Clashes take place on western outskirts of Juba on January 4; first instance of armed conflict in the capital since July 2016 – South Sudan Alert
Please be advised
Reports indicate that heavy gunfire and artillery were exchanged as forces belonging to Colonel Chan Garang Lual attacked Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) positions in Kapuri and Luri, west of Juba, with additional fighting and military mobilization reported in Juba’s Lemon Gaba neighborhood during the evening hours of January 4.
The SPLA confirmed in a statement on January 5 that their positions had been assaulted by “rebels” belonging to Chan Garang. Chan was additionally reported to claim responsibility for the attacks, claiming to inflict high casualties and that dozens of SPLA soldiers had defected to his forces during the events.
During the fighting, the South Sudanese government ordered that mobile providers shut down access to the 3G network and mobile internet on January 4 for “security reasons”. There continue to be disruptions to mobile internet services at the time of writing.
Sources citing a government spokesperson on January 5 indicate that additional troops have been mobilized to the western areas of Juba to reinforce security measures against the rebels, including searches of residences in the area for weapons.
Assessments & Forecast
Juba has not seen armed conflict since July 2016, when several days of fighting between the government and Riek Machar’s SPLA-IO led to the expulsion of the rebels from the capital and Machar’s flight to DRC. In the absence of rebel forces, with opposition sympathizers largely fleeing or seeking refuge at the UN Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites, Juba has been calm in the year and a half since then. Tensions were raised in November when President Salva Kiir ordered the military to disarm former SPLA chief of staff Paul Malong, was then under house arrest after being fired in May, though the standoff was ultimately resolved by Malong’s release and departure to Nairobi. Amid these events, Colonel Chan Garang Lual, an SPLA officer loyal to Malong, announced his defection from the government to engage in a rebellion against President Kiir. At the time, he stated that he was holding a position “near Juba” with his men, and this incident serves as the first confirmation that his rebel forces remained in the vicinity of the capital.
Although Chan announced when he defected that he would be joining the SPLA-IO under Machar, it remains unclear to what degree there has been any communication or organization between Chan and the main rebel movement. Given the relatively limited size of the clashes, it does not appear that Chan has assembled a larger force beyond those with whom he defected several months earlier, thought to number in the low hundreds. In this case, Chan seems to have taken action in Juba independently from Machar’s organization. Instead, with his claims of gathering new defectors, these events may have been driven by new SPLA forces defecting from the government. These soldiers may have a personal connection to Chan and, more likely, loyalty to ex-SPLA chief Malong. We assess that, despite the public announcement of joining the SPLA-IO in November, all of the developments involving Chan illustrate that the greatest threat to the status quo in South Sudan is the trajectory of Malong and his followers rather than that of the traditional armed opposition.
To this point, it is possible that the timing of Chan’s attack in Juba was deliberately aligned with recent developments in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, Malong’s home region. President Kiir has made a series of public moves to consolidate his political support base in Aweil, appointing Malong’s rivals as top government and military leaders in that sector, and having Malong’s residence raided by SPLA troops in late December. However, days later, two SPLA officers and local government officials loyal to Malong fled to Sudan with 1,500 soldiers who joined the South Sudan Patriotic Army (SSPA) led by Agany Abdelbagi Ayii. The SSPA has been operating on the South Sudan – Sudan border for much of the year and has been suspected to be linked to Malong. In this context, this may have served as incentive or encouragement for further defections and other activity near Juba.
FORECAST: Despite the attacks in Juba, the events and players in Northern Bahr el Ghazal continue to retain the highest risk of escalation. It is unclear to what degree Malong himself is involved in the actions that his followers have taken though, at this point, it has become increasingly unlikely over the past several months that he is entirely dissociated from their actions. He continues to hold significant support among Aweil-area natives, including SPLA troops and Mathiang Anyoor militia, and could likely inspire a much greater number of defections beyond those who have been seen thus far, should conflict ignite. That thousands have already joined the SSPA, known to receive material support from Khartoum, continues to elevate the threat of renewed clashes on the Sudanese border over the coming weeks.
FORECAST: With that said, while the risks in Northern Bahr el Ghazal are high, this is less likely in Juba. Notwithstanding the January 4 fighting, the threat to the capital city is not as distinct given the balance of forces in and around the city is in President Kiir’s favor. Chan’s troops are outnumbered, by far, not only by the SPLA but by Kiir’s own Tiger Division as well as the National Security Service (NSS) forces. Although this does not rule out the potential for similar, relatively small clashes in the same area of the Juba outskirts, or near the southwestern route into the capital, this is unlikely to significantly escalate in the near term. While new developments may emerge to make a shift on the ground possible, this clashes on January 4 are insufficient to indicate a deterioration of the security conditions in Juba at this time.
Recommendations
Those traveling to South Sudan should restrict essential travel to Juba, while maintaining heightened vigilance and adhering to stringent security protocols, given high levels of crime and insecurity.
We advise against all travel outside of Juba to outlying areas of South Sudan, given the continuing clashes between the armed opposition and pro-government troops throughout the country, as well as repeated instances of inter-communal violence.
Israel’s March 23rd election results likely to prolong political stagnation; may pose challenges to strategic business operations – Israel Analysis
Executive Summary:
On March 23, Israel held its fourth round of parliamentary elections in the past two years, which produced another stalemate. Rather than the left and right, the political fault lines in Israel are currently divided along the pro-Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu bloc and the anti-Netanyahu bloc. At present, neither has been able to form a viable coalition.
Even if either bloc succeeds in forming a coalition through complex political maneuvering, any potential government’s longevity will likely be limited in time. Therefore, the years-long period of political deadlock in Israel is likely to persist due to the lack of a conclusive outcome.
The political stagnation will hinder the implementation of a long-term budget and comprehensive government planning, which will disrupt proper governance, cause some economic damage, limit the ability for strategic long-term security planning, and hamper Israel’s foreign relations with key allies.
This is liable to pose challenges for long-term strategic business operations in Israel, especially those requiring high-level government collaboration. However, regardless of the political situation, essential services and infrastructure remain operational and the country is largely functioning as normal. The highly successful COVID-19 vaccine campaign has significantly reduced restrictions on business and commercial activities, with domestic and foreign companies and organizations able to operate without major hindrance.
Those operating or residing in Israel are advised to remain abreast of the ongoing political situation, which is liable to result in some challenges to long-term business operations requiring state collaboration. Consult with us at [email protected] or +44-20-3540-0434 for more information.
Implications of the political deadlock
As well as leading to an unprecedented situation in which four elections have been held in the past two years, the political stalemate has had, and will continue to have, an impact on the functioning and governance of Israel in various fields. These range from budgetary and economic issues to foreign relations and long-term security doctrines. Below are the primary areas in which the political deadlock is liable to impact until a conclusive outcome is reached and a stable government is formed.
Economy, budget, and domestic governance
The political situation in Israel has had an impact on the country’s economic functioning and ability to strategically plan ahead. As a result of the political stalemate, the Knesset has not passed an annual budget or comprehensive spending plans since March 2018, which has hindered the capacity of ministries and other government-funded organizations to operate effectively. This concern has been shared by Israel’s economic leadership, as evidenced by comments on April 9 by Bank of Israel Governor, Amir Yaron, who reiterated that “without a stable government that operates long-term” Israel will not be able to implement a multi-year economic plan to effectively emerge from the COVID-19 health and economic crises. This view highlights the importance of both the formation of a stable and cohesive government as well as its longevity for proper governance and economic growth. This is particularly in light of the pandemic, which had a severe impact on the Israeli workforce, with unemployment reaching a high of 27 percent early on in the health crisis and falling to 9.8 percent by March amid the opening up of the economy. Prior to the pandemic, unemployment had reached a record low of 3.8 percent.
FORECAST:Payments to furloughed workers in Israel are set to expire at the end of June. Many furloughed workers have preferred to continue receiving state payments instead of returning to the workforce and will thus likely be compelled to return to part-time unemployment when these payments end in June. That said, parts of the population will likely remain indefinitely unemployed. This will require government-funded training programs and investment, potentially in cooperation with the private sector, to assist these individuals to reenter the workforce. This is especially because several sectors, particularly those depending on tourism, continue to operate at lower than pre-pandemic capacity and there are therefore fewer jobs in these fields. In the absence of a stable government able to strategically implement such initiatives, hundreds of thousands of people are liable to be in a precarious final situation, which will place strain on the government and the wider economy as their consumption will be reduced.
The political situation has partly impaired Israel’s ability to respond to pressing needs in a timely manner. This is most saliently evidenced by a reported delay in Israeli payments to vaccine production companies as the Israeli cabinet has not convened to pass this budget due to political infighting in the current Likud-Blue & White caretaker coalition. This is due to the cancellation of a cabinet meeting by Defense Minister Gantz as a result of Netanyahu’s alleged refusal to permit the appointment of a Justice Minister, which also hinders the Knesset’s ability to pass key legislation. The void in the Justice Ministry is one of multiple senior roles, including in the security and defense sectors, that have not been filled due to government infighting. The fact that this led to Gantz’s cancellation of the cabinet meeting underscores the potential for multiple other issues of an important and strategic nature to be hindered or delayed due to political stagnation. The ministers were slated to vote on a 2.1 billion USD procurement of new vaccine doses, which is essential for Israel to sustainably combat the COVID-19 pandemic over the long-term and keep the economy open and thus provide crucial income for individuals and revenue for the state. FORECAST: Although the government will likely find a solution to this specific issue, the development highlights multiple aspects of the current political impasse on proper governance.
The failure to pass a budget has impacted the government’s capacity to fund infrastructure projects and major national initiatives. This has affected multiple sectors and fields. For instance, the lack of a budget hindered the start of the academic year as the Knesset was forced to pass a special budget in order for schools to open while other state-funded educational services were impacted. More generally, the lack of a long-term budget poses challenges in terms of structural economic reforms and for ministries to provide essential services, including physical and mental healthcare, social provision, and education, which require increased investment in order to meet rising inflation and demand.
FORECAST: Although the government has managed to pass a series of short-term spending plans and special budgets to cover specific needs, the longer the political deadlock continues, the more that certain services and infrastructure plans will be impacted. Furthermore, even if a coalition is formed, if its primary components lack a shared vision beyond replacing the current Netanyahu-led government, this will also hinder state funding and the passing of a viable long-term budget due to disagreement over policy and economic priorities. Taken as a whole, the political situation will continue to have a relative impact on the functioning of the state over the coming months at least. It may also reduce the desire of international firms to commit to invest and set up offices in Israel until a stable government is in place that can facilitate such operations and work in collaboration. This is also evidenced by a warning by an international credit ratings agency from March 31 indicating that while the present situation does not pose immediate risks to Israel’s economic rating, shown by the fact it kept Israel’s credit rating at AA-, if the political situation persists, it will elevate the fiscal risks due to the difficulty in reducing the deficit. Bank of Israel governor Yaron reinforced this concern, stating that “credit ratings companies are worried by the government’s instability and the failure to pass a budget.”
Regardless of the political situation, essential services and infrastructure remain operational and the country is largely functioning as normal. The highly successful COVID-19 vaccine campaign has significantly reduced restrictions on business and commercial activities, with domestic and foreign companies and organizations able to operate without a major hindrance. FORECAST: The political stagnation in the country is more likely to pose a challenge to foreign companies potentially seeking to initiate major investments or launch large-scale projects within Israel. This is because government ministries face both budgetary issues and obstacles in the decision-making process. This may also affect collaboration with ministries or state-funded organizations, but routine operations of existing companies within Israel will continue regardless, albeit delays can be expected when receiving permits, regulatory approvals, or other activities that depend on legislation.
Foreign Relations
The political situation is also somewhat affecting Israel’s ability to forge relations and gain international influence. As a result of political infighting, the current caretaker government, even when it managed to convene on a fairly regular basis, struggled to project a united message to the international community regarding Israel’s policies as senior members of the Likud and Blue and White parties frequently undermined each other. This is particularly the case in sensitive issues of foreign and defense policy, with the latter portfolios being held by Blue and White’s Gabi Ashkenazi and Benny Gantz, respectively, but many diplomatic and security matters being directed by Netanyahu. These competing points of authority have likely posed problems for various states when dealing with Israel. FORECAST: The failure to establish a viable and stable government led by ministers appointed for the long-term will likely pose a challenge for Israel’s efforts to forge relations in essential sectors such as trade and commerce. Foreign governments may be reluctant to commit to such agreements with caretaker officials, while the latter may be restricted by legal obstacles placed upon an interim government.
The current impasse has resulted in a situation wherein 36 new ambassadorial appointees, which have been approved by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) appointments committee are not yet fulfilling their roles. This situation has been ongoing since November 2020 and many of the ambassadors are reportedly ready and set to be posted on diplomatic missions on an immediate basis. Reports state that this delay is due to a refusal by Netanyahu to bring their approval to the cabinet for its consent. The absence of new ambassadors is a significant issue that is liable to harm Israel’s diplomatic, trade, and security interests. This situation can hinder Israel’s ability to conduct diplomatic campaigns and strategic discourse with other international actors as well as to advance visits of economic delegations to other countries.
Most importantly for Israel, the lack of government can undermine the country’s relations with key strategic allies such as the US. Continued political paralysis within Israel has likely somewhat hindered its ability to build strategies and coordinate with its allies on matters of essential policy and national security. This is because these allies may be reluctant to engage in long-term planning in the absence of a stable government, especially one that may be perceived as volatile and potentially liable to fall as soon as a political crisis emerges. This may impact Israel’s positions on the Iranian nuclear agreement, especially amid international efforts to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); and any US engagement with the Palestinians.
Another area that the political situation can impact in terms of foreign policy is the pre-election, US-brokered normalization trend that was recorded, consisting of diplomatic agreements between Israel and four Arab states (the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco). These deals are extremely important and strategic for Israel’s diplomatic, security, and economic interests as they enable Jerusalem to garner additional international support against its adversaries and forge trade and investment relations. FORECAST: This trend is likely to slow down or be suspended altogether in the absence of a stable Israel government that other potential Arab states perceive to be a long-term partner. The regional actors that are most likely to reach a normalization agreement with Israel tend to be relatively risk-averse and attach great importance to stability. Thus, if the political deadlock continues or an unstable government is formed, further normalization agreements are unlikely.
Security
In terms of security, the political deadlock will have an impact on the procurement of military hardware and weaponry. It may also impact the development of advanced security doctrines based on these weapon systems and long-term, large-scale organizational planning. This is due to various budgetary obstacles and challenges posed to the decision-making process. However, over the past two years, despite the political stalemate, Israel has continued to act to safeguard its security interests across multiple arenas. Military activity, both overt and covert, has been reported in various theaters of operation throughout the Middle East region. That said, although these operations are informed by a guiding strategy that has been formulated by previous governments and continues to be updated by Israel’s security agencies, especially vis-a-vis the regional threat posed by Iran and its proxies, the lack of a cohesive government is liable to affect proper governance and the decision-making process. This is shown for instance by the Israeli government’s apparent lack of strategy regarding the best way to manage the threat of militant groups based in the Gaza Strip, which is an issue that periodically emerges with a potentially decisive operation indefinitely put on hold until a stable government is formed. Taken as a whole, despite the political situation dictate, Israel can continue to respond to any threats to its national security and continue to formulate a military strategy to defend these interests.
FORECAST: This situation will impact Israel’s security in the strategic realm and possibly lead to long-term damage as Israel’s adversaries can gain an edge on delays to procure and develop weaponry due to budgetary and decision-making challenges. However, the ability of Israel’s security apparatus to mitigate and thwart security within Israel itself will remain intact over the coming period. The Israeli security agencies have proven during this period of relative political instability and throughout periods of far greater security volatility that the vast majority of local and regional threats, namely along its northern borders and vis-a-vis Palestinian militants in the West Bank and Gaza, are manageable. Thus, the political situation will not lead to a fundamental destabilizing of the security environment within Israel over the coming period.
Election Results and Political Blocs
On March 23, Israel held its fourth round of elections for its parliament (the Knesset) in the past two years.
During this two-year political deadlock, a government was formed in May 2020, which was led by Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu and the Likud party alongside Benny Gantz, his political rival from the“Blue and White” party. The government’s functioning was hindered by in-fighting and discord between the rival political factions, which eventually led to the dispersal of the Knesset in December 2020, resulting in the March election.
The results of the election can be seen below. The political fault lines within Israel since the first election in March 2019 have revolved around the parties’ willingness to join or rejection of a government led by PM Netanyahu, who is on trial having been officially indicted in November 2019 for breach of trust, bribery, and fraud.
The debate on Netanyahu’s political and legal status has transcended the traditional left-right discourse within the Israeli political landscape. In this context, parties that are part of the right-wing political camp in Israel, such as former Likud member Gidon Saar’s “New Hope”, have formally declared themselves to be part of the “anti-Netanyahu” or “change” bloc. Other parties, such as Naftali Bennett’s right-wing “Yamina” and Mansour Abbas’ Islamist “Raam”, remain unaffiliated with either of the pro- or anti-Netanyahu blocs.
This has resulted in a situation that neither the pro-Netanyahu bloc, primarily made up of right-wing and religious/ultra-Orthodox parties nor the ideologically diverse anti-Netanyahu bloc has been able to form a coalition, which requires a 61-seat majority in the Knesset.
On April 6, Netanyahu was given a four-week mandate to form a government by President Reuven Rivlin. He has until May 4 to try to assemble a viable coalition and can thereafter request a 14-day extension at the discretion of the president. If he fails, Rivlin can ask a second person or return the mandate to the Knesset. If these alternatives fail to yield a government, the Knesset will automatically dissolve and another election will be held.
Affiliations of political parties
These are the various political parties and their affiliations and policies.
Main options for government coalitions – likelihood and longevity
Option 1: Pro-Netanyahu bloc & Yamina government plus Raam external support in Knesset
Prime Minister: Benjamin Netanyahu
Coalition Components: Likud, United Torah Judaism, Shas, “Religious Zionism”, and Yamina (59 seats)
External support for government votes: Raam (4 seats)
Analysis:
This option is somewhat feasible as it includes various political parties with broadly similar ideological agendas and worldviews in government. Although the Raam party would likely not be a formal part of the government, but an external support bloc, its inclusion poses the greatest challenge to the formation of the government. The “Religious Zionism” party has explicitly stated and reiterated that it will not be part of a government that depends on Raam’s support and this is likely to hinder any progress on this option. This is compounded by major concessions that Netanyahu may have to make to Bennett for the latter to join a government led by the former. In terms of longevity, the Raam party’s leadership is able to cooperate with the religious factions in this potential government, particularly over social policy and support for religious institutions. However, its overall Islamist agenda and links to the Palestinian cause are liable to create complications for the government’s functioning, which would be exacerbated during periods of escalation or religious sensitivities.
Option 2: Pro-Netanyahu bloc & Yamina government plus defectors from the anti-Netanyahu bloc
Prime Minister: Benjamin Netanyahu
Coalition Components: Likud, United Torah Judaism, Shas, “Religious Zionism”, Yamina + 2 members of anti-Netanyahu bloc shift allegiances (61 seats)
Analysis:
This government is unlikely due to the reluctance of members of the center or center-right parties to renege on their pledges not to join a government led by Netanyahu amid his indictment on corruption charges. The “Blue and White” party has insisted it will not join a Netanyahu-led government following its previous power-sharing experience with the incumbent prime minister while “New Hope” members, more likely to defect, have so far insisted they will not join the pro-Netanyahu bloc. Although individual members of these parties may choose to join Netanyahu under the pretext of preventing another round of elections, the parties themselves are unlikely to do so due to the potential for a fifth vote and the impact this would have on voters who will perceive this as the violation of election pledges. In terms of longevity, a government made up of the Netanyahu bloc, Yamina, and two defectors from the anti-Netanyahu bloc would likely be more stable on key policies than a Raam-backed coalition. However, with legislation pertaining to Netanyahu’s legal complications, this government would likely face substantial hurdles as several members of Yamina and most potential defectors are unlikely to support any perceived efforts by Netanyahu or his supporters to release him from or evade the legal process.
Option 3: Anti-Netanyahu bloc plus external support from Raam
Prime Minister: Naftali Bennett/Yair Lapid (Rotation)
Coalition Components: Yesh Atid, Blue & White, Yisrael Beitenu, Labor, Meretz, Yamina, New Hope (58 seats)
External support for government votes: Raam (4 seats)
Analysis:
In terms of the likelihood of formation, this government faces multiple challenges due to the ideological diversity of the parties it would include and the pressure within both the left-leaning (Yesh Atid, Labor, Meretz) and right-leaning factions of the potential coalition (Yamina, New Hope) to extract concessions from the other. The former parties seek to ensure Yesh Atid’s Labor is the prime minister (PM) or first in any rotation, while the latter right-leaning bloc insists on Bennett as PM and first in the rotation. The right-leaning parties will also aim to block the left-leaning parties from holding key cabinet posts and thus advancing a left-wing agenda as well as blocking their entry to the security cabinet. Even if this government does materialize, it would likely be hindered by major in-fighting and its longevity is thus very low.
Option 4: Netanyahu chooses/forced to sit aside; right-wing government formed
Prime Minister: Consensus among right-wing parties
Coalition components: Likud, Shas, United Torah Judaism, Yamina, New Hope, Religious Zionism (65 seats)
Analysis:
This option is extremely unlikely due to Netanyahu’s widespread popularity among the Likud party and the Ultra-Orthodox parties that support the Likud. Members and voters of these parties would consider any attempt to coerce Netanyahu to step down as anti-democratic, which would create major tensions within Israeli society. Netanyahu also continues to hold significant support among parliamentarians in his and other supporting parties, while even some of his detractors may oppose legislation that prevents him from being prime minister due to its targeted nature. This is evidenced by the failure of anti-Netanyahu parties to pass such legislation over the past years despite their overall opposition to his continued premiership. Taken as a whole, this option is highly unlikely and its longevity is thus negligible.
BOTTOM LINE
Overall, given that all of the above-mentioned options pose considerable challenges to political actors in terms of both the formation of a viable coalition and the longevity of any government, the most likely scenario is either a fifth election with a similar outcome along pro- and anti-Netanyahu lines or an unstable government that fails to complete its term and thus elections are again called.
Recommendations:
In light of the current situation:
Those operating or residing in Israel, or seeking to do so, are advised to remain abreast of the ongoing political situation, which is liable to have an impact on business continuity.
It is advised to allot for obstacles to cooperation with public sector bodies and ministries as well as other state-funded organizations.
Allot for disruptions to processes that require government permits, regulatory approvals, or other activities that are liable to depend on legislation.
More generally, allot for continued restrictions on entry to Israel due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Consult with us at [email protected] or +44-20-3540-0434 for guidance on entry to Israel amid the current limitations.
General Recommendations:
Travel to Israel may continue at this time while adhering to security precautions regarding militant attacks, while avoiding the immediate vicinity of the Syrian, Lebanese, and Egyptian borders, due to the persistent risk for cross-border violence.
Those traveling in the 40 km area surrounding the Gaza Strip should continue adhering to all safety precautions regarding early warning sirens for incoming rockets. Remain cognizant of the situation along with the Lebanese and Syrian border areas, as minor hostilities between various groups can escalate into a broader conflict. In case you hear a siren, seek shelter in a protected area and remain inside for at least 10 minutes.
In major Israeli cities, remain vigilant in crowded commercial areas or public transport hubs, as these locations have been targeted by militant groups in the past. Alert authorities to suspicious, unattended packages in these areas.
As a general precaution, avoid nonessential travel to the vicinity of Jerusalem’s Old City, particularly in the vicinity of Damascus Gate, due to the increased potential for acts of militancy and civil unrest. For those seeking to travel to the Old City, it is advised to contact us for a security-oriented travel guide.
Social, security, and economic reforms implemented as transition continues, country further opens to investment – Sudan Analysis
Executive Summary
The government signed an agreement with the SPLM-N al-Hilu rebel group that notably established a shift toward a secular government. Major social reforms have enabled progress in the peace process but have also triggered pushback from conservative elements of society.
Efforts to incorporate all rebel groups in the peace process into a joint force with the Sudanese security apparatus is likely to be difficult and delayed, with the situation to remain volatile in Darfur.
The military’s willingness to divest from the economy in some sectors will bolster the government’s efforts to open the country’s markets to private and foreign investment. However, military elites will likely remain heavily involved in newly privatized industries.
Economic reforms including the removal of subsidies, devaluation of the Sudanese Pound, and allowing non-Islamic banking will likely have positive effects in terms of economic growth and enabling foreign investment.
The government is expected to struggle in persuading the public that the reforms will take time to take effect and the subsidy cuts in particular will be unpopular. Protests over the economic situation are thus expected to persist over the coming months.
Current Situation
On March 26, the World Bank stated that the Sudanese government had cleared its arrears and would now be able to secure financing from the World Bank Group and other multilateral institutions under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HPIC) initiative. This was made possible by a 1.15 billion USD bridge loan from the US government on January 6 that was specifically intended to help clear Sudan’s debts.
Sudan’s inflation rate rose to 341 percent in March according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, despite the implementation of subsidy cuts and currency devolution. These measures and the rising cost of living has led to recurrent protests in Khartoum and other cities.
On March 29, the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP) in Juba, South Sudan.
The parties agreed that: “No religion shall be imposed on anyone and the State shall not adopt any official religion.” The state will also “guarantee freedom of religion” and “these principles shall be enshrined in the Constitution”.
The DOP also stated that the government will sanctify human rights, including for women and children, and take adequate measures to accede to international and African human rights charters that are currently unratified.
In addition, the SPLM-N al-Hilu and the government agreed to the formation of a “single apolitical professional army” beginning with the gradual integration of rebel forces.
The Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdelwahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) had a leadership figure meet with the government in Khartoum on April 3. However, the rebel group released a statement on April 29 stating that it is not interested in negotiating with the current authorities or cooperating with the South Sudanese mediation team.
Sudan’s Security and Defense Council said on April 10 that it is seeking to form a joint force of 20,000 government troops and rebel fighters drawn from peace agreement signatories to deploy in Darfur. This was decided upon after large-scale intercommunal clashes in El Geneina, West Darfur State on April 3-6 resulted in hundreds of casualties.
Assessments & Forecast
Agreement to separate state & religion regarded as landmark advance of transition, peace process
The signing of the declaration of principles between the Sudanese government and SPLM-N al-Hilu is a historic step and significantly advances the political transition and peace process. This follows the signing of a comprehensive peace deal with the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) in August 2020 and signifies continued positive momentum in bringing rebel groups into the mainstream. Coming to an agreement with the SPLM-N al-Hilu is important as the group controls substantial tracts of land in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile State, and this will help stabilize the region. A major stumbling block had long been that al-Hilu consistently maintained that a secular Sudanese state is required as many of the population in the group’s territory is Christian and animist, unlike the majority of Sudan. The Sovereign Council’s decision to accede to this demand is highly notable given the country’s long Islamist identity.
The Sovereign Council likely also decided to agree to a separation of religion and state as a means to garner favor with the international community, who have largely welcomed the agreement as a sign of Sudan’s intent to accelerate democratization and instill liberal values. This would also further sideline the National Congress Party (NCP), which was the ruling party under former President Omar al-Bashir and had enshrined religious principles and the use of Sharia law in state jurisprudence. This comes as a broader shift toward secular governance during the transition. This was best exemplified by the repeal of the “Public Order Law” in November 2019 that had allowed for harsh penalties, including death, for women whom authorities deemed to be violating social norms. The government’s notably decisive actions to institute social changes, particularly for women, have also met international favor. The commitment to these changes was underscored by the transfer of the Khartoum police chief to a minor political post on March 28 after he called for the reinstatement of the Public Order Law, with the government releasing a statement rejecting his call.
FORECAST: Given the wide-ranging social impact of these reformist policies, there will continue to be pushback from conservative segments of society and government. In addition, the youth and women who led the 2019 revolution and turned away from Bashir’s Islamist policies often tied those policies to the widespread corruption in the government. If the transitional government is able to provide basic services to its citizens and tackle corruption, the move away from Islamic jurisprudence is likely to be accepted more optimistically by the population. However, if the government is unable to deal with these systemic issues, a new set of religious leaders may galvanize a movement toward reinstating Islamic law as a means to achieve these social objectives. In that sense, the popularity of social reforms is tied heavily to the overall perception of the government’s progress.
In addition, Islamist elements within the country who are supportive of a return to Sharia-based governance such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the disbanded NCP would likewise aim to support any move to roll back social reforms. FORECAST: This support is likely to be in the form of protests against the transitional government, which would be suppressed by local authorities that have consistently prioritized maintaining public order. Conservative leaders are likely to use Islamist sympathizers within the bureaucracy and security agencies, such as the former Khartoum police chief, to push for a return to more religious social norms. Such practices are likely to be the biggest challenge facing the government in its attempts to secularize governance in the coming months and could raise tensions over what is considered acceptable conduct in public spaces.
Efforts to launch unified joint force in Darfur likely to be difficult, delayed
With the new agreement with the SPLM-N al-Hilu, nearly all major rebel groups have been officially demobilized and slated to integrate into the new security structure, with the exception of the SLM-AW operating from Jebel Marra. Regardless, in the wake of large-scale intercommunal violence in El Geneina in early April, the Security and Defense Council announced plans to create a new joint force composed of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and fighters of signatory rebel groups that will be capable of “rapid intervention” across Darfur. This has been a long-awaited step in fulfilling the August 2020 peace accords, which would be crucial to stabilizing Darfur and ensuring the success of the transition in the periphery. FORECAST: However, it will likely face significant challenges in implementation and authorities have yet to release any clear timeline for the plan or indication that funding has been allocated to this project.
The work of unifying the force will be difficult given longstanding intercommunal hostilities. While a force with representation from Arab and non-Arab tribes will be promoted as a mechanism to build public confidence in the security forces and increase inter-ethnic cooperation, it will also likely be fraught with tensions, internal divisions, and disputes over organization and leadership. The prime example of this may be the role of the government’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary, whose origins are in Arab militias implicated in atrocities in Darfur. These militias fought the war against the rebel groups that will now integrate into the joint force and there is likely to be significant mistrust that could jeopardize cooperation. This will likely demand intensive reconciliation and confidence-building measures, and it is unclear if the government has the capabilities to do this.
The need for increased security deployments in Darfur has particularly been emphasized since the December 2020 withdrawal of the UN – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeepers. Although the RSF has launched its own “Peace Shield Forces” initiative to fill the security vacuum, this has been controversial in areas that have been victimized by RSF militias in the past. RSF operations without the SAF or rebel fighters risk stoking further intercommunal violence, and this can cast further doubt on the eventual ability of all of these parties to eventually integrate.
FORECAST: With the joint force in its infancy, the SAF is expected to continue to enforce state of emergency measures in conflict zones across Darfur and mitigate further large-scale intercommunal violence. With this, local civil society groups and professional organizations are likely to continue sit-in protests in El Geneina, El Fasher, Nyala, and other cities across Darfur to demand improved security and government accountability for military misconduct. Although the government has made some progress in responding to public demands by removing soldiers’ immunity and promising that troops involved in human rights abuses will face prosecution, tensions between Darfuri communities and existing security apparatuses are likely to persist. Consequently, the risk of further small and large-scale intercommunal clashes remains high.
Markets likely to open to foreign, private investment, though military elites to remain heavily involved
As part of security sector reforms, the transitional government pledged to ease the military’s traditional control over state resources, including gold, food staple production, rubber, weaponry, and other resources. For decades, the security sector has controlled the majority of the economy, most notably with a monopoly over the gold mining industry. The military has also been exempt from paying taxes or being transparent about the earnings of industries under its control, all of which left the government with a small budget and lack of hard currency. Until January 2020, the Central Bank was the sole procurer and exporter of gold, which restricted the market and allowed for extensive smuggling and embezzlement of gold resources. This fact that this system benefits the military as well as RSF leader and Sovereign Council Vice President Mohammed Hamdan “Hemetti” has slowed the process of military divestment from the economy during the transitional process.
PM Abdallah Hamdok and other transitional officials recognize that military divestment from the economy and a restructure of the state budget is critical for economic growth, access to currency, and the opening of Sudanese markets to private and foreign investment. In this context, Hemetti pledged to turn over the Jebel Amer gold mines in North Darfur to the transitional government with mining and production to be regulated and eventually privatized. FORECAST: Other military-owned companies were similarly handed over in recent years, and this is likely to slowly reduce the security apparatus’s control over public sectors and make way for the development of new industries. This includes the development of civil industries, which could become taxable, shareholding companies. However, given that top RSF and military officials remain heavily involved in various industries, including private mining companies, with Hemetti serving on the board of directors of a company tied to Jebel Amer mines, means that these military elites will continue to directly benefit from revenues, including black market revenue streams.
FORECAST: Although military elites will likely remain involved behind the scenes in private mining company operations and other industries, the fact that the military and RSF have agreed to rescind control in some sectors is likely to bolster the government’s efforts to open the country’s markets to private and foreign investment in the coming months. With a properly regulated gold market, investment opportunities are likely to increase and thereby attract interest for the development of other industries once monopolized by the military. That being said, given that the military has yet to dissociate from the mining sector altogether, and that it continues to benefit financially from its control over many public works programs, water, and fuel distribution, it’s unlikely that the military will allow for the complete liberalization of Sudan’s economy.
Social, security developments underpinned by public economic reforms including subsidy cuts
The changes to laws on social norms, religious identity, and the security sector would likely not have been possible without the implementation of crucial public economic reforms. Over the past six months, the Sudanese government has enjoyed an increase in political capital and an opportunity to re-engage with the wider international community. The normalization of relations with Israel and removal of Sudan from the US “State Sponsors of Terrorism” list have been crucial steps. The delisting allowed Khartoum to bypass a barrier in accessing funds from international financial institutions, bolstered by US assistance to help the government clear its arrears. However, these warmer relationships have been weighed against Sudan’s pledges to cut subsidies on major commodities such as fuel, wheat, and electricity, which is controversial among a public in which many people rely on the subsidies for basic goods and services.
Subsidies were said to account for 40 percent of the national budget, which the former Bashir government was unable to borrow money to cover due to sanctions. Instead, the Bashir administration printed money, resulting in rampant inflation. The subsidy system under Bashir kept some commodity prices down for a period, but also led to periodic shortages of key items, as supply chain actors smuggled subsidised goods out of Sudan for sale at higher market prices in neighboring countries. In this context, the transitional government partially cut fuel subsidies in October 2020 in efforts to remedy the situation despite inflation continuing to climb, which was welcomed by the international community as a necessary austerity measure. The government attempted to ameliorate the effects of this by announcing a system of money transfers to people below the poverty line, though 65 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Nonetheless, there have been recurrent protests since January 2021 in many states over the high costs of fuel, bread, and electricity.
Given these conditions, despite new economic policies, the government will likely struggle to persuade the public that the reforms will take time to take full effect. This will be further exacerbated by the doubts over the effectiveness of the cash transfer system due to endemic levels of corruption within the government. FORECAST: As the cash transfers are supported by the World Bank and other donors, it is possible that the COVID-19 pandemic could result in a shortfall in international aid as donor countries focus on improving their own economies in a post-pandemic scenario. It remains likely that periodic protests over the economic situation will persist in the coming months. While security forces have been relatively lenient regarding protests held by smaller groups in Khartoum, any attempts to organize a larger-scale protest movement against the government will likely result in a security clampdown.
FORECAST: Ultimately, the reform process in terms of the removal of subsidies and the devaluation of the Sudanese Pound is likely to have positive effects on economic growth over the coming months. Reforms such as the decision to allow for non-Islamic banking will further encourage foreign investment in the country, with these investors now more able to benefit from projects in Sudan given the opening up of credit avenues and issual of credit cards for the first time. However, the business environment is likely to remain enmeshed in the interests of traditional elites, including the military. While these elites have signaled a willingness to adapt to economic reforms, these power brokers will remain a prominent part of the economy in the coming years.
Recommendations
Travel to Khartoum can continue while adhering to general security precautions regarding the threat of crime.
We advise against all travel to the Darfur region as well as South Kordofan and Blue Nile states given the volatile security situation caused by ongoing violence between the government and armed rebel groups as well as intercommunal clashes.
Maintain vigilance in remote areas of northern and eastern Sudan given the risks of crime and lower presence of security forces.
Avoid nonessential travel to the borders with Egypt and Libya due to the risk of violent crime, kidnappings, and general lawlessness.
Avoid the vicinity of all large gatherings or political demonstrations given the associated risk of violent security crackdowns.
Conflict with TPLF in Tigray Region likely to be prolonged, transform into insurgency, involve neighboring states – Ethiopia Analysis
Executive Summary
The ongoing military offensive against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is being framed as a ‘rule of law operation’ to downplay the scale of the operation. However, given the TPLF’s entrenched position and capabilities, the conventional war is likely to devolve into a protracted insurgency.
The government’s alliance with Amhara militias particularly in disputed areas along the Amhara-Tigray border is likely to set a dangerous precedent. Given that land disputes are common across Ethiopia, the perception of tacit approval for these militias may prompt other conflicts over disputed areas.
The federal conflict with the TPLF also threatens to involve Eritrea, whose role thus far has largely been logistical or in self-defense. However, this restraint will likely be tested, particularly if the TPLF conducts further attacks on Eritrean locations or forces.
The conflict will result in a humanitarian crisis, with tens of thousands of Ethiopian refugees fleeing in Sudan. Sudan remains ill-equipped to deal with the strain on its system, heightening existing insecurity caused by arms proliferation, land disputes, and resource competition.
While the government has stated that the conflict is only against the TPLF and not ethnic Tigrayans, this nuance is likely to be lost as the conflict endures. Increased nationalistic sentiment and anti-TPLF rhetoric heighten the potential for violence against Tigray citizens.
Those operating or residing in Ethiopia over the coming days are advised to avoid all travel to Tigray Region as well as the Tigray-Amhara border region due to the ongoing conflict.
Introduction
On November 4, following months of simmering tensions, the federal government under PM Abiy Ahmed launched a military offensive that he later described as a “war” against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which leads the Tigray Regional State government. The immediate trigger for the conflict was an alleged attack by the TPLF on the Northern Command of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) in the state capital of Mekelle and in other areas. However, tensions had become amplified after the TPLF held state elections on September 9, polls that the federal government called illegal. This appeared to escalate in late October after the federal government diverted program funds away from the state government and, at the same time, the TPLF refused to allow a newly-appointed deputy commander of the Northern Command to take his position.
Relations between PM Abiy and the TPLF have been strained since 2018 when Abiy was designated as the first ethnic Oromo PM in Ethiopia, essentially unseating the TPLF from the center of the government after they had ruled since 1991. Abiy later embarked on a raft of reforms, including the contentious dissolution of the then ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition on February 4, 2019. Following this, the TPLF refused to join Abiy’s new ruling Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP), as the TPLF which has dominated politics in Ethiopia within the EPRDF, despite only constituting 6 percent of the population, felt increasingly marginalized. This appeared to culminate in the September 9 elections, as the TPLF regards the federal government as “illegitimate” because its constitutional mandate was supposed to end on October 5 after national polls slated for August were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Current Situation
The House of Federation and Council of Ministers declared a six-month state of emergency in Tigray Region on November 4 and later approved the establishment of a transitional government. This followed statements by the federal government that the purpose of the operation is to disarm the TPLF and remove its leaders.
Sources citing internal UN documents indicate that the TPLF took control of the ENDF Northern Command headquarters in Mekelle and seized weapons from its armories, which partially verified the TPLF’s claims that the Northern Command defected.
TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael called for negotiations on November 8, though also stated that Tigray would defend itself until such time that talks take place. PM Abiy and other federal spokespeople have rejected calls for dialogue.
The TPLF repeatedly accused Eritrea of sending troops over the border to attack Tigrayan forces, which Eritrean officials have reportedly denied. Meanwhile, Sudanese officials and aid agencies have reported that over 27,000 Ethiopian refugees have crossed into Sudan, with thousands more expected in the coming days.
On November 13, the TPLF fired rockets toward the cities of Bahir Dar and Gondar in Amhara Region, causing damage to airport complexes in both cities. On November 14, the TPLF fired at least three rockets that struck Asmara, Eritrea. Both attacks were claimed by the TPLF.
As of November 18, the federal military offensive in Tigray Region has reportedly moved through western, northern, and southern Tigray toward Mekelle.
Assessments & Forecast
PM Abiy’s war against TPLF likely to result in protracted insurgency in Tigray Region
PM Abiy Ahmed gave a speech on November 8 framing the military intervention in Tigray Region as a ‘law enforcement operation’ to guarantee peace and stability and to bring the TPLF to justice, as the perpetrators of instability. By labeling the military offensive as a means to re-establish law and order, PM Abiy is likely attempting to downplay the scale of the military activity in Tigray despite not giving any timeline for the operations, along with the political and military difficulty in rooting out the TPLF from the region. This effort is further aided by the communications blackout that remains in place in Tigray and the government’s efforts to consolidate information releases into select federal sources. While PM Abiy and the federal authorities have repeatedly insisted that the ENDF has been successful “on all fronts”, the lack of independent information makes all claims difficult to corroborate.
Such corroboration is needed, as the TPLF commands a regional paramilitary force that is led by the former army generals, while also commanding militias containing war veterans of the conflict against Eritrea in 1998-2008. Furthermore, even a partial defection by the Northern Command could aid the TPLF’s defense against the ENDF offensive. The presence of significant Ethiopian military hardware in Tigray Region, intended for the defense of the country against Eritrea, has given the TPLF significant resources. This was evidenced by the use of rockets against Bahir Dar and Gondar in Amhara Region as a warning to halt the advance in Tigray.
With that said, the ENDF does appear to be moving its advance forward and pushing the front lines increasingly toward Mekelle. FORECAST: In the coming days and weeks, the ENDF is likely to continue its success in moving further into Tigray, reaching the state capital Mekelle, with the TPLF likely withdrawing from the major urban centers and engaging in guerilla tactics against federal forces. This is significant, as the TPLF is well-versed in these tactics, as witnessed by the guerilla war to topple the ‘Derg’ government in 1991. In this sense, while the ENDF may capture major urban centres in Tigray including Mekelle, the rugged terrain of the countryside and the TPLF’s experience in waging an insurgency provide a platform for a protracted and costly war. This insurgency effort is likely to be further aided by the call to all ethnic Tigrayans to defend themselves against the federal government.
Conflict with TPLF risks violence expanding southward, with fragile internal cohesion further likely to be strained
Given the specter of a prolonged insurgency against the TPLF, albeit with the ENDF controlling the major urban centers, the government will need additional troops to secure the countryside. In this context, the government is likely to revert to redeploying troops placed in other restive areas of the country such as the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR), and Oromia Region to the Tigray theater. This also appears to include troops recalled from Somalia, which are intended to act as a buffer against al-Shabaab militants along the border. Such actions will likely stretch ENDF capabilities, especially given that many areas of the country continue to witness ethnically driven violence. FORECAST: In this scenario, the absence of ENDF troops in other volatile regions of Ethiopia heightens the potential for attacks by ethnic militias against minorities in various states, which could then be countered by these minorities forming self-defense groups to protect their neighborhoods.
Given these conditions, the government will likely come to rely more heavily on ethnic Amhara militias to preserve the stability in the Tigray Region, especially in the disputed areas in western Tigray. The status of these disputed areas is likely to draw Amhara Region’s interest as well as represent a potential trigger for wider grievance or conflict. Amharas living in areas bordering Tigray Region claim the Welkait Woreda illegally annexed by the TPLF when it assumed power in 1991, for example. This longstanding dispute likely spurred greater Amhara involvement in the federal offensive in Tigray, with Amhara Region troops as well as local Amhara militias operating in coordination with the ENDF in its operations in these territories. These militias will likely use the targeting of Bahir Dar and Gondar to galvanize local citizens and further spur recruitment efforts against the TPLF.
However, the use of Amhara militia in apparent tandem with ENDF operations is likely to set a dangerous precedent. While it is likely that the ENDF now holds the disputed lands such as Wolkait, with other efforts ongoing to push through the Raya Woreda, also claimed by Amhara, the perception of the role of Amhara will heighten the perception of PM Abiy’s acceptance of Amhara nationalism. Such a dynamic is likely in areas such as Oromia Region, where leaders have long accused Abiy of favoring the Amhara over the Oromo. FORECAST: The perception that the federal government has allowed Amhara militias to recapture their disputed territory may embolden other states to use their own militia forces to raid and attempt to retake disputed regions. In Tigray, the TPLF will also likely use the presence of Amhara militias in disputed land to further bolster recruitment efforts against both federal and Amhara forces.
FORECAST: Given that nearly every state in Ethiopia claims land in neighboring states, this type of escalation could lead to pockets of violence across the country. If pressured by the Abiy administration to halt, other state governments may allude to the appearance that the federal government has tacitly accepted the Amhara role in Tigray, which further complicates the efforts to curb violence. Additionally, given that the stated goal of the military offensive is to remove the TPLF and install a provisional Tigray transitional government, the fact that Amhara militias have appeared to capture long sought after land is likely to act as an impediment, as the Amhara government is unlikely to allow a new Tigray government to retake these lands. This will likely raise objections among the ethnic Tigrayans, who will already be inclined to view the transitional government as false or weak and continue to support the TPLF, which has commanded strong support in the state since they came to dominate the national government in 1991 and made Tigray Region the richest and most influential state in Ethiopia.
Role of Eritrea in conflict with Tigray likely to provoke tensions within Ethiopia
Another dynamic in the war against the TPLF is the perceived and actual role of Eritrea during the conflict. The TPLF and Eritrea have been at odds with each other since Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993. Ethiopia, then led by the TPLF, fought a war with Eritrea from 1998-2000, which is said to have left 100,000 people dead. However, relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa improved considerably after PM Abiy came to power, and signed a peace deal with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in 2018. However, Tigrayan leaders remained highly skeptical of the peace deal, which included a promise by PM Abiy to honor a 2002 ruling on the demarcation of the border between Eritrea and Tigray, where the town of Badme was rewarded to Eritrea but remained and continues to remain under Ethiopian control.
Eritrean involvement in the conflict thus far has remained muted, with Asmara mainly acting in a defensive capacity in preventing TPLF fighters from fleeing north, as the ENDF advances northward. That said, the TPLF has accused Eritrea of shelling Tigrayan positions along the border, which both Eritrea and Ethiopia have denied. However, the Ethiopian government has made statements noting that ENDF soldiers, who were allegedly wounded in TPLF attacks, crossed the border into Eritrea before regrouping and counter-attacking. This is a sign that Eritrea is at least cooperating with Ethiopia, and is likely tacitly assisting with medical and logistical support on the frontlines. The TPLF rocket attack on Asmara was likely a response to this perceived involvement in the conflict. However, it also remains possible that the TPLF attacked Eritrea as a means to galvanize the Tigryan populace by propagating the narrative of the TPLF defending Tigray Region from both internal and external aggression.
FORECAST: In this context, it is likely that Eritrea will likely remain uninvolved in major combat operations, despite TPLF claims of PM Abiy and President Isaias working together to crush the TPLF. Asmara’s likely pragmatic stance is likely due to the fact that despite the peace deal with Ethiopia, a protracted civil war will weaken Ethiopia and increase its reliance on Eritrea in the process. Furthermore, following the 2018 peace deal, the UN lifted sanctions on Eritrea, which means that President Isaias will likely be wary of openly sending troops into active combat, and risk the reimposition of sanctions. However, given the rocket attack on Asmara, the Eritrean government’s restraint will likely be tested if further such attacks continue. In this scenario, Eritrea’s involvement in the war would further destabilize an already precarious conflict and open up another front in the fighting.
Conflict against Tigray to adversely affect Sudan with increased refugee flows, given porous frontier
Given the TPLF is unlikely to escape northward towards Eritrea, and the conflict will likely metastasize into an insurgency, TPLF elements will likely seek refuge along the border with Sudan. While Sudanese authorities closed the border on November 5, the frontier is approximately 775 km and has long been a hub for smuggling. This partially explains why the ENDF targeted western Tigray at the start of the campaign and seized airports and territory along the border, seeing this as a way to cut off TPLF escape. While these actions will likely make it more relatively difficult for the TPLF, it will be difficult to fully secure the border, particularly in the long term. FORECAST: Thus, the TPLF is likely to utilize the frontier with Sudan to procure weaponry and other supplies for their insurgency campaign against the government. While Ethiopia will likely press Sudan to increase patrolling at the border to prevent smuggling, these efforts may not be sufficient and the border will serve as some form of pressure release for the TPLF.
Furthermore, the conflict in the Tigray Region is poised to be a humanitarian disaster for both Ethiopia and Sudan. The border with Sudan will remain a gateway for fleeing civilians and potentially combatants, with Sudanese and UN authorities saying that they are preparing for approximately 100,000 refugees over the coming weeks. According to UN reports and local Sudanese sources, the majority of the crossings are occurring near Hamdayat in Kassala State, with Luqdi in Gedaref State being another major point of refugee inflows. FORECAST: The displacement will cause immense strain on Sudanese authorities who lack the resources to deal with such a massive inflow of people, in rural areas with lack of infrastructure. Further exacerbating the crisis is the fact that both Kassala and Gedaref states have witnessed intense ethnic conflicts, often over land disputes and resource competition, both internally as well as with Ethiopian farmers across the frontier. Access to land and resources are further likely to be further compromised by the refugee crisis.
PM Abiy likely to consolidate power, persecution of ethnic Tigray likely to intensify
Within days of the launch of the offensive, PM Abiy replaced his army chief and reshuffled his entire security cabinet in what the government termed as a regular change of staff. While initial reports sought to portray the replacement of the army chief as a sign of dissension within the ranks of the national security apparatus, it is notable that most of the individuals were given different responsibilities within the government hierarchy and not demoted, with few exceptions. This is likely a reflection of Abiy staffing key positions with people he regards as trustworthy and capable in handling the Tigray offensive, while also keeping the security hierarchy relatively stable. For example, Temesgen Tiruneh resigned from his post as President of Amhara Region and was appointed as the intelligence chief, likely because he is a known confidant and ally of the PM.
However, PM Abiy’s consolidation within the security establishment, with the appointment of trusted aides runs the risk of the government disregarding any dissenting voices, and concern over the effect of the war on internal cohesion. FORECAST: The government is likely to continue seeking to portray complete support for the ENDF and its operations in Tigray by organizing additional pro-government demonstrations, events, and blood drives, as has been seen across the country. However, these activities are propped up by the fact that the government has arrested some of its most strident critics, especially in the Oromia Region, where opposition politicians such as Jawar Mohammad and Eskinder Nega remain and will continue to remain imprisoned or under house arrest in the coming months. Furthermore, the government’s suppression of the press will allow the administration to portray public support for the Tigray operations, while the internet blackout in Tigray allows the government to project its battlefield successes.
FORECAST: In Addis Ababa, the government and the security agencies will likely continue with the arrests of TPLF leaders and ethnic Tigray linked to the party. Security agencies will also likely periodically publish information about raids conducted wherein the government uncovered large caches of weapons, they alleged were to be used by TPLF elements to cause insecurity in the city. However, at the time of writing, the TPLF has not demonstrated any capability to conduct large-scale attacks in Addis Ababa, the potential for disgruntled TPLF elements or supporters to conduct small-scale incidents such as the throwing or planting of grenades as witnessed on November 11, and November 14.
FORECAST: More broadly, while PM Abiy has stated that the war in Tigray was aimed specifically against the TPLF and not the ethnic Tigray, this nuance is likely to get further ignored over the coming months. Multiple reports have indicated that ethnic Tigray working within the government have been relieved of their positions, while the government has also sought to remove Tigray security officials from positions of power within regional organizations. These assessments are bolstered by the African Union’s sacking of its head of security on November 11, after a memo from the Ethiopian defense ministry questioned the ethnic Tigray officer’s loyalty to Addis Ababa. This perceived sense of persecution by the government is likely to filter through into other areas of the country, leading to a heightened potential for attacks on ethnic Tigray by majority communities. Ultimately, the conflict with the TPLF will likely herald entrenched insecurity within Ethiopia over the coming weeks and months.
Recommendations
Those operating or residing in Ethiopia over the coming days are advised to avoid all travel to Tigray Region as well as the Tigray-Amhara border region due to the ongoing conflict.
Those in Tigray Region are advised to minimize all movement. Consider contingency and evacuation plans when possible.
Travel to Addis Ababa may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance in crowded areas due to the high risks of non-violent personal property crime.
Those operating or residing in Oromia Region’s West Wollega Zone are advised to maintain heightened vigilance over the coming days and be prepared to comply with additional or sudden security measures and checkpoints.
Those operating in Ethiopia and particularly in Addis Ababa are advised to consult with us for support at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434.
Democratic transition stalls, military influence increases as COVID-19 pandemic threatens revolutionary gains – Sudan Special Report
Executive Summary
Following the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, the democratic transition in Sudan has largely stalled due to myriad factors, leading to a precarious security, economic, and political situation.
The government negotiations with armed groups remain fractious, with the rebel groups bound together in unwieldy alliances that undercut any progress made in talks. This tension is best exemplified by the fragmentation of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) coalition and tensions between factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North.
Further exacerbating the situation is friction between groups within the Declaration of Freedom and Change (DFC), with composite groups disagreeing on the state of relations with the military. This situation is further complicated by the inability of civilian opposition to protest given restrictions imposed due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
However, the volatile political climate is aggravated by the crippled Sudanese economy. While PM Abdallah Hamdok has attempted to get foreign investment, these efforts are stifled by Khartoum’s presence on the US ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’ list, which disallows aid and funding from international financial institutions.
Ultimately, the precarious political and economic situation will suppress the influence of the civilian wing of the government, allowing the military, which retains cash reserves and revenue through various state-owned companies, to increase their political influence.
Travel to Khartoum may continue while adhering to standard security protocols regarding criminal activity, while remaining cognizant of authorities’ instructions regarding restrictions, quarantines, and health procedures due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
Introduction
A little more than a year after the toppling of President Omar al-Bashir on April 11, 2019 through military intervention spurred by months of massive nonviolent protests nationwide, the stability of Sudan remains precarious. Despite the appointment of the widely-respected Abdallah Hamdok as PM and the signing of a power-sharing deal, the transitional government of the military and the Declaration of Freedom and Change (DFC) revolutionary council of groups remains fragile. This fragility remains despite the signing of a constitutional declaration on August 4, 2019, which laid out the transitional agenda, including the new institutional arrangements for sustained peace. This agenda also included securing a peace deal with armed groups within the first six months of the transitional period.
This process has stalled, even as it is being implemented in the form of peace talks brokered by South Sudan in Juba starting in October 2019. The peace talks were set up as a platform to create a truce between myriad armed groups in the outlying areas of Sudan in return for the safe participation of rebel leaders in the national political process in Khartoum. However, these talks have become the main forum for political negotiations between the government and the rebel groups, upstaging and undermining the role of institutional transition, which remains an unfulfilled promise as envisioned by the constitutional declaration. The efforts of the government to bring the disparate armed groups into mainstream Sudanese polity is further undermined by the internal fragility of the armed groups and the myriad objectives of the groups engaged in discussions.
Key Actors & Groups
Sovereign Council: The Sovereign Council is the collective body that rules as the head of state. It consists of five civilians chosen by the Declaration of Freedom and Change (DFC), five military representatives, and one civilian chosen by common consent.
Declaration of Freedom and Change (DFC): The DFC is a political coalition of civilian and rebel groups. The DFC consists of members such as the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), unionist groups, and armed groups such as the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF).
Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA): The SPA is an umbrella organization consisting of 17 different trade unions. The group played an integral role in the mass protests that led to the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in 2019.
Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF): The SRF is an alliance of armed groups from across the country that was formed in 2011 in opposition to al-Bashir. Following the overthrow of Bashir, the SRF has engaged in negotiations with Khartoum over positions in the transitional government.
Current Situation
Negotiations between the Sudanese government led by PM Abdallah Hamdok and the SRF that were supposed to conclude on June 20 with a final peace deal were reportedly extended again.
The breakdown between the government and SRF continued to be on matters of security arrangements, the system of governance, and the wealth and power distribution within the transitional government.
Assessments & Forecast
Eventual fragmentation of SRF likely to open new fronts of negotiations
The stagnation of the peace process is best exemplified by the talks between the government and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition of nine Darfuri groups that have long been at odds with the government under former President al-Bashir. While the government negotiators and SRF leaders have managed to sign provisional agreements over resource sharing in Darfur and the cessation of hostilities by either the government security forces or the armed group, a comprehensive peace agreement remains elusive. The government has made some transitional justice in Darfur a priority and has actively worked to earn the confidence of the populace in Darfur. Steps such as PM Hamdok visiting Darfur in November 2019 and the continued prosecution of al-Bashir for both corruption and atrocities committed in Darfur have been hailed as much needed in building trust between Khartoum and the outlying areas of Sudan. Furthermore, the government has also sought to placate and empower the SRF by allotting four seats on the powerful Sovereign Council to the group.
These developments are threatened by factionalism within the SRF, as various previously antagonistic groups attempt to garner as much influence with the negotiations as possible, while also aiming to consolidate power within the SRF. This was illustrated by the withdrawal of the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM) from the SRF on May 18 after consistently being rebuffed in its requests for reforms in the SRF structure that is currently headed by Hadi Idriss of the Sudan Liberation Movement – Transitional Council (SLM-TC). The SLM-MM, whose leader Minni Minnawi was the SRF deputy leader, has consistently criticized the organization of the SRF, while other groups such as the SLM-TC stress the need for progressing in the peace talks with the government and dealing with internal structural issues at a later date.
By withdrawing from the SRF, the SLM-MM is demonstrating its lack of faith in the ability of the group to negotiate with the government on even terms, given the structural instability within the SRF. However, that the SLM-MM has established its own SRF wing, which includes the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM-Dabajo) led by Bakheet Abdelkarim, is illustrative of the SLM-MM aiming to upstage the original SRF movement led by the SLM-TC. FORECAST: The breakaway faction is likely to pressure the government to negotiate with its constituents in the coming weeks and claiming that the new group is more internally stable than the original SRF organization given that it has fewer members.
FORECAST: To that end, the breakaway SRF will claim that any agreements made between Khartoum and the SLM-MM led faction would stand a better chance at actually being implemented. Additionally, the SLM-MM is likely to talk to other rebel groups within the original SRF to get them to secede and join the new faction, thereby escalating tensions between the already antagonistic groups. That said, the smaller size of the new SRF faction means that the government will likely continue negotiations with both groups simultaneously. The government will likely negotiate with both groups as a leveraging tactic and as a strategy to allow for more maneuvering space. This is likely given the entrenched distrust between both groups, and thereby the government will use this animosity to push for quicker resolutions in negotiations. However, given the wide variety of issues that need to be resolved, it remains unclear if such a strategy will succeed.
Progress with SPLM-N factions remains limited, with distrust between the groups remaining persistent
Meanwhile, the government has made some progress with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) faction led by Malik Agar in terms of integrating the group into the political mainstream. On May 2, the government and the SPLM-N Agar agreed to reintegrate rebel fighters into the Sudanese military, police, security and intelligence, wildlife, customs, and civil defense. The government also granted the SPLM-N Agar areas to establish military camps in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. However, these developments have provoked protests from the rivaling SPLM-N al-Hilu faction, which accused the government of favoring the SPLM-N Agar and stated that the land allotted to established military camps was untenable, given that the Agar faction has a presence in Blue Nile, but does not control any land in South Kordofan or the Nuba Mountains, which remain an al-Hilu stronghold.
In this context, talks between the government and the SPLM-N al-Hilu faction remain volatile, given the group’s initial decision to refuse to negotiate until the government agrees to secularization and self-determination for the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile regions. However, given that SPLM-N al Hilu faction then agreed to restart negotiations with the government, excluding the points of secularization and self-determination, is indicative of al-Hilu’s cognizance that any government agreement with the Agar faction could lead to Khartoum favoring the rival group.
Ultimately, the renewal of talks with the SPLM-N al Hilu suggests progress, given the group remains one of the major armed factions in Sudan and controls a significant portion of territory. However, the decision of the SPLM-N al-Hilu to resume talks has likely not been made in good faith, given that the group only agreed to discuss issues that preclude the topics of secularization and self-determination. These issues are particularly important to them as a major segment of the population under their control is Christian and Animist, unlike the majority of Sudan. These groups perceive that, without concessions on these issues, they remain vulnerable to attack by Islamist government forces, as was seen by an attack by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in October 2019, which led to a suspension of the talks. In this context, it is likely that the group is only resuming talks to prevent the government from overly favoring the Agar faction. FORECAST: Given these conditions, it is possible that the government may agree to small concessions to the group, however, a larger peace deal will likely remain out of reach as the government contends with various Islamist groups and factions and their interests.
Factionalism within the DFC likely to further help the military undermine transitional efforts
Following the ouster of al-Bashir, factionalism within the Declaration of Freedom and Change (DFC) has increased over the past year. This is in contrast to the disparate groups within the political opposition working together with the common purpose of the revolution and preventing the military establishment from gaining total control in the aftermath. However, transitional efforts have been slow and patience among the civilian opposition has waned, with groups such as the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), which was a major driving force of the revolution, perceiving that the transitional government has been slow to install civilians into positions of power.
This tension is best exemplified by PM Hamdok’s decision on April 18 to postpone the appointment of state governors, allegedly due to the fact that the PM was still holding consultations with the leaders of the SRF. The delays were exacerbated by the SRF insisting that they should have input on how governors are chosen, despite the fact that the group has not signed a comprehensive peace deal with the government. This stance agitated members of the DFC, who agreed that the democratic transition needed to be inclusive of those in the periphery, especially Darfur, but perceived the SRF to be stalling for time in their negotiations with the government. The DFC raised this as a concern that the military wing of the government would use the delays to further entrench themselves in positions of power. FORECAST: In this context, the military will likely use their influence with the current military-appointed state governors to disrupt any attempts to democratize state institutions. This deadlock has led to violent protests in many parts of Sudan, which has, in turn, led to military leaders cracking down on the demonstrations, as they claim these instances of civil unrest to be a threat to national security.
Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the DFC in pressuring the government to hasten the democratization process is undermined by divisions within the political coalition. This can be seen with the divergent approaches of the SPA and the National Ummah Party (NUP) led by former PM Sadiq al-Mahdi. The NUP has consistently aimed to undermine the DFC, despite being part of the coalition, likely in an attempt to gain favor with the military leaders. Even during the process of the negotiations for the constitutional agreement, al-Mahdi publicly stated his acceptance of the military leadership in the country, as opposed to a power-sharing agreement. Most recently, the NUP froze all its activities in the DFC, criticizing what it perceived to be excessive demands by the armed groups during negotiations with the transitional government.
In contrast, the SPA remains highly suspicious of the military and consistently voices its disagreement on occasions where it perceives that the civilian government under PM Hamdok is ceding too much control to the military generals. The SPA has sought to preserve its influence nationwide by keeping neighborhood resistance committees active and occasionally holding protests to pressure the government into adhering to its schedule of democratization, though this approach has been disrupted by COVID-19 restrictions. The SPA has also taken divergent stances in terms of dealing with armed rebel groups, exemplified by the SPA’s support for the SPLM-N al-Hilu demand for a secular state and self-governance of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile State. This position is at odds with the DFC position, which has tended to downplay the SPLM-N al-Hilu’s demands, likely perceiving that any acquiescence to secular demands could lead to a loss of support to the government from the various Islamist groups present within the DFC.
FORECAST: The NUP will likely continue to issue statements criticizing the DFC and the government while positioning itself close to the military establishment. Al-Mahdi likely perceives that any possible eventual failure of the transitional government and subsequent increase in military control would allow the former PM to be positioned to be the civilian face of the military-dominated government. However, given that the generals are unlikely to be willing to divest much influence to even nominal supporters such as al-Mahdi, the NUP’s impact in national politics is likely to remain one of complication, rather than of any real influence. More broadly, the military generals are likely to portray the NUP’s support, and the SPA’s public divergences in policy choices, as proof of the DFC’s disorganized nature as a threat to national security, further putting pressure on the government to cede influence to the military.
Fallout from COVID-19 pandemic likely to further cripple government standing, strengthen military control
Sudan recorded its first case of COVID-19 on March 13, with the majority of cases being reported in Khartoum. However, the disease has expanded its reach exponentially, with the number of cases now doubling approximately every 13 days. The authorities remain ill-equipped to deal with the pandemic with contact tracing procedures remaining relatively non-existent. In this context, the medical infrastructure already incapacitated by decades of authoritarian rule under Omar al-Bashir has all but collapsed. The nationwide lockdown prevented doctors from going to work, with some professionals self-isolating due to the severe lack of protective equipment. The resulting staff shortages have led to many hospitals shutting down, with existing doctors noting that the burgeoning infection and mortality rates are likely being caused by the breakdown in healthcare services. While the government has implemented strict curfews and implored the citizenry to follow social distancing protocols, the low public knowledge of the disease has led to many of these instructions being ignored.
That said, while the military has precluded the treatment of COVID-19 patients in its hospitals, military leaders have used the pandemic to jostle for more influence while improving their image among the public. This is best exemplified by the fact that the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohammed Hamdan “Hemetti”, took advantage of the cracks within the DFC to rise to head the Emergency Economic Committee, a powerful ad hoc panel which decides matters of national importance such as economic reforms and the national response to COVID-19. Hemetti further attempted to burnish his image by pledging to deposit 200 million USD of his own money into the Central Bank to tackle the economic and COVID crisis.
Amid this play for power by Hemetti, he remains cognizant of his negative reputation among the population and international community given the RSF’s violent repression in Darfur during the al-Bashir era. Given this wariness, Hemetti has sought to allow PM Hamdok deputy positions in government committees, including the Emergency Economic Committee. The PM has not been the driving force for the democratic transition, instead seeking consensus from a fractured DFC, the military establishment, or in many cases both parties. However, such consensus has been difficult to achieve, given the parties involved are at odds with each other. Hamdok has also lost trust within the DFC after he rejected the nomination of DFC figures as state governors. The DFC perceives the PM as being too willing to acquiesce to the demands of the military establishment, with this perception being further bolstered by Hamdok’s statement that he viewed his relationship with the generals as a “partnership which is working,” despite the PM’s power being gradually stripped away.
Exacerbating the situation is the continued downward spiral of the Sudanese economy, with PM Hamdok’s attempts to liberalize the economy being disrupted by the DFC, who have consistently sought to block the implementation of policies that would allow for investment from the “Friends of Sudan” group of foreign donors, which includes the USA, France, Germany, Britain, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt. One of the major demands of foreign investors is the removal of a crippling system of subsidies on fuel and wheat. While the removal of subsidies is a way to halt the repeated monetized deficits and currency collapses in the medium term, it will likely lead to a further rise in prices of these essential goods in the short term, which greatly affects members of the DFC, of which unions play an important part. Furthermore, inflation continues to near 100 percent, with experts estimating that the COVID-19 pandemic will cause the economy to contract by seven percent. On the street, there remains considerable discontent over the inability of the government to control the rising prices of goods and services.
Since taking office in 2018, PM Hamdok has sought to solve Sudan’s economic woes by attempting to garner financial support and pledges of aid from various Western governments, most notably the US. In December 2019, Hamdok arrived in Washington, DC, becoming the first Sudanese leader to officially visit the country since 1985 as a result of President al-Bashir’s decision in the 1990s to provide havens for various jihadist leaders such as Osama bin Laden. These policies led Sudan to be placed onto the US ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’ list. While on this list, the US government is mandated to veto any debt relief for Sudan from international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
While being on the ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’ list does not place Sudan under formal sanctions, the designation acts as a deterrent to foreign investment and debt relief efforts. Khartoum has gone to significant lengths to prove its commitment to reform, including agreeing to pay damages for its role in the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. While the exact amount of damages has not been made public, the depressed state of the Sudanese economy will make it hard for any damages to be paid, which may further delay any US assistance.
FORECAST: Furthermore, given that US President Donald Trump has decided against fast-tracking Sudan’s removal from the list, this means that the case will likely be caught between the various committees of the State Department, national security agencies, and the US Congress. Ultimately, while the government is likely to continue pleading with the US to take Sudan off the list, Khartoum will likely remain low on the list of priorities for Washington, thereby further delaying any prospect of economic recovery through international investment.
In this context, while the government has traditionally been unable to borrow money from international donors and institutions, Khartoum has received relatively regular aid from China and the Gulf states. The Arab governments, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have generally been significant donors, though much of this aid has been directed toward the military generals with an aim to control the levers of power within government and aid the Gulf states in their strategic aims. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to historically low oil prices, denting the economies of the Gulf countries, leading to pay freezes and layoffs. Another source of foreign exchange that has been affected by the pandemic layoffs is the remittances sent home by Sudanese workers in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as both countries have implemented the prioritization of nationals in the workforce. Recent estimates are that remittances are expected to drop by approximately 20 percent given the layoffs, meaning that this money, which is often the sole source of income for families in Sudan, will diminish, thereby heightening insecurity and strife among the populace.
FORECAST: The government and PM Hamdok will continue to seek international assistance and investment, mainly garnered through donor conferences such as the ‘Friends of Sudan’ conference slated to be held in Berlin in June 2021. However, given that the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a global economic downturn, with many of the wealthy foreign nations facing slowing growth or recessions, it remains highly uncertain whether these countries will be willing to pledge the large sums of money required to resuscitate the Sudanese economy. In this context, the military establishment will use its control of state-owned companies to keep patronage networks functioning, thereby further undermining the government.
FORECAST: In this context, the shortage of funds for the government is likely to further bolster the standing of the military. The military is unlikely to be affected by a lack of funds as it owns approximately 100 state-run companies, including establishments that sell lucrative commodities such as gold, gum arabic, oil, water, and weaponry. The military also has deep connections with the banks, telecommunications, and real estate, which means that the generals will likely remain liquid financially, money which they can lend to the government or use to gain control of government committees such as the Emergency Economic Committee. While the government has approved a plan to liquidate and privatize many government companies that do not pay taxes and are connected to the military elites, it remains to be seen how well this plan can be implemented. Given that many of the business elites in Sudan are allied to the military leaders, this means that any bidding process for these companies will also likely be compromised. Given these conditions, the government will likely struggle to raise funds for essential services. These entrenched issues mean that the political transition in Sudan will remain highly volatile in the coming months.
Recommendations
Travel to Khartoum may continue while adhering to standard security protocols regarding criminal activity, while remaining cognizant of authorities’ instructions regarding restrictions, quarantines, and health procedures due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
Immediately consult a doctor if you are concerned that you have potentially contracted the disease. Only procedure medication and medical advice from vetted professional institutions and remain cognizant of any fake or counterfeit medication.
Those operating or residing in Khartoum, as well as other urban centers across Sudan, are advised to avoid the vicinity of all gatherings and protests given the associated risks of violence.
We advise against all travel to the Darfur region as well as South Kordofan and Blue Nile states given the volatile security situation.
For any further questions or consultation, please contact us at [email protected] or +44 203 540 0434.
Transitional government attempts to revive economy, while challenges remain over opposition cohesion, military consolidation – Sudan Analysis
Executive Summary
The transitional government is likely to focus on reviving the crippled Sudanese economy, with PM Abdullah Hamdok likely looking to realign the budget, rerouting funds from military expenditure towards social welfare programs. However, these military budget cuts retain the potential for increased tensions between the security establishment and the civilian authority in the government.
Another major challenge for PM Hamdok will be the ability to keep the political opposition united given the disparate groups that form the Declaration of Freedom and Change (DFC). The military is likely to focus on the divisions between the various groups within the DFC in an attempt to break the coalition and thereby consolidate power in the coming months.
That said, there will remain latent tensions within the military establishment over relations between General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader Mohammed Hamdan “Hemetti” especially over the latter’s control of lucrative gold mines in the outlying regions, which leave the RSF in a better position to fund and pay its troops in coming months.
Current Situation
An eleven-member Sovereign Council was formed on August 20, to be led by General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan for the next 21 months. On September 8, an 18-member cabinet led by PM Abdalla Hamdok was sworn in.
On September 9, the Sovereign Council and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) agreed to start peace talks in October with a final peace agreement slated to be signed by the end of the year. Meanwhile, Abdel Wahid al-Nur, leader of (SPLM-N) stated that he did not recognize the transitional government, and withdrew from ongoing negotiations with Khartoum on September 10.
Severe bread and fuel shortages were reported in various parts of the country on September 14, resulting in repeated protests in Kassala, South Darfur, and Khartoum states over the subsequent days and weeks.
On September 14, the acting governor of South Kordofan ordered an immediate stop to all gold mining activities in the state as reported on September 14 following multiple protests against Rapid Support Forces (RSF) owned mines over chemical polluting the local environment.
In the first joint meeting of the Sovereign Council and the cabinet, the two bodies amended Transitional Constitutional Document that allows the appointment of the Attorney General and the Chief Justice on October 2.
The US Assistant Secretary of State said on October 2 that Sudan’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terror list is “a process, not an event”. Following this, the Sudanese pound’s exchange rate hit a new low against foreign currencies.
PM Hamdok continued to warn of disastrous consequences for Sudan if the world did not negotiate in getting the country removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 3. In connection, the World Bank on October 4 stated that Sudan needed to meet minimum criteria before it could be given foreign debt relief.
Assessments & Forecast
Transitional government likely to focus heavily on reviving economy, though attempts to realign budget likely to face military pushback
On September 28, new Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok urged the US to remove Sudan from its list of “state sponsors of terrorism”, framing it as punishing Sudan for the acts of the former government. Hamdok’s focus on getting Sudan removed from that list is indicative of the crippling effects that the sanctions, which makes the country ineligible for much-needed debt relief and funding from international institutions, as well as limits potential foreign investment. In this context, there remains considerable doubt over the new Sudanese government’s ability to revive its stagnant economy, a priority given that protests against the former President Omar al-Bashir’s government started in December 2018 over the rise in prices of essential commodities amid skyrocketing inflation.
That said, in the short term the government will likely look to prioritize fiscal reforms, as well as measures to contain inflationary pressures and boost productivity in critical sectors. In this endeavor, the transitional government will likely look to leverage the legitimacy and trust gained from the successful implementation of the first stage of the power-sharing agreement to reform the budget and cut spending. Previous budgets have focused on the security apparatus, state transfers, and subsidies, which together make up 70 percent of the official budget. FORECAST: To better highlight its credentials as a civilian government, the PM will likely look to realign the budget to give greater priority to health, education, and social welfare, which together are currently allocated less than 10 percent of budgetary expenses. In this context, in the near term, there remains a heightened possibility that anti-government protests will begin recurring in the coming months if the government does not take immediate steps to reduce high of bread, while also alleviating chronic fuel shortages. Given the security forces disposition towards forcibly suppressing protests, makes it likely that any renewed protests will likely be met with force.
Additionally, given that security sector wages account for approximately 60 percent of all government salaries, reducing military personnel and costs will likely prove to be a politically sensitive and difficult process requiring support from the armed forces and its leaders in the transitional administration. In this context, realigning the budget will likely prove to be a major flashpoint and source of tensions between the PM and the Sovereign Council, which is led by senior military figures such as General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader Mohammed Hamdan ‘Hemetti’. The military establishment will likely not countenance any cuts to the budgets, which could lead to a reduction in salaries for the armed forces, especially given their long-established practice of keeping the security forces well stocked and thereby relatively reliable even in times of nationwide upheaval as witnessed during the most recent nationwide protests. FORECAST: In this scenario, any attempts by the government to trim the security budget is likely to lead to consternation by the security establishment, as they will likely perceive the move to be the civilian authority under PM Hamdok attempting to curb the military’s influence on crucial revenue streams, thereby heightening the potential for civil-military unrest in the coming months, however this unrest is remains unlikely to devolve into large-scale violence at this time.
Furthermore, over the coming months, the biggest obstacles to the government in reforming the economy will be to dismantle the entrenched patronage networks that continue to hold control all institutions and key sectors of the economy. One of the sectors where this reform is most crucial is the gold mining industry, a sector which has taken on additional significance following the loss of nearly 70 percent of oil production after South Sudan seceded in 2011. Sudan is Africa’s third-largest producer of gold, with production in 2018 officially stated to be 93 tons which is equivalent to approximately 4 billion USD, with gold also now being Sudan’s main source of hard currency. That said, the al-Bashir government used the gold sector for patronage and to secure loyalties, often leading to huge inefficiencies and leaving companies tied to political interests and the security services. Such practices are best exemplified in South Kordofan where multiple gold mines are controlled by the RSF and Hemetti, who often uses the revenue from the mines to enrich himself and to assure the loyalty of his forces. FORECAST: In this context, any efforts to open up the mining sector to private investment will likely directly lead to tensions with elements of the security establishment, who may perceive that privatization of hitherto public assets would lead to them losing control of a major revenue stream.
PM Hamdok faces challenge of balancing competing factions within DFC, delivering on expectations of justice
One of the major defining traits of the protests that forced the military coup that finally toppled al-Bashir and then eventually led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement between the TMC and the Declaration of Freedom and Change (DFC) was the cohesiveness of the political opposition. The SPA’s role in circulating information about resistance activities meant that the movement was able to sustain its momentum and regularly stage demonstrations. The cohesiveness of the protest movement also proved vital in the talks concerning the transitional rule too, as it helped the military and the mediators identify counterparts within the DFC that, while not directly representing various opposition groups, enjoyed a relative degree of credibility as representatives of the political opposition.
The DFC also consists of parties such as the umbrella group of Darfuri armed groups known as the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), who have consistently petitioned for positions within the transitional government. However, following the signing of the power-sharing deal, the SRF currently holds no position in the Sovereign Council, which is likely suggestive of the DFC’s reticence in allowing the SRF back into the mainstream political space. In this context, the SRF continues to lobby for amendments to the Constitutional Declaration drafted and signed by the DFC and TMC. The SRF contends that they represent marginalized areas in the country, such as Darfur. That said, in the unlikely event of the government acquiescing to the SRF demands, it is notable that the SRF body is composed of myriad armed groups who have often clashed with each other during the long conflict against the government. This means that while the SRF appears to be united in the short term, any government rapprochement towards the group is likely to heighten internal tensions with the SRF, as the various leaders of the armed groups jostle for superiority and the chance to be presented with a lucrative cabinet position in Khartoum. FORECAST: Ultimately, the government is likely to continue negotiating with the SRF, to maintain the appearance of the administration wanting to facilitate pan-Sudan representation within the government while continuing to block the entrance of such volatile entities into the already delicate power-sharing agreement between the opposition and the military.
FORECAST: In this context, the SRF demands for constitutional amendments would inevitably slow down the process of establishing independent institutions in Sudan including a free judiciary along with the Legislative Council, whose vote is necessary to even initiate any legal action against Sovereign Council members such as Hemetti and other military leaders who the vast majority of the political opposition hold responsible for atrocities against protesters during the revolution to depose al-Bashir. In the event that the government ceded to the SRF demands of amendments to the constitutional agreement, the decision would then raise tensions within the political opposition, including the SPA, who using their neighborhood committees have already held mass protests in Khartoum and other urban centers reiterating the demand that governmental reforms be sped up. These protests were then dispersed by the security forces who likely considered the gatherings as a threat to national security.
While PM Hamdok has consistently stated the need for Sudan to build truly independent institutions including the judiciary, there remains a tension between the kind of justice that friction between the armed rebel movements and the DFC leadership, caused by diverging priorities concerning the emerging political order in Sudan. While the protesters led by the SPA strive to establish a civil rights-based rule, the parts of the DFC from the outlying areas of Sudan prioritize achieving peace and security and ending regional marginalization. The SRF initially rejected the Constitutional Declaration on the basis that it inadequately addresses the question of peace in conflict areas such as Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan. FORECAST: Following the signing of the peace agreement, Darfur has witnessed a relative increase in violence against civilians by paramilitary forces including the RSF. This development and local actors’ disappointment at the way the Constitutional Declaration addresses the conflict situations puts the armed groups at odds with the emerging regime. While the agreement over the peace roadmap is a promising sign, frustration at the lack of progress in the peace processes will heighten the potential for increased violence in the outlying areas of Sudan over the coming months.
Military likely to seek to exploit opposition fragmentation in bid to consolidate power, though threat of internal split remains
Despite the positive development of power-sharing agreement between the military and the political opposition, security establishment backlash and consolidation of the military rule remains a real possibility. Sudan has a history of authoritarian backsliding, following similar successful non-violent uprisings in 1964 and 1985. Both movements were followed by a military takeover after a few years of tenuous and unstable multi-party rule. In this sense, the deep roots of military autocratic rule in Sudan are unlikely to dissipate easily. Generals such as Burhan and Hemetti are accustomed to exercising power and likely view themselves as cornerstones and essential elements for political and security stability. In this context, a full transition to civilian rule would likely lead to weakening in their powers, which would then expose them to possible legal retribution for alleged crimes against the population over the past two decades.
In contrast, the leadership in the DFC remains relatively inexperienced in ruling the state, as even PM Hamdok while a respected figure has resided and worked for much of his life outside of Sudan. However, given the protesters, relative success in indirectly leading to the deposition of al-Bashir, and forcing the TMC into agreeing to sign a power-sharing agreement with a commitment to eventually transitioning to a civilian government raises expectations to a high level. FORECAST: In this context, the military will likely aim to exploit differences within the DFC by negotiating deals with parties such as the SRF and the National Ummah Party (NUP), which have criticized the constitutional agreement for its failure to appoint SRF or NUP leaders to positions of influence within the cabinet. Furthermore, the military is likely to use the differences within the DFC to deepen existing fissures within the DFC, all the while using opposition disunity to consolidate power.
FORECAST: While the military is likely to use divisions within the DFC as a method to consolidate control of the country, there remains an underlying yet persistent possibility of splits within the security establishment itself. While General Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Hemetti are both parts of the Sovereign Council as President and Vice President, there have been persistent tensions between the two groups over control of assets and resources. That said, the constitutional declaration shows an effort to simultaneously control the military by placing the RSF under the authority of the SAF, there remains doubt over whether this hierarchy can be maintained.
The position of the RSF is particularly precarious position with regard to the transition, as its involvement in the transitional bodies is unpopular as the force is perceived to be responsible for the June 3 crackdown on protesters in Khartoum, which is thought to have killed over 100 people. However, Hemetti’s position as Vice President of the Sovereign Council makes it exceedingly difficult for the political opposition to exclude the group. FORECAST: While Burhan and Hemetti have thus far resolved to work together within the transitional government framework, fragmentation within the DFC could lead to both leaders jostling to consolidate power within the government, which could then further exacerbate existing tensions between the two generals. Ultimately, the political and security environment in Sudan is expected to remains tense for the foreseeable future.
Recommendations
Those operating or residing in Khartoum, as well as other urban centers across Sudan, are advised to avoid the vicinity of all gatherings and protests given the continued risks of violence.
We advise against all travel to the Darfur region as well as South Kordofan and Blue Nile states given the volatile security situation caused by ongoing violence between the government and armed rebel groups as well as inter-communal clashes.
Those in Sudan are advised to maintain contingency and evacuation plans due to the continued risks of operating in the country during the political transition.
For any further questions or consultation, please contact us at [email protected] or +44 203 540 0434.
Car Ramming Attack on Parliament Illustrates the Continuing Impact of Declining Islamic State’s Ideology on Disenchanted Migrants – London Alert
Please be advised
At 07:37 (local time) on August 14, an individual drove a vehicle at speed towards a security barrier outside Parliament, Westminster, London. Three people were lightly injured and security forces immediately arrested the individual without further violence. The area was closed to the public for several hours while security forces determined that the vehicle posed no further risk and no weapons were inside.
The Met Police stated later on August 14 that the incident was being considered a militant attack and that the suspect was refusing to cooperate with investigations.
Reports from the morning of August 15 state that the individual is 29-years-old, originally from Sudan, living in Birmingham. Footage from the area reportedly shows the vehicle used in the attack circling Parliament several times before the incident took place.
Security forces reportedly carried out raids on residences in the central UK cities of Birmingham and Nottingham as part of the investigation into a supposed militant attack in London on August 14.
The suspect’s lack of resistance to being arrested and absence of weapons inside the car differentiate the incident from recent Islamist militant attacks. Therefore, while he may have been inspired by previous vehicular attacks, it remains unlikely that he had direct links with an Islamist group, such as Islamic State (IS). As with previous similar incidents, it is possible that the attacker was suffering from a psychological disorder, which played a role in motivating the attack.
With that, the raids in Birmingham and Nottingham may have been precautionary and do not necessarily indicate the assailants links to an established or well-coordinated militant cell. However, there is a possibility that the individual was part of a small locally radicalized cell of untrained individuals who subscribe to the ideology of IS.
Given the details released about the suspect, the incident reiterates the risk of incitement to commit attacks among migrant populations who perceive themselves to be disenfranchised. This risk is amplified among young males, who are generally far more susceptible to feelings of frustration over such sentiments and are also more likely to become self-radicalized. Furthermore, the incident underscores that, even with the decline of the Islamic State, the aftereffects of their ideology and modus operandi on the collective consciousness of the West, particularly among disenchanted migrants, continues to inspire attacks.
The incident also reflects the popularity of the vehicular method for those intending to carry out indiscriminate attacks, regardless of ideology. The popularity of the method stems from the ease with which attacks can be carried out and the difficulty for security forces to be warned before the incident
Despite the unlikelihood of the suspect being directly linked to an organized group, militant organizations, like IS, may attempt to claim responsibility or connection to the incident in order to increase perceptions of their threat in the UK and Europe in general.
Recommendations
Travel to London may continue while maintaining vigilance for possible militant related activity.
Alert authorities immediately to any suspicious behavior or items.
Recent developments in Darfur highlight Sudan’s security dilemma of past armament of local militias; local escalation of conflict likely – Sudan Special Analysis
Current Situation
The Sudanese government launched a large-scale disarmament campaign in Darfur in October, as part of an effort to marginalize local militias and mitigate the threat they pose to the central government. Musa Hilal, the head of the Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council (SARC), refused to comply with demands for disarmament, and alleged that the campaign was launched deliberately to target him.
In response, Hilal, also the head of the Border Guards militia, was reportedly arrested by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in a raid in Misteriya, North Darfur State, alongside his children, as well as other senior members of the SARC on November 26.
Reports indicate that dozens of people were killed in clashes between Border Guards militia and the RSF in Misteriya on November 29, when the RSF raided the Border Guards headquarters in response to an ambush of their vehicles the day prior. The RSF had reportedly besieged the town ahead of Hilal’s arrest, and remains heavily deployed in the area.
On December 1, the SARC released a statement condemning the arrest of their leader, and threatened revenge against the Sudanese government, particularly the RSF militia. They further noted that the arrest was a violation of the entire Rizeigat Arab tribe, as Hilal is the tribal leader of its Mahamid clan.
Background
Musa Hilal is most notorious for being a founder of the Janjaweed in 2003, organizing the loose coalition of armed Arab militias at the behest of the Sudanese government to put down the rebellions in Darfur. Hilal was eventually named as a suspect of genocide by the US State Department in 2004 and individually sanctioned by the UN in 2006 for his role in the ethnic cleansing of several tribes in the region.
Hilal came to be the head of a subset of the Janjaweed known as the Border Guards. After the war in Darfur largely subsided, the unit was later formally integrated into Sudanese military intelligence, now consisting of thousands of people, including 3,000 militia in Hilal’s home area in North Darfur.
Other elements of the Janjaweed became part of the newly-formed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in 2013, which operates in coordination with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and is deployed throughout the country’s conflict zones in the western and southern regions, with another contingent sent overseas to fight in Yemen with the Saudi coalition.
Assessments & Forecast
Militia Groups Formerly Supported By Government Now Present Main Security Dilemma
Throughout the the outlying regions, and particularly in Darfur, the Sudanese government armed militias to fight local rebellions, with relatively high rates of successes in these campaigns. Nonetheless, in the absence of an active mission, Khartoum has been left with well-equipped and combat-tested militias whose services are no longer needed, but present a threat as an armed group, acting as destabilizing agents in their regions as well as potential challengers to government authority. This is exacerbated by Sudan’s poor economic situation, leaving the government with fewer funds with which to pay off any militia leaders as necessary. Despite the widespread volatility of the region, Hilal and the SARC represented the largest group in Darfur that was in rebellion to the government in all but name, thus bolstering the likelihood that the disarmament campaign was a specific effort to neutralize Hilal as a threat.
Despite the integral role that Musa Hilal played throughout the intensive phases of the conflict in Darfur, his arrest is the highly notable culmination of the rift between Hilal and President Omar al-Bashir that has been ongoing since 2013. Hilal had become more politically ambitious, demanding a prominent role in the central government, and claimed that he was not sufficiently rewarded for his role in crushing the rebellion. This has caused tensions and outright clashes in the past, including an armed confrontation with the SAF and RSF over control of Jabal Amer, the source of significant gold deposits in North Darfur. This period saw the founding of the SARC as a new movement, now thought to number between 8 to 10,000 people, as a vehicle for Hilal’s political and tribal agenda, serving as a prominent example of the extent of the threat posed to the central government by previously supported local militias. Bashir has been increasingly wary of Hilal, especially as the latter has become more vocally critical of Khartoum, particularly in condemning the deployment of troops to Yemen, urging his tribesmen not to participate.
These developments are additionally notable as it comes as Khartoum is engaged in peace talks with the Sudan Call opposition, with ceasefires extended throughout 2017. While there remain holdouts, notably the Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdelwahid al-Nur (SLM-AW), the power of these groups has considerably diminished and outright confrontations are intermittent, with the most recent clashes lasting about a month in June and July in Jebel Marra. Reports have circulated of cooperation between Hilal and the rebel groups, which would appear paradoxical given Hilal’s role in the campaign against them, but the calculus had shifted following Hilal’s falling-out with Bashir. This was further emphasized when the SLM – Minni Minawi (SLM-MM) issued a statement on November 28 calling for Hilal’s release.
FORECAST: With that said, while this is politically expedient for the rebel groups, the extent to which they would be willing to mobilize on Hilal’s behalf is likely limited. Rather, the threat they pose in this situation is opportunistic, and there is likely to be increased rebel activity as they seek to take advantage of the government’s focus on Hilal and the SARC in order to stage their own attacks on the SAF and RSF in their areas of operation within Darfur.
Involvement of Regional Actors
An additional element of this situation is Hilal’s ties to neighboring states, with the move to arrest him possibly triggered by suspicions that he is connected with Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA), whom President Bashir accuses of deliberately working to destabilize Darfur. While Haftar’s specific involvement in Sudan is less clear, his presence is broadly in Libya’s east, which also hosts hundreds of Darfuri rebels suspected to use Libyan territory to avoid Sudanese authorities and, at times, to launch attacks back into Sudan. Furthermore, there are indications that Darfuri militias are employed by rival factions in Libya, increasing the Darfuris’ capabilities with funds, and further weapons and experience. To this end, several top SARC members were arrested by the RSF while en route from Libya to Darfur in September, who Khartoum publicly accused of recruiting for Haftar. In addition to concerns about Hilal receiving material support from Haftar that could be used against Sudan, the Sudanese government has likely pointed to the foreign influence in efforts to undermine Hilal and the SARC, attempting to impugn their opposition as non-local, or driven by external forces rather than a legitimate cause for hostility toward Khartoum.
In addition to Libya, Hilal’s daughter is married to Chad’s President Idriss Deby, who could have represented a source of support as N’Djamena and Khartoum have clashed in the past. However, Deby made a statement on December 2 affirming his support for the disarmament, suggesting that this will be limited and, instead, Bashir’s willingness to arrest Hilal may have involved a signal from Deby that he would not interfere. Deby and Bashir have made a number of public steps in recent months to demonstrate improved relations, including discussions of a joint border force. It is possible that Deby sees the disarmament campaign as potentially stabilizing the Darfur region, which would improve the security situation on his eastern border. In this case, this suggests that Hilal will see little support from those familial ties, which could have been considerable given Chad’s formidable military. With that being said, it is unlikely that Chad will actively participate in any of the ensuing conflict in Darfur, instead tacitly allowing Bashir’s plans to go forward without interference on Hilal’s behalf.
Conflict Likely to Remain Localized with Tribal Features, Have Indirect Effects on Other Regions
The most substantial risk in the coming weeks and months is intra-tribal. Hilal’s precarious situation with Khartoum in 2014 was exacerbated by President Bashir taking the second-in-command of the Border Guards, General Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hametti’, who once served under Hilal in the Janjaweed, and appointing him to a coveted role as the head of the RSF, which reports directly to Bashir. Crucially, Hametti is the head of the Amhary clan, also in the Rezeigat Arab tribe, and in addition to the RSF troops that he commands, this directly pits him against Hilal both within the military as well as the tribe.
FORECAST: As a result, the coming conflict is likely to be within the Rezeigat tribe, dispersed across Darfur, between the factions backing their respective leaders. Although elders have been attempting to mediate in recent months, the arrest of Hilal is expected to ignite the in-fighting. Arresting Hilal’s sons and other SARC leadership may have been an attempt to eliminate potential replacements that could organize the movement, but the SARC’s immediate response suggests they nonetheless retain these capabilities. Both the ambushes and targeted attacks on RSF troops near Misteriya as well as the SARC statement swearing revenge are indicative that those loyal to Hilal are ready and willing to escalate the conflict. Furthermore, given the role that Hilal played in the formation of the Janjaweed, his popularity among his compatriots and disillusionment due to his treatment by the government may trigger defections from the RSF to the Border Guards and the SARC.
FORECAST: Following Hilal’s arrest, there is likely to be a continuation of the backlash that was seen with the immediate fallout, namely deliberate attacks and ambushes on RSF troops in the Misteriya area in North Darfur. However, this is liable to spread throughout northern and central Darfur, where the Rezeigat Arab tribe is located, and see tribal clashes that extend beyond specific attacks on militia forces to violence against rivaling villages and towns, including in al-Fasher and its environs. This comes amid the ongoing withdrawal of the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which has been in the process of handing over 11 military bases in Darfur to the RSF and SAF, better positioning them in the impending fight while removing a source of international oversight. Furthermore, as conflict intensifies between the Border Guards and RSF, President Bashir has little incentive to intervene or otherwise de-escalate the situation, as allowing the groups to fight each other necessarily weakens both, therefore relieving pressure on the government in managing the security threat of reining in the militias he first empowered years ago.
Given this dynamic, the forthcoming escalation is likely to be restricted to the Darfur Region. However, the re-deployment of troops from other conflict zones to Darfur as reinforcements may result in an uptick in militia activity in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, as other rebel groups seek to take advantage of any additional security vacuum.
Recommendations
Travel to Khartoum can continue while practicing security precautions regarding the threat of criminality.
We advise against travel to outlying areas of Sudan, particularly Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile States, given the volatile security situation caused by ongoing fighting between the government and armed rebel groups, the threat of kidnapping, as well as intercommunal clashes.
This report was written by:
Rachel Jacob– MAX Security’s Associate Director of Intelligence, Sub-Saharan Africa Division
And reviewed by:
Tzahi Shraga – MAX Security’s Chief Intelligence Officer, ret. LTC from the Israeli intelligence community Oded Berkowitz – MAX Security’s Regional Director of Intelligence, Sub-Saharan Africa Division, Europe and the Americas Division
The Arab Spring: The Decline of the Arab Nation-State?
By Danny B.
The “Arab Spring,” simplistically coined as a regional freedom and democracy movement, is leading to protracted periods of sectarian fighting and an accelerated breakdown of the Arab states.
The genesis of Arab states is in mandates maintained by European powers, Britain and France, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War One. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, with reluctant consent from Moscow, carved up zones of influence for the two colonial powers in the Middle East. As a result, newly independent Arab states were hastily crafted without much consideration for outstanding sectarian conflicts. Generally speaking, concepts of nation-states are rather foreign to the region, thus a lack of unifying narratives, combined with outstanding internal sectarian conflicts, and destined these Arab states to be plagued with a myriad of seemingly irreversible problems.
An Egyptian holds a sign in support of an An-Nour party member in Cairo (New York Times)
For decades, Arab states have attempted to establish a variety of political platforms to ensure economic growth, security, and increase sovereign power. Excluding the oil-rich GCC monarchs, the political concepts of Arab socialism (Baathism), pan-Arabism, and secular-nationalism have failed. Then the collective Arab defeat in the Six Day War against Israel, compelled many in the Muslim world to seek a new sociopolitical answer to the Jewish State and the West. Their defeat, in addition to other factors, was one catalyst for the Islamic awakening in those nations. That said, moderate political Islamic movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood, endured decades of modest, yet solid beginnings as a result of suppressive secular dictatorships. But with the weakening or ousting of these leaders, the political Islamists have seized the initiative, thus set to rule many Arab states. Most surprising however, are the unprecedented gains by more radical Salafist sects throughout the region – at the expense of inept liberal parties – which has propelled them to lead the new opposition against their new rivals, the Muslim Brotherhood. It is important to note that Salafist Islam comes in various degrees, but the their burgeoning influence results from the work of the most radical Salafists. Their surge has become one of the most important consequences of the “Arab Spring.” For these reasons, this Salafist stream now appears to be the primary obstacle for more moderate political Islam, embodied in parties such as the Freedom and Justice in Egypt, or the Ennahda Party in Tunisia.
