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process, regardless of which party receives the majority of votes.

 

Lack of organization, clear objectives of ‘Hirak’ protesters to undermine role of independent political candidates in electoral process, potentially result in polarized parliament

  1. There are segments of the public that have indicated their support for the election process due to the perception that it can be a means for change. This is evidenced by reports that dozens of independent candidates have submitted their lists to participate in the elections in every province. These include young individuals, academics, and professionals that have little to no experience in politics. They have sought to capitalize on the changing political environment by projecting themselves as apolitical and therefore different from the status quo in order to garner support. Moreover, over the past several months, the formation of new political entities seeking to participate in the elections has been recorded. These primarily entail al-Massar al-Jadid, Nida el-Watan, and el-Hisn el-Matine. These groups have portrayed themselves as coalitions of civil society elements and other “Hirak” activists. Al-Massar al-Jadid group, for example, is headed by Moundir Boudene, former Secretary General of the Algerian Students’ Union, who has previously indicated his support for students’ right to participate in the political arena through the anti-government protest movement.

  1. FORECAST: While this indicates an increased participation of wide segments of society within the electoral process, it could result in a polarized parliament and undermine its stability. This is because the variation of candidates could divide the votes of the public, as no one group or individual may be able to earn a significant majority to become the ruling political party. This challenge can be attributed to the fact that while the “Hirak” movement has persisted over the past two years with relative consistency, the movement has not organized itself into one main group with a clear leader or group of leaders. Moreover, while the movement has persistently called for a political overhaul of the system, it has not put forth any alternatives or ideas of what this reform may entail. The candidates are thus unlikely to have a coherent platform that can meet the demands of the “Hirak” movement. Therefore, none of the independent candidates or new political parties running will receive a clear majority of votes. Moreover, the ruling party, FLN, has witnessed a steady decline amid the changing political scene. This, combined with the lack of strong support for any one “Hirak” political candidate, may result in a hung parliament.
  2. FORECAST: While it is unclear whether the FLN and the RND will win a plurality of seats, they are unlikely to win enough seats to form a clear majority coalition. Moreover, other political parties, particularly Islamist groups such as the MSP and the National “Binaa” Movement, have recently been attempting to capitalize upon the decline of the FLN and the RND to garner local support. Given that these Islamist groups have a more defined and established voter base due to their ideological clarity and traditional affiliations, they are more likely to win a significant number of votes in the upcoming elections. This is particularly given the anticipated low voter turnout, wherein voters are more likely to have strong affiliations with the more established candidates rather than independent members of the anti-government movement.
  3. On the other hand, the new political parties that have formed are largely composed of those already in positions of power, political or otherwise, despite their effort to project themselves as “Hirak” political parties. Nida el-Watan, for example, was formed under the chairmanship of Nazih Berramdane, an advisor to President Tebboune. While he has indicated his support for the role of students and the youth in facing the current political challenges in Algeria, the group has nonetheless been perceived by some political activists as a continuation of the ruling political parties seeking to capitalize on the “Hirak” movement to win the legislative elections. El-Hisn el-Matine is headed by Yacine Merzougui, who was an advisor to a former CEO of Algeria’s state-owned oil company and an executive in a senior management team of the organization, whereas Moundir Boudene of the al-Massar al-Jadid group was previously a member of the RND and supported former President Bouteflika’s mandates on several occasions. FORECAST: This will therefore reinforce the perception among significant segments of the population that the new, “independent” political parties are simply a continuation of the old political system. This may further deter support for the electoral process and undermine its legitimacy, even if these parties get some seats in the parliament.

Upcoming elections to challenge legislative process, negatively impact economy; political instability to undermine public confidence in government

  1. FORECAST: The upcoming elections will therefore bring significant challenges to the legislative process. Political parties will likely have to form alliances in order to form a coalition government. However, as discussed above, the “Hirak” movement does not have any clear organization and lacks ideological compatibility beyond calling for political reform. Meanwhile, the previously ruling parties, such as the FLN, may face significant opposition even if they are reelected to parliament with a plurality of votes. This opposition will come from both the “independent” political candidates as well as the Islamist parties that are seeking to make headway in the upcoming elections. This increasing partisanship within the parliament could in turn hinder the legislation and implementation of political and economic reforms in the country, which will elevate socio-economic grievances among large segments of the populace.
  2. FORECAST: This anticipated political instability will also adversely impact Algeria’s economic growth. This is because while Algeria has largely had a state-run economy thus far, the government has been seeking to attract foreign private investment over the past year to boost the economy. In August 2020, Algeria amended a law to allow foreign investors to own 100 percent of companies set up in the country with certain exceptions as opposed to only 29 percent, as per previous legislation. This was part of Tebboune’s economic recovery plan, part of which involved economic diversification. Moreover, the state-owned oil company has been signing several contracts with foreign energy companies in order to strengthen the oil-dependent economy. On March 25, for example, the Algerian state-owned oil company and an Italian oil and gas company signed several agreements with regards to the exploration and production of crude oil as well as  cooperation on technological research and development. Algeria has also signed similar agreements with American and French oil and gas conglomerates.
  3. However, political instability serves as a deterrent to foreign investment. For example, it may deter international oil and gas conglomerates from signing further agreements with Algeria’s state-run oil company or potentially hinder the implementation of the agreements that have already been signed. Algeria’s economy has been in significant decline over recent years, particularly amid the COVID-19 pandemic, which has resulted in the global decrease of oil prices. Moreover, Algeria’s oil and gas production has overall declined, with a decrease of eight percent recorded in 2020 as compared to 2019. FORECAST: Against this backdrop, the ensuing political instability in Algeria will likely hinder Tebboune’s economic recovery plan over the coming year. This will further undermine the confidence of the public in the government.

 

Anti-government protests, civil unrest to persist in lead up to, following June 12 elections

  1. FORECAST: As evidenced by the nationwide protests recorded following the announcement of the election date to denounce the legislative elections, nationwide “Hirak” demonstrations will persist over the weeks leading up to the elections. This is particularly given precedent of similar developments around the presidential elections in December 2019 and the constitutional referendum in November 2020. These protests will likely gather further traction in light of the unrest recorded during the recent demonstrations. Security forces have attempted to block and disperse anti-government protesters on several occasions in Algiers over recent weeks.
  2. On May 2, security forces used tear gas to disperse a protest held by firefighters in Algiers to demand an increase in wages and the payment of COVID-19 bonuses. While this was not directly part of the “Hirak” protest movement, it nonetheless showcases the authorities’ growing intolerance towards perceived anti-government activity. On May 3, 230 firefighters were subsequently dismissed for participating in the demonstrations. The authorities have also arrested several prominent activists in the movement, including Karim Tabbou, on April 28. On May 5, the Minister of Justice, Belkacem Zeghmati, submitted a draft bill to criminalize any obstructions to the legislative elections, which could consist of prison sentences of up to 20 years. The Justice Minister’s draft bill to penalize obstructions to the legislative elections with up to 20 years in prison, which could be applicable to those who seek to damage ballot boxes as well as those who seek to “undermine” the proper conduct of the elections, has also prompted protests.
  3. FORECAST: These measures will elevate the anti-government sentiments of “Hirak” activists and further diminish support for the electoral process. In Algiers, as well as in other major cities, such protests generally garner turnouts in the mid- to high-thousands. This is particularly on Tuesdays and Fridays, which have become symbolic days for the anti-government protesters. In Algiers, Martyrs’ Square usually serves as the starting point for protests on Tuesdays. The Grand Post Office, Place Maurice Audin, Didouche Mourad Street, and 1st of May Square are also key focal points for anti-government protests. In the days leading up to and on the election date, protesters are likely to gather around ballot boxes and other government buildings where the electoral process is being organized. Given the authorities’ heightened sensitivities, a security deployment can be expected at focal points across major cities of Algeria in order to prevent the materialization of large gatherings. There may also be an increase in the arrests of activists under the guise of “undermining national security” in order to demoralize activists and reduce the momentum of the protest movement. However, such measures will instead bolster the “Hirak” movement, which will continue to persist in the weeks and months following the elections.

  1. On the other hand, in the days leading up to the 2019 presidential elections, some protests were also recorded in outlying areas of Algeria calling on locals to cast their vote. This can be attributed to the fact that locals in these areas prioritize economic reform over political ones due to the overall deterioration of socio-economic conditions in the outlying parts of the country. FORECAST: It is also possible that similar protests will be held in support of these elections. This is particularly given that, as discussed above, a low voter turnout could overall undermine the legislative process and result in a polarized parliament, with fewer and more divided votes. The ensuing legislative challenges will more adversely impact those in outlying areas of the country. However, in the weeks and months following the elections, these communities will resume anti-government protests as their economic hardships persist.

Recommendations:

  1. Travel to Algiers may continue while adhering to security precautions regarding civil unrest. Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary and contingency support options.
  2. In Algiers, it is advised to maintain heightened vigilance in the vicinity of the Grand Post Office, Martyrs’ Square, Place Maurice Audin, and Didouche Mourad Street as these locales serve as focal points for anti-government protests.
  3. It is further advised to maintain vigilance in the vicinity of public squares, government buildings, judicial courts, and police stations in other cities of Algeria as these serve as focal points for anti-government protests.
  4. Avoid discussing anti-government discourse in public spaces, including on social media, particularly pertaining to the anti-government protest movement and the upcoming June 12 legislative elections due to the risk of detention by the authorities.

Social, security, and economic reforms implemented as transition continues, country further opens to investment – Sudan Analysis

Executive Summary

  • The government signed an agreement with the SPLM-N al-Hilu rebel group that notably established a shift toward a secular government. Major social reforms have enabled progress in the peace process but have also triggered pushback from conservative elements of society.
  • Efforts to incorporate all rebel groups in the peace process into a joint force with the Sudanese security apparatus is likely to be difficult and delayed, with the situation to remain volatile in Darfur.
  • The military’s willingness to divest from the economy in some sectors will bolster the government’s efforts to open the country’s markets to private and foreign investment. However, military elites will likely remain heavily involved in newly privatized industries.
  • Economic reforms including the removal of subsidies, devaluation of the Sudanese Pound, and allowing non-Islamic banking will likely have positive effects in terms of economic growth and enabling foreign investment.
  • The government is expected to struggle in persuading the public that the reforms will take time to take effect and the subsidy cuts in particular will be unpopular. Protests over the economic situation are thus expected to persist over the coming months.

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Current Situation

  • On March 26, the World Bank stated that the Sudanese government had cleared its arrears and would now be able to secure financing from the World Bank Group and other multilateral institutions under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HPIC) initiative. This was made possible by a 1.15 billion USD bridge loan from the US government on January 6 that was specifically intended to help clear Sudan’s debts.
  • Sudan’s inflation rate rose to 341 percent in March according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, despite the implementation of subsidy cuts and currency devolution. These measures and the rising cost of living has led to recurrent protests in Khartoum and other cities.
  • On March 29, the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP) in Juba, South Sudan.
    • The parties agreed that: “No religion shall be imposed on anyone and the State shall not adopt any official religion.” The state will also “guarantee freedom of religion” and “these principles shall be enshrined in the Constitution”.
    • The DOP also stated that the government will sanctify human rights, including for women and children, and take adequate measures to accede to international and African human rights charters that are currently unratified.
    • In addition, the SPLM-N al-Hilu and the government agreed to the formation of a “single apolitical professional army” beginning with the gradual integration of rebel forces.
  • The Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdelwahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) had a leadership figure meet with the government in Khartoum on April 3. However, the rebel group released a statement on April 29 stating that it is not interested in negotiating with the current authorities or cooperating with the South Sudanese mediation team.
  • Sudan’s Security and Defense Council said on April 10 that it is seeking to form a joint force of 20,000 government troops and rebel fighters drawn from peace agreement signatories to deploy in Darfur. This was decided upon after large-scale intercommunal clashes in El Geneina, West Darfur State on April 3-6 resulted in hundreds of casualties.

Assessments & Forecast

Agreement to separate state & religion regarded as landmark advance of transition, peace process

  1. The signing of the declaration of principles between the Sudanese government and SPLM-N al-Hilu is a historic step and significantly advances the political transition and peace process. This follows the signing of a comprehensive peace deal with the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) in August 2020 and signifies continued positive momentum in bringing rebel groups into the mainstream. Coming to an agreement with the SPLM-N al-Hilu is important as the group controls substantial tracts of land in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile State, and this will help stabilize the region. A major stumbling block had long been that al-Hilu consistently maintained that a secular Sudanese state is required as many of the population in the group’s territory is Christian and animist, unlike the majority of Sudan. The Sovereign Council’s decision to accede to this demand is highly notable given the country’s long Islamist identity.
  2. The Sovereign Council likely also decided to agree to a separation of religion and state as a means to garner favor with the international community, who have largely welcomed the agreement as a sign of Sudan’s intent to accelerate democratization and instill liberal values. This would also further sideline the National Congress Party (NCP), which was the ruling party under former President Omar al-Bashir and had enshrined religious principles and the use of Sharia law in state jurisprudence. This comes as a broader shift toward secular governance during the transition. This was best exemplified by the repeal of the “Public Order Law” in November 2019 that had allowed for harsh penalties, including death, for women whom authorities deemed to be violating social norms. The government’s notably decisive actions to institute social changes, particularly for women, have also met international favor. The commitment to these changes was underscored by the transfer of the Khartoum police chief to a minor political post on March 28 after he called for the reinstatement of the Public Order Law, with the government releasing a statement rejecting his call.

Notable social reforms implemented in 2020-2020 - Sudan Analysis | MAX-Security

  1. FORECAST: Given the wide-ranging social impact of these reformist policies, there will continue to be pushback from conservative segments of society and government. In addition, the youth and women who led the 2019 revolution and turned away from Bashir’s Islamist policies often tied those policies to the widespread corruption in the government. If the transitional government is able to provide basic services to its citizens and tackle corruption, the move away from Islamic jurisprudence is likely to be accepted more optimistically by the population. However, if the government is unable to deal with these systemic issues, a new set of religious leaders may galvanize a movement toward reinstating Islamic law as a means to achieve these social objectives. In that sense, the popularity of social reforms is tied heavily to the overall perception of the government’s progress.
  2. In addition, Islamist elements within the country who are supportive of a return to Sharia-based governance such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the disbanded NCP would likewise aim to support any move to roll back social reforms. FORECAST: This support is likely to be in the form of protests against the transitional government, which would be suppressed by local authorities that have consistently prioritized maintaining public order. Conservative leaders are likely to use Islamist sympathizers within the bureaucracy and security agencies, such as the former Khartoum police chief, to push for a return to more religious social norms. Such practices are likely to be the biggest challenge facing the government in its attempts to secularize governance in the coming months and could raise tensions over what is considered acceptable conduct in public spaces.

 

Efforts to launch unified joint force in Darfur likely to be difficult, delayed

  1. With the new agreement with the SPLM-N al-Hilu, nearly all major rebel groups have been officially demobilized and slated to integrate into the new security structure, with the exception of the SLM-AW operating from Jebel Marra. Regardless, in the wake of large-scale intercommunal violence in El Geneina in early April, the Security and Defense Council announced plans to create a new joint force composed of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and fighters of signatory rebel groups that will be capable of “rapid intervention” across Darfur. This has been a long-awaited step in fulfilling the August 2020 peace accords, which would be crucial to stabilizing Darfur and ensuring the success of the transition in the periphery. FORECAST: However, it will likely face significant challenges in implementation and authorities have yet to release any clear timeline for the plan or indication that funding has been allocated to this project.
  2. The work of unifying the force will be difficult given longstanding intercommunal hostilities. While a force with representation from Arab and non-Arab tribes will be promoted as a mechanism to build public confidence in the security forces and increase inter-ethnic cooperation, it will also likely be fraught with tensions, internal divisions, and disputes over organization and leadership. The prime example of this may be the role of the government’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary, whose origins are in Arab militias implicated in atrocities in Darfur. These militias fought the war against the rebel groups that will now integrate into the joint force and there is likely to be significant mistrust that could jeopardize cooperation. This will likely demand intensive reconciliation and confidence-building measures, and it is unclear if the government has the capabilities to do this.
  3. The need for increased security deployments in Darfur has particularly been emphasized since the December 2020 withdrawal of the UN – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeepers. Although the RSF has launched its own “Peace Shield Forces” initiative to fill the security vacuum, this has been controversial in areas that have been victimized by RSF militias in the past. RSF operations without the SAF or rebel fighters risk stoking further intercommunal violence, and this can cast further doubt on the eventual ability of all of these parties to eventually integrate.
  4. FORECAST: With the joint force in its infancy, the SAF is expected to continue to enforce state of emergency measures in conflict zones across Darfur and mitigate further large-scale intercommunal violence. With this, local civil society groups and professional organizations are likely to continue sit-in protests in El Geneina, El Fasher, Nyala, and other cities across Darfur to demand improved security and government accountability for military misconduct. Although the government has made some progress in responding to public demands by removing soldiers’ immunity and promising that troops involved in human rights abuses will face prosecution, tensions between Darfuri communities and existing security apparatuses are likely to persist. Consequently, the risk of further small and large-scale intercommunal clashes remains high.

 

Markets likely to open to foreign, private investment, though military elites to remain heavily involved

  1. As part of security sector reforms, the transitional government pledged to ease the military’s traditional control over state resources, including gold, food staple production, rubber, weaponry, and other resources. For decades, the security sector has controlled the majority of the economy, most notably with a monopoly over the gold mining industry. The military has also been exempt from paying taxes or being transparent about the earnings of industries under its control, all of which left the government with a small budget and lack of hard currency. Until January 2020, the Central Bank was the sole procurer and exporter of gold, which restricted the market and allowed for extensive smuggling and embezzlement of gold resources. This fact that this system benefits the military as well as RSF leader and Sovereign Council Vice President Mohammed Hamdan “Hemetti” has slowed the process of military divestment from the economy during the transitional process.
  2. PM Abdallah Hamdok and other transitional officials recognize that military divestment from the economy and a restructure of the state budget is critical for economic growth, access to currency, and the opening of Sudanese markets to private and foreign investment. In this context, Hemetti pledged to turn over the Jebel Amer gold mines in North Darfur to the transitional government with mining and production to be regulated and eventually privatized. FORECAST: Other military-owned companies were similarly handed over in recent years, and this is likely to slowly reduce the security apparatus’s control over public sectors and make way for the development of new industries. This includes the development of civil industries, which could become taxable, shareholding companies. However, given that top RSF and military officials remain heavily involved in various industries, including private mining companies, with Hemetti serving on the board of directors of a company tied to Jebel Amer mines, means that these military elites will continue to directly benefit from revenues, including black market revenue streams.
  3. FORECAST: Although military elites will likely remain involved behind the scenes in private mining company operations and other industries, the fact that the military and RSF have agreed to rescind control in some sectors is likely to bolster the government’s efforts to open the country’s markets to private and foreign investment in the coming months. With a properly regulated gold market, investment opportunities are likely to increase and thereby attract interest for the development of other industries once monopolized by the military. That being said, given that the military has yet to dissociate from the mining sector altogether, and that it continues to benefit financially from its control over many public works programs, water, and fuel distribution, it’s unlikely that the military will allow for the complete liberalization of Sudan’s economy.

 

Social, security developments underpinned by public economic reforms including subsidy cuts

  1. The changes to laws on social norms, religious identity, and the security sector would likely not have been possible without the implementation of crucial public economic reforms. Over the past six months, the Sudanese government has enjoyed an increase in political capital and an opportunity to re-engage with the wider international community. The normalization of relations with Israel and removal of Sudan from the US “State Sponsors of Terrorism” list have been crucial steps. The delisting allowed Khartoum to bypass a barrier in accessing funds from international financial institutions, bolstered by US assistance to help the government clear its arrears. However, these warmer relationships have been weighed against Sudan’s pledges to cut subsidies on major commodities such as fuel, wheat, and electricity, which is controversial among a public in which many people rely on the subsidies for basic goods and services.
  2. Subsidies were said to account for 40 percent of the national budget, which the former Bashir government was unable to borrow money to cover due to sanctions. Instead, the Bashir administration printed money, resulting in rampant inflation. The subsidy system under Bashir kept some commodity prices down for a period, but also led to periodic shortages of key items, as supply chain actors smuggled subsidised goods out of Sudan for sale at higher market prices in neighboring countries. In this context, the transitional government partially cut fuel subsidies in October 2020 in efforts to remedy the situation despite inflation continuing to climb, which was welcomed by the international community as a necessary austerity measure. The government attempted to ameliorate the effects of this by announcing a system of money transfers to people below the poverty line, though 65 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Nonetheless, there have been recurrent protests since January 2021 in many states over the high costs of fuel, bread, and electricity.

Sudan's inflation rate, January 2020 - Sudan Analysis | MAX-Security

  1. Given these conditions, despite new economic policies, the government will likely struggle to persuade the public that the reforms will take time to take full effect. This will be further exacerbated by the doubts over the effectiveness of the cash transfer system due to endemic levels of corruption within the government. FORECAST: As the cash transfers are supported by the World Bank and other donors, it is possible that the COVID-19 pandemic could result in a shortfall in international aid as donor countries focus on improving their own economies in a post-pandemic scenario. It remains likely that periodic protests over the economic situation will persist in the coming months. While security forces have been relatively lenient regarding protests held by smaller groups in Khartoum, any attempts to organize a larger-scale protest movement against the government will likely result in a security clampdown.
  2. FORECAST: Ultimately, the reform process in terms of the removal of subsidies and the devaluation of the Sudanese Pound is likely to have positive effects on economic growth over the coming months. Reforms such as the decision to allow for non-Islamic banking will further encourage foreign investment in the country, with these investors now more able to benefit from projects in Sudan given the opening up of credit avenues and issual of credit cards for the first time. However, the business environment is likely to remain enmeshed in the interests of traditional elites, including the military. While these elites have signaled a willingness to adapt to economic reforms, these power brokers will remain a prominent part of the economy in the coming years.

Recommendations

  1. Travel to Khartoum can continue while adhering to general security precautions regarding the threat of crime.
  2. We advise against all travel to the Darfur region as well as South Kordofan and Blue Nile states given the volatile security situation caused by ongoing violence between the government and armed rebel groups as well as intercommunal clashes.
  3. Maintain vigilance in remote areas of northern and eastern Sudan given the risks of crime and lower presence of security forces.
  4. Avoid nonessential travel to the borders with Egypt and Libya due to the risk of violent crime, kidnappings, and general lawlessness.
  5. Avoid the vicinity of all large gatherings or political demonstrations given the associated risk of violent security crackdowns.

President Farmajo calls for elections as allies withdraw support; Mogadishu to remain volatile – Somalia SITUATION UPDATE

Executive Summary:

  • President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo’s April 27 announcement that he will not pursue a two-year term extension is highly notable. With tensions escalating in Mogadishu and having lost support from allies, Farmajo likely had no other option but to back down on his desired term extension and to pursue elections.
  • However, it remains unclear how electoral stakeholders will proceed with inclusive dialogue and the implementation of the September 2020 electoral agreement after facing months of failed discussions over the same issues.
  • Given the extent of opposition and public anger toward Farmajo, any unfavorable outcome from the May 1 parliamentary sitting could elicit further backlash and demonstrations in Mogadishu. In turn, Farmajo may aim to subvert the narrative and blame the opposition for endangering national security. Such a scenario heightens the possibility of further violent clashes in the coming days.

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  • In the evening hours of April 27, President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo addressed the nation, announcing that he will not pursue a two-year term extension and will hold a special parliamentary session on May 1 to relaunch the electoral process.
  • Farmajo further called for the immediate resumption of unconditional dialogue between electoral stakeholders and reiterated his commitment to the September 2020 electoral agreement.
  • Earlier on April 27, Hirshabelle State President Ali Guudlawe and Galmudug State President Ahmed Kaliye, alias Qoor Qoor, withdrew their support for President Farmajo’s two-year term extension and called for the implementation of the September 17, 2020, electoral agreement along with the resumption of dialogue between electoral stakeholders.
  • Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble also issued a statement welcoming the announcement by Hirshabelle and Galmudug leaders and called for all five Federal Member States (FMS) to commit to renewed, inclusive dialogue and to prepare for elections.
  • Furthermore, PM Roble called for Somali National Army (SNA) and opposition force commanders to withdraw their troops from Mogadishu and to “cease all hostilities.”
  • Opposition presidential candidates including leader Abdirahman Abdishakur and former Presidents Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud also expressed support for these statements on social media.
  • The US Embassy in Mogadishu issued a statement on April 27 in support of these announcements, and called for President Farmajo to accept “a clear path to dialogue and peace.”
  • Meanwhile, in Mogadishu, pro-government and opposition security elements remain deployed across the city, with several neighborhoods throughout the Hodan, Hawlwadag, Shibis, and Yaqshid districts under the control of opposition forces. Residents, primarily from Hodan and Hawlwadag districts, reportedly continued to flee Mogadishu on April 27 fearing renewed clashes.
  • The capital reportedly remained calm on April 27, however, sources indicate that President Farmajo recalled additional pro-government forces to Mogadishu from Dhusamareb in Galmudug, Baladweyne in Hirshabelle, and Gedo Region in Jubaland to secure his position.

Main Tenets of FGS-FMS Electoral Model Agreement September 2020 - Somalia Situation Update

Assessment & Forecast:

  1. With tensions rapidly escalating in Mogadishu, the statements by Hirshabelle and Galmudug Presidents, and the subsequent endorsement from PM Roble, have effectively united all five FMS against President Farmajo’s attempts to remain in power for an additional two years. Hirshabelle and Galmudug State Presidents had remained staunch supporters of Farmajo and his administration until this point, backing Farmajo’s position at repeated FGS-FMS discussions before and after the February 8 election deadline and initially supporting the Lower House of Parliament’s resolution to extend his term. However, with the opposition mobilizing extensive support from clan militias, police commissioners, and certain SNA units in recent days, and demonstrating their ability to successfully counter pro-government security elements in Mogadishu, it is plausible that the Hirshabelle and Galmudug leaders were pressured to either withdraw support for Farmajo or enter into armed conflict on his behalf.
  2. While the exact circumstances that motivated their announcement remain unclear, it is possible that urgent negotiations among political figures and clan leaders facilitated by PM Roble convinced Qoor Qoor and Guudlawe that such action was necessary to defuse the situation in Mogadishu. Moreover, given PM Roble’s immediate expression of support for the Hirshabelle and Galmudug statements and his efforts to quell tensions in Mogadishu, it appears that he has significantly distanced himself from Farmajo in recent days. While PM Roble had previously attempted to maintain neutrality throughout the electoral impasse and repeatedly facilitated negotiations with Farmajo’s opponents including Jubaland and Puntland states and the Presidential Candidates Union (PCU), electoral stakeholders continued to perceive him as Farmajo’s closest ally. Therefore, his break with Farmajo is notable and could have also motivated Qoor Qoor and Guudlawe to do the same.
  3. Having lost support from allies within the FGS, FMS, and from international partners like the US and EU, Farmajo likely understood that his current position was untenable, and thereby has no other option but to back down on his desired term extension and to resume the electoral process. FORECAST: However, despite the significance of his announcement, it’s unclear how electoral stakeholders will proceed with inclusive dialogue and the implementation of the September 2020 FGS-FMS electoral agreement after facing months of failed discussions over the same issues. For instance, although Parliament will likely rule to renew the electoral process on May 1, with the Lower House allied to Farmajo, the body could vote to delay elections for some time to provide for sufficient stakeholder dialogue, which in turn will allow Farmajo to remain in office for an indefinite extended period. Furthermore, although all parties reiterated their commitment to inclusive dialogue as a way forward to elections, the parties are likely to once again disagree on the conditions for negotiations as Farmajo has already called for “unconditional” talks while PCU members will likely demand Farmajo’s resignation before discussions move ahead. Ultimately however, Farmajo remains unlikely to resign, further entrenching the mistrust between all parties.
  4. FORECAST: Given the potential for these same issues to derail renewed discussions and the electoral process, it is possible that international partners, particularly the US, will ramp-up pressure on stakeholders to agree to the conditions for negotiations. In this context, the US endorsement of the position adopted by Hirshabelle and Galmadug, is notable and may likely result in other international partners such as the EU, UK, and Norway endorsing the same position. While such a scenario further reduces Farmajo’s thus far relatively steady international support, it remains highly unlikely that international actors will intervene, apart from further threats, and the possible imposition of sanctions on specific FGS or FMS leaders, additional reduction of humanitarian and security aid.
  5. FORECAST: In terms of the security environment, given that pro and anti-government forces remain deployed across Mogadishu, the security situation is poised to remain extremely volatile with a heightened risk for further clashes. Although some opposition contingents have reportedly withdrawn from various areas of the capital and may heed PM Roble’s call, given that additional pro-Farmajo SNA troops are slated to arrive in Mogadishu, opposition elements are likely to remain on high alert and prepared for potential confrontations. Additionally, given the extent of opposition and public anger toward Farmajo, any unfavorable outcome from the May 1 parliamentary sitting could elicit further backlash and opposition demonstrations in Mogadishu. Given this possibility, Farmajo is likely to aim to subvert the narrative, and blame opposition forces and protesters for endangering national security, and may use loyalist forces to repress the opposition. Such a scenario heightens the possibility of further violent clashes in the coming days.

Recommendations:

  1. Those operating or residing in Mogadishu on April 28 and in the coming days should minimize movement throughout the city due to the potential for renewed clashes between pro-Farmajo and anti-Farmajo forces in multiple districts.
  2. Those in Mogadishu are advised to consider organizing contingency and evacuation plans.

Maoist insurgency to remain significant internal security risk in central India despite growing security offensive – India Analysis

Executive Summary:

  • On April 3, dozens were killed as Maoist militants ambushed a contingent of security forces in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar region in the most deadly attack since 2017, underscoring continued tactical capabilities despite leadership losses and ceding significant territory in recent years.
  • The latest ambush highlighted the authorities’ flawed intelligence gathering and limited operational competencies in Maoist strongholds, largely due to their lack of knowledge of the terrain, compounded by support from local tribes for Maoist elements.
  • Going forward, insurgent attacks are expected to recur in central India, as Maoists make a concentrated effort to portray strength and bolster recruitment amid a tightening security grid in neighboring states that have forced cadres to retreat to Chhattisgarh.
  • Travel to Delhi and other major Indian cities can continue, while travelers are advised to maintain general vigilance for security risks associated with potential insurgent threats targeting government buildings, security installations, and large crowded public places.

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Current Situation:

  • On April 3, 22 soldiers were killed and 31 injured following an encounter with Maoist insurgents along the border between Sukma and Bijapur districts in Chhattisgarh’s southern Bastar region. Nearly 400 Maoists ambushed a joint contingent of forces conducting an anti-Maoist operation, leading to a three-hour encounter. Maoists in an official statement claimed that four of their members were killed in the clashes, contradicting the government’s earlier announcement that 12 Maoists were killed.
  • The attack came amid days of counterinsurgency operations in the region, with reports indicating that several teams of around 2,000 security personnel were deployed. Operations were ongoing following intelligence reports stating the presence of Maoist squads along with Madvi Hidma, the commander of the Maoists’ People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) Battalion No. 1, who has been linked to major attacks since 2010. The latest intelligence suggested his location in the forests in Bijapur, along with a large number of Maoist cadres. The April 3 attack was reportedly orchestrated by Hidma.
  • This incident closely followed the first major Maoist attack in nearly a year, during which five security personnel were killed and 14 injured in Chhattisgarh’s Narayanpur district, on March 23.

Madvi Hidma

Background:

  • The left-wing extremist (LWE) movement is rooted in the violent rural community uprisings against landlords in West Bengal’s Naxalbari area in 1967. It has taken several forms over the years but gained momentum after two Maoist groups merged to establish the Communist Party of India (Maoists) [CPI (Maoists)] in 2004.
  • Under the banner of the CPI (Maoists), insurgents conducted violent attacks against security forces and state installations, which included low-intensity guerrilla ambushes and large-scale attacks. The violence has claimed the lives of thousands of security personnel and civilians over the years, with the insurgency being termed as the “single biggest internal-security challenge” by former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. During its peak years, Maoists were active in more than 200 districts across more than 20 states in India.
  • The rebel movement has waned since 2010 due to a concentrated effort by security forces to crack down on LWE groups while simultaneously conducting on-ground development projects. As of 2020, there were 90 Maoist-affected districts in 11 states, with the 30 worst-affected districts largely concentrated in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, followed by Andra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Telangana. While incidents of violence have significantly reduced since 2004-2010, Maoists continue to carry out deadly attacks against the state apparatus, with several major ambushes recorded over the last decade.

Major Maoist attacks and death tolls in Chhattisgarh

Assessments & Forecast:

Maoists look to demonstrate continued capabilities despite operational setbacks 

  1. The Maoist attack on April 3 is highly notable given the significant number of casualties, making it the most deadly LWE encounter since the 2017 attack in Sukma. The latest plot appeared to be a calculated and well-planned ambush, with reports indicating that the insurgents carried out a “U-shaped” trap, wherein rebels lured the team of security personnel into flat land before firing at them from the surrounding high ground. These developments, coupled with the attack just weeks prior on March 23, suggest an effort by Maoists to project their continued operational capabilities.
  2. This was likely informed by the fact that LWE activities, which have been on a declining trend in recent years, were further hit by the strict nationwide lockdown imposed at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The movement restrictions that included strict controls at inter-district and inter-state borders served to constrict the Maoists’ supply chains for food, medicines, and other essential commodities, thereby, significantly hampering their capabilities. The insurgents reportedly also faced difficulties in procuring weapons from their arms factories in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, further impeding their capacity to conduct tactical offensives.
  3. The latest attacks are also notable as they were timed to coincide with the annual Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign (TCOC) from March to June, the core of the Maoists’ strategy, during which insurgents carry out recruitment drives and conduct major plots to showcase their tactical proficiency. This is relevant since there was reportedly a 40 percent decline in violence during the 2020 TCOC period as compared to the year prior. The alleged use of light machine guns (LMGs), IEDs, and crude rockets during the April 3 ambush also serves to display the Maoists’ capacities.

 

The latest attack highlights major lapses in counterinsurgency intelligence and operations in Maoist strongholds

  1. While the Chhattisgarh state government ruled out intelligence and operational failure as the reason behind the April 3 encounter, the details of the attack that dealt heavy casualties to security forces suggest otherwise. The information regarding the presence of Maoist commander Hidma and other cadres in the area was not incorrect but the ambush indicates that the intelligence was flawed in terms of the intention and scale of the Maoist presence in the region, resulting in security forces walking into a trap.
  2. There are two main reasons behind the recent tactical failure. Firstly, security forces in Chhattisgarh are largely dependent on human intelligence to gather information about Maoists. This serves as a major problem in Bastar, a Maoist bastion, where the insurgents have strong support from the locals who keep them informed of security movements. This was also evidenced by the fact that Maoists allegedly vacated locals from the villages near the encounter zone days before the ambush to prevent civilian casualties. Such acts are liable to heighten goodwill towards the rebels among the villagers in Bastar, ensuring future support and possibly boosting recruitment.
  3. Secondly, the Maoist rebels have an undisputed advantage vis-a-vis knowledge of the terrain since the cadres are largely composed of individuals from the area, including Hidma, who was reportedly born in Sukma. In this context, the deployment of 2,000 security personnel in the weeks before the attack was a major oversight in the counterinsurgency operation. The large number of troops moving in the Maoist stronghold lands was a highly overt operation , underscoring the difficulty in formulating an effective strategy in countering the insurgents in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar region.
  4. FORECAST: Unless security forces recalibrate their strategy and intelligence gathering techniques in the stronghold of Bastar, the Maoist insurgency is expected to remain a major threat in central India. Instead of conducting large operations, smaller special operations units are more likely to succeed in infiltrating the stronghold and carrying out targeted operations against key Maoist leaders. This is especially given reports that top leaders like Hidma are reportedly protected by a multi-layered security cover, making it particularly hard to breach with direct offensives. Authorities are also seeing problems due to their inability to adequately adopt a more population-focused approach, which includes development strategies in the tribal regions, to sway local sentiment away from the Maoists.

Maoist insurgency - Affected states in India

 

Insurgency attacks to sustain for foreseeable future despite losing ground in recent years 

  1. The latest developments suggest that the Maoist insurgency is not in its last stages despite the steady decline in LWE-related incidents of violence since 2010. While the group has ceded significant territory and lost several leaders in recent years, the outfit remains a major security threat in central India. That said, the recent incident does not signify that the outfit is regaining dominance or expanding into lost territories; rather, it points to a concerted effort to portray strength and bolster recruitment in the Maoist bastion amid a tightening security grid in neighboring states that has forced cadres to retreat to strongholds in Chhattisgarh.
  2. FORECAST: In this light, LWE attacks are expected to continue for the foreseeable future, especially in Maoists’ core areas where they have the capacity to conduct high-visibility attacks. This is particularly given the increasingly assertive tactics adopted under Basavaraj, the former head of the outfit’s Central Military Commission (CMC), who was appointed as chief of the CPI (Maoists) in 2018. His leadership reinvigorated violent plots by the group through large-scale IED-based attacks and multi-pronged ambushes on security forces as well as high-value targets, such as prominent politicians. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that Hidma is set to head the CMC, which oversees all guerrilla activities in India, increasing the risk of attacks in restive regions.
  3. FORECAST: While insurgents are expected to predominantly attack security operatives and the state apparatus, civilians residing or traveling in Maoist-affected regions can be potential targets, particularly if they are suspected of being police informants or of holding links to the government. Maoists may also target infrastructure projects as well as local industries and businesses in a bid to extort money. In the near term, security forces are liable to increase the frequency and intensity of anti-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh, as well as in other Maoist-affected regions in the “Red Corridor”, which mainly encompasses parts of Andhra Pradesh Bihar, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Telangana. Such measures may include intensified combing operations and the deployment of additional security personnel, increasing the risk of clashes.

Recommendations:

  1. Those operating or residing in Chhattisgarh over the coming months are advised to maintain heightened vigilance, particularly in rural districts, due to the risk of Maoist attacks and the threat of collateral damage from increased security operations.
  2. Travel to Delhi and other major Indian cities can continue, while travelers are advised to maintain general vigilance for security risks associated with potential insurgent threats targeting government buildings, security installations, and large crowded public places.
  3. We advise against all nonessential travel to rural and tribal areas of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, West Bengal, and Odisha states given their restricted travel status with the government. Travel to urban areas, such as Bhubaneshwar, can continue while maintaining heightened vigilance.
  4. It is advised to consult with India’s Bureau of Immigration for a full list of restricted areas within India which travelers must obtain special permission to visit.
  5. Given the continued militant threat in India, maintain heightened vigilance for suspicious individuals and unattended baggage, particularly in public places including major hotels, government installations, transport hubs, markets, restaurants, entertainment venues, and places of worship.

COVID-19 to disrupt emergency preparation and response plans for 2021 North Atlantic Hurricane Season – Americas Analysis

Executive Summary

  • The 2021 North Atlantic Hurricane Season is expected to witness at least 10 hurricanes between June and November.
  • Planning for the season will be impacted by COVID-19 considerations, including restrictions on travel.
  • Based on the situation in 2020, the region’s uneven COVID-19 response will be disrupted by these storms, just as vaccination campaigns are set to speed up.
  • Given this, the 2021 Hurricane Season will have long-term impacts on the health, transport, and political infrastructure of Central and North America, and the Caribbean.
  • Those operating or residing in the Caribbean, Central America, and North America are advised to review and update existing hurricane preparedness protocols in consideration of COVID-19 regulations.

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Please be advised

North Atlantic Hurricane Season: 2020 review and 2021 forecast

  • Between 2011-2020, there was an average of 17 named tropical storms, seven hurricanes, and three major hurricanes in the North Atlantic each year (17-7-3). In 2020, this ratio was 30-13-6. It was the most active hurricane season on record, with Hurricane Iota being the latest Category 5 to form in November since 1932; the fifth season in a row that a Category 5 has formed.
  • Within the Caribbean, Central America, and North America, over 430 deaths were recorded and over 50 billion USD in damages were caused by widespread flooding, landslides, debris falling, and disruptions to essential utilities.
  • Hurricane Laura (Cat 4) killed 77 [42 USA, 31 Haiti, 4 Dominican Rep] and caused over 14 billion USD worth of damages over nine days in August, fluctuating in strength, regaining enough power over the Gulf of Mexico to be the strongest hurricane to make landfall in Louisiana in over 150 years.
  • Hurricane Delta’s wind speeds intensified from 55 kmph (35 mph) to 215 kmph (130 mph) within 24-hours, the fastest such intensification on record. The hurricane knocked out power to over 750,000 customers in the USA as it passed along the Gulf Coast.
  • For 2021, as of April 18, various observers forecast between 16-18 named storms, 6-9 hurricanes, and 3-4 major hurricanes between June and November. It should be noted that at the same time in 2020, the same observers forecast similar numbers based on the decadal average, 17-7-3, while the end tally was nearly double on all counts.

Impact of North Atlantic hurricane seasons 2011-2020

2020 witnessed unprecedented modern-day impact in Central America

  • Hurricanes Eta and Iota passed over Central Americas in November 2020 and were responsible for at least 270 of the roughly 430 deaths recorded across North and Central America during the 2020 Hurricane Season.
  • Roughly nine billion USD worth of damage was reportedly sustained, including five billion USD to Honduras alone during Hurricane Eta.
  • Landslides and flooding hit large parts of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and other countries in the region, destroying infrastructure and causing widespread homelessness.
  • The US Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated that roughly 3.5 million people in Central America were facing an acute food and livelihood crisis due to the two hurricanes.

 

Tropical Storms are retaining more power for longer

  • According to research undertaken by the Okinawa Institute of Science Technology Graduate University, tropical storms in the North Atlantic are losing power less quickly once they make landfall.
  • Tropical cyclones gain their strength from hot waters and moisture, normally losing a significant amount of their energy once they make landfall. The research claims that in the past 25 years, tropical storms are retaining close to double the amount of energy once over land compared to the previous 25 years due to climate change.
  • As such, rather than losing 75 percent of their intensity after 24 hours above land, this figure is now closer to 50 percent. This means that tropical cyclones will not only be more powerful as they move over land but will also last longer and potentially move deeper inland, depending on other factors.

Tropical storms in the North Atlantic

 

COVID-19 Update

  • The USA has been one of the worst affected countries by COVID-19. Of the states most impacted, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas are all situated within the typical impact zones for hurricanes. In several states, hospitals have been overwhelmed during parts of the pandemic, due to the sudden influx of COVID-19 patients, especially as those with severe cases need at least several weeks of treatment in ICUs.
  • These states, as well as Alabama, Louisiana, and South Dakota have roughly 20-30% of their populations fully vaccinated, as of April 18, with various agencies forecasting that most adults in these states will be fully vaccinated by July or August, as long as current rates are maintained. However, various groups, including ethnic minorities and those from poorer socio-economic communities, have slower rates of vaccine uptake compared to the wider population.
  • Outside of the USA, most of Central and North America is only just beginning vaccination campaigns. Most countries in Central America have witnessed negligible vaccination distribution, while the Caribbean’s distribution efforts are uneven. This is partially due to many relying on the WHO COVAX vaccine distribution system, which has been slow and sporadic in its delivery so far. As of March 31, it had only distributed 38 million of the 100 million doses it planned to deliver.
  • Authorities have raised concerns over potential evacuation plans during COVID. The recent eruption of the La Soufriere volcano on St Vincent & Grenadines has led to a spike in cases, as evacuees are forced into shelters together, with limited oversight of COVID restrictions and testing. The health situation has reportedly been exacerbated by poor infrastructure, including water and electricity supply.

Percentage of population covered by covid-19 vaccines

Assessments & Recommendations

COVID-19 regulations to disrupt hurricane planning and response

Evacuation

  1. In many areas that are used to responding to tropical storms, many individuals and organizations will have ‘go-to’ evacuation destinations. However, these destinations may be out of reach or require extra planning in 2021 due to the remaining restrictions.
  2. Although many states in the USA eased domestic travel restrictions, various counties and states maintain some form of entry restrictions, whether it be for certain international travelers or testing or quarantine requirements for those entering the area. As such, even those who have designated evacuation locations will need to reconfirm their emergency itineraries.
  3. This situation is also liable to be similar in Central America, where residents typically move inland during times of hurricanes. Given that major cities have been the hotbed of COVID-19 in these countries, there may be additional restrictions, not related to entry, that are still in place.
  4. As demonstrated with St Vincent & Grenadines, in the Caribbean, evacuations are liable to be significantly disrupted, especially for those who typically evacuate out of the country or to another region within the country. For example, the Bahamas currently requires a negative test to travel between various regions of the islands. Inter-island travel within the Caribbean is liable to be extremely limited during such times, with testing often sparse.

Recommendations

  1. Identify multiple potential evacuation destinations and routes in the case of a hurricane.
  2. Remain cognizant of COVID-19-related entry requirements for destination locations, including testing and quarantine.
  3. Remain cognizant of local COVID-19 restrictions in destinations, such as curfews, mask requirements, and which stores are allowed to open and when.
  4. In case of the need to quarantine upon arrival, ensure that evacuation destinations are stocked with water and food per person, first aid items, medications, flashlight, batteries, radio, and other essential supplies for the duration of the stay.

 

Impact on healthcare and authorities’ response

  1. Emergency and healthcare services across the region are already stretched thin, with resources being redirected to COVID-19 patients and oversight. This is liable to lead to a fragmented and disrupted response to tropical storms and their results. Healthcare services, in particular, are likely to witness a dual problem during hurricanes this year.
  2. Those hospitals and medical facilities within hurricane zones are liable to witness similar rates of injuries and patients to normal years, although many have their resources limited by COVID-19, especially ICU capacity, potentially impacting their ability to treat emergency patients during hurricanes.
  3. Additionally, in many places, those facilities that are within evacuation zones move patients to locations outside of the area. Given that most facilities at present have dedicated resources and personnel to specifically deal with COVID-19 patients, such operations will be additionally complicated, as well as the destination facilities having their resources stretched to deal with the existing COVID-19 patients and the additional influx, impacting other services.
  4. In the case of mass evacuations, police are also liable to be overstretched, with local forces likely to be unable to enforce COVID-19 restrictions during such times. The ability of health and emergency authorities to evacuate at-risk populations en masse will be disrupted and complicated, especially regarding those who belong to communities that are less likely to have had vaccinations. The dual-task of maintaining COVID-19 restrictions and overseeing emergency response operations may reduce police efficacy in responding to criminal acts during such times.

Recommendations:

  1. Those operating or residing within hurricane impact zones should create an emergency supply kit with three days’ worth of water and food per person, first aid items, medications, flashlight, batteries, radio, and other essential supplies in case of being unable to evacuate.
  2. Acquire additional prescription medication ahead of time if possible.
  3. Identify available healthcare facilities in destination locations.
  4. Maintain vigilance for potential criminal behavior during times of evacuations.
  5. Take additional measures to ensure asset security during such times.

Things to consider in hurricane planning during covid-19

 

Hurricanes liable to lead to COVID-19 spike in both impacted area and evacuation destinations

  1. As witnessed in St Vincent & Grenadines, the mass movement of people due to natural hazards will likely lead to spikes in COVID-19 cases in shelters and areas receiving refugees and evacuees.
  2. Especially outside more developed areas, there is liable to be limited recording of who is moving where and whether they have been tested, vaccinated, or quarantined. As mentioned above, police and healthcare services are unlikely to be able to effectively monitor these aspects amid mass movements of people during times of emergency. As such, destination areas, often large cities in Central America and the Caribbean, may witness an increase in COVID-19 cases in the weeks following evacuations, worsening the strain on already limited healthcare services.
  3. On the other hand, as is often witnessed in southeastern states in the USA, poorer individuals are more likely to have to stay in affected areas, unable to evacuate due to lack of transport, family to stay with, or funds for accommodation. In such cases, many often amass at local shelters, including sports stadiums, schools, or other public sites. Governments will face significant pressure to balance ensuring that those who use such facilities are tested for COVID while making sure that no one is turned away. As such, already stretched authorities will have to make contingency plans for these scenarios, possibly having to increase capacities at facilities in order to house tested and non-tested individuals separately.
  4. In both cases, the mass number of individuals involved makes even those locations with high vaccination rates open to spikes in COVID-19 cases following evacuations, sheltering, and returning citizens following the end of emergency situations. This may reverse recent gains made from the vaccine campaign and result in the reintroduction of certain restrictions.

 

2021 Hurricane Season likely to have a long-term impact on politic, healthcare, and infrastructure

  1. As witnessed in 2020, the massive economic and infrastructural impact of Hurricanes Eta and Iota still have an effect on local populations and national politics, over six months later.
  2. Given the confluence of a potentially record-breaking hurricane season and the COVID-19 pandemic, in Central America, a complete loss of trust in governments may ensue, with non-state actors, including regional criminal groups, becoming the go-to provider of aid and services to local communities.
  3. Furthermore, the mass displacement of individuals during a period of economic downturn and pandemic is liable to lead to heightened criminal activity within affected regions, especially in Central America, potentially into the long term.
  4. Politicians are liable to be judged by their response to these crises, with multiple countries in the region slated to have local or national elections in the coming year or so, including Costa Rica, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Bahamas. These votes are likely to be impacted by the health crisis and upcoming natural hazards.
  5. Given the already stretched public resources, the regional response to damaged infrastructure, including transport, utilities, and communications, may be slowed, making repair works slower, with areas of significant impact potentially witnessing several months without or with a limited supply of essential supplies.

General Recommendations for Hurricane Season

  1. Those operating or residing in the Caribbean, Central America, and North America are advised to review and update existing hurricane preparedness protocols in consideration of COVID-19 regulations.
  2. Instruct employees on updated procedures. Inform employees of local emergency and evacuation plans.
  3. If not in an area ordered for evacuation, stay at home, close storm shutters, and stay away from windows. Secure any loose objects outdoors.
  4. Confirm that places where you will be located have working generators in case of power outages while packing sufficient batteries and flashlights.
  5. Charge essential electronic devices such as cellular phones, laptops, and tablet computers ahead of the planned power outage, and initiate energy-saving functions on these devices as needed.
  6. Disconnect all surge-prone devices such as computers, televisions, and appliances to prevent potential damage.
  7. Allot extra time for travel and flight disruptions; reconfirm overland and flight travel itineraries, and remain cognizant of local updates.
  8. Do not walk or drive through floodwaters.
  9. Avoid contact with floodwater, including through bathing and drinking. Ensure adequate supply of bottled water; boil water before consumption as a last resort.
  10. Practice increased health and sanitation precautions to mitigate risks of contracting waterborne diseases during the flooding. Drink only bottled water and avoid exposure to flood water and natural bodies of water when possible.
  11. For more information please contact [email protected]

Cartel Threats to Business and Travel: El Bajio’s industrial development attracts the CJNG – Mexico Analysis

Executive Summary:

  • The El Bajio region in the west and north-central Mexico houses the major industrial centers for automotive parts in the country, which have primarily driven manufacturing growth over the past decade, as well as increasing agribusiness.
  • Organized criminal groups have shifted sights to diversify into and target various agricultural and manufacturing industries in recent years, especially during the pandemic.
  • This trend is expected to worsen the operating environment due to the extreme risk of violence and disruptions to business activity in the absence of an adequate security response.
  • Essential business travel to Mexico’s industrial center can continue while remaining cognizant of international travel advisories and the persistent risk of violence stemming from organized criminal activity.

This is the first in a series of analyses explaining and forecasting the cartel-related risks posed to business and travel in Mexico, with future reports focusing on border cities, ports, and popular tourist destinations.

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Current Situation

  • The Bajio region of west and north-central Mexico, which includes parts of Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, and Zacatecas, has been the major driver of industrial growth in the country over the past decade.
  • Areas in the Bajio region have also emerged as hotspots for organized criminal activity, serving as the headquarters for major groups prior to the industrialization wave. The Michoacan-based La Familia Michoacana (LFM), Guanajuato-based SRLC, and Jalisco-headquartered CJNG are the primary cartels engaged in various turf wars directly as well as through proxies and allies.
  • The fast-growing Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) has now established a presence in all states of the Bajio region. Turf wars with the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (SRLC) continue, although security operations targeting this group have weakened it significantly.
  • These groups have sought to target industry and critical infrastructure in recent years as a means to diversify from solely focusing on drug trafficking revenue, which declined somewhat due to increased cross-border operations. For instance, the SRLC is known to rely mainly on oil theft for the black market and extortion against state-owned oil company PEMEX’s assets.
  • In June 2020, authorities rounded up 26 suspected members of the SRLC in the state capital of Celaya in Guanajuato, including leader ‘El Marro’s’ mother, sister, and girlfriend. This prompted a wave of intense retaliation throughout the year, including public shootouts, attacks on law enforcement, and sieges of stronghold areas. Despite the eventual arrest of El Marro in August 2020, the SRLC has continued its wave of violence, mainly stemming from an intense turf war with the CJNG, which has struggled to take control of Guanajuato.
  • In February 2020, the CJNG announced their arrival in San Luis Potosi state with a social media video featuring heavily armed masked men warning other groups to stay away, as well as alleging that Police Chief Jose Guadalupe Castillo Celestino was in charge of the sale of drugs in the state capital.
  • In November 2019, federal authorities froze 533 bank accounts linked to the CJNG in the Bajio region. 53 accounts linked to the still-at-large leader of the CJNG, ‘El Mencho’, were also frozen.

El Bajio

Background

  • Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Queretaro, and San Luis Potosi agreed to form a new manufacturing region called the Central Bajio Corridor in November 2018, with shared infrastructure, investment, and employment policies. Long-term cooperation between the states will also extend to security, tourism, transport and social development, among other areas.
  • Overall, the El Bajio region recorded a 47.2 percent increase in production between 2013-2018. Investment in the area remains robust in activities such as logistics, e-commerce, financial services, and manufacturing, specifically in the automotive industry.
  • Reports from 2020 indicate that the pandemic did not significantly affect rental prices in the region, indicating that investors continue to hold high levels of confidence in the growth potential of the area.
  • Apart from industry, the Bajio region is also very fertile, with several export-oriented farms centered in the region, particularly in the multimillion-dollar avocado belt of Michoacan, which cartels refer to as ‘green gold’. Instances of cartels attempting to take over farms, extort farmers, and target indigenous land reserves in the area have been increasing over the past few years.

Manufacturing Units in El Bajio Corridor

Assessments & Forecast

Rapid expansion of industry, foreign firms to continue attracting cartels

  1. The increasing availability of a well-educated workforce from nearby Mexico City and the State of Mexico, as well as the ease of doing business in El Bajio due to policies designed to attract foreign investment, will ensure that the region remains a popular destination for foreign firms to headquarter Mexico-based industrial operations and house ex-pat workers.
  2. Given the systemic issue of public corruption in local police forces, businesses are also unlikely to be able to rely solely on state and national officials to secure their assets. Despite the pandemic and its purported effects on disrupting criminal activity, states like Guanajuato did not record a significant decline in homicides in 2020, indicating the continued threat posed by organized crime groups.
  3. In addition, as seen in Guerrero in 2018, when major American beverage companies were forced out of production facilities due to extortion threats from drug trafficking groups, the possibility of recognizable international brands being specifically targeted remains high. These are usually targeted for extortion, protection fees, kidnappings, and intimidatory shootouts.
  4. With this, pandemic-related slowdowns and a change in working patterns in the near term may lead to fertile ground for organized criminal groups to capitalize on reduced staffing at manufacturing and storage facilities for break-ins and thefts of materials and goods. Such a trend has emerged in other areas of Latin America during the pandemic, as disruptions to supply chains and drop in demand mean such goods are often in storage or holding locations for longer.
  5. As seen in various Mexican cities during the pandemic, well-organized cartels have also emerged as a viable, faster, and more efficient alternative to local government when it comes to distribution of scarce resources such as food and medicines. With the faith in all levels of government and big business further undermined by this two-pronged carrot-and-stick approach pursued by organized criminal groups, poorer locals are likely to be easier to recruit or bribe to aid in their operations.
  6. FORECAST: With the recent legalization of marijuana in Mexico on March 10 potentially seen as a precursor to further reductions of drug trafficking revenues, coupled with the pandemic-related border restrictions, the CJNG and other major groups will likely focus on diversifying revenue and capitalize on this industrial growth. Given El Bajio’s location between a number cartels’ strongholds and its increasing development, a continuing uptick in illicit activities, including kidnappings of both local and foreign workers, extortion, and attacks on buildings and installations is likely to be witnessed over the coming months and years.

Sources of Income for Cartels

 

Cartels to target agricultural industry, local communities with high chance of violent retaliation

  1. Local farming communities in Michoacan and other states have persistently been targeted by various organized crime groups seeking illicit gain from export revenues, and set up their own semi-legal agricultural businesses such as avocado farms and timber, to diversify revenue streams. Colombian authorities have also alleged that Mexican cartels are attempting to produce synthetic cocaine using cheaper coca base paste within Mexico itself, which would simplify their trafficking supply chains and reduce associated costs of importing from Colombia. As such, the Bajio region will continue to be lucrative to such criminal groups not only as a source of extortion but as a base for emerging agri- and narcotic-based production due to its high fertility and vast expanses of land.
  2. An additional threat is posed by the cartels’ continued targeting of indigenous communities in these states, by burning protected lands and illegally cutting through forests. Given their distrust of authorities over historic grievances and the inability of the state to provide them protection, such communities often form self-defense groups or grupos autodefensas. Owing to their limited resources and inter-group conflicts, as well as reports of self-defense groups being involved in drug trafficking, kidnapping, and infiltration by criminal organizations, their presence is likely to pose additional risks to local businesses and residents. This could be directly through targeted criminal activity or indirectly through violent public confrontations with law enforcement and cartels.
  3. FORECAST: The agro-business environment in Bajio will become increasingly uncertain as the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic becomes more apparent in the coming months, with unemployed local communities likely to blame big businesses for job losses and rising violence in the states. Given that adequately protecting farmland and forest areas has proven to be a major concern for both private and public security apparatuses, secondary industries are likely to be adversely affected by the resultant deterioration of the business environment. Cartels are thus likely to capitalize on the economic downturn by taking over disenfranchised land owners’ assets and disrupting localized agri-business activity, as well as emerging as an alternative source of aid and services from officials for disadvantaged locals.

CJNG Statement Upon Entering San Luis Petosi

 

Increasingly violent turf wars, standoffs with law enforcement to increase risk to bystanders

  1. Groups such as the SRLC and the CJNG have faced increasing scrutiny and security operations in the El Bajio region in recent years, likely due to authorities’ attempts to ensure the region remains an attractive investment opportunity. However, this has led to brutal turf wars and retaliatory violence in states like Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, and San Luis Potosi. This is reflected in these states consistently recording some of the highest homicide and assault rates, and multiple advisories by the US Department of State advising against travel to some areas in these states.
  2. In addition, the trend of smaller, often more radical, local groups allying themselves to large cartels to carry out violent proxy attacks on rival groups and law enforcement, as well as mass-casualty attacks in public areas, is expected to continue going forward. As such, there remains a high risk of spillover violence affecting travelers and residents in these states.
  3. Further, given the general mid-term legislative, gubernatorial, and local elections scheduled for June 2021, as well as the electoral significance of major states in El Bajio, the threat of politically-motivated violence remains high. This is supported by attacks targeting mayoral candidates between March 3-5 in the municipalities of Nuevo Casas Grandes in Chihuahua, Casimiro Castillo in Jalisco, Isla Mujeres in Quintana Roo, Tamazunchale in San Luis Potosi, and La Perla in Veracruz. Groups such as the CJNG are known to engage in armed attacks on candidates and sitting officials to ensure that those in power are favorable to their operations, and targeted attacks sometimes carry the latent potential of spillover violence.
  4. FORECAST: Given precedent, key states and cities in El Bajio are likely to witness a spike in violence in 2021 due to political developments, and into the longer-term due to an anticipated uptick in security operations against large criminal groups. Such insecurity is likely to adversely affect the image of the El Bajio industrial region as being safe for doing business.

Cartel Presence in El Bajio

Recommendations

  1. Those operating or residing in Mexico are advised to remain cognizant of the threat posed by organized criminal groups to business activity in the El Bajio region.
  2. Avoid nonessential travel to areas with an extreme or high risk of cartel and gang-related violence, including avoiding rural road travel.
  3. Those with continuing essential operations in such areas are advised to maintain an adequate private security contingent in order to secure any facilities or transport plans. Minimize employee exposure to areas with a known cartel presence.
  4. In the event that a facility or operation is targeted by cartel members, it is advised to evacuate nonessential personnel immediately from the site, while avoiding any interaction with the criminal groups where possible and contacting local and home-nation authorities.
  5. Remain cognizant of local media updates regarding areas with a significant cartel presence, given the dynamic nature of the violence.