MAX Intelligence: Germany Election 2025

Executive Summary

• Snap elections for the Bundestag, the German parliament, are scheduled to take place on February 23, 2025.

• Latest polls show the center-right Christian democratic conservative CDU/CSU union leading with 30 percent, followed by the far-right populist AfD with 22, and the incumbent center-left SPD with 17 percent.

• Issues dominating the electoral campaign agenda include economic policy, controversial issues such as immigration, Germany’s relations with NATO and the EU, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

• Russia-backed election interference and destabilization efforts is elevated in the coming weeks. Such efforts are likely to manifest as disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and sabotage incidents.

• Increased pre-electoral violence targeting campaign events and candidates is likely. Mass protests, including pro- and anti-right-wing demonstrations, are expected to persist. Such protests are at heightened risk of unrest.

• Travel to Germany may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance in the vicinity of campaign events and large-scale protest activity over the coming weeks.

Background

Reasons for Snap Elections

• Snap elections will take place on February 23 to elect the members of the Bundestag, the German parliament. Snap elections were called after the “traffic light coalition” led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD) together with the liberal Freie Demokraten Partei (FDP), and the green Die Grunen collapsed on November 6, 2024. This resulted in Scholz calling for and losing a motion of confidence in the Bundestag.

• The coalition collapsed due to persistent disagreements over proposals to fill a 60 billion EUR governmental budget gap. The SPD and Die Grunen were in favor of reforming constitutionally enshrined debt brake to fill the gap, a measure that limits government deficits to 0.35 percent of GDP and prohibits the government from taking on new debt.

• Coalition partner FDP, and Finance Minister Christian Lindner, rejected any reform to the government budget. On November 6, Scholz fired Lindner, leading the FDP to leave the coalition.

German Electoral System

• In Germany, the federal elections for the Bundestag use a proportional representation system. There are at least 598 members; half are elected directly from Germany’s 299 constituencies, and the other half via party lists in Germany’s 16 states.

• Accordingly, each voter casts two votes in the elections – the first elects their local representative to the Bundestag, while the second party list vote determines the relative strength of the parties represented. To enter the Bundestag, a party must receive more than five percent of the party list votes or at least three constituency seats from the direct vote.

• While allocating seats, “balance seats” may be added to the Bundestag to reflect the parties’ national share of party-list votes. In the 2021 election, the size of the Bundestag was adjusted to 735 seats during calculations, the largest Bundestag to date.

• As a result of the proportional representation system established in 1949, parties do not often achieve a majority, leading to all but one government being coalition governments. The party landscape has been dominated by two factions led by the center-right CDU/CSU and center-left SPD. The 2021 “traffic-light coalition” marked the first three-party coalition on the federal level.

Current Situation: Political Parties

Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands – Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CDU-CSU)

• The center-right Christian democratic conservative Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU) form the CDU/CSU Bundestag political alliance.

• The CDU/CSU is currently polling in first place, with 30 percent as of January 27.

• The CDU/CSU opposes reforming the constitutionally enshrined “debt brake” and proposes large-scale reforms to Germany’s benefits system. It supports reducing unemployment welfare and implementing income and corporate tax cuts.

• The CDU/CSU expresses strong support for Ukraine, committing to diplomatic, military, and financial aid to Kyiv and increased sanctions on Moscow. It supports maintaining defense spending at two percent of GDP, in line with NATO’s defense spending obligation, and advocates for improving defense cooperation with the EU. It supports the reintroduction of conscription to military or community service. It has expressed support for the stationing of US long-range weapons in Germany, slated to begin in 2026.

• In its election manifesto, the CDU/CSU takes a stricter stance on immigration than in previous elections, calling for tighter asylum regulations, a de facto freeze on asylum admissions at the border, and deportations for refugees who commit crimes. It proposes that asylum seekers be transferred through safe third countries during deportations and claims processing. The alliance supports an overall change in EU asylum policy to process asylum seekers in “safe” third countries.

Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD)

• The far-right populist Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) was established in 2013 and is a Euroskeptic and anti-immigration party. There has been a cordon sanitaire on the AfD since it was founded, with mainstream parties refusing to work with the party, citing concerns that accepting the AfD’s support would legitimize the far-right. This “firewall” against the AfD has applied on a federal, state, and municipal level— as such, it has never governed.

• The AfD is currently polling in second place, with 22 percent as of January 27.

• The AfD supports significantly limiting the acceptance of asylum seekers and “irregular migrants.” This includes the implementation of strict border controls. On January 10, the party’s leader officially supported “remigration”, a term used to refer to the mass deportation of individuals with migrant backgrounds, including German citizens.

• The AfD’s anti-immigration rhetoric frequently intersects with its Euroskeptic stance, denouncing the Common EU Asylum Policy and immigration from other EU countries. The AfD supports reducing Germany’s integration in the EU, including holding a national referendum to leave the eurozone (EZ) and even leaving the EU altogether in a move modeled after Brexit. It also supports exiting other international agreements, such as the Paris Climate Deal. The AfD has been critical of the green Die Grunen party’s climate and economic policies, with Die Grunen described as the AfD’s “favorite enemy”.

• The AfD has also called for Germany to reconsider its membership with the NATO bloc. The party supports ending military support for Ukraine in favor of restoring ties with Moscow, and advocates for immediate peace negotiations and a reversal of sanctions on Russia. It is strongly against increasing German public borrowing and opposes any reform to the debt brake.

• The party has been the subject of multiple controversies. This includes accusations of right-wing extremism, with multiple state chapters and the youth wing Junge Alternative fur Deutschland (JA) classified as confirmed extremist organizations by the federal domestic intelligence agency, Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (BfV). AfD politicians have been accused of receiving money from pro-Kremlin strategists and intelligence operatives in exchange for spreading alleged disinformation since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict in 2022.

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)

• The Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) is a center-left social democratic party. The SPD is polling at 15.5 percent as of January 27.

• Under Olaf Scholz, the party has overseen increases in military modernization and supports investing in Germany’s military production. Factions within the SPD support increased military aid to Ukraine, although Scholz blocked defense packages earmarked for Kyiv in January 2025. The party continues to oppose delivering German-made Taurus cruise missiles to Kyiv. On January 18, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius of the SPD indicated that the government may consider deploying troops in Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping mission. While the party has overseen increases in German military spending, it has called for it to remain at two percent of GDP, in line with NATO obligations.

• The party manifesto calls for a reform to relax the debt brake to allow for higher public spending. It supports government intervention policies, including a “Made in Germany” tax bonus to incentivize private investment. A key priority is the German pension system, opposing proposals to increase the retirement age.

• The SPD has historically been a supporter of a more open immigration policy, especially supporting the migration of skilled workers. The party prioritizes speeding up all asylum procedures. This includes making deportation procedures more efficient for migrants who commit crimes. It views immigration policy as a topic to be tackled at an EU level but supports border controls as a temporary policy.

Freie Demokraten Partei

• The Freie Demokraten Partei (FDP) is a center-right liberal economic party and former governing partner in the SPD-led coalition. The FDP is currently polling at 4.5 percent as of January 27.

• The party emphasizes support for free market economic policies and opposes any reform or abolition of the debt brake. It has called for budget cuts and reduction of bureaucracy, particularly to support small businesses in eastern states. In addition to cuts in income and corporate taxes, it demands cuts to electricity and energy taxes. FDP also supports diversifying Germany’s gas supply, including by expanding domestic natural gas production and reinvesting in nuclear energy.

• The FDP’s stance on immigration has become more restrictive compared to previous elections, advocating for a labor-based immigration policy and increasing deportations. It supports the establishment of a single centralized federal immigration authority, as opposed to separate systems in each state.

• The FDP supports increasing military aid to Ukraine, including an increased financial package of three billion EUR. The FDP also supports delivering German-made Taurus cruise missiles to Kyiv.

Bundnis 90/Die Grunen

• Die Grunen is a green party and member of the interim government with the SPD. It is currently polling at 12.5 percent as of January 27.

• The party largely campaigns on climate policy and calls for increasing Germany’s goal of reducing greenhouse gases from 55 percent to 70 percent by 2030. Die Grunen is in favor of reforming the debt brake to allow for higher public spending, citing the need for further investment in renewable energy, climate adaptation, and infrastructure.

• It also supports increasing Germany’s defense budget beyond the two percent GDP threshold and is in favor of financing this increase through higher borrowing in the medium term. Die Grunen supports increasing military aid to Ukraine, including the delivery of German-made Taurus cruise missiles.

• Die Grunen supports an open asylum policy, citing Germany’s “humanitarian responsibility”, and opposes major restrictions to immigration and asylum policies, advocating for continued policies for family reunification. The party supports attracting employment-based immigration to Germany and promotes investment in social integration programs for migrants.

Bundnis Sahra Wagenknecht

• Bundnis Sahra Wagenknecht is a far-left populist party, founded in January 2024 following a split from the left-wing Die Linke party. BSW is currently polling at six percent as of January 27.

• It has campaigned primarily on Euroskeptic, anti-NATO, and anti-immigration policies. The party opposes increases in military spending, supporting an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine. It favors ending military aid to Kyiv and resuming good relations with Moscow.

• Aligning with its anti-NATO rhetoric, it has strongly opposed Berlin’s approval of stationing US intermediate-range missile systems in western Germany and denounced the announcement of a new NATO maritime command structure in Rostock, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern state. Additionally, the party has been described as “pro-China”, supporting better relations with China, including trade.

• Regarding economic policy, the BSW supports economic interventionism and greater investment in the German welfare state. It opposes green policies, particularly EU green policies, and cites globalization as the cause of wealth inequality. It supports reinvesting in German nuclear power plants.

• BSW favors increasing restrictions on asylum and immigration policies, citing the protection of the “German welfare state” from economic strain. The party proposes that asylum procedures be carried out in “safe” third countries outside of the EU and that asylum seekers who commit crimes be deported.

Current Situation: Key Actors

• Friedrich Merz is the leader and chancellor candidate for the CDU. He also served as the leader of the opposition in the Bundestag since February 2022.

• Merz supports increased investment into German military modernization. He is a strong supporter of Germany’s integration into the EU and role in NATO. He has expressed support for supplying Kyiv with long-range German and Swedish-made Taurus cruise missiles after consultations with the USA, which has drawn criticism from the AfD.

• Merz is in favor of increasing welfare cuts and reduction of green regulation.

• On January 23, Merz promised to pass strict immigration restrictions if elected chancellor, citing the January 22 stabbing attack in Achaffenburg by a former asylum seeker as a reason to crack down on irregular immigration and increase deportations. He added that he would push for these restrictions even if only supported by the AfD, a statement that was criticized by other parties and prompted anti-CDU protests.

• On January 30, Merz presented two non-binding motions in parliament calling for heightened security measures and the closure of land borders to irregular immigration. The SPD and Die Grunen opposed the motions in a parliamentary vote, but the land border measure passed with a slim majority with the support of the AfD. This prompted criticism from mainstream parties and other social groups, including statements calling into question Merz’s commitment to maintaining the cordon sanitaire against the AfD.

• Alice Weidel is the co-chair of the AfD. She is also the AfD’s first chancellor candidate since the party’s formation.

• Weidel has also expressed support for a Brexit-style referendum on Germany’s EU membership, citing concerns over German national sovereignty and the EU’s economic policies.

• Weidel is in favor of reducing taxes, ending the minimum wage, and slimmed-down bureaucracy. In alignment with the AfD party platform, she has called for tight restrictions on immigration, including asylum, strengthening border police, and increasing deportations.

• Olaf Scholz, leader of the SPD, is currently serving as interim Chancellor. He previously served as Vice Chancellor of the fourth government headed by former Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) from 2018-2021. He also served as Federal Minister of Finance from 2018-2021.

• While Scholz has overall supported aid to Ukraine, he opposes sending Taurus long-range cruise missiles to Kyiv and allowing Ukraine to use long-range weapons for strikes inside Russia. He oversaw the creation of a special one-time fund to modernize the German armed forces, increasing Germany’s defense budget by 100 billion EUR in 2022. In January 2025, he stated that he was against a further defense budget increase. Scholz also blocked additional aid for Ukraine, saying he would only agree to the package if new debt were issued to fund it. He has expressed the need for “real negotiations” in Ukraine.

• Scholz has expressed openness to reforming Germany’s constitutional debt brake to allow for increased public spending.

• Scholz’s immigration stance is in line with that of the SPD. As Chancellor, Scholz implemented several significant policies curbing irregular migration, including speeding up asylum procedures. He also oversaw Germany’s introduction of more systematic border checks on those arriving from the Schengen Area, citing the need to control irregular migration.

• Robert Habeck is currently serving as the Economy Minister in the SPD-led caretaker government and is the chancellor candidate for the Die Grunen party.

• Habeck is in favor of major investment programs to boost the economy, modernizing rail and energy infrastructure. He is also in favor of reforming debt-brake rules to enable further government debt financing and is in favor of closing corporate tax loopholes.

• Habeck backs military aid to Ukraine and has supported policies reducing Germany’s dependence on Russian gas and oil by transitioning to renewable energy sources—such as offshore wind energy. However, Habeck opposes investment in nuclear energy, overseeing the shutdown of Germany’s last three nuclear power plants in April 2023.

• Habeck’s policies of increasing agricultural subsidy cuts have been criticized by German farmer’s groups. In January 2024, the subsidy cuts triggered mass farmers’ protests, causing nationwide disruptions.

• Sahra Wagenknecht is the leader and namesake of her party, BSW. Prior to the creation of the BSW, she was a member of the Bundestag and co-chair of the left-wing Die Linke party.

• Wagenknecht argues for strict immigration controls, calling for deportations and regulated immigration policy. She favors closer relations with Russia and has been critical of NATO and EU policies, opposing Germany’s involvement in any military interventions. She is a strong critic of Die Grunen, favoring reindustrialization policies over clean energy measures.

• Christian Lindner is the leader of the FDP and the former Finance Minister in the previous SPD-led coalition.

• A strong proponent of economic reform, Lindner is in favor of cuts to personal income taxes. However, as discussed, Lindner opposes proposals to reform Germany’s constitutional debt-brake.

• Lindner is a strong supporter of the EU and is in favor of deeper economic integration with the bloc. He strongly supports military aid to Ukraine but has suggested that Germany should accept Russia’s annexation of Crimea as a ‘permanent provisional solution’, which has drawn criticism.

• Lindner advocates for a regulated immigration policy, including cutting social payments for asylum seekers.

Current Situation: Campaign Issues

Immigration

• According to an electoral survey conducted by a monthly German election and political research service, immigration has emerged as a primary area of concern for German voters. As per the most recent January 9 survey, 37 percent of Germans consider immigration and emigration the top political problem that politicians must address. This marks a 14 percent increase compared to the results of the survey carried out in December 2024.

• The topic of “remigration” remains a contentious issue, with the AfD formally including it as part of the party manifesto for the first time.

• Moreover, Merz’s promises to tighten immigration and asylum measures have been met with criticism, with politicians calling into question Merz’s commitment to maintaining the cordon sanitaire against the AfD.

Economy and Inflation

• With the German economy contracting for the second year in a row in 2024, the economy remains a key policy point for voters, coming in second place in the electoral survey after immigration. Inflation remains a predominant concern, with 56 percent of the population emphasizing the need for governmental action to curb ongoing price rises.

• Proposals to reform the constitutionally enshrined debt brake are a key topic in combination with economic concerns. With the policy cited as a reason for the “traffic light” coalition’s collapse, parties have taken multiple positions on a possible reform, which also influences the government’s ability to fund other policy positions.

• Energy prices are also a prominent campaign topic, as it is the first election since Germany phased out its reliance on Russian gas.

Relations with NATO and the EU

• Strategic issues such as Germany’s position in NATO and EU integration are also important campaign themes.

• Although all mainstream parties support Germany remaining in NATO, policy disagreements exist over Germany’s military spending and contributions, including the stationing of US long-range weapons systems in Germany. Meanwhile, the AfD and BSW have called for Germany to reconsider its role in NATO, claiming that it works against German interests.

• Drawing on the AfD’s proposals for Germany’s exit from the EU, mainstream parties have denounced plans to separate from European institutions, accusing the AfD of fostering Eurosceptic policies that are detrimental to Germany.

• Despite this criticism, rhetoric from the AfD and BSW continues to focus on the need to preserve German national interests and values against the EU’s alleged imposition of overly liberal policies. Both parties call for reversing Germany’s European integration.

Ukraine Conflict

• After the USA, Germany is Ukraine’s second-biggest financial and military backer, with 7.1 billion EUR in aid provided in 2024 alone.

• While polls indicate that the German public is generally in support of Germany’s aid to Ukraine, the proportion of Germans that support the cession of Ukrainian territories to end the conflict has grown from 35 percent in March 2023 to 53 percent in December 2024.

• While all mainstream parties are generally in favor of support for Ukraine as a necessary defense against Russia, the AfD and BSW continue to call for a cessation of aid to Kyiv. Moreover, given existing economic policy disagreements, parties have increasingly disagreed over how to fund this aid, with Scholz blocking a 3 billion EUR aid package in the Bundestag in January 2025, citing funding concerns.

Assessments & Forecast

CDU/CSU expected to come first in federal elections amid growing disapproval of SPD

1. As in past years, no party is likely to win an outright majority in the elections. However, as indicated by current polls, the CDU/CSU alliance is expected to win the most seats. This is evidenced by the CDU/CSU maintaining around a 10-point lead with around 30 percent since at least December 2023.

2. The party’s consistent polling can be attributed to the SPD-led coalition’s loss in public support and CDU leader Friedrich Merz’s strong approval rating. Indeed, Merz’s position as a strong candidate has arguably boosted the CDU/CSU’s image since the 2021 elections. Notably, 2021 Chancellor candidate Armin Laschet’s multiple campaign gaffes in the aftermath of mass flooding in western Germany have been cited as key factors to the alliance’s poor performance in 2021. That said, Merz’s January 30 push for stricter anti-immigration measures with the AfD’s help may lower his popularity, given criticism that this broke the “firewall” among mainstream parties against working with the far-right. While criticism against the CDU is expected to increase, with anti-CDU protests already manifesting in cities nationwide in response to Merz’s statements, this is unlikely to lead to a significant decrease in support for the party or an increase in support for the SPD.

3. This is especially so, given that the CDU/CSU is likely increasingly seen as an alternative to the SPD. Since 2023, Scholz’s government has seen low levels of approval, triggered by persistent intra-coalition conflict over policy, the Ukraine conflict, increasing levels of inflation, and dissatisfaction with mainstream immigration policy. The collapse of the “traffic light” coalition government in November 2024 further exacerbated the lack of trust in the SPD, evidenced by Scholz’s recent approval ratings of 16 percent, making him the least popular chancellor since Germany’s reunification in 1990. Given Scholz’s low popularity, the SPD’s decision to re-elect him as Chancellor candidate is liable to contribute to the party losing seats in the election.

AfD expected to see largest vote share in federal election since its founding

1. While the AfD has been polling at second place for several months, it is uncertain whether it will surpass the SPD. This is especially so given multiple controversies surrounding the AfD in recent weeks, including distributing controversial fake “airplane tickets” to promote the deportation of people with immigration backgrounds.

2. Despite these controversies, which have sparked mass anti-AfD protests in recent weeks, the party is expected to see its largest vote share in a federal election since it was founded. This is also supported by AfD polling between 17 and 22 percent since August 2024, a notable increase from the 11 percent it was polling at prior to the 2021 elections. Given increasing dissatisfaction with mainstream parties, it has seen a particular increase in support in traditional strongholds in the five eastern states of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) – evidenced by its strong showing in recent state elections in Thuringia and Saxony, where the party came first and second, respectively, for the first time. However, the party is also likely to see an increase in support in other states, as already witnessed by its results in the European Parliamentary elections, where it finished in second place with 16 percent of the overall vote.

3. The AfD’s electoral prospects will likely also be bolstered by its increasing popularity among the youth voters. While the AfD received seven percent of the 18–24-year-old vote in the 2021 Bundestag election, that number increased to 16 percent in the 2024 European Parliamentary elections. This success is partly attributed to the AfD’s effective use of social media, where it is able to mobilize younger voters.

4. Separately, Die Grunen is expected to enter parliament as well, given the high satisfaction rating of Robert Habeck and consistent support for the party around 11-14 percent since mid-2023. The party is likely to see similar results as in 2021, with their voter base remaining relatively stable given their consistent focus on environmental issues.

5. On the other hand, as seen in current polling, the BSW, FDP, and Die Linke are at risk of failing to enter the Bundestag altogether, given declining support. However, if the BSW does win enough seats, this would be a notable development, given that there would be a presence of two populist parties in the parliament.

Elevated risk of Russia-backed hybrid warfare expected during campaign period

1. The risk of Russia-backed election interference and destabilization efforts is elevated in the coming weeks. This is supported by allegations by Western authorities that Russia has previously engaged in disinformation campaigns and electoral fraud in Europe, including in the June 2024 European Parliament elections, the October 2024 Moldovan presidential elections, and the November 2024 Romanian presidential elections. This threat is also supported by Defense Minister Boris Pistorius warning of potential Russia-backed “hybrid attacks” in the lead-up to the election on December 22, 2024.

2. Given precedent, election interference is likely to be through disinformation campaigns. Disinformation campaigns will capitalize on hot-button issues such as the economy, inflation, and immigration to reinforce growing dissatisfaction with mainstream parties and increase support for far-right and populist parties, especially the AfD. Indeed, according to a January 20 report by a German think tank, a Russia-backed disinformation campaign has already been deployed on multiple social media platforms in recent weeks. The campaign seeks to promote pro-Russia parties and policies using German-language posts on social media criticizing the SPD, CDU, and Die Grunen and spreading false information.

3. There is also a heightened risk of Russia-backed physical sabotage, targeting both private and public entities. With multiple such instances already observed in recent months, sabotage attempts are likely to intensify in the coming weeks.

4. Given precedent, these are likely to take the form of arson, vandalism, explosive attacks. Such attacks are liable to target Germany’s defense industry, as well as critical infrastructure such as energy supplies, water networks, energy companies, and civil aviation. Additionally, Moscow is also liable to target commercial entities that have no apparent strategic importance or links to Ukraine, including commercial retailers, telecommunications, and transport companies. For instance, reports alleged Russian involvement in packages with incendiary devices that caught fire at cargo and courier facilities in Leipzig, Germany; Birmingham, UK; and Jablonow, Poland in July 2024.

5. Russian-backed cyberattacks are also likely to increase in the lead-up to the election, as seen in cyberattacks targeting German defense and aerospace firms and the SPD party websites in May 2024. While cyberattacks have primarily resulted in online disruptions from distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, there is a latent threat of cyberattacks causing real-time disruptions to transportation, government, electoral authorities, and other infrastructure services.

6. Espionage activity is also liable to see an uptick, with multiple suspected instances of Russia-linked individuals and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) sightings reported near military bases, ports, and infrastructure in recent months. However, with the government authorizing the army to shoot down suspicious UAVs seen near military sites or critical infrastructure on January 15, the frequency of UAV-aided surveillance is liable to decrease in favor of more covert methods.

7. Additionally, there is a latent threat of targeted attacks on prominent individuals connected to critical industries, as was seen in July 2024 when Germany and US authorities foiled a Russian plot to assassinate the chief executive of a German arms manufacturer.

8. FORECAST: Given such instances, pre-election increased security measures are likely to be observed surrounding campaign events and rallies, as well as increased protection for high-profile politicians and business executives. Bolstered measures are also likely to be observed around military infrastructure, logistics hubs, ports, energy and water structures, and entities related to the defense industry.

Pre-electoral violence across ideological spectrum to increase amid growing polarization

1. Amid growing political polarization, violence targeting campaign events and politicians is likely to increase in the coming weeks. Indeed, this was already seen in the December 14 attack targeting an SPD party stand by far-right extremists at the Lichterfelde train station in Berlin and arson targeting a vehicle belonging to an AfD politician in Neustadt, Schleswig-Holstein on December 2.

2. While parties across the ideological spectrum are at risk of political violence, politicians and events associated with the Die Grunen party are most likely to be targeted, as witnessed in previous years. This is largely due to far-right extremists targeting Die Grunen, amid AfD rhetoric against the party. That said, AfD MPs or events are also at an elevated risk of attacks, particularly by far-left radical actors. This was seen in multiple alleged attacks on AfD politicians by far-left demonstrators during the party’s conference in Riesa, Saxony on January 12.

3. Moreover, the risk of Islamist and far-right extremist terrorist attacks is also elevated, with authorities warning of heightened extremism since 2023. FORECAST: Far-right and Islamist extremists are likely to target locations with large crowds, such as political rallies, public transport hubs, and tourist hotspots, given the potential for inflicting mass casualties. Jewish public and religious establishments, such as synagogues and community spaces, also remain vulnerable to attacks, given that both Islamists and far-right extremists are known to harbor anti-Semitic sentiments.

Campaign period to witness recurring anti-AfD, anti-immigration protests, with heightened risk of unrest

1. Given widespread disapproval of the AfD, anti-far-right protests are expected to continue in the lead-up to and aftermath of the elections. Large-scale anti-AfD protests have already taken place nationwide, with tens of thousands demonstrating in Berlin alone on January 25.

2. Moreover, anti-immigration protests driven by far-right groups and parties are likely to continue in the near term, especially in cities in eastern states like Thuringia. Such protests are especially likely in the event of attacks carried out by migrants or asylum seekers, as already seen following the attack in Aschaffenburg and the December 2024 vehicular ramming attack in Magdeburg.

3. Given heightened sentiments, any political protests and rallies carry a heightened risk of unrest in the form of clashes between opposing political camps and police. This was seen on December 14, 2024, when far-right protesters and left-wing counter-protesters clashed with police during a far-right march in Berlin, as well as in localized clashes between protesters and police during a far-right demonstration in Magdeburg on December 21, 2024.

4. Anti-AfD protests are also at heightened risk of unrest, especially if there is a presence of far-left or antifa groups, as seen in the unrest recorded at protests denouncing the AfD party conference in Riesa, Saxony, on January 11.

Recommendations

1. Travel to Germany may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance in the vicinity of campaign events and large-scale protest activity over the coming weeks.

2. Those operating or residing in Germany are advised to maintain vigilance in the vicinity of election campaign events due to the heightened risk of pre-electoral violence targeting such events over the coming weeks.

3. Maintain heightened vigilance in the vicinity of associated large-scale protests due to the heightened risk of unrest.

4. Maintain heightened vigilance in the vicinity of locations with large crowds, including tourist hotspots and transportation hubs, due to the heightened risk of militancy in the coming weeks.

5. Maintain heightened vigilance for possible sabotage activity around key military, industrial, maritime, aviation, logistical hubs, and civilian infrastructure and sites.

6. Companies and businesses operating in at-risk sectors are advised to renew cybersecurity procedures, including regular software updates and training for staff.

7. Alert authorities of suspicious behavior or individuals.

8. For more information on the political and security situation, as well as planning for the upcoming political developments, please contact intel@max-security.com