Tag Archives: North Korea

Constitutional, foreign policies bolster PM Abe’s bid in LDP presidential elections on September 20 – Japan Analysis

Executive Summary

Presidential elections within the ruling-Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will take place on September 20, with incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba competing for the leadership spot.

Proposed constitutional amendments are expected to be a major sticking point in the election, and might ultimately boost PM Abe’s favorability.

A series of domestic scandals have impacted PM Abe’s approval ratings, but are they unlikely to single-handedly block his electoral prospects.

PM Abe’s proactive foreign diplomacy agenda thus far is likely to bolster his campaign due to perceptions of stability associated with his engagement on the North Korea issue.

Travel to Japan can continue as normal while adhering to basic security precautions regarding protests.

Current Situation

On August 10, former Defense Minister, Shigeru Ishiba, formally announced his candidacy for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) internal presidential elections, which are slated for September 20. On August 26, incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced his own candidacy, which, if elected, would place him in contention to become Japan’s longest-serving post-war leader and extend his term to 2021. According to reports from September 7, PM Abe already holds support from five of the party’s seven factions, representing approximately 257 parliamentary votes, whereas Ishiba’s support was recorded at only 20. A third candidate withdrew from the race on August 31 due to insufficient support.

Reports from August 15 indicate that PM Abe intends on introducing LDP-drafted legislation for revising the constitution’s war-renouncing Article 9 during the next parliamentary session in the coming months. Ishiba advised caution on August 17 in regards to the proposed amendments, claiming that PM Abe’s LDP-drafted legislation has yet to be approved by the entire party. Meanwhile, multiple scandals in 2017 have affected PM Abe’s approval ratings in recent months. This included the reappearance of a scandal from the previous year involving the leader’s wife and a land deal, unreported activity logs regarding Japanese troops in Iraq, and allegations of sexual assault against a Finance Ministry bureaucrat close to him. As a result, PM Abe’s public approval ratings have fluctuated since March, reaching as low as 27 percent.

At the present time, Japan continues to play a vital role in multiple foreign-policy initiatives, including a multinational Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and a Pacific security strategy embraced by Washington. Regionally, Japan has a stake in the ongoing negotiations with North Korea. Reports from August 29 indicate that Japanese and North Korean officials held a secret meeting in July, while speculation has emerged over a potential meeting between leaders of the two countries in the near term, although this has yet to be confirmed. Globally, PM Abe maintains a close relationship with US President Donald Trump, having met at least eight times since Trump took office. This comes amid ongoing trade measures by Washington, which includes auto tariffs that may impact Japan.

Assessments

Proposed constitutional amendments will inform elections as a major talking point

Amendments to the country’s constitution have been a longstanding debate due to Japan’s history as a perceived antagonistic power and fears that replacing the decades-old pacifist character may lead to a revival of the country’s past militarism. Given these fears, large sections of LDP appear to favor a more moderate and gradual approach in order to avoid completely alienating grassroots support for the ruling party. In this context, the LDP is unlikely to support Ishiba on the basis of constitutional amendments given his relatively more radical views. For instance, Ishiba has campaigned for the removal of Paragraph 2 in Article 9, which has denied Japan’s “right to belligerency”. Instead, PM Abe is likely the favorable choice given his relatively more moderate approach. Additionally, electing him to the position would provide leadership stability and may improve the party’s chances of effecting constitutional change.

In terms of a timeline for introducing the constitutional changes, PM Abe appears more proactive than his rival. Ishiba has stated that he preferred the revisions remain on the back burner and called for legislative caution on August 18. His reticence likely stems from fears that overtly disagreeing with the party-backed policy will impact his success. However, this is likely to be viewed as uncertainty in Ishiba’s platform, impacting his chances of defeating PM Abe in the elections. Meanwhile, Abe has announced his intentions to introduce the LDP-drafted bills in the near term. This highlights his attempts to retain party backing among the various factions by using LDP-backed legislation.

Domestic scandals impact PM Abe’s approval ratings, but unlikely to entirely diminish prospects

A number of recent scandals may have eroded PM Abe’s public favorability gains and appeared to have boosted Ishiba’s confidence to challenge the incumbent leader, despite having failed in three consecutive LDP leadership elections since 2008. In 2012, Ishiba achieved a majority from rank-and-file party members, which he likely believed may happen again in the upcoming race given the prime minister’s significantly deteriorated approval ratings. This possibility emerged as a result of a surge in public opposition against PM Abe in March, due to concerns over abuses of power and government cover-ups in recent scandals. This also has seemingly informed Ishiba’s election platform, which is based on reforms for an “honest and fair” government.

Despite this, PM Abe is liable to recover from the scandal allegations, as was similarly witnessed in the 2017 snap elections, which resulted in the LDP’s super-majority. At this time, PM Abe has already started exhibiting a similar upswing in more recent public approval ratings, which was recorded at approximately 44 percent as of August 26, in comparison to the 26.7 percent in April. PM Abe’s party approval from five of the seven factions further highlights the broad nature of his intra-party appeal. While scandal allegations may affect the margins of support he may eventually draw, the current numbers indicate that the scandals themselves are unlikely to single-handedly block PM Abe’s candidacy.

PM Abe’s foreign policy agenda likely increases electability due to perceptions of stability

Japan’s role in various foreign initiatives thus far can be attributed in part to PM Abe’s foreign policy agenda. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) remains a relevant trade agreement among 11 international partners, despite the US’ withdrawal in 2017, due to Japan’s initiative in leading negotiations thereafter. The agreement’s success may contribute to positive perceptions surrounding PM Abe’s abilities to ensure Japan’s interests are addressed in multilateral forums in the region.

Despite the US’ move regarding the TPP, PM Abe maintains a relatively positive relationship with US President Donald Trump, as demonstrated by numerous meetings between the two leaders in recent months. A continuation of this relationship will likely be a major priority for voting members. In the context of Washington’s recent trade tariffs, PM Abe’s relations with President Trump may be seen as an asset, given its potential use in minimizing the effects of automobile industry-specific tariffs on Tokyo.

Furthermore, these relations are vital in the context of regional threats, given that the US is in negotiations with Japan’s primary external security concern, North Korea. PM Abe’s hardline stance on North Korea and push for the greater visibility of Tokyo’s position in future regional dialogue will further aid his campaign. These include concerns over the alleged North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens and the security threat from future missile tests or failure to denuclearize at an adequate pace. The government has demonstrated its support for the prime minister’s stance by approving a military budget increase, although this is pending parliamentary approval. Given Tokyo’s eagerness to ensure its position is well represented in future regional dialogue on North Korea, the LDP may be motivated to retain its current leader. Further, Abe is slated to visit China in October, the first time a sitting Japanese leader has done so since 2011.  Perceptions of stability associated with PM Abe amid these ongoing foreign policy initiatives will help shore up support for his presidency of the LDP.

Recommendations

Travel security – travel to Japan can continue as normal while adhering to basic security precautions regarding protests.

In Tokyo, allow for additional travel time near the Prime Minister’s Office and National Diet, due to the frequency of protests at these locations.

Annual joint US-South Korea military exercises to begin on April 1; US, North Korea display commitment to upcoming bilateral talks – Korean Peninsula Analysis

Current Situation

On March 19, the US Department of Defense confirmed that the annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve joint military exercises with South Korea will begin on April 1 and last approximately one month. A spokesperson said that the exercises will be on a scale similar to previous exercises, and involve 23,700 US and 300,000 South Korean troops. There have been no announcements regarding the involvement of  US aircraft carriers. Last year’s exercises lasted two months and involved the nuclear supercarrier USS Carl Vinson. According to recent reports, South Korea is considering procuring Apache heavy-attack helicopters and anti-artillery surface-to-surface missiles, to be used in the event of a ground war.

The US and South Korean presidents are preparing for individual summits with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. South Korean President Moon Jae-in is planning to meet with Kim in late April, and US President Donald Trump has tentatively agreed to meet with Kim in May, although no details of the latter meeting have been confirmed, including the location. A South Korean envoy reported that Kim said he understands that joint exercises must continue, but that he expected them to be readjusted in the future if bilateral developments remain positive.

Background

Kim delivered a speech on New Year’s Day suggesting a restart in bilateral negotiations with South Korea and offered to send a delegation to the 2018 Olympics in Pyeongchang. South Korea accepted, and the two sides held a series of meetings leading up to and following the Olympics, resulting in the North Korean offer of bilateral talks with both South Korea and the US.

No sitting US president has ever agreed to meet with North Korean leadership; President Bill Clinton and President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang after leaving office.

North Korea has not held a nuclear weapon or missile test since November 28, 2017.

Annual joint US-South Korea military exercises to begin on April 1; US, North Korea display commitment to upcoming bilateral talks  - Korean Peninsula Analysis | MAX Security

Assessments

US, North Korea appear committed to talks, although deep distrust remains

The announcement of a U.S.-North Korea summit marks the first ever for a sitting US President, and is made more notable by Pyongyang’s stated willingness to discuss denuclearization. The main reason to doubt a North Korean commitment to denuclearization is the fact that it views its nuclear arsenal as the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. Other, more realistic objectives for the summit might be reaching an agreement on an indefinite ban of missile or nuclear testing in exchange for limits on US-South Korea exercises or a sanctions relief.

In the immediate term, a positive outcome is the North’s offer to temporarily suspend missile tests ahead of the talks, without presenting pre-conditions such as freezing military exercises or requesting sanctions relief. This suggests Kim’s willingness to begin negotiating in good faith, although similar strong starts have collapsed in the past.

The upcoming US-led exercises look to be an in-kind response to this good faith despite public claims to the contrary that the 2018 military exercises are on a similar scale to previous years. The decision to exclude aircraft carriers and halve the length of the drills demonstrates reciprocal flexibility following statements from Pyongyang showing increased tolerance for the exercises. Pyongyang’s stated tolerance and the drawdown of exercises by the US are signals that the desire for talks is, for the time being, sincere.

Despite this projected sincerity, the exercises are perceived as highly provocative by Pyongyang. By not delaying them entirely until talks, the US may be testing Pyongyang’s restraint, as the spring exercise season is normally notorious for North Korean weapons tests. The tenuous nature of the potential US-North Korean harmony is underscored by South Korea’s military tenders for equipment that has little use outside of war with the North.

Major areas of discussion include disarmament, sanctions, detentions

There is significant divergence in the expectations of such a process, as the US views denuclearization as the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, while North Korea views denuclearization as the complete withdrawal of US forces from the region. At present, neither side has shown willingness to satisfy the other’s demands on the issue. The US appears equally unwilling to ease sanctions in the short term, as the current belief in Washington is that economic pressure is one of the few things that brought North Korea to negotiations in the first place. Other areas may prove more easy to reconcile, including the transfer of foreign detainees out of North Korea prisons. The prisoners serve little strategic value for North Korea, and their release would constitute a strong showing of good faith ahead of more contentious issues.

The unprecedented meeting could have positive outcomes even if the primary goal of complete denuclearization of the peninsula is not achieved, including a more general de-escalation of tensions between Washington and Pyongyang. A more comprehensive solution is less likely, as it would be particularly difficult for an agreement to be reached based on a few days of talks, especially given the short preparation time for the Kim-Trump summit. It also remains possible that the lack of preparation, along with the remaining uncertainty over a neutral location for the meeting, might lead to abandoning or delaying the summit. Ultimately, whether or not agreements are made, just holding the summit at all would mark a significant breakthrough.

Recommendations

Travel to Seoul may continue at this time, while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.

We advise against nonessential travel to Pyongyang and North Korea given the risk of detainment of foreign travelers.

During periods of armed escalation between North and South Korea, we advise against all nonessential travel to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Yeonpyeongdo Islands.

Talks between North and South Korea result in rare cooperation over Pyeongchang Olympics; detente unlikely to last long term – Korean Peninsula Analysis

Current Situation

On January 9, North Korea agreed to send a large delegation to the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics in South Korea, to be held between February 9-25. The agreement was reached during talks between officials at a face-to-face meeting along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the two countries. The meeting was organized following North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Day address, during which he expressed a desire to send athletes to the games and the need for bilateral relations without outside actors.

On January 4, the US and South Korea agreed to delay joint military exercises until the conclusion of the Olympics. South Korean President Moon Jae-in reportedly discussed the agreement directly with US President Donald Trump over the phone on the same day. In the lead-up to the talks, President Trump posted on social media that “talks are a good thing!”, and credited his approach of hardline sanctions as the impetus behind North Korea’s conciliation. President Moon thanked President Trump during a press conference following the border talks. He also stated that he would be open to talks with Kim Jong Un under certain unspecified preconditions. President Trump echoed the same willingness during an interview on January 6.

The North and South also agreed to hold further military talks during their initial meeting, although officials have stated that at least in the opening rounds of such future talks, the meetings would focus on logistical issues related to bringing a large North Korean delegation over the heavily militarized border. Reports indicate that the North Korean negotiator emphatically rejected a suggestion that they also engage with the US or discuss their weapons program.

North Korea has faced a number of sanctions regimes championed by the Trump administration as recently as December 22, in response to the November 29 test of a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Hwasong-15.

Talks between North and South Korea result in rare cooperation over Pyeongchang Olympics; detente unlikely to last long term - Korean Peninsula Analysis | MAX Security
Assessments & Forecast

Decrease in tensions likely to persist until end of 2018 Olympics

The in-person talks of January 9 were the first to occur in over two years, and mark the first such occurrence during the administration of President Trump. In general, despite threats of violence by North Korean leadership largely going unfulfilled, diplomatic overtures from Pyongyang normally result in periodic lulls in tension and varying levels of progress in peninsular cooperation. Given the positive results of the initial meeting and the temporary fulfillment of the North Korean desire for a halt to US-led military drills, all sides appear to be sincere in their commitment to maintaining a drawdown until at least the close of the Olympics.
FORECAST: The developments of January 9 are likely to result a period of relative ease between North and South Korea until at least the closing ceremonies of the Olympics on February 25.

Significant concessions from either side unlikely in near term, North Korea on course to attain nuclear-capable ICBM by end of 2018

Both countries have varying goals that are essentially at odds with one another’s, and as such, there remains a low likelihood that the current thaw will see Pyongyang abandoning their nuclear ambitions. Despite the initial overtures by Kim Jong Un, he emphasized his commitment to North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as a deterrent in the same speech where he offered to resume bilateral talks, and there are no indications of any substantive consideration of alterations to this plan as a result of the ongoing talks.
FORECAST: Given North Korea’s continued commitment to their nuclear program, previous assessments regarding their completion of a nuclear ICBM by the end of 2018 remain unchanged.

While there have been no tests following the November 29 Hwasong-15 launch, this may have more to due with technical considerations. Now that North Korea has a viable launch mechanism, the focus has turned to creating a working reentry vehicle and navigation system. The need to meet these milestones has likely created a delay between tests, and North Korea may be taking advantage of the lull in order to present itself as a more stable partner. Moreover, the motivation for participating in the Olympics may be an attempt to gain acceptance as a presumed nuclear state and normalize their possession of a nuclear arsenal on the world stage.

Similarly, the US-South Korean commitment to halt joint exercises does not cover the annual Foal Eagle or Key Resolve exercises slated to take place in April, and there have been no indications that the schedule will be altered in any way. This suggests that despite positive steps from all sides, red lines nonetheless remain that are likely to be crossed in upcoming months.

North Korean emphasis on bilateral talks unlikely to exclude US from reconciliation process

Kim Jong Un referred to the harmful influence of the US at least 13 times in his speech and emphasized the explicit need for bilateral relations at least another four times. By all accounts, North Korea is likely attempting to use bilateral relations as a way to minimize the role of the US in any eventual substantive talks outside of Olympic preparations, and their rejection of the US during the January 9 talks further reflects this desire. However, the likelihood of exclusive, bilateral peace talks between South Korea and North Korea at the expense of US involvement remains unlikely. South Korea depends on US military commitments for protection from North Korea, and would not be liable to abandon such a partnership, especially considering the North’s nuclear capabilities.

That said, bilateral talks over the coming days and weeks are likely to exclude the US, although as previously mentioned, do not appear to cover substantive reconciliation or demilitarization. Such bilateral talks on issues of economic and cultural cooperation have historically excluded the US, however, have had no impact on the South’s insistence on the inclusion of Washington for more strategic issues. As such, North Korea may be laying the groundwork for an excuse to resume nuclear tests, blaming any increase in tensions on South Korea’s unwillingness to be more flexible on the US presence in their country.

Recommendations

Travel to Seoul may continue at this time, while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.

We continue to advise against nonessential travel to Pyongyang and North Korea given the risk of detainment of foreign travelers.

Those planning on traveling to South Korea for the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics are advised to contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary-based consultation and contingency planning

How will ruling party’s landslide victory in Japanese election affect security and stance on North Korea? – Japan Analysis

Current Situation

Japan held nationwide general elections on October 22 to appoint 465 people to the House of Representatives, the country’s Lower House of parliament. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as well as the newly established Party of Hope (PoH) and Japanese Communist Party (JCP), were all vying for seats. The traditional primary opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DP), decided not to field any candidates after a crushing defeat to LDP in 2012. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) was formed after a split from the DP in October 2017, further weakening the once powerful DP.

The LDP secured 284 seats out of a total of 312 seats obtained by the ruling coalition while the CDPJ came second with a seat share of 55 seats. PoH came in third with 50 seats.

The snap elections were called after PM Abe dissolved the Lower House on September 28, citing the administration’s need for a fresh mandate to deal with contentious subjects like intensified North Korean hostilities and controversies surrounding domestic social welfare policies. PM Abe has also long called for reforms to Japan’s pacifist constitution, a highly emotive proposition in a largely pacifist Japanese society.

The PM’s approval rating had witnessed a notable dip in July 2017 following allegations of his involvement in a number of scandals involving cronyism. However, polls taken in September suggested that the approval ratings bounced back in the immediate aftermath of North Korea’s firing of two ballistic missiles over Japanese airspace during the month. PM Abe is considered to maintain a hawkish stance regarding Pyongyang’s provocations.

PoH leader Yuriko Koike, a former LDP lawmaker and the current governor of Tokyo, announced the formation of her party in September, attempting to contrast the relatively hawkish policies of the ruling government by calling for more tempered policy vis-a-vis North Korea, a freeze in tax hikes, and the establishing of a 2030 deadline to eliminate nuclear power plants. Despite their stated differences, critics claimed that the party was too ideologically similar to the ruling LDP and that it failed to offer feasible policy alternatives.

How will ruling party’s landslide victory in Japanese election affect security and stance on North Korea? - Japan Analysis | MAX Security

Assessments & Forecast

Opposition weaknesses, PM Abe’s tough stance towards North Korea likely served as key determinants in LDP’s retention of super-majority in parliament

PM Abe’s decision to call for snap elections was likely influenced by the recent surge in his approval ratings, perceived to largely stem from his tough stance on North Korea. As tensions with Pyongyang reached unprecedented heights in recent months, culminating in the missile launches over Japan on August 29 and September 15, PM Abe’s attempts to foster a more offensive-capable military by revising Japan’s pacifist constitution became increasingly palatable to the general public. The resounding nature of the victory highlighted current priorities of the Japanese general public, which may have placed the PM’s alleged involvement in scandal and feelings of anti-incumbency as secondary when compared to direct security threats from Pyongyang.

Another significant factor in the victory was the perceived lack of a viable alternative, as the newly created PoH was too weak to pose a legitimate electoral challenge to the ruling party. Apart from the party’s inability to significantly distinguish itself from the LDP in terms of policy, another significant factor was Koike’s decision not to participate in the election itself but rather remain as the party head. Voters likely perceived this as an attempt by Koike to hedge her bets, using the election as an opportunity to test the political waters while still maintaining her position as the current governor of Tokyo.

How will ruling party’s landslide victory in Japanese election affect security and stance on North Korea? - Japan Analysis | MAX Security

PM Abe unlikely to push for amendment of constitution in the immediate term due to contentious status in society, US pressure

PM Abe will likely use the LDP’s electoral gains as evidence that the society is supportive of revisions to the country’s post-World War II pacifist constitution, which the leader has suggested he aims to amend by 2020. Conversely, as of present, only the CDPJ remains vocally opposed to the constitutional review. The PM will likely highlight the poor electoral performance of the CDPJ as an indication of growing public consensus regarding Japan’s evolving regional security environment.

Before dealing with the constitution, the new government’s immediate priority will likely remain economic recovery and containing the North Korean threat, particularly as the snap election was called by PM Abe as a mandate on the government’s handling of those issues and not the constitutional review. Despite strong support for the LDP and his candidacy, PM Abe continues to maintain low approval ratings. The fact that the election victory was at least partially the result of a lack of credible alternatives to the Japanese public, movement on more contentious issues like the constitution will likely continue to be met with severe backlash. Even LDP’s coalition partner, Komeito, which is open to a constitutional review, has indicated that it will still likely be an “opposition within the coalition” on the matter.

As such, the PM would likely not push for reforms in the immediate term, instead, using geopolitical triggers that the country can rally behind as evidence of the necessity for such changes, such as a dramatic escalation in North Korea tensions or perceived aggressive movements by Beijing in the Spratly Islands. Even though the LDP has a supermajority, since it is such an emotive issue, PM Abe is unlikely to attempt to alter the constitution without some form of a unity government, especially given that many opposition parties have expressed their willingness to hold a review of the 70-year-old constitution. Their motivations for expressing willingness are likely an attempt to have some degree of influence over the deliberations on the changes.

PM Abe’s hardline stance against North Korea in recent months has seemingly paid off in the eyes of the general populace. This suggests that the Japanese PM will attempt to double down on his hawkish stance, further supporting aggressive sanctions against North Korea with strong mechanisms for enforcing them. He is also likely to continue his policy of non-negotiation with Pyongyang. While US President Donald Trump is especially supportive of PM Abe, the US is unlikely to support the constitutional reform, as the move will likely be viewed by both Beijing and Seoul, both of which suffered under Japan’s World War II expansion, as provocative and destabilizing. Further, it may complicate the long-standing military relationship between the two nations.

US relations with Japan likely to see improvement under new administration

FORECAST: The controversial constitutional changes aside, overall, Japan’s relations with the US are likely to improve as a result of Abe’s landslide election victory, given the convergence of strategic interests on several issues including regional security. It is also important to note PM Abe’s seemingly excellent interpersonal relationship with US President Donald Trump. In contrast to the leaders of other traditional US-allied nations like German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, who have been critical of the newly-elected US President, Abe’s efforts have thus far focused exclusively on charming Trump. This includes Abe’s visit to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort just one week after he was elected, as well as over a dozen phone calls between the two since the President took office. It was reported that President Trump asked a group of congressmen in mid-June why they could not be more like Shinzo Abe. This closeness will likely be especially apparent in the coming week when the US President is expected to visit Japan as part of his November overseas trip.

This relatively unique relationship may compel PM Abe to push for increased defense cooperation with the US, with a particular focus on bolstering Japan’s ballistic missile defense capabilities. It also remains possible he will use the constitutional review as leverage over the US, as having additional close protection services from its ally would minimize the justifications for needing an offensive military force. This would also alleviate recently growing sentiments in Japanese society, which see Washington’s inability to come to Tokyo’s aid and deter Pyongyang’s repeated ballistic missile launches and threatening rhetoric as an indication that the country must defend itself.

PM Abe’s successful reelection will nevertheless be perceived as a favorable result by Washington with respect to the US-Japan alliance. Similarly, regional neighbors concerned by Beijing’s maritime expansionism, like Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, are also expected to welcome the election results, as PM Abe has visibly strengthened defense relations with these actors during his term in office.

Which options are on the table for Trump and Kim Jong-Un amid rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula? – Korean Peninsula Analysis

*** THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS WAS DISTRIBUTED TO MAX CLIENTS AT 18:00UTC ON 14 AUGUST ***

Situation: North Korea Tensions

Key-Developments-in-US-North-Korea-Tensions-July-August-2017On August 10, North Korea released a statement detailing a planned missile test that would be operational by mid-August. Using four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the statement threatened that it was “seriously examining the plan for an enveloping strike at Guam.” The statement also included details about the trajectory of the launch, noting that the missiles “cross the sky above Shimane, Hiroshima, and Koichi Prefectures of Japan,” fly for 3,356 kilometers over 1,065 seconds and would “hit the waters 30 to 40 km away from Guam.” This statement is part of a series of back-and-forth diplomatic provocations between the US and North Korea following Pyongyang’s recent breakthroughs in their weapons program.

On July 28, North Korea launched the second of two intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) test that month. The projectile traveled approximately 3,000 km in an upward trajectory, leading observers to speculate that the missile is capable of traveling up to 10,000 km on a standard trajectory, making both Los Angeles and Chicago within its theoretical range. In the aftermath of the test, a new US-led sanctions regime was adopted by the UN Security Council, potentially causing up to one billion USD in economic damage for Pyongyang out of an estimated three billion USD in annual export revenues.

Meanwhile, the annual joint Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercises between the US and South Korea will take place between August 21-31 and include the participation of tens of thousands of troops over sea, land, and air simulations.

Assessments & Forecast

Which options are on the table for Trump and Kim Jong-Un amid rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula? - Korean Peninsula Analysis | MAX Security

Long-range test necessary for continued advancement of North Korean weapons program; US, allies unlikely to initiate wide-scale conflict in the event of launch

While test missile launches are certainly provocative, they are also a necessary component of developing a viable weapon, and the major underlying motivation for their continued execution. Until now, North Korea has almost exclusively conducted high-arc missile tests. While these tests have provided valuable information on ballistics in the initial launch stage, as well as reentry, their value is limited as such a trajectory is not equal to real-world conditions. Whereas Pyongyang has refrained from long-distance tests, likely due to concerns over a strong reaction from Tokyo as such a test would have to travel over Japanese territory, the weapons program has accelerated to such a point that this type of trajectory has become increasingly necessary. Testing missiles at varying launch trajectories provide different insights on how to improve tactical abilities. More traditional trajectory, as opposed to the high arc trajectories North Korea has typically employed, would provide Pyongyang great tactical insight that could not be divined from previous tests, including information regarding guidance, aerodynamics, and engine power. As such, the ratcheting up of rhetoric by President Trump, which fits into Pyongyang’s narrative of a belligerent Washington, also provides North Korea the justification for carrying out a missile test that is very necessary for the improvement of their capabilities.Given their close coordination and adherence to international norms and agreements, any action undertaken by the US, South Korea, or Japan is extremely unlikely to be unilateral in nature. These countries essentially have three immediate options in the event of a launch, which are not mutually exclusive: interception, military intervention, or diplomatic/economic retaliation. In terms of military intervention, this can also be divided into two options: an all-out assault with

Given their close coordination and adherence to international norms and agreements, any action undertaken by the US, South Korea, or Japan is extremely unlikely to be unilateral in nature. These countries essentially have three immediate options in the event of a launch, which are not mutually exclusive: interception, military intervention, or diplomatic/economic retaliation. In terms of military intervention, this can also be divided into two options: an all-out assault with pre-emptive positioning of ships towards the Korean Peninsula as well as artillery, or limited action in the form of tactical strikes. Nonetheless, of the three, military intervention remains the least likely due to the tremendous risk of such actions leading to a full-scale war. In this regard, it’s important to note that Seoul is situated only about 56 km from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), thereby limiting the US military option, given that even conventional, short-range missiles, which North Korea is known to have in its arsenal, could strike the South Korean capital in retaliation. The diplomatic and economic track also does not seem a likely immediate response, as a launch would signify that even the recent far-reaching sanctions and offers of negotiation were not enough to dissuade Pyongyang. Overall, the US is likely to seek to exhaust all diplomatic measures before turning to military action, and at this time, a nuclear escalation remains unlikely.

The most likely immediate reaction would be the activation of the missile defense capabilities wielded in the Pacific. These include land, sea, and air-based interceptors. In preparation for the strike, Japan deployed land-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile interceptors to bases in three of the four prefectures that were mentioned by North Korea in the notice. Knowing the North Korean plan, and that the missiles are only intended to pass over Japan, these batteries would most likely only be used if the missiles were to appear to be falling short in their trajectory and thus threatened the island nation. However, beyond the PAC-3s, Japan has also deployed an Aegis ballistic missile defense system to the waters between Japan and the Korean Peninsula, which is able to track approximately 100 missiles simultaneously and fire interceptors to take out ballistic projectiles. While these may be used to halt the missiles in mid-flight, the Aegis is not without limitation. It must be in the exact right part of the sea to intercept the missile and while it has been successful in intercepting ballistic missiles during tests, it has not been used to take out one in a live combat situation.Additionally, there are local airfields in South Korea and Japan from which fighter jets can be scrambled to intercept the missile during its boost phase. Along with Patriot missiles, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) is also currently deployed at the Anderson Air Force Base in Guam and could be used to try and take down the missiles, however, missiles falling outside of the immediate landmass may also not be interceptable by the system.

Additionally, there are local airfields in South Korea and Japan from which fighter jets can be scrambled to intercept the missile during its boost phase. Along with Patriot missiles, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) is also currently deployed at the Anderson Air Force Base in Guam and could be used to try and take down the missiles, however, missiles falling outside of the immediate landmass may also not be interceptable by the system.Despite a range of tools available, Japanese, Korean, and US forces may still choose not to intercept the tests should they occur. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, while the action would likely be presented as defensive, a failed interception would greatly undermine the credibility of the countries’ missile defense systems, which may embolden North Korea to carry out future tests. The stakes of a failed interception are especially high because four missiles have threatened to be shot. Even if just one of the missiles breaks though, it would still be a huge strategic blow to US defenses in the region. Secondly, if the North Korean missiles were shot down, Pyongyang may view this as an escalation worthy of a further military response.

Despite a range of tools available, Japanese, Korean, and US forces may still choose not to intercept the tests should they occur. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, while the action would likely be presented as defensive, a failed interception would greatly undermine the credibility of the countries’ missile defense systems, which may embolden North Korea to carry out future tests. The stakes of a failed interception are especially high because four missiles have threatened to be shot. Even if just one of the missiles breaks though, it would still be a huge strategic blow to US defenses in the region. Secondly, if the North Korean missiles were shot down, Pyongyang may view this as an escalation worthy of a further military response.

Meanwhile, Beijing has publicly indicated a willingness to defend North Korea in the event of an American first strike, but also not to intervene in the event of a North Korean first strike. The language of this statement was purposefully vague, and allows for a bit of maneuvering in the event of a launch on Guam, as such an event can be viewed as a North Korean first strike, and likewise can an American military response. In all actuality, China would most likely be reticent to involve itself militarily in any large-scale conflict (as would the US and its allies), although limited tactical strikes would likely engender a swift diplomatic rebuke.

FORECAST: Given these factors, a North Korean test launch into the waters of Guam remains a valuable strategic goal, although a military response by the US and its allies is undesirable by all sides in the current context. Should North Korea decide to attempt a launch towards Guam in the immediate future, it would likely coincide with the upcoming joint US-South Korea exercise, as such exercises have in the past served as a backdrop for weapons tests.

Pyongyang may seek to launch alternate tests in attempt to de-escalate, save face

One of the largest advantages on both sides is the element of unpredictability. President Trump does appear to be genuinely impetuous, which more than anything else is likely weighing on Pyongyang’s calculus before missile tests. This is likely compounded by the aforementioned opening given to the US to retaliate in the event of a North Korean first strike. As such, the next North Korean launch may be a test of a different missile in an attempt to still project military might while avoiding a potential confrontation.

Satellite imagery since June has suggested increased activity at North Korea’s Sinpo naval shipyard. In particular, activity towards the end of July led many to speculate that a submarine missile test was imminent; instead, North Korea launched an ICBM from a base in the almost exact opposite area of the country. Threatening to launch specific land-based missiles and then instead launching a different projectile would fit with Pyongyang’s established modus operandi of distraction and disinformation. A submarine launch would likely involve the solid-fuel Pukguksong-1 missile variant, as the liquid fueled Hwasong-12, which Pyongyang threatened to launch near Guam, is incapable of submarine launch.Additionally, if the major underlying motivation behind the test is scientific, as opposed to provocation, Pyongyang may still seek to launch a missile along a different flight path. This would still give their missile program largely the same information about the weapon ballistics and guidance, while potentially averting a major incident. Additionally, Pyongyang would be able to claim that the test intended to attack Guam but simply misfired, which would contribute to their disinformation campaign. However, such a path would still likely travel over Japan, risking the possibility of the projectile being shot down.

Additionally, if the major underlying motivation behind the test is scientific, as opposed to provocation, Pyongyang may still seek to launch a missile along a different flight path. This would still give their missile program largely the same information about the weapon ballistics and guidance, while potentially averting a major incident. Additionally, Pyongyang would be able to claim that the test intended to attack Guam but simply misfired, which would contribute to their disinformation campaign. However, such a path would still likely travel over Japan, risking the possibility of the projectile being shot down.

Ambiguous nature of US statements contrast explicit North Korean threats; highlights apparent willingness to follow through on Guam plan

The relatively bellicose rhetoric used by President Trump marks the first time that the US threatened a first strike against North Korea. Previous presidents had typically reiterated a willingness to retaliate to a North Korean strike, most likely as a means of assuring allies in Seoul and Tokyo. However, President Trump’s initial statement on August 8, in which he threatened “fire and fury”, was reportedly unvetted by his own aides, suggesting that the announcement itself was improvised. This, coupled with recent statements from other officials stressing a more diplomatic approach, suggest that the President’s statements were more bluster or posturing and not an actual expression of actual intent.On the North Korean side, while the hostile rhetoric has remained a consistent part of its foreign policy vis-a-vis the US, the release of the strike plan was similarly unusual, as it served as the first time such a notice was given for a missile test. Comparing the nature of the threats from both sides, the US government appears uncoordinated and ambiguous, while North Korea’s seems explicit and exceptionally detailed.

On the North Korean side, while the hostile rhetoric has remained a consistent part of its foreign policy vis-a-vis the US, the release of the strike plan was similarly unusual, as it served as the first time such a notice was given for a missile test. Comparing the nature of the threats from both sides, the US government appears uncoordinated and ambiguous, while North Korea’s seems explicit and exceptionally detailed.The main limiting factor that would prevent Pyongyang from launching such a test is the fear of a US response. President Trump’s overtly offensive posture, at least on face value, would seem to suggest a wide spectrum of possible responses, from tactical strikes on key North Korean facilities to full-scale war on the Peninsula. In this sense, Trump’s tone may be an asset, or even the result of an explicit plan, although this latter possibility is unlikely.

The main limiting factor that would prevent Pyongyang from launching such a test is the fear of a US response. President Trump’s overtly offensive posture, at least on face value, would seem to suggest a wide spectrum of possible responses, from tactical strikes on key North Korean facilities to full-scale war on the Peninsula. In this sense, Trump’s tone may be an asset, or even the result of an explicit plan, although this latter possibility is unlikely.

Recommendations

We advise against non-essential travel to Pyongyang and North Korea given the risk of detainment of foreign travelers.
Travel to Seoul may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.
During periods of armed escalation between North and South Korea, we advise against all non-essential travel to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Yeonpyeongdo Islands.
While the potential that a North Korean missile strike would have a direct physical impact on Guam remains low, given the current climate we advise against all non-essential travel to the island over the coming weeks.

Contact MAX Operations: If you plan to travel to / or are currently operating in South Korea:

  • MAX Global Operations Center is available 24/7 for operational support
  • Consult with MAX Senior Advisor prior to your visit
  • Share your itinerary in advance and have MAX Ground Support
  • Use MAX Consultancy service to create Evacuation & Business Contingency Plans

MAX offers strong on-ground capabilities in South Korea and our teams are standing by ready to provide you with secure transportation, executive protection, and evacuation services. For on-ground support now, contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434/5