The Syrian Opposition’s Long Road to Victory

By Daniel N.

Only a dramatic escalation in the Syrian conflict will convince the world that Assad must fall

On December 2nd, Syrian insurgents staged an attack on an Intelligence facility in northern Idlib province. Eight people were killed in the ensuing clashes, including several Air Force intelligence personnel. Like the high-profile attack on the Air Force intelligence headquarters in Damascus, the media rushed to portray this act along with recent calls for sanctions as the fall of another pillar signaling the imminent end of the Assad regime.   The reality of the situation is that the Idlib attack symbolizes all that is plaguing Syrian opposition in its many forms.

The Idlib attack came hours after the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) insurgent group announced a decision to coordinate their resistance. Included in the agreement, was a pledge by the FSA to halt its offensive attacks, limiting its armed activity to protecting protest neighborhoods in flashpoint cities like Homs and Hama. The SNC, an umbrella body of various opposition groups in exile has been struggling to prove its legitimacy to the world, while the FSA has taken the spotlight with its high profile attacks, drawing concerns of the advent of a civil war in Syria.  The nature of these groups and geographical and ideological divides between them continue to deter the international community from taking measures which would expedite Assad’s fall as they did Gaddafi.

In the Libyan case, the opposition NTC was able to create the façade that they were a viable alternative to Gaddafi, established firmly in their base in Benghazi from which they would conduct their military campaign to overthrow him.   Today, no one seems quite sure just who is leading the revolution in Syria, as most of the world has yet to recognize the SNC’s legitimacy, while it remains to be seen whether the FSA boasts any real hierarchy as opposed to various bands of defected soldiers operating independently of each other.

Opposition Militarily ineffective 

Despite their growing attention from the media, the Free Syrian Army remains in capable of launching a sustained military campaign against the Syrian military. The hit-and-run style attacks on symbolic targets such as Air Force intelligence facilities (Assad the Father was the commander of Air Force Intelligence) show that these insurgents are conducting these raids in order to portray a scenario that the government is losing control of its territory.  The reality of matter is that these insurgents not only lack the necessary heavy weaponry to compete with Assad’s powerful military, but they also lack sufficient supply lines to conduct a prolonged campaign. Many of these insurgents are forced to make do with the arms in taken when they defected from their units, while others buy small arms from smugglers in neighboring countries or raid military stockpiles.

Even with the rapidly increasing defection rates, the soldiers who are deserting their post are mostly Sunni conscripts with limited training and strategic know-how.  The Alllawite-dominated Syrian air force, Special Forces, and command echelon are unlikely to follow suit, as they understand their fight is currently the best way to preserve their sect’s domination of the country.

The Syrian opposition is therefore greatly in need of international intervention in the form of advanced arms, training, and ultimately, a military strike to eliminate Assad’s military advantage- his air power.  Given the potential regional consequences of such a strike, the Syrian opposition is left with little choice but to use global public opinion to create a dire situation, which would lead to Syria’s complete isolation, even from its remaining allies in Russia and Iran.

 They must therefore draw the Syrian military into a situation where it is forced to use its airpower, causing mass casualties which would give regional and western leaders no choice but to consider military intervention.  Doing this would require a concerted effort to secure neighborhoods in opposition hubs such as Homs and Idlib, making it so dangerous for Syrian ground troops to enter, and forcing them to resort heavy bombing raids.   As Homs plays host to one of Syria’s few oil refineries, further intensifying the conflict in that city would force Assad to take desperate measures in order to save one of the last staples of his country’s faltering economy.

After nearly ten months of brutal crackdown, it remains clear that peaceful protest in Syria will not remove the remaining economic and military pillars still bolstering the Assad regime. Both the opposition leadership in exile and within Syria must commit to taking drastic steps which will likely bring about greater suffering in order to pressure the world to take action to remove these pillars.  The first step is an agreement between armed opposition elements on the ground and the opposition in exile to create a united front which would provide the world with a viable alternative to the Assad regime.  It will then be up to the West, Turkey, and other willing nations to provide the opposition with the arms and support it requires to draw the Syrian military into a far more brutal conflict. Only such brutality will leave the world with no other choice but to bring down Assad by any means possible.

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