Tag Archives: South Korea

Annual joint US-South Korea military exercises to begin on April 1; US, North Korea display commitment to upcoming bilateral talks – Korean Peninsula Analysis

Current Situation

On March 19, the US Department of Defense confirmed that the annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve joint military exercises with South Korea will begin on April 1 and last approximately one month. A spokesperson said that the exercises will be on a scale similar to previous exercises, and involve 23,700 US and 300,000 South Korean troops. There have been no announcements regarding the involvement of US aircraft carriers. Last year’s exercises lasted two months and involved the nuclear supercarrier USS Carl Vinson. According to recent reports, South Korea is considering procuring Apache heavy-attack helicopters and anti-artillery surface-to-surface missiles, to be used in the event of a ground war.

The US and South Korean presidents are preparing for individual summits with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. South Korean President Moon Jae-in is planning to meet with Kim in late April, and US President Donald Trump has tentatively agreed to meet with Kim in May, although no details of the latter meeting have been confirmed, including the location. A South Korean envoy reported that Kim said he understands that joint exercises must continue, but that he expected them to be readjusted in the future if bilateral developments remain positive.

Background

Kim delivered a speech on New Year’s Day suggesting a restart in bilateral negotiations with South Korea and offered to send a delegation to the 2018 Olympics in Pyeongchang. South Korea accepted, and the two sides held a series of meetings leading up to and following the Olympics, resulting in the North Korean offer of bilateral talks with both South Korea and the US.

No sitting US president has ever agreed to meet with North Korean leadership; President Bill Clinton and President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang after leaving office.

North Korea has not held a nuclear weapon or missile test since November 28, 2017.

Assessments

US, North Korea appear committed to talks, although deep distrust remains

The announcement of a U.S.-North Korea summit marks the first ever for a sitting US President, and is made more notable by Pyongyang’s stated willingness to discuss denuclearization. The main reason to doubt a North Korean commitment to denuclearization is the fact that it views its nuclear arsenal as the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. Other, more realistic objectives for the summit might be reaching an agreement on an indefinite ban of missile or nuclear testing in exchange for limits on US-South Korea exercises or a sanctions relief.

In the immediate term, a positive outcome is the North’s offer to temporarily suspend missile tests ahead of the talks, without presenting pre-conditions such as freezing military exercises or requesting sanctions relief. This suggests Kim’s willingness to begin negotiating in good faith, although similar strong starts have collapsed in the past.

The upcoming US-led exercises look to be an in-kind response to this good faith despite public claims to the contrary that the 2018 military exercises are on a similar scale to previous years. The decision to exclude aircraft carriers and halve the length of the drills demonstrates reciprocal flexibility following statements from Pyongyang showing increased tolerance for the exercises. Pyongyang’s stated tolerance and the drawdown of exercises by the US are signals that the desire for talks is, for the time being, sincere.

Despite this projected sincerity, the exercises are perceived as highly provocative by Pyongyang. By not delaying them entirely until talks, the US may be testing Pyongyang’s restraint, as the spring exercise season is normally notorious for North Korean weapons tests. The tenuous nature of the potential US-North Korean harmony is underscored by South Korea’s military tenders for equipment that has little use outside of war with the North.

Major areas of discussion include disarmament, sanctions, detentions

There is significant divergence in the expectations of such a process, as the US views denuclearization as the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, while North Korea views denuclearization as the complete withdrawal of US forces from the region. At present, neither side has shown willingness to satisfy the other’s demands on the issue. The US appears equally unwilling to ease sanctions in the short term, as the current belief in Washington is that economic pressure is one of the few things that brought North Korea to negotiations in the first place. Other areas may prove more easy to reconcile, including the transfer of foreign detainees out of North Korea prisons. The prisoners serve little strategic value for North Korea, and their release would constitute a strong showing of good faith ahead of more contentious issues.

The unprecedented meeting could have positive outcomes even if the primary goal of complete denuclearization of the peninsula is not achieved, including a more general de-escalation of tensions between Washington and Pyongyang. A more comprehensive solution is less likely, as it would be particularly difficult for an agreement to be reached based on a few days of talks, especially given the short preparation time for the Kim-Trump summit. It also remains possible that the lack of preparation, along with the remaining uncertainty over a neutral location for the meeting, might lead to abandoning or delaying the summit. Ultimately, whether or not agreements are made, just holding the summit at all would mark a significant breakthrough.

Recommendations

Travel to Seoul may continue at this time, while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.

We advise against nonessential travel to Pyongyang and North Korea given the risk of detainment of foreign travelers.

During periods of armed escalation between North and South Korea, we advise against all nonessential travel to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Yeonpyeongdo Islands.

Talks between North and South Korea result in rare cooperation over Pyeongchang Olympics; detente unlikely to last long term – Korean Peninsula Analysis

Current Situation

On January 9, North Korea agreed to send a large delegation to the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics in South Korea, to be held between February 9-25. The agreement was reached during talks between officials at a face-to-face meeting along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the two countries. The meeting was organized following North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Day address, during which he expressed a desire to send athletes to the games and the need for bilateral relations without outside actors.

On January 4, the US and South Korea agreed to delay joint military exercises until the conclusion of the Olympics. South Korean President Moon Jae-in reportedly discussed the agreement directly with US President Donald Trump over the phone on the same day. In the lead-up to the talks, President Trump posted on social media that “talks are a good thing!”, and credited his approach of hardline sanctions as the impetus behind North Korea’s conciliation. President Moon thanked President Trump during a press conference following the border talks. He also stated that he would be open to talks with Kim Jong Un under certain unspecified preconditions. President Trump echoed the same willingness during an interview on January 6.

The North and South also agreed to hold further military talks during their initial meeting, although officials have stated that at least in the opening rounds of such future talks, the meetings would focus on logistical issues related to bringing a large North Korean delegation over the heavily militarized border. Reports indicate that the North Korean negotiator emphatically rejected a suggestion that they also engage with the US or discuss their weapons program.

North Korea has faced a number of sanctions regimes championed by the Trump administration as recently as December 22, in response to the November 29 test of a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Hwasong-15.

Assessments & Forecast

Decrease in tensions likely to persist until end of 2018 Olympics

The in-person talks of January 9 were the first to occur in over two years, and mark the first such occurrence during the administration of President Trump. In general, despite threats of violence by North Korean leadership largely going unfulfilled, diplomatic overtures from Pyongyang normally result in periodic lulls in tension and varying levels of progress in peninsular cooperation. Given the positive results of the initial meeting and the temporary fulfillment of the North Korean desire for a halt to US-led military drills, all sides appear to be sincere in their commitment to maintaining a drawdown until at least the close of the Olympics.
FORECAST: The developments of January 9 are likely to result a period of relative ease between North and South Korea until at least the closing ceremonies of the Olympics on February 25.

Significant concessions from either side unlikely in near term, North Korea on course to attain nuclear-capable ICBM by end of 2018

Both countries have varying goals that are essentially at odds with one another’s, and as such, there remains a low likelihood that the current thaw will see Pyongyang abandoning their nuclear ambitions. Despite the initial overtures by Kim Jong Un, he emphasized his commitment to North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as a deterrent in the same speech where he offered to resume bilateral talks, and there are no indications of any substantive consideration of alterations to this plan as a result of the ongoing talks.
FORECAST: Given North Korea’s continued commitment to their nuclear program, previous assessments regarding their completion of a nuclear ICBM by the end of 2018 remain unchanged.

While there have been no tests following the November 29 Hwasong-15 launch, this may have more to due with technical considerations. Now that North Korea has a viable launch mechanism, the focus has turned to creating a working reentry vehicle and navigation system. The need to meet these milestones has likely created a delay between tests, and North Korea may be taking advantage of the lull in order to present itself as a more stable partner. Moreover, the motivation for participating in the Olympics may be an attempt to gain acceptance as a presumed nuclear state and normalize their possession of a nuclear arsenal on the world stage.

Similarly, the US-South Korean commitment to halt joint exercises does not cover the annual Foal Eagle or Key Resolve exercises slated to take place in April, and there have been no indications that the schedule will be altered in any way. This suggests that despite positive steps from all sides, red lines nonetheless remain that are likely to be crossed in upcoming months.

North Korean emphasis on bilateral talks unlikely to exclude US from reconciliation process

Kim Jong Un referred to the harmful influence of the US at least 13 times in his speech and emphasized the explicit need for bilateral relations at least another four times. By all accounts, North Korea is likely attempting to use bilateral relations as a way to minimize the role of the US in any eventual substantive talks outside of Olympic preparations, and their rejection of the US during the January 9 talks further reflects this desire. However, the likelihood of exclusive, bilateral peace talks between South Korea and North Korea at the expense of US involvement remains unlikely. South Korea depends on US military commitments for protection from North Korea, and would not be liable to abandon such a partnership, especially considering the North’s nuclear capabilities.

That said, bilateral talks over the coming days and weeks are likely to exclude the US, although as previously mentioned, do not appear to cover substantive reconciliation or demilitarization. Such bilateral talks on issues of economic and cultural cooperation have historically excluded the US, however, have had no impact on the South’s insistence on the inclusion of Washington for more strategic issues. As such, North Korea may be laying the groundwork for an excuse to resume nuclear tests, blaming any increase in tensions on South Korea’s unwillingness to be more flexible on the US presence in their country.

Recommendations

Travel to Seoul may continue at this time, while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.

We continue to advise against nonessential travel to Pyongyang and North Korea given the risk of detainment of foreign travelers.

Those planning on traveling to South Korea for the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics are advised to contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary-based consultation and contingency planning

South Korea presidential election to take place on May 9; economic reform and concerns over North Korea at center of electoral discourse – South Korea Analysis

Current Situation: South Korea Presidential Election

On May 9, early elections will be held for the next President of the Republic of Korea, commonly known as South Korea. The day has been categorized as a public holiday, and as such, schools, banks, and other government services and offices will remain closed. The early election follows the impeachment of former president Park Geun-hye on March 10, the culmination of a series of corruption allegations and mass protests that began in late 2016. Leading the polls are (in order) Moon Jae-in of the liberal Democratic Party, Ahn Cheol-soo of the centrist People’s Party, and Hong Jun-pyo of the Liberty Korea Party, a rebranded iteration of Park’s former Saenuri Party. Hong’s vote share has been steadily increasing in recent polls at the expense of Ahn’s decline.

Elsewhere, North Korea has been the subject of intense international scrutiny for their ongoing ballistic missile and nuclear weapon development programs, launching high-profile tests as recently as April 29. In response to recent North Korean activity, US President Donald Trump ordered the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to the region in early April, in a move perceived as highly provocative by Pyongyang. Additionally, South Korea and the US have accelerated the deployment window for the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile battery in Seongju, which reportedly has already reached minimal operational capabilities.

Mass protests against former President Park, as well as smaller-scale protests against the THAAD deployment, have occurred nearly every Saturday in Seoul since Park’s scandal first broke in October 2016, with a recent protest in Seongju on April 26 resulting in at least 10 injuries during scuffles with security forces. Whereas Moon has advocated rapprochement with North Korea and a freezing of the THAAD deployment, Ahn has switched his stance to be supportive of the deployment, in line with the conservative stance espoused by Hong.

Assessments & Forecast

Economic reform and security issues remain top voter priorities according to recent polling

Hong and Ahn’s volatility in recent polling suggests that the “shy conservative” phenomenon, wherein respondents in polls do not indicate their true intentions to vote for a conservative candidate, may be occurring in the South Korean election. Namely, Park’s negative down-ballot effect on her former political camp has led many people to abandon the party ticket, even though they are generally aligned with the platform. Whereas Ahn was initially able to capitalize on this phenomenon, the recent swing in Hong’s favor suggests that many conservatives may be moving back to Liberty Korea as the Park scandal begins to fade in the face of mounting security challenges posed by North Korea.

While it would appear that Hong’s more hardline approach to North Korea is one of the driving factors behind his recent surge, liberal economic views have buoyed Moon and Ahn, giving them a combined 60 percent share of the last poll. For younger voters, economic stagnation, youth unemployment, and rising wage inequality are perceived as more immediate issues than peninsular security. Reforming the massive family conglomerates, known as chaebols, which dominate the South Korean economy, has been a major part of Ahn and Moon’s respective platforms. Meanwhile, Hong supports deregulating the very same sectors, which may explain why his support base is largely composed of older voters. There is no candidate that offers a package of both market reform and a hardline stance on North Korea, and polls seem to indicate that voters have largely chosen economics as their driving priority.

Moon has remained consistently ahead in recent polls, maintaining approximately 40 percent of the vote share, which is more than enough to emerge victorious in South Korea’s first-past-the-post system. Of the three candidates, Moon advocates the least hardline approach to North Korea, including political and economic engagement, which faltered under Park. Nevertheless, his position remains similar to runner-up Ahn, who also advocates for renewed talks, albeit from a more cautious standpoint. It stands to reason that the election of either candidate would, therefore, see South Korea becoming a more moderating force in regional security planning, as opposed to the previous administration. Meanwhile, under Hong, the current peninsular standoff would not only continue but be likely to escalate in the long term.

One important singular issue that has been at the forefront of the leading candidates’ platforms has been the deployment of the THAAD system by US forces. While Ahn was initially in line with Moon in opposition to the THAAD deployment, recent provocations by North Korea in the form of continued missile tests have likely led him to reverse on the issue, possibly also in an attempt to court the many conservative voters uneasy with voting for any party that may be perceived as having connections to Park. Ahn’s decision underscores shifting public perceptions over the project in the face of a more defiant and unpredictable North Korea, most notably illustrated by his party’s recent dip in favor of Hong Joon-pyo. Moreover, reversing the deployment would essentially be a violation of an agreement with the US, an action that Moon himself has noted despite his opposition to the project. That being said, with the deployment reaching a milestone of limited operational capacity, and Hong Jun-pyo making solid gains in recent polls, it remains unlikely that even Moon will be able to stop it at this point, especially as public opinion seems to be drifting in the opposite direction.

Political stability in the South strengthening, despite looming threat from the North

Pro- and anti-Park protests, which reached a short-lived period of elevated unrest during the Supreme Court hearings on her impeachment, have declined in participation from the mass turnouts that defined late 2016 and early 2017. Approximately four million voters have already cast early ballots by May 4, and the lack of reported unrest near polling stations suggest that the likelihood of such incidents remains similarly low on election day. Overall, what this downward trend suggests is that the country is slowly returning to normalcy following the highly divisive impeachment period.

FORECAST: Nonetheless, there remains a strong, politically active anti-THAAD and anti-Western contingency, whose ongoing protest campaign is unlikely to cease in the near term, given the project’s anticipated continuation. In this context, protests against the THAAD deployment are likely to continue, materialized near the site itself in Seongju as well as Seoul. While these protests have featured varying levels of unrest in the past, participation in these demonstrations is markedly lower than previous, strictly anti-Park rallies, especially due to rising security concerns over North Korea’s weapons programs.

At this point, a new nuclear test has been anticipated for weeks, a conclusion refuted by US security officials based on undisclosed intelligence. For their part, North Korea has stoked this tension, levying threats of a new test as recently as May 1. FORECAST: North Korea normally chooses opportunities for nuclear and missile tests during high-profile political and military developments by adversaries such as the US and South Korea, and as a result, the possibility of a new test during the election window remains. However, it may be part of Pyongyang’s calculus that a new test immediately before the election might influence the outcome in favor of a more hardline candidate. Thus, it remains more likely that should a new test occur, it would take place after voting.

Recommendations

Travel to Seoul may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea. Those operating or residing in South Korea are advised to allot for disruptions to travel and business continuity on May 9, election day, due to the slated closures. Avoid the vicinity of any political or student related demonstrations, as such events carry an underlying potential to witness localized unrest. During periods of armed escalation between North and South Korea, we advise against all nonessential travel to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Yeonpyeongdo Islands.