Tag Archives: Beijing

China’s national security law accused of eroding “one country, two systems” – Hong Kong Analysis

Executive Summary

China announced on May 21 that it would bypass the Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) to pass the “Hong Kong national security law.”

The timing of the law is likely aimed at taking advantage of the distraction offered by the COVID-19 pandemic, limiting the resurgence of street protests.

The legislation will act as a base for increased curbs on freedom of speech, activism.

Increased control by Beijing on Hong Kong’s judicial affairs will worsen tensions between the US, China.

Civil unrest will increase in the near term, however, the implementation of restrictions will dampen anti-government activism over a longer period of time.

Travel to Hong Kong can continue while adhering to security precautions regarding civil unrest, crime, and protests.

Current Situation

China announced on May 21 that it would bypass the Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) to pass the “Hong Kong national security law.” The legislation seeks to criminalize secessionist or subversive activity against Beijing, terrorism, and foreign interference in the city. The draft bill was presented to Beijing’s National People’s Congress (NPC) on May 22 and a vote is set for the end of the body’s two-sessions meeting on May 28.

Similar legislation was introduced in Hong Kong’s LegCo in 2003, known as Article 23, but was tabled after its introduction prompted hundreds of thousands of individuals to march in protest on July 1 of the same year. The date marks Hong Kong’s handover from the UK to China in 1997. Small-scale commemorative events were held on this day prior to 2003, while events in the years that followed saw participation in the high thousands.

Assessments & Forecast

Introduction of national security law informed by failure to control 2019 protests, distraction offered by COVID-19 pandemic 

The legislation represents China’s most overt and assertive attempt to increase control over the special administrative region since its 1997 handover. As the NPC is largely symbolic, an overwhelming majority is expected and the law will take effect in the coming months, although an exact timeline for its implementation remains unclear. Regardless, the development will stoke prevailing anti-China sentiment in the city that fueled the anti-government protest campaign in the past year. This will be compounded by long-standing sensitivities among pan-democrats over contentious national security legislation, particularly Article 23, that would strengthen Beijing’s influence in the city if enacted.

The timing of the move is informed by multiple factors. The anti-government protest campaign that emerged in 2019 was accompanied by high levels of violence, with officials labeling certain incidents part of the resistance as “terrorism” and citing these as cause for stronger national security laws. Meanwhile, the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and associated restrictions on mass gatherings have significantly impacted the protest campaign in recent months, with participation numbers sinking to the high dozens to low hundreds and the tempo of events decreasing. In this light, Beijing is likely using the global health crisis as a distraction and perceives the lull in protests as an opportunity to assert its control.

More broadly, the protest campaign and the authorities’ failure to placate anti-government activists highlighted obstacles to local governance that were likely to resurface after the pandemic abated. This was especially likely in the event that Article 23 was re-tabled in the LegCo, a possibility that officials have often hinted at, and given ongoing efforts by Beijing to attain control over the city’s affairs. Thus, the cognizance of these obstacles to city authorities’ governance likely contributed to Beijing’s decision to supersede the LegCo.

Further, the timing of the legislation can be attributed, in part, to the LegCo elections slated to be held in September. The pro-democracy camp’s significant win in the District Council polls in November 2019 spoke to the high levels of anti-China and anti-government sentiment, while a rebound in the campaign in recent weeks raised the potential for reigniting anti-government sentiment that could jeopardize the pro-establishment camp’s electoral prospects.

Legislation to provide grounds for severe curbs on protest activity, freedom of speech in near-to-medium term

There are a number of implications arising from the passage of the legislation in its current form later in the week. First, such a development will signal a clear change to Beijing’s “one country, two systems” policy, given that residents of Hong Kong will now be on par with citizens of mainland China in the way they are treated for criticizing the ruling dispensation. This will feed into fears of diminished judicial independence and significantly increased curbs on speech and protest freedoms. Moreover, in light of Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s statement that the local government will comply with the integration of the national security legislation, the passage of the draft bill will also indicate an increased willingness on the part of the Hong Kong government to cede issues such as criminal laws to Beijing. This opens the space for the secession of other powers that were earlier held by the local government.

In practical terms, the enforcement of the legislation will pave the way for the preemptive detention of protesters under allegedly vaguely defined security provisions, as well as their incarceration without trial for extended periods of time over the coming months. Moreover, the local government will retain the imperative to pick up anti-government activists for questioning and authorize their remand, if necessary, simply on the basis of their online activity or statements in other mediums. At the same time, Chinese security forces may also expand their monitoring activities within the city in the near-to-medium term, likely through liaison with the Hong Kong Police Force and surveillance units part of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) garrison in the city. However, Beijing is not likely to increase its on-ground security presence through the mobilizing of additional PLA troops, given the empowerment of the HKPF should suffice in maintaining law and order and considering the negative signal such a move would send to the international community in terms of violating the 1997 agreement.

Developments will exacerbate US-China tensions, impact Hong Kong’s status as regional financial hub over long-term

Once the terms of the legislation begin to be enforced over the coming months, there is an increased risk of retaliatory action by Washington DC, either through the revocation of the special status accorded to the territory under US law or by the increasing of sanctions on Chinese entities and interests. It is also possible that US action will comprise a combination of these measures for maximum effect, more so given the government and Congress’ convergent opinions regarding strict actions against purported Chinese belligerence. The primary effect of this will be on the annual trade of goods and services between the US and Hong Kong, estimated to be worth approximately 67 billion USD, with Hong Kong likely to lose its preferential tariff rate of zero percent on US goods. Additionally, visa regimes for US businesses may also change, with investment patterns likely to be impacted as well. While countries like the UK may not have such a drastic reaction, their policy alignment with the US on certain trade matters, and Chinese counter-measures over perceptions of foreign interference in internal matters, will, over the next half-decade, make China a less attractive option for global business houses, should economic measures by both sides kick in.

With respect to the broader US-China relationship, the introduction of national security legislation will emerge as the latest sticking point impeding rapprochement on issues, such as the ongoing trade conflict and China’s actions in the South China Sea (SCS) and Taiwan Strait. This stands to precipitate a new round of tariffs and counter-measures by either side, with Washington likely to increase pressure on Beijing by advocating closer defense ties and further cooperation with Taiwan. Simultaneously, it will aim to oppose Chinese agendas on other fronts by backing opposition from Vietnam, Malaysia, and other claimants involved in territorial disputes with China in the SCS, and providing support for investigations into China’s alleged role in concealing the spread of COVID-19 in its territory, among others. Overall, the next two years will see increased friction between the two countries, with aspects like China’s increasing control on Hong Kong and generally growing isolationism across the world acting as fuel.

Civil unrest to peak in coming weeks, though national security legislation likely to cripple anti-government movement over extended period

Thousands of anti-government activists protested across Hong Kong Island on May 24 in reaction to the proposed law. Per reports, the protest saw similar methods to those seen in the 2019 campaign, including the lack of an organizer for the event itself and activists dispersing to other parts of the city to evade police action. This is a preliminary indication that protests over the legislation will increase in the near term off the back of heightened anti-China and anti-government sentiments, with elevated turnouts and a high risk of violent clashes.

Further, these tensions will bolster attendance at events on highly sensitive days, such as the annual June 4 vigil to mark the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown and the July 1 pro-democracy march. Further, June 9 and 12 mark two notable events in the 2019 campaign, with the former featuring protests involving at least one million individuals and the latter seeing a notable clash in Admiralty between protesters and police.

Radical sections of protesters may also look to target Chinese installations in the city, including the Hong Kong Liaison Office, during this period, with vandalism and attacks on police facilities also likely to see an uptick. However, as previously mentioned, the implementation of the national security law will cripple the anti-government movement to a great extent over the long term, with police officials likely to arrest notable activists and organizers prior to events being held. The wholesale imprisonment of anti-government protesters based on opinions espoused on fora like social media will also result in the curtailment of anti-government dissent.

Recommendations

Travel to Hong Kong can continue while adhering to security precautions regarding civil unrest, crime, and protests.

Those operating or residing in Hong Kong are advised to avoid nonessential travel near protests and further maintain heightened vigilance throughout the city due to the potential for continued demonstrations and unrest. This may include the use of teargas and rubber bullets by police, the hurling of incendiary objects such as petrol bombs, or the throwing of bricks and projectiles by protesters.

Avoid the vicinity of police stations, checkpoints, or other security installations as they remain susceptible to arson attacks or vandalism.

Maintain particular vigilance around government buildings on Hong Kong Island which are often used as protest sites, such as the LegCo Building, Central Government Complex, Hong Kong Police Headquarters, Hong Kong Liaison Office, and Chief Executive’s Office.

Avoid carrying any sensitive material either on electronic devices or clothing that puts forward controversial political opinions, particularly anti-Beijing stances, when crossing over by land due to heightened security checks.

MAX Security has strong on-ground capabilities for executive protection and facilitating business travel to Hong Kong. For contingency plans and on-ground operational support, contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434.

Protesters to remain steadfast on remaining demands, will influence November’s District Council elections – Hong Kong Analysis

Executive Summary

Chief Executive Carrie Lam invoked emergency legislation on October 4 to ban the use of masks during all protests in the city, a month after she formally announced the complete withdrawal of the extradition bill.

The significant escalation in protest tactics and forceful dispersal methods has resulted in a deterioration in all-around security in Hong Kong, while the protest lobby will continue to pressure the government to address all five of their demands.

The discovery of an IED in Mong Kok on October 13 for the first time during the ongoing wave of protests is highly notable. Despite its isolated nature, the incident is likely to be used by authorities to further justify a more heavy-handed crackdown on protesters, including mass arrests, over the coming weeks.

The anti-government campaign is liable to impact the upcoming District Council polls, slated for November, with election-related violence anticipated in the coming weeks.

Travel to Hong Kong can continue while adhering to security precautions regarding civil unrest, and avoiding the vicinity of all protests.

Current Situation

Hong Kong authorities officially withdrew the contentious extradition bill, via a statement by Secretary for Security John Lee at the Legislative Council (LegCo) on October 23. The move follows Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s announcement of the bill’s complete withdrawal on September 4 after it sparked anti-government protests since March. CE Lam also announced a ban on the use of masks in all protests by invoking emergency legislation on October 4.

Notable recent developments have included a significant uptick in protest tactics as well as police dispersal methods in the months of September and October. The most recent was a low-level IED explosion in Mong Kok during a protest in the area, during which demonstrators also threw at least 20 petrol bombs at the Mong Kok Police Station. Further, October 1 and 4 saw two separate instances of young protesters being shot by police personnel.

The US House of Representatives passed three pieces of legislation in support of Hong Kong on October 15. These include the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, which seeks an annual review of Hong Kong’s autonomy and the city’s special treatment as a separate trade entity if it becomes law. The second measure, the Protect Hong Kong Act, seeks to ban the commercial exports of military and crowd-control equipment that the police could use against protesters. The third measure passed by the House is a non-binding resolution recognizing Hong Kong’s relationship with the US, supporting the residents’ right to vote, and condemning China’s alleged interference in their domestic affairs.

Key Events in Anti-government Protests in Hong Kong

Assessments and Forecast

Escalation in violence, increased confrontations despite bill’s withdrawal signals entrenched position of protesters 

Recent tactics adopted by both the security forces and anti-government protesters, mainly consisting of Hong Kong’s youth, represent notable escalations. The first instances of protesters being shot by police forces have thus far aggravated radical groups and have sustained their use of more violent means of protests in recent weeks. FORECAST: The continuation of demonstrations despite CE Lam’s announcement of the formal withdrawal of the bill shows how the movement has evolved into a larger anti-government campaign, and as such, shows no signs of quelling in the near term.

Status if Demands by Anti-government Protesters

The introduction of the anti-mask law by emergency legislation served to further antagonize protesters against CE Lam. It also raised concerns about further restrictions on freedoms and the potential implementation of a full emergency in the city.  While this latter measure is less likely in the immediate term, sustained protest violence may be used to justify the usage of increased emergency measures in the long term, as was witnessed with the anti-mask regulation. Calls for CE Lam’s resignation are expected to continue gaining traction in the near term, evidenced by pan-democrats’ heckling of CE Lam during her policy address on October 16.

Vandalism, arson, and the use of petrol bombs can be expected with continued frequency by radical anti-government groups. The slightly diminished participation in protests may be attributed to various reasons. This may include the disengagement of more moderate groups who have now been placated by the withdrawal of the extradition bill or those driven away by the increase in violent protest tactics. Despite these factors, local solidarity with the anti-government campaign as a whole appears unlikely to abate, signaled by moderate groups dubbing their radical counterparts as “the braves” for continuing the movement. Specific incidents of escalation, such as the alleged police excesses or the use of live rounds to disperse protesters, may prompt a sudden spike in turnouts at rallies, especially on the weekends.

Authorities likely expected the extradition bill’s complete withdrawal to placate the protest movement. Instead, the withdrawal emboldened participating groups to continue pushing for their four remaining demands, likely due to perceptions that the withdrawal of the bill was a result of the pressure they put on the government. This continuation of protests has likely informed the increased intensity of forceful dispersal measures witnessed in the aftermath of the bill’s withdrawal. FORECAST: Police are liable to continue with this approach, using tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and bean bag rounds, with the latent risk of isolated incidents involving live ammunition usage in the near term. The increasing frequency of MTR cancellations ahead of protests appear to have also created perceptions among protesters that the MTR corporation is siding with the police by restricting protesters’ movement. As such, MTR stations are likely to continue to remain hotspots, especially for acts of arson and vandalism.

The discovery of an IED in Mong Kok on October 13 for the first time during the ongoing wave of protests is highly notable, although it appears to have been crudely constructed and caused limited damage with no injuries. FORECAST: Nevertheless, the incident is likely to be used by authorities to further justify a more heavy-handed crackdown on protesters, including mass arrests, over the coming weeks. An increase in the deployment of riot police is also expected city-wide. However, it is unlikely that IED attacks will become commonplace in Hong Kong, as the aforementioned instance appears to have been an isolated event.

Anti-government campaign liable to inform trends in upcoming election

The protesters’ recent targeting of Chinese-owned banks and businesses in the city further highlights heightened anti-Beijing sentiments, which has largely energized the clashes between pro-democracy and pro-Beijing individuals in Hong Kong. FORECAST: This may further deepen social polarization within the city, especially ahead of the November District Council elections. Pro-democracy lawmakers may attempt to capitalize on current sentiments to gain visibility for their campaigns, potentially by staging election rallies during or close to predetermined anti-government events.

Voter turnout and support for these groups may see an uptick as smaller pro-democracy parties draw support by association with the protests. Turnouts in the election are liable to be high, based on the record number of citizens enrolled to vote. Incidents of election-related violence are also likely, potentially targeting pro-government lawmakers and their offices. This risk pertains to pan-democrat candidates as well, evidenced thus far in the October 16 attack on CHRF convenor and Lek Yuen constituency candidate Jimmy Sham.

FORECAST: Precedence suggests that the government will enforce stringent electoral rules to exclude pan-democrat candidates. This was witnessed in the barring of pro-democracy leader Joshua Wong, per an October 29 announcement. Authorities may also attempt to disqualify elected pro-democracy representatives following the polls. Such moves will exacerbate anti-government sentiment, potentially spurring a new wave of rallies or violence in the aftermath of the elections. Another trigger that could instigate such unrest is the cancellation of polls in specific areas due to security concerns. This is likely as such a move would be perceived as a rejection of protesters’ demand for universal suffrage.

FORECAST: Though the District Council polls are not expected to significantly impact the shaping of the Legislative Council, they will inform representation in the committee that selects the city’s chief executive. This is significant considering protesters’ calls for incumbent CE Lam’s resignation. While such a result is less likely at present, pan-democrats will seek to maximize poll participation in order to ultimately bolster their committee representation. In this light, Beijing will monitor the elections closely and may push to escalate the local government’s crackdown on pan-democrat candidates or their camp as a whole in the months that follow. This is especially likely in preparation for the Legislative Council elections set to occur in 2020.

Assult Incidents on Pro-democracy Activist

China may use punitive trade measures to discourage international support, risk of direct military intervention still low

The month of October saw China exerting its influence on US-based businesses that were perceived as supporting the protest movement in Hong Kong. The developments underscore China’s economic influence on US-based businesses by virtue of its large market access, especially those perceived to take an anti-China stance. This is bolstered by multiple Chinese businesses dropping sponsorship deals with a large US-based sporting franchise over perceived support for the protests.

FORECAST: The US House of Representatives’ votes in favor of several pieces of legislation to support Hong Kong on October 15 are likely to embolden pro-democracy demonstrators, especially as the votes coincided with a mass protest in Hong Kong in support of the legislation. The passage of these bills may be raised at ongoing trade talks between the US and China, as Beijing condemns Washington for interfering in affairs it views as domestic.  CE Lam’s recent statements that the administration will not hesitate to take Beijing’s assistance in quelling protests is likely a form of signaling; as such, direct intervention by the Chinese government or security forces still remains less likely in the immediate term. However, the level of security cooperation between Beijing’s security establishment and the Hong Kong police is expected to increase as protests sustain for the foreseeable future.

US Legislation in Support of Hong Kong

Recommendations

Travel to Hong Kong can continue while adhering to security precautions regarding civil unrest, crime, and protests.

Those operating or residing in Hong Kong are advised to avoid all travel near protests and further maintain heightened vigilance throughout the city due to the potential for continued demonstrations and the unrest. This may include the use of teargas and rubber bullets by police, incendiary objects such as petrol bombs, or the throwing of bricks and projectiles by protesters.

Avoid the vicinity of police stations, checkpoints, or other security installations as they are being increasingly targeted with arson attacks or vandalism in the latest wave of protests. This is particularly likely after multiple arrests occur at protest rallies.

Maintain particular vigilance around government buildings on Hong Kong Island, which are often used as protest sites, such as the LegCo Building, Central Government Complex, Hong Kong Police Headquarters, and Chief Executive’s Office.

Minimize nonessential travel to sensitive areas where the propensity for violence is greater at present. These primarily include Tin Shui Wai, Ma On Shan, Sha Tin, and Sheung Shui in the New Territories; Tsim Sha Tsui, Sham Shui Po, and the West Kowloon Train Station in Kowloon; and North Point in the Eastern District of Hong Kong Island.

Allot for disruptions if taking the MRT service given that authorities are known to close off specific lines to prevent protesters’ movements, especially during multiple simultaneous demonstrations across the city.

Avoid carrying any sensitive material either on electronic devices or clothing that puts forward controversial political opinions, particularly anti-Beijing stances, when crossing over by land due to the heightened security checks.

MAX Security has strong on-ground capabilities for executive protection and facilitating business travel to Hong Kong. For contingency plans and on-ground operational support, contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434.

Prolonged trade conflict with US likely amid disagreements on core issues, domestic political compulsions for both parties – China Analysis

Written by Tarun Nair 

Executive Summary:

On June 29, the US and China arrived at a truce in the trade conflict on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan. The agreement halted the next round of US tariffs on Chinese goods worth 300 billion USD.

While no further escalatory actions by either party have materialized, reports from July 17 suggest that trade talks have once again reached a standstill over the lack of clarity in the White House on addressing Beijing’s demands to back off restrictions on a prominent Chinese telecommunications company.

A prolonged trade conflict is likely due to domestic compulsions on leaders of both sides. This will be compounded by continued disagreements on core issues related to the negotiations.

However, a low level of rapprochement is anticipated while fluctuations to global supply chains, as well as impacts on business sentiment and investor confidence, are likely in the medium to long term.

Travel to China may continue at this time while avoiding nonessential travel to outlying areas in China, notably Xinjiang Province in the west. When traveling anywhere in China, we advise using caution when discussing sensitive political issues.

Current Situation:

China and the US agreed to a 90-day truce in the ongoing trade conflict on December 1, 2018, following weeks of heightened rhetoric. Subsequently, three-day talks were held in Beijing in January 2019. Two rounds of trade talks were also held in Beijing and Washington in the months of February and April, with US Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin calling the discussions “positive”.

However, on May 13, China announced tariff hikes on US products after the US increased tariffs from 10 percent to 25 percent on 200 billion USD worth of Chinese goods on May 10.

Washington placed a prominent Chinese telecommunications company on its “entity list” on May 16, which effectively bans US companies from selling to the firm without authorities’ approval. The company, which is the world’s largest telecom equipment supplier, has been the target of allegations that its technology facilitates espionage.

On May 31, Beijing announced that it will form its own “unreliable entities” list comprising foreign enterprises and individuals that are suspected of disregarding market rules, violating contracts, and influencing supply for non-commercial reasons.

Beijing increased tariffs on goods worth 60 billion USD from the US on June 1, while opening an official investigation into a US-based shipping company for purportedly diverting China-bound packages to the US.

On June 29, reports indicated that both sides arrived at a fresh truce in their trade dispute through an agreement that halted the next round of US tariffs on Chinese goods worth 300 billion USD, apart from reopening the door for negotiations. The development came about on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan.

On July 5, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke at a meeting of military leaders, politicians, and bureaucrats where he stated that the ongoing political reform process has systematically enhanced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s leadership. He attended yet another meeting on July 9 to emphasize the importance of the party.

Reports from July 17 suggest that trade talks have once again reached a standstill over the lack of clarity in the White House on addressing Beijing’s demands to roll back restrictions on the aforementioned telecommunications company. This comes amid indications that US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer will travel to Beijing in the near future with Trade Secretary Mnuchin for further trade deliberations.

Assessments & Forecast:

Domestic compulsions on leaders from both sides to sustain friction in medium to long term

Primarily, domestic compulsions on both sides will make it more challenging for either party to adopt a concessionary attitude with respect to tariff de-escalation. In China, President Xi Jinping has increasingly moved towards strengthening the powers of the CCP since the third plenary session of the CCP Central Committee in March 2018, where it was decided that reforms are needed to bolster the party’s leadership and control over state institutions. While this reversal of the previously limited separation of powers between the party and state is not new, he has doubled down on evaluating the progress of the 2018 plenum’s goals in recent times, as indicated by the consecutive meetings in early July. This speaks to a desire to expedite the expansion of CCP leadership.

This is relevant in the context of the trade conflict given that dissident factions in the party will increasingly hold him accountable with respect to avoiding prospective concessions to the US. These compulsions may be compounded by criticism from individuals with close links to trade negotiations, such as a comment by the former vice-minister for foreign trade in November 2018, wherein he stated that action on agricultural products by China was ill-thought out. This is especially likely when considering pressure on Beijing following the ongoing anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong and the recently-approved US arms deal with Taiwan, which could be used by opponents to show President Xi’s lack of control on Chinese regional interests. In this light, China likely to adopt a tougher stance on trade negotiations in the coming months, a preliminary indication of which was seen in the hardliner Chinese Minister of Commerce Zhong Shan’s addition to the trade talks. Further, President Xi may also seek to avoid making moves until the results of the presidential election in the US are announced, in order to gauge the degree of amenability a new government may have to some of Beijing’s terms.

In the US, President Donald Trump is unlikely to accede given that the trade conflict has been a major pillar of his “America First” platform, more so against the backdrop of the upcoming presidential elections in 2020. Another consideration informing this position will be the growing domestic consensus on cracking down on the Chinese telecommunications firm. A broader unilateral de-escalation seems increasingly improbable at this point. Increased rhetoric can be expected from authorities in Washington, as illustrated by President Trump’s statement days after the truce, in which he implied that he was open to place tariffs on additional goods worth 325 billion USD.

Zhong-Shan-Quote

Prolonged tensions further likely due to core disagreements regarding Chinese firm, Beijing’s projected capacity to absorb economic shocks 

While one of the key outcomes of the G-20 truce involved the US lifting some of the curbs on the Chinese telecommunications company, authorities later stated on July 9 that licenses for sales to the firm will be contingent on the protection of national security. The sweeping nature of national security considerations indicates that dealings with the Chinese firm in question will remain complicated, with the concession at the G-20 meeting likely only being symbolic. Broadly, this points to the continued disagreements on the regulation of the firm, which has emerged as a core concern behind the trade dispute. This is also backed by the reported stalling of talks in recent weeks due to a lack of clarity on dealing with the firm’s alleged violation of intellectual property laws. It also remains unclear if the firm will be given access to US parts for its product development.
FORECAST:
Given this lack of clarity and the fact that security concerns remain unaddressed, the issue will remain a sticking point to a trade deal, further speaking to a state of flux in the coming term. The inclusion of five additional Chinese firms in the US’ entity list on June 21 will further exacerbate tensions on the issue.

FORECAST: Another factor pointing to prolonged tensions is China’s projected capacity to absorb economic shocks through measures like interest trade cuts, trade diversification, and additional domestic tax cuts. According to July 15 reports, China’s growth rate slumped to a 27-year low of 6.2 percent in the quarter that ended in June, down from 6.4 percent in the previous quarter. US President Donald Trump cited the sluggish growth to be a product of pressure from tariffs. Despite the ongoing slowdown of the Chinese economy, it is pertinent to note Chinese authorities’ claim that the 6.2 percent figure is still within Beijing’s target range for the year. Thus, China’s current aggressive approach in light of its estimated robust domestic economy may indicate its willingness to sustain a trade conflict for extended periods of time. Its perceived upper hand will likely serve as justification to avoid making concessions to the US, thus exacerbating trade tensions in the medium term.

Low-level rapprochement may materialize in absence of concrete deal, security situation to remain unchanged 

FORECAST: Regardless of the impediments to a concrete deal, low-level rapprochement by both sides may occur over the coming weeks and months. This may include additional meetings such as principal-level calls between trade representatives where minor concessions on certain tariff structures may be discussed. Certain countries like Indonesia and Vietnam will likely see heightened labor productivity through relocation of investments and facilities away from China, although trade reliance will serve to affect these gains on a case-to-case basis. Regional powerhouses like Singapore, which have seen troubling economic conditions in recent times including a potential recession, will continue to feel the blowback with respect to manufacturing. In China, the tech sector will face a disproportionate effect of the ongoing tariffs regime, due to revenue changes as a result of slower exports to the US and restrictions on the proliferation of technological inputs.

FORECAST: In terms of the on-ground security situation, we assess that the latent threat of arbitrary arrests and harassment of US nationals remains largely unchanged. Beijing will be keen to avoid direct escalations that could translate to pressure through other avenues such as international courts. While a number of Western nationals have been targeted in anti-narcotics raids and on espionage charges, these events appear to be linked to their respective nations’ actions against Chinese citizens and interests rather than being directly linked to the trade dispute. Beijing’s projected reticence to use the trade conflict to take action against US nationals appears likely since it has largely sought to delink the issue of the telecommunications company from the trade dispute in an attempt to restrict patterns of escalation. That said, further arrests or detentions may nevertheless be perceived as retaliatory measures that are indirectly related to the trade conflict, thus sustaining peripheral tensions on the issues.

Recommendations:

Travel to China may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols given the latent threat of militancy and crime. We advise against non-essential travel to outlying areas in China, particularly Xinjiang Province in the west.

When traveling anywhere in China, we advise using caution when discussing sensitive political issues in China, including Xinjiang, the graft purge, Tibet, Taiwan or Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Refrain from photographing sensitive sites, including government buildings and security forces.

Remain cognizant of developments in the ongoing trade dispute involving China and closely monitor the rhetoric of the Chinese government in order to identify early escalation warning signs.

Companies with ongoing disputes with Chinese authorities are advised to consider the risks involved in sending high-level executives to the country.

Employees should avoid posting any material on social networks that may be deemed as critical of the Chinese government, as this may invite temporary detention or even prosecution.

Annual joint US-South Korea military exercises to begin on April 1; US, North Korea display commitment to upcoming bilateral talks – Korean Peninsula Analysis

Current Situation

On March 19, the US Department of Defense confirmed that the annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve joint military exercises with South Korea will begin on April 1 and last approximately one month. A spokesperson said that the exercises will be on a scale similar to previous exercises, and involve 23,700 US and 300,000 South Korean troops. There have been no announcements regarding the involvement of  US aircraft carriers. Last year’s exercises lasted two months and involved the nuclear supercarrier USS Carl Vinson. According to recent reports, South Korea is considering procuring Apache heavy-attack helicopters and anti-artillery surface-to-surface missiles, to be used in the event of a ground war.

The US and South Korean presidents are preparing for individual summits with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. South Korean President Moon Jae-in is planning to meet with Kim in late April, and US President Donald Trump has tentatively agreed to meet with Kim in May, although no details of the latter meeting have been confirmed, including the location. A South Korean envoy reported that Kim said he understands that joint exercises must continue, but that he expected them to be readjusted in the future if bilateral developments remain positive.

Background

Kim delivered a speech on New Year’s Day suggesting a restart in bilateral negotiations with South Korea and offered to send a delegation to the 2018 Olympics in Pyeongchang. South Korea accepted, and the two sides held a series of meetings leading up to and following the Olympics, resulting in the North Korean offer of bilateral talks with both South Korea and the US.

No sitting US president has ever agreed to meet with North Korean leadership; President Bill Clinton and President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang after leaving office.

North Korea has not held a nuclear weapon or missile test since November 28, 2017.

Annual joint US-South Korea military exercises to begin on April 1; US, North Korea display commitment to upcoming bilateral talks  - Korean Peninsula Analysis | MAX Security

Assessments

US, North Korea appear committed to talks, although deep distrust remains

The announcement of a U.S.-North Korea summit marks the first ever for a sitting US President, and is made more notable by Pyongyang’s stated willingness to discuss denuclearization. The main reason to doubt a North Korean commitment to denuclearization is the fact that it views its nuclear arsenal as the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. Other, more realistic objectives for the summit might be reaching an agreement on an indefinite ban of missile or nuclear testing in exchange for limits on US-South Korea exercises or a sanctions relief.

In the immediate term, a positive outcome is the North’s offer to temporarily suspend missile tests ahead of the talks, without presenting pre-conditions such as freezing military exercises or requesting sanctions relief. This suggests Kim’s willingness to begin negotiating in good faith, although similar strong starts have collapsed in the past.

The upcoming US-led exercises look to be an in-kind response to this good faith despite public claims to the contrary that the 2018 military exercises are on a similar scale to previous years. The decision to exclude aircraft carriers and halve the length of the drills demonstrates reciprocal flexibility following statements from Pyongyang showing increased tolerance for the exercises. Pyongyang’s stated tolerance and the drawdown of exercises by the US are signals that the desire for talks is, for the time being, sincere.

Despite this projected sincerity, the exercises are perceived as highly provocative by Pyongyang. By not delaying them entirely until talks, the US may be testing Pyongyang’s restraint, as the spring exercise season is normally notorious for North Korean weapons tests. The tenuous nature of the potential US-North Korean harmony is underscored by South Korea’s military tenders for equipment that has little use outside of war with the North.

Major areas of discussion include disarmament, sanctions, detentions

There is significant divergence in the expectations of such a process, as the US views denuclearization as the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, while North Korea views denuclearization as the complete withdrawal of US forces from the region. At present, neither side has shown willingness to satisfy the other’s demands on the issue. The US appears equally unwilling to ease sanctions in the short term, as the current belief in Washington is that economic pressure is one of the few things that brought North Korea to negotiations in the first place. Other areas may prove more easy to reconcile, including the transfer of foreign detainees out of North Korea prisons. The prisoners serve little strategic value for North Korea, and their release would constitute a strong showing of good faith ahead of more contentious issues.

The unprecedented meeting could have positive outcomes even if the primary goal of complete denuclearization of the peninsula is not achieved, including a more general de-escalation of tensions between Washington and Pyongyang. A more comprehensive solution is less likely, as it would be particularly difficult for an agreement to be reached based on a few days of talks, especially given the short preparation time for the Kim-Trump summit. It also remains possible that the lack of preparation, along with the remaining uncertainty over a neutral location for the meeting, might lead to abandoning or delaying the summit. Ultimately, whether or not agreements are made, just holding the summit at all would mark a significant breakthrough.

Recommendations

Travel to Seoul may continue at this time, while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.

We advise against nonessential travel to Pyongyang and North Korea given the risk of detainment of foreign travelers.

During periods of armed escalation between North and South Korea, we advise against all nonessential travel to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Yeonpyeongdo Islands.