Tag Archives: violence

Cartel Threats to Business and Travel: El Bajio’s industrial development attracts the CJNG – Mexico Analysis

Executive Summary:

  • The El Bajio region in the west and north-central Mexico houses the major industrial centers for automotive parts in the country, which have primarily driven manufacturing growth over the past decade, as well as increasing agribusiness.
  • Organized criminal groups have shifted sights to diversify into and target various agricultural and manufacturing industries in recent years, especially during the pandemic.
  • This trend is expected to worsen the operating environment due to the extreme risk of violence and disruptions to business activity in the absence of an adequate security response.
  • Essential business travel to Mexico’s industrial center can continue while remaining cognizant of international travel advisories and the persistent risk of violence stemming from organized criminal activity.

This is the first in a series of analyses explaining and forecasting the cartel-related risks posed to business and travel in Mexico, with future reports focusing on border cities, ports, and popular tourist destinations.


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Current Situation

  • The Bajio region of west and north-central Mexico, which includes parts of Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, and Zacatecas, has been the major driver of industrial growth in the country over the past decade.
  • Areas in the Bajio region have also emerged as hotspots for organized criminal activity, serving as the headquarters for major groups prior to the industrialization wave. The Michoacan-based La Familia Michoacana (LFM), Guanajuato-based SRLC, and Jalisco-headquartered CJNG are the primary cartels engaged in various turf wars directly as well as through proxies and allies.
  • The fast-growing Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) has now established a presence in all states of the Bajio region. Turf wars with the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (SRLC) continue, although security operations targeting this group have weakened it significantly.
  • These groups have sought to target industry and critical infrastructure in recent years as a means to diversify from solely focusing on drug trafficking revenue, which declined somewhat due to increased cross-border operations. For instance, the SRLC is known to rely mainly on oil theft for the black market and extortion against state-owned oil company PEMEX’s assets.
  • In June 2020, authorities rounded up 26 suspected members of the SRLC in the state capital of Celaya in Guanajuato, including leader ‘El Marro’s’ mother, sister, and girlfriend. This prompted a wave of intense retaliation throughout the year, including public shootouts, attacks on law enforcement, and sieges of stronghold areas. Despite the eventual arrest of El Marro in August 2020, the SRLC has continued its wave of violence, mainly stemming from an intense turf war with the CJNG, which has struggled to take control of Guanajuato.
  • In February 2020, the CJNG announced their arrival in San Luis Potosi state with a social media video featuring heavily armed masked men warning other groups to stay away, as well as alleging that Police Chief Jose Guadalupe Castillo Celestino was in charge of the sale of drugs in the state capital.
  • In November 2019, federal authorities froze 533 bank accounts linked to the CJNG in the Bajio region. 53 accounts linked to the still-at-large leader of the CJNG, ‘El Mencho’, were also frozen.

El Bajio

Background

  • Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Queretaro, and San Luis Potosi agreed to form a new manufacturing region called the Central Bajio Corridor in November 2018, with shared infrastructure, investment, and employment policies. Long-term cooperation between the states will also extend to security, tourism, transport and social development, among other areas.
  • Overall, the El Bajio region recorded a 47.2 percent increase in production between 2013-2018. Investment in the area remains robust in activities such as logistics, e-commerce, financial services, and manufacturing, specifically in the automotive industry.
  • Reports from 2020 indicate that the pandemic did not significantly affect rental prices in the region, indicating that investors continue to hold high levels of confidence in the growth potential of the area.
  • Apart from industry, the Bajio region is also very fertile, with several export-oriented farms centered in the region, particularly in the multimillion-dollar avocado belt of Michoacan, which cartels refer to as ‘green gold’. Instances of cartels attempting to take over farms, extort farmers, and target indigenous land reserves in the area have been increasing over the past few years.

Manufacturing Units in El Bajio Corridor

Assessments & Forecast

Rapid expansion of industry, foreign firms to continue attracting cartels

  1. The increasing availability of a well-educated workforce from nearby Mexico City and the State of Mexico, as well as the ease of doing business in El Bajio due to policies designed to attract foreign investment, will ensure that the region remains a popular destination for foreign firms to headquarter Mexico-based industrial operations and house ex-pat workers.
  2. Given the systemic issue of public corruption in local police forces, businesses are also unlikely to be able to rely solely on state and national officials to secure their assets. Despite the pandemic and its purported effects on disrupting criminal activity, states like Guanajuato did not record a significant decline in homicides in 2020, indicating the continued threat posed by organized crime groups.
  3. In addition, as seen in Guerrero in 2018, when major American beverage companies were forced out of production facilities due to extortion threats from drug trafficking groups, the possibility of recognizable international brands being specifically targeted remains high. These are usually targeted for extortion, protection fees, kidnappings, and intimidatory shootouts.
  4. With this, pandemic-related slowdowns and a change in working patterns in the near term may lead to fertile ground for organized criminal groups to capitalize on reduced staffing at manufacturing and storage facilities for break-ins and thefts of materials and goods. Such a trend has emerged in other areas of Latin America during the pandemic, as disruptions to supply chains and drop in demand mean such goods are often in storage or holding locations for longer.
  5. As seen in various Mexican cities during the pandemic, well-organized cartels have also emerged as a viable, faster, and more efficient alternative to local government when it comes to distribution of scarce resources such as food and medicines. With the faith in all levels of government and big business further undermined by this two-pronged carrot-and-stick approach pursued by organized criminal groups, poorer locals are likely to be easier to recruit or bribe to aid in their operations.
  6. FORECAST: With the recent legalization of marijuana in Mexico on March 10 potentially seen as a precursor to further reductions of drug trafficking revenues, coupled with the pandemic-related border restrictions, the CJNG and other major groups will likely focus on diversifying revenue and capitalize on this industrial growth. Given El Bajio’s location between a number cartels’ strongholds and its increasing development, a continuing uptick in illicit activities, including kidnappings of both local and foreign workers, extortion, and attacks on buildings and installations is likely to be witnessed over the coming months and years.

Sources of Income for Cartels

 

Cartels to target agricultural industry, local communities with high chance of violent retaliation

  1. Local farming communities in Michoacan and other states have persistently been targeted by various organized crime groups seeking illicit gain from export revenues, and set up their own semi-legal agricultural businesses such as avocado farms and timber, to diversify revenue streams. Colombian authorities have also alleged that Mexican cartels are attempting to produce synthetic cocaine using cheaper coca base paste within Mexico itself, which would simplify their trafficking supply chains and reduce associated costs of importing from Colombia. As such, the Bajio region will continue to be lucrative to such criminal groups not only as a source of extortion but as a base for emerging agri- and narcotic-based production due to its high fertility and vast expanses of land.
  2. An additional threat is posed by the cartels’ continued targeting of indigenous communities in these states, by burning protected lands and illegally cutting through forests. Given their distrust of authorities over historic grievances and the inability of the state to provide them protection, such communities often form self-defense groups or grupos autodefensas. Owing to their limited resources and inter-group conflicts, as well as reports of self-defense groups being involved in drug trafficking, kidnapping, and infiltration by criminal organizations, their presence is likely to pose additional risks to local businesses and residents. This could be directly through targeted criminal activity or indirectly through violent public confrontations with law enforcement and cartels.
  3. FORECAST: The agro-business environment in Bajio will become increasingly uncertain as the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic becomes more apparent in the coming months, with unemployed local communities likely to blame big businesses for job losses and rising violence in the states. Given that adequately protecting farmland and forest areas has proven to be a major concern for both private and public security apparatuses, secondary industries are likely to be adversely affected by the resultant deterioration of the business environment. Cartels are thus likely to capitalize on the economic downturn by taking over disenfranchised land owners’ assets and disrupting localized agri-business activity, as well as emerging as an alternative source of aid and services from officials for disadvantaged locals.

CJNG Statement Upon Entering San Luis Petosi

 

Increasingly violent turf wars, standoffs with law enforcement to increase risk to bystanders

  1. Groups such as the SRLC and the CJNG have faced increasing scrutiny and security operations in the El Bajio region in recent years, likely due to authorities’ attempts to ensure the region remains an attractive investment opportunity. However, this has led to brutal turf wars and retaliatory violence in states like Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, and San Luis Potosi. This is reflected in these states consistently recording some of the highest homicide and assault rates, and multiple advisories by the US Department of State advising against travel to some areas in these states.
  2. In addition, the trend of smaller, often more radical, local groups allying themselves to large cartels to carry out violent proxy attacks on rival groups and law enforcement, as well as mass-casualty attacks in public areas, is expected to continue going forward. As such, there remains a high risk of spillover violence affecting travelers and residents in these states.
  3. Further, given the general mid-term legislative, gubernatorial, and local elections scheduled for June 2021, as well as the electoral significance of major states in El Bajio, the threat of politically-motivated violence remains high. This is supported by attacks targeting mayoral candidates between March 3-5 in the municipalities of Nuevo Casas Grandes in Chihuahua, Casimiro Castillo in Jalisco, Isla Mujeres in Quintana Roo, Tamazunchale in San Luis Potosi, and La Perla in Veracruz. Groups such as the CJNG are known to engage in armed attacks on candidates and sitting officials to ensure that those in power are favorable to their operations, and targeted attacks sometimes carry the latent potential of spillover violence.
  4. FORECAST: Given precedent, key states and cities in El Bajio are likely to witness a spike in violence in 2021 due to political developments, and into the longer-term due to an anticipated uptick in security operations against large criminal groups. Such insecurity is likely to adversely affect the image of the El Bajio industrial region as being safe for doing business.

Cartel Presence in El Bajio

Recommendations

  1. Those operating or residing in Mexico are advised to remain cognizant of the threat posed by organized criminal groups to business activity in the El Bajio region.
  2. Avoid nonessential travel to areas with an extreme or high risk of cartel and gang-related violence, including avoiding rural road travel.
  3. Those with continuing essential operations in such areas are advised to maintain an adequate private security contingent in order to secure any facilities or transport plans. Minimize employee exposure to areas with a known cartel presence.
  4. In the event that a facility or operation is targeted by cartel members, it is advised to evacuate nonessential personnel immediately from the site, while avoiding any interaction with the criminal groups where possible and contacting local and home-nation authorities.
  5. Remain cognizant of local media updates regarding areas with a significant cartel presence, given the dynamic nature of the violence.

Killing of at least 137 civilians in Tahoua Region on March 21 highlights role of ethnicity, communal conflicts in ongoing insurgency – Niger Analysis

Executive Summary

  • The killing of at least 137 civilians, primarily Tuareg, in Tahoua Region marks the deadliest ever militant attack in Niger. It aligns with a recent trend of high-casualty attacks against civilians in Niger in 2021 and is a notable departure from the Islamic State in Greater Sahara’s (ISGS) usual modus operandi of only small-scale violence against the civilians in Niger.
  • This lends credence to sources indicating that the attacks were perpetrated by local militias affiliated with the ISGS, suggesting that the attack may not have been motivated by jihadist ideology or ordered by central command but rather was conducted independently by the militia in pursuit of personal or communal aims.
  • The precedent of hostilities between the Tuareg and the Fulani communities in the Tahoua Region suggests that a Fulani militia may have been responsible and portends a spate of reprisals and attacks over the coming weeks. This aligns with the broader Sahelian trend of ethnically motivated violence against civilians, with communal militias being a large contributor of insecurity across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
  • We advise against all travel to Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua regions in the west along the borders of Mali and Burkina Faso, with the exception of Niamey, due to the ongoing risk of militancy.

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Please be advised

  • Reports indicate that at least 137 civilians, primarily of Tuareg ethnicity, were killed by armed men on motorbikes who attacked Intazayene, Bakorat, and Wistane in Tillia Department in Niger’s Tahoua region on March 21.
  • Some sources indicate that the attack was perpetrated by militias affiliated with Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), with one source stating that the militia responsible for the attack started associating with the ISGS In 2018.
  • Sources from March 23 indicate that Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM) denied perpetrating the attacks and promised to take revenge on those responsible.

Location of armed attacks in Niger on March 21

Assessments & Forecast

  1. These coordinated raids, with 137 dead and the death toll still likely to rise, mark the deadliest attack on Nigerien soil since the beginning of the jihadist insurgency. It is particularly notable that the attack targeted civilians, primarily ethnic Tuareg, which aligns with the recent trend established by the January 2 attack that killed 100 civilians and the March 16 attack that killed 58, both in Tillaberi Region’s Ouallam Department. While violence against civilians perpetrated by the jihadists has always been prevalent in Niger, predominantly in the form of militant raids and assassinations of local leaders and government collaborators, this violence had largely been small-scale before 2021. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) was likely oriented toward presenting the group as a viable alternative to state presence to local communities in western Niger. Thus, these recent attacks are a marked departure from the group’s usual modus operandi in Niger.
  2. This lends credence to reports suggesting that the attacks were conducted by local communal militias affiliated with the ISGS. There is an important distinction between ISGS and affiliated militias conducting the attack because it potentially implies that the attack was not ordered by the ISGS leadership, but was rather carried out by the militias autonomously. This highlights a broader theme of local militias affiliated with larger jihadist groups sometimes acting independently from the central command, with their actions motivated by personal and communal grievances and not jihadist ideology or strategy. This potentially explains some of the larger casualty attacks, and even some smaller-scale raids, against civilians that have not been claimed by the jihadist groups over the past years. The leadership of the jihadist groups may tacitly support the militias’ activities since they serve to intimidate the population, making them more susceptible to the jihadists’ overtures of protection. However, the jihadists likely want to maintain some plausible deniability as they recruit from numerous ethnic communities, some of which have long-standing disputes.
  3. Within this context, the latest attack targeting the Tuareg in Niger was likely rooted in communal and local conflicts, possibly over some resource dispute or as a reprisal for some action perpetrated by Tuareg militiamen. The assailants likely belonged to a militia that was ethnically Fulani and the attack was probably a manifestation of the cyclical violence between the Arab and Fulani militias in Tahoua Region, given the precedent of hostilities between the two communities, with multiple attacks and reprisals reported over the past years. The conflict between the two communities has been heightened since 2017 when the Arab Malian militias, sanctioned to operate in the country by the Nigerien government, were perceived to be indiscriminately targeting the Fulani under the guise of fighting militancy. To that point, the attack aligns with the broader Sahelian trend of high-casualty attacks against civilians being ethnically motivated, with communal militias being a large contributor to the ongoing violence and insecurity across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Militants exploit this dynamic by escalating communal hostilities and engendering perceptions of marginalization to exacerbate insecurity and facilitate recruitment and their entrenchment.
  4. The authorities’ hardline response exacerbates this tension, thereby benefiting the militants by further giving rise to sentiments of disenfranchisement. This was exemplified in Niger when the government authorized Malian ethnic militias to operate in the country in 2017-2018 to combat rising jihadism. These militias, which were largely composed of ethnic Tuareg and Daosahak, engaged in biased targeting, extrajudicial killings, and large-scale violence, primarily against the Fulani, leading to the creation of communal militias and accelerating the militarization of the border. While the government attempted to take a more conciliatory approach towards the border communities following this, the perception that the government-sanctioned the targeting of border communities, particularly the Fulani, had taken root, driving both the recently formed and existing militias to align with the ISGS. In fact, the militia allegedly responsible for the latest attack in Tahoua was reportedly formed in the early 2000s but started being associated by the ISGS in 2018, likely in the aftermath of the Malian militia’s activities.
  5. FORECAST: In line with the constant spate of attacks and retaliation that characterize these ethnic conflicts, the latest attack is liable to elicit a swift reprisal. Arab militias operating in the area are liable to pursue the militia responsible for the attack and may even target civilians, likely Fulanis. Even JNIM may get involved given leader Iyad ag Ghaly’s Tuareg heritage and as suggested by their denial of complicity and promise of revenge. This has the potential to devolve into clashes between JNIM and ISGS, as the latter is likely to take umbrage with JNIM operating within its strongholds. As such, insecurity is likely to persist in the Tchintabaraden Department along the Malian border over the coming weeks.
  6. FORECAST: The government is also likely to intensify operations in Tahoua Region to catch the perpetrators of the attack over the coming weeks. This is especially likely since newly elected President Mohamed Bazoum will likely want to demonstrate his ability to handle the ongoing insurgency. These operations may succeed in temporarily incapacitating the activities of the armed groups operating in the region, however, they are unlikely to be successful in curtailing the groups’ activities in the long-term. This aligns with the limitation of hard-line military response against the jihadists and other armed actors to adequately combat the insurgency since it fails to address the conditions that lead to radicalization and ethnic conflicts.

Recommendations

  1. We advise against all travel to Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua regions in the west along the borders of Mali and Burkina Faso, with the exception of Niamey, due to the ongoing risk of militancy.
  2. Avoid all travel to the border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, given the extreme risks of militancy, ethnic conflict, and violent crime.
  3. Travel to Niamey can continue while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding crime.

Organized crime to remain primary security threat in Sweden throughout 2021 – Sweden Analysis

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Gang violence in Sweden continues to proliferate, acting as the primary security threat and undermining the country’s otherwise relatively safe security landscape.
  • Authorities estimate that there are 40 family-based criminal “clans” operating in Sweden’s so-called vulnerable areas, attempting to consolidate their influence by recruiting youths and increasing their targeting of both business and local politics.
  • The government has introduced a number of reforms providing police with more tools in addressing gang violence, including the target of increasing the national police force by 10,000 officers by 2024.
  • Travel to Sweden may continue while practicing standard safety procedures and avoiding nonessential travel to police-designated high-risk areas.

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Current Situation

  • In February 2021, the Swedish Police confirmed that the government is on course to meet its target of adding 10,000 officers to the national police force by 2024. The measure is part of a 34-point program introduced by the government to combat gang violence.
  • An estimated 40 family-based criminal “clans” are operating in Sweden. These clans are increasing their influence in Sweden’s so-called “vulnerable areas,” disadvantaged neighborhoods that are increasingly segregated. Police estimate there are 12,000 people active in such organized criminal groups.
  • Sweden has witnessed a significant increase in gun violence in recent years, with authorities recording a total of 366 shootings in 2020, compared to 334 in 2019.
  • Criminal gangs continue to utilize explosives in order to intimidate rival gangs, as well as extort businesses. In 2020, 107 detonations were recorded, in addition to 89 attempted explosions, compared to 133 detonations and 82 attempted explosions in 2019.

 

Gang members & Police officers numbers Sweden 2021

 

Notable Incidents

  • In August 2020, a twelve-year-old girl was killed after being caught in a crossfire of a gang shootout in Botkyrka, outside of Stockholm, while two teenage boys were tortured, raped, and buried alive in a cemetery in Solna, also outside of Stockholm, in a so-called humiliation crime. The incidents received widespread public attention and incited calls for a government response.
  • Also in August 2020, members of a criminal organization set up roadblocks in the suburbs of Gothenburg in order to catch members of a rival gang, as part of an ongoing gang rivalry between four different criminal organizations operating in the area. The gangs eventually negotiated a truce at a hotel in Gothenburg, without any police interference.

Vulnerable areas 

  • Police have identified 60 vulnerable areas in Sweden, characterized by low socioeconomic development, which makes them prone to influence by organized crime. Of the 60 areas, 22 have been classified as high risk, or so-called “no go zones”, where police are greatly hindered or unable to carry out operations due to high levels of violence and a general reluctance to cooperate in investigations and the judiciary system. The majority of these areas are located in the suburbs of major cities.
  • These areas typically have large immigrant communities, in which unemployment is high, compounded by restrictive labor laws, which make it difficult for migrants to gain employment. Additionally, vulnerable areas have a considerably higher proportion of children, as well as high school dropout rates. As such, youth in these areas are prime targets for criminal organizations, who tend to target young men seeking a sense of belonging and purpose.
  • An estimated 50 percent of all gang members are foreign-born and 85 percent have an immigrant background.
  • According to Deputy Police Chief Mats Lofving, criminal groups are increasing their presence in business and politics in such areas in order to wield more formal influence.

Sweden High Risk Areas scaled

Assessments & Forecast

Criminal groups expected to continue embedding themselves in vulnerable areas, increasing the potential for spillover violence

  1. The increase in criminal-related violence is likely driven by ongoing inter-gang rivalries, as evidenced by the inter-gang-derived checkpoints in Gothenburg.
  2. As evidenced by the increase in shootings in recent years, including in 2020, gang-rivalries have led to the increased influx of illegal arms in Sweden, utilizing arms trafficking routes predominantly from the Balkans. Moreover, despite COVID-19-related border restrictions, authorities seized a record number of firearms and drugs in 2020, with a total of 147 firearms seized in customs compared to 58 in 2019. These figures suggest the actual number of illegal weapons circulating in Sweden is likely much higher.
  3. With this, weapon- and explosive-involved violence is expected to continue in the form of shootings, as well as grenades and explosive attacks. In more extreme cases, and especially during heightened inter-gang tensions, execution-style killings remain possible. As demonstrated by the August 2020 incidents, the threat of spillover violence is high, with shootouts liable to occur in public areas.
  4. Further, based on precedent, criminal gangs are liable to increase extortive tactics, targeting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in both their strongholds and more central areas in Stockholm and Gothenburg. Extortion is likely to take place in the form of grenade attacks targeting property, as well as potential attacks on vehicles or residences belonging to business owners.
  5. The use of grenades as an extortive tactic further increases the risk to bystanders, as undetonated grenades may be left in public spaces. This was illustrated by the 2018 death of a 60-year-old man in Stockholm, who was killed after picking up a grenade at a metro station mistaking it for a toy.
  6. While the vulnerable areas will remain the primary locations of criminal activity, the continued gang violence risks spilling over to other areas. This is supported by a November 2019 attack in Angelholm, an affluent municipality located north of Helsingborg. Unknown individuals threw an explosive device onto a balcony in a residential building, no injuries were reported.
  7. In addition to violent crime, the presence of criminal organizations increases the likelihood of petty crime, such as pickpocketing and home burglary, both in vulnerable areas, as well as urban centers. That 81,000 home burglaries were reported in 2020, an increase of eight percent from 2019, in contrast to other countries that witnessed a downturn during the COVID-19 pandemic, further supports this.
  8. Further, criminal activity, including armed robberies, has seen an uptick in and around central train stations, as well as main streets in urban areas, particularly during the nighttime hours, increasing the risk to the public. In Gothenburg, multiple armed robberies have been reported in recent weeks, with three teenagers reportedly robbed and beaten near Spantorget by a group of six young men on February 14, for example.
  9. Further, criminal organizations are likely to target police in response to recent security operations, including heightened security measures in vulnerable areas. This is supported by a March 2 investigation, which found that a criminal organization in Uppsala was attempting to carry out an attack against police in the city.

 

Crime In Sweden 2020

 

Government and authority bolstered response to gang violence reflects growing threat and public pressure

  1. Gang violence has become a central political issue in 2020, following a surge in violence and the death of the 12-year-old girl in Botkyrka.
  2. The government, currently led by the left-wing Social Democrats party, has introduced a number of reforms providing police with more tools in addressing gang violence, highlighting the pervasiveness of gang violence. These include permitting police to access encrypted information, juvenile surveillance (i.e. convicted juvenile offenders are to be monitored using ankle bracelets), increased use of camera surveillance, harsher punishments for possession of weapons, and increased resources for schools in vulnerable areas.
  3. Despite these measures, various parties have argued that the government’s response has proven ineffective. The center-right Moderate Party, the second largest in the Riksdag, has called for higher police wages, a paid police education program, doubling the punishment for crimes related to gang violence, removing shorter sentences for individuals aged 18-21, increased surveillance in vulnerable areas, and the introduction of witness protection.
  4. While the far-right Sweden Democrats party has voiced similar criticism of the government’s handling of crime, the party has repeatedly focused on the abovementioned links between organized crime and migration, stating that while the issue is partially due to socioeconomic difficulties, it is also due to sociocultural factors related to Islam. This narrative has been purported by alternative media sources, including Samhallsnytt and Nyheter Idag, both founded by the Sweden Democrats. This is likely to heighten anti-migrant sentiments, with the public support for deportation and stricter migration policies liable to increase.
  5. That multiple police operations targeting organized crime are ongoing reiterates the primacy of the threat posed by these groups. Such operations include the nationwide Operation Rimfrost, which began in 2019 following the public execution of a 15-year-old in Malmo. Local operations have also begun, such as Operation Solvind in Malmo. Further, police announced on March 2 that 58 people are currently being prosecuted for involvement in criminal networks in Uppsala. 17 of the suspects are in police custody. The arrests are part of an ongoing large-scale operation against criminal networks, which began in May 2020. Police have seized 100 kilograms of explosives along with illegal weapons, 17 kilograms of crystal, 200,000 benzodiazepines and amphetamines, cocaine, and doping substances.

 

Stockholm Risk Map

Recommendations

  1. Travel to Sweden may continue while practicing standard safety procedures.
  2. Avoid nonessential travel to the police designated high-risk areas (See map) due to increased criminal activity and the risk posed to the general public and bystanders.
  3. Maintain heightened vigilance in central stations and isolated areas in central Gothenburg, Malmo, and Stockholm during the nighttime hours due to the potential for crime, including muggings and armed robbery.
  4. Maintain vigilance in crowded areas in urban centers due to the potential for petty crime, such as pickpocketing.

Police statistics indicate violent, opportunistic crime to pose major threat within London following easing of COVID-19 lockdown – UK Analysis

Executive Summary

Police have warned of a significant increase in violent crime in London as lockdown measures ease.

Met Police statistics released in July show increases in drug offenses, knife crimes, and racist hate crimes in June following the easing of restrictions.

Opportunistic and violent crime is likely to be a major risk to those operating or residing in London over the coming months

Travel to London may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance for the expected increase in local criminal activity over the coming months.

Current Situation

Since COVID-19 related lockdown measures have been implemented in London, the Metropolitan Police (Met) have warned of marked increases in violent crime once lockdown measures ease. Police have warned of an increase in knife crime in London and a general increase in gang-related crime across the UK.

London Crime Statistics – January until June

Knife crime increased in June by 28 percent compared to May. Knives have increasingly become the preferred method to settle scores between gangs, carry out opportunistic robberies, assaults, gang initiations, intimidations, and homicides. Youths are also often paid to carry out certain activities. Overall, knife crime gradually decreased from January until April. Although they have since increased, the June numbers remain below the six-month average. Newham recorded the highest number of knife crimes followed by Haringey in the past six months.

Although thefts remained below the six months average, they rose by 28 percent in June compared to May. Burglaries targeting residences and businesses steadily increased by 11 percent in June, however, remain below the six months average. Westminster is the worst affected by burglaries targeting businesses while the boroughs of Barnet and Enfield recorded the highest number of offenses against residential properties.

Drug offenses, which include possession, as well as trafficking, rose in May by 26 percent before dropping in June by 28 percent, although was still up 15 percent from June 2019. In particular, the borough of Westminster recorded the highest number of arrests for drug trafficking. During the lockdown, local-level drug dealing evolved to adopt innovative tactics to avoid attention. Instead of dealing on the streets that would have risked being flagged by passing patrols, gangs resorted to taking orders on social media, dropping off the drugs in letterboxes via couriers, or conducting drive-by sales.

According to the Met, racist and religious hate crimes, which include physical assaults, verbal abuse, and incitement to hatred and cover crimes against the LGBT community, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism, increased by over 80 percent between April and June. Westminster followed by Southwark, Lambeth, and Hackney were among the worst affected boroughs. These have sharply increased by 51 percent in June compared to May and are well above the six months average.

Notable Criminal Incidents

On July 2, The National Crime Agency cracked a secret communications system used by organized crime groups to trade narcotics and weapons, called EncroChat, in a transnational operation with French and Dutch police, and Europol. The operation led to 746 arrests in the UK, including two law enforcement officers. Large amounts of cash, narcotics, and weapons were seized.

On June 27, two individuals were stabbed in Clapham Common near a kosher bakery during the evening hours (local time). The incident occurred during an illegal street party against COVID-19 restrictions in the area.

In June, the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests in London recorded unrest and clashes between BLM protesters and opposing far-right groups and the police. More than 100 people were arrested at the June 13 rally on charges of violent disorder, assault of officers, possession of an offensive weapon, and possession of drugs.

Assessments & Forecast

Lockdown measures significantly shifted crime trends, with easing seeing sudden increase and return to previous levels

As knives became the preferred weapon for a variety of criminal activities due to the easy availability and concealment of the weapon, the aforementioned statistics are directly related to the effects of the lockdown. The steady increase in knife crime is likely due to individuals adapting to the ‘new normal’ as lockdown measures are gradually eased, given that previously, the drop in people being outdoors, especially at night, increased the risk for gang members to operate outdoors, immediately being considered suspicious or open to police checks for breaking lockdown. That individuals were allowed outdoors in groups of up to six people and congregate in public spaces such as gardens and other private outdoor spaces from June 1 supports the assessment as it allows for criminals to again operate with reduced suspicion.

The change in rates of thefts and burglaries is directly dependent on the lockdown measures as they tend to be more opportunistic in nature, with individuals spending more time at homes. Given that major decreases in thefts targeting businesses and residences were recorded in April, when London was under a strict lockdown and saw a heightened police presence on the streets, supports the assessments and as curbs on movement are gradually being lifted, instances of burglaries steadily increased, supported by nonessential businesses being permitted to reopen as of June 15.

The May and June increase in racist and religious hate crime was likely influenced by misinformation campaigns by a range of actors, such as foreign states or foreign or domestic far-right groups, promoting xenophobic notions, exacerbating the deepening of political polarization in UK society, which is reflected in the anti-racism protests. Claims that the virus was caused by “foreigners” or that religious groups have not upheld lockdown measures were promulgated among online forums.

That the statistics suggest a decrease in organized crime activity in June is likely directly related to the COVID-19 lockdown measures, which saw inter-gang rivalry shift to online platforms and social media as domestic operations and international trafficking routes were disrupted. However, that regions in the UK are responding to the crisis in differing ways provides rival gangs the opportunity to expand in each other’s area of operations without immediate repercussions, signaling potential turf wars in the medium-term.

Violent, opportunistic crime to be an increased risk going forward due to economic fallout of lockdown

The economic and political impact of the COVID-19 crisis is expected to affect various crime trends into the medium and long term. Given that individuals from low-income neighborhoods are likely to be disproportionately affected by the expected economic downturn, the major risk to individuals in London in the immediate future is likely to come from opportunistic crimes, such as armed mugging and racist attacks, with knives remaining the preferred weapon for attacks.

Fluctuations in rates of thefts and burglaries are expected. In the immediate term, that the police have long regarded summer months in London to record higher instances of thefts, a bolstered security presence in potential target locations or quick response to these incidents is expected. As people return to normal patterns of activity, theft, and burglaries are liable to return to previous norms, with shops with high-cash turnover, residences in wealthy neighborhoods, and high-value businesses such as jewelry stores, banks, and ATMs liable to be primary targets, given the potential for large cash sums or sellable objects, which offer quick access to profits after the recent downturn.

That Lewisham has recorded the highest number of drug trafficking arrests on average in the past two years suggests that individuals in the borough will be at risk as it will likely continue to have a higher presence of gangs than the rest of London. As groups attempt to re-establish their operations and reclaim territories/bases to open up trafficking routes to adapt to changing country restrictions, the possibility of targeted violent confrontations such as shootings that may pose a risk to bystanders cannot be ruled out.  That gangs tend to involve youths from poorer socio-economic backgrounds to be couriers and distributors of narcotics suggests that individuals in local distribution areas of Croydon, Lambeth, Newham, Tower Hamlets, Southwark, and Westminster are at risk. Overall, possession-related offenses may decrease as gangs adopt certain techniques used during the lockdown to avoid police scrutiny as standard practice.

Given the range of criminal activities in which knives are used, such crimes are likely to quickly return to pre-COVID-19 levels as lockdown continues to be eased, remaining a major challenge to authorities in the long term. Low-income boroughs such as Newham are expected to be a higher risk for such criminal activity, given the direct correlation between unemployment, poverty, and knife crimes. Given police reports on 2019 hotspots and a two-year average, individuals in Brent, Camden, Enfield, Haringey, Hackney, Southwark, and the West End area of Westminster are most at risk of knife crimes targeting passersby.

In light of the current political climate, hate crimes, which are predominantly spontaneous, are likely to persist, with verbal abuse or online messages reported more frequently than physical assaults. Target groups in the near term are expected to be members of the Islamic community, the LGBT community, and individuals of Asian or African extraction. Based on trends observed in the past two years, individuals are more likely to be targeted in Barnet, Camden, Lambeth, Tower Hamlets, and Westminster.

Unlikelihood of return to pre-pandemic norms and a possible second-wave indicate further changes in criminal trends

While Westminster’s higher-than-normal crime rates indicate that the borough is the most dangerous in London for residents, the assessments indicated above suggest that the major threat to individuals in Westminster is primarily to tourists in the form of muggings, pickpocketing or racist incidents. This is supported by July typically seeing an increase in such crimes, during the height of tourist season. That said, given the reduction in tourism, criminals may change their targets to locals to retain revenue over the coming months.

In the event that a second wave of COVID-19 occurs, the possibility of another lockdown remains high, impacting criminal trends, with possible spikes or dips in certain activities expected to return. However, latest reports indicate that the government would prefer localized, targeted lockdowns, although London Mayor Sadiq Khan claims such measures would be nearly unenforceable beyond specific buildings or sites.

With the COVID-19 outbreak likely to disrupt multiple sectors into 2021, at which point Brexit will come into full force, while a trade deal with the EU remains unlikely to be in place by January, further disruptions and changes to criminal trends within London and nationwide are possible. Changes to tourism, trade routes, imports and exports, checks at borders, immigration and other factors that are liable to be impacted by Brexit into the long-term will in turn influence the criminal trends mentioned above.

Recommendations

Travel to London may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance of local criminal activity.

Refrain from pedestrian travel during the night hours, particularly in the vicinity of high-value targets such as ATMs or isolated areas that may not be well lit.

If confronted by muggers, it is advised to cooperate fully and not engage in any behavior that could raise tensions and lead to violence.

Foreigners in the city or undertaking travel in the coming months are advised to maintain vigilance due to the potential for abuse incited by anti-foreign sentiments.

Businesses and residents are advised to review existing measures against robbery and theft in light of returning to more regular activities and routines.

Written by Alefiya Rangwala

Edited by Adam Charlton

COVID-19 lockdown measures to affect criminal patterns across Europe – Europe Analysis

Executive Summary

Since the introduction of COVID-19 restrictions in February-March, multiple countries across Europe reported a significant drop in home burglaries, violent robberies, and thefts. Meanwhile the region saw an increase in burglaries at commercial establishments, theft of medical supplies, as well as racial and domestic violence.

The expected economic downturn from the lockdown will likely lead to a return to pre-crisis rates or an increase in robberies and other violent crimes and in anti-establishment sentiments while presenting human traffickers new opportunities in the long-term.

In the short-to-medium term, the disruption of narcotics supply chains will likely lead to low-level drug dealers shifting to alternative crimes, such as burglary and armed robberies, and the sale of more dangerous alternatives. Going forward, supply shortages and increasing demand for illicit drugs may increase gang-violence as restrictions begin to ease.

Nonessential travel within Europe should be voided as per government directives amid COVID-19, while remaining cognizant of local criminal activity.

Current Situation

Decrease in home burglaries, violent robberies, and drug trafficking

Multiple countries have reported a shift in criminal activity since February when countries began implementing COVID-19 precautionary measures.

Spanish police recorded a roughly 50 percent decline in criminal offenses compared to the same period in 2019 since the partial lockdown on March 14.

French authorities reported a 45 percent drop in crime rates between March-April, with the most significant decreases seen in burglaries of accommodation, robberies with weapons, and vehicle thefts.

Italy witnessed a 72 percent decrease in home robberies in March 2020 compared to 2019, while other robberies dropped by roughly 54 percent and drug-related offenses by 46 percent.

Dutch, German, Greek, Irish, and Swedish authorities witnessed a similar reduction in thefts and burglaries, with thefts in Greece dropping by 25 percent as of April.

Slovenia witnessed a recent decrease in burglaries, robberies in residential areas, and property crimes compared to 2018.

Knife crime reportedly declined in London in the latter half of March, while public violence and home burglaries decreased across the UK.

The French anti-narcotics agency, OFAST, reported in early April that the suspension of air traffic significantly disrupted the inflow of cocaine. Reports also indicate that supply shortages have also been recorded in Germany since the closing of borders. Nonetheless, trafficking networks have attempted to smuggle drugs via cargo. In the UK, drug treatment experts warned that a drop in the supply of narcotics has resulted in users turning to more dangerous alternatives such as the synthetic opioid Fentanyl, which can be obtained with a prescription.

Increase in commercial burglaries, theft of medical supplies, domestic and racial violence

Despite the decrease in certain crimes, other offenses have witnessed an uptick.

Large numbers of scams, thefts, and the illegal sale of medical supplies were recorded across Europe in recent months. Three pharmacists in southern France were arrested for illegally reselling face masks, as per March 28 reports. Individuals were arrested in Hungary and the Netherlands for scamming individuals and hospitals into buying non-existent protective masks. On March 23, oxygen canisters were stolen from a hospital in the UK. Multiple incidents of verbal and violent attacks on healthcare workers and vandalism of ambulances were also reported across the region. Interpol stated that organized crime is thriving by trading in counterfeit goods due to an increased demand for medical and hygiene products.

Multiple countries recorded an increase in burglaries at closed commercial establishments, pharmacies, and other stores that remain open, with Madrid recording nine pharmacy robberies in one day. In Italy, theft and robbery of pharmacies has only decreased by about 13 percent compared to the overall drop of robberies of between 54 and 72 percent. Meanwhile, authorities in Sicily bolstered security near supermarkets and grocery stores as a result of an uptick in shoplifting.

There are also reports of organized criminal groups across southern Italy using the situation to extort local enterprises in need of short-term loans to cover the commercial losses.

In terms of anti-foreign sentiment, there have been a number of notable incidents targeting individuals of Asian descent in recent weeks. In the UK, the owner of a Chinese restaurant was attacked by a group in Hertfordshire, before being asked if the victim had COVID-19. An individual of Asian descent was assaulted in Munich, Germany, with the assailant spraying disinfectant in the victim’s face while yelling “corona.”

Finally, countries across Europe have reported a surge in domestic violence since the start of lockdowns. Within the first week since March 17, there was a 32 percent increase in France’s domestic violence cases and a 36 percent increase in Paris. Spain witnessed an 18 percent increase and the UK a 25 percent increase in calls and online requests concerning domestic abuse since the beginning of the lockdown.

SHORT-TERM CRIME TRENDS ANID COVID-19

Assessments & Forecast

Economic downturn resulting from lockdown to increase domestic burglaries, property vandalism, and organized crime in the medium-to-long term

Given that the lockdowns have significantly altered the activity of the public and criminals alike, the drop in residential burglaries, violent theft, public violence, and knife crimes is a direct effect of the quarantine measures limiting the opportunities for crimes of this nature. Therefore, it is unlikely for this trend to persist as restrictions begin to ease.

On the contrary, with the economic impact of the lockdowns likely to be felt well beyond their removal, domestic burglaries, thefts, and ATM robberies are liable to gradually rise following the easing of restrictions.

With studies following the economic crash in 2008 demonstrating a correlation between rising homicide and assault rates and economic downturns, the expected economic crisis is also liable to trigger an increase in violent crimes, especially among relatively socioeconomically underdeveloped communities. As a result of economic stress, violent robberies in relatively wealthier neighborhoods and vehicular theft are liable to rise as a means to earn money.

With certain sections of the society, especially urban youth, being likely to be disproportionately affected by the economic slowdown, these worst affected groups are liable to increasingly engage in criminal behavior. Rising poverty and unemployment resulting from the lockdowns are likely to create opportunities for organized criminal networks to increase trafficking activities and recruitment. Countries that already had a significant presence of organized crime are liable to witness increased activity. As demonstrated in southern Italy, such groups are liable to take advantage of the increased potential for human smuggling, extortion, racketeering, and money laundering, embedding themselves in local economies for the long-term. This may be exacerbated as criminal groups look to gain a footing in local businesses in order to benefit from any potential government bailouts which may look to help small businesses and the self-employed.

Popular discontent among the sectors of society most affected by job cuts and economic downturn will likely result in increasing anti-establishment sentiments and resentment towards governments and certain organizations. Companies that undertook more severe job cuts and failed to provide employees with adequate compensation are liable to be the primary targets of protests and vandalism in the months following the removal of lockdown measures.

Illicit drug shortages to see low-level dealers shift to alternative crimes in short-to-medium term and increase gang violence in the long-term

In addition to international border restrictions having significantly impacted the supply of illicit drugs from South America and Asia, they are likely to have reduced access to chemical precursors used in the production of methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine that are largely procured from China. Given that travel restrictions to and from China were among the first to be introduced, the production of drugs has likely been impacted since January. The liquidity of trafficking groups has also likely been severely affected, especially among the mafia of Albania and Italy, with merchants unable to pay extortion fees amid lockdowns.

Due to movement restrictions during lockdowns, low-level criminals, who otherwise rely on the sale of drugs on the streets, are liable to resort to the other crimes, such as theft of medical supplies and burglaries or armed robbery to maintain a source of income. Additionally, due to shortages in the supply of heroin, dealers may also resort to the sale of more dangerous alternatives like fentanyl, which are easier to procure, store, and transport in smaller batches. In addition, supply chain issues will likely put considerable pressure on any domestic supplies in Europe, most likely Cannabis, which can be grown in makeshift greenhouses. This may catalyze a short term increase in local production, especially with police likely not focusing on such issues at present.

As restrictions begin to ease, while trafficking routes for illicit drugs will open up, the demand for cocaine and heroin is likely to be significantly higher than supply, especially in Western Europe. The resulting high prices are likely to lead to violent confrontations between gangs fighting over control of the limited supplies. With this, gun violence and homicide rates could see a rise following the reopening of borders. This is likely to be primarily focussed in urban and suburban areas that typically see high levels of gang activity anyway, as well as potentially in major port towns.

Anti-foreign attacks to recur amid COVID-19 and after opening of borders

That attacks against individuals of Asian descent were recorded in multiple countries early on in the outbreak indicates that anti-Asian sentiments are liable to persist beyond the immediate crisis, especially as multiple countries begin to question China’s handling of the crisis. This is liable to raise perceptions of a deliberate attempt by China to mismanage the pandemic, in addition to fears of Asians being carriers of the virus. Increased rhetoric by international political leaders sometimes referring to the virus as ‘Chinese virus’ is liable to further strengthen xenophobic sentiments.

This increases the likelihood of Asian-owned companies being the target of attacks, vandalism, and protests by nationalist and xenophobic groups. As quarantine restrictions ease, the risk of foreign nationals operating or residing in Europe being verbally or physically harassed is liable to persist into the medium-term. Furthermore, Asian-linked companies and enterprises may witness decreased sales due to such sentiments.

Finally, there remains a likelihood of general xenophobic sentiments persisting due to the fear of foreigners being virus carriers, as evidenced with French visitors being harrassed in the German border town of Gersheim in April. This may result in an overall decrease in intra-European travel and tourism into the medium-term, as well as travelers being subject to harassment and abuse.

Recommendations

Avoid nonessential travel within Europe as per government directives amid COVID-19 while remaining cognizant of local criminal activity.

Remain cognizant of possible scams and sale of counterfeit medical and hygiene supplies.

Foreign residents across Europe are advised to maintain heightened vigilance due to the elevated potential for racially motivated harassment.

Facilities that are currently non-operational due to COVID-19 restrictions are advised to take additional precautions against possible vandalism and burglaries.

G20 Buenos Aires summit 2018 – November 30-December 1 – Argentina Special Analysis

Written and edited by Federico Sujarchuk and Ollie Wiltshire

Executive Summary

Between November 30 and December 1, Argentina will hold the 13th leaders’ summit of the Group of Twenty (G20) in Buenos Aires.

A number of security checkpoints will be established on the roads that lead to the complex hosting the summit and in the vicinity of the hotels where the heads of state and government will be staying.

Anarchist and left-wing groups are expected to hold mass protests throughout the city, many of which will lead to significant instances of violence.

Major disruptions to traffic and business continuity will occur due to security provisions, protests, roadblocks, and public closures during the summit.

Travel to Buenos Aires can continue while maintaining vigilance for an increase in violent crime and protests between November 30-December 1.

Avoid all protests given the potential for violence.

Please be advised

G20 summit

Between November 30 and December 1, Argentina will hold the 13th leaders’ summit of the Group of Twenty (G20). The meeting will be the first-ever G20 summit to be hosted in South America and the most high-profile multilateral event ever held in Argentina.

The city will reportedly host 8,000 summit participants, including foreign leaders, ministers, politicians, and officials. Moreover, at least 2,500 journalists have been granted clearance to cover the event and around 1,000 people will work on the summit’s logistics. The leaders of 19 member nations, plus the European Union, and seven guest nations will meet in Buenos Aires’ Costa Salguero complex, located in the Palermo neighborhood, less than a kilometer away from Jorge Newbery International Airport (AEP).

Official security around the summit

A number of security checkpoints will be established on the roads that lead to the complex and in the vicinity of the hotels where the heads of state and government will be staying. These include Arroyo Street, Avenida Dorrego, Avenida del Libertador, Avenida Alvear, Avenida Ramos Mejia, and Avenida Sarmiento. Moreover, a number of key roads and highways will be closed off to the public for the duration of the summit. These include Avenida 9 de Julio, Avenida Figueroa Alcorta, and Illia and Lugones highways. Subway and other rail services will not operate during the summit. A bolstered security presence has also been confirmed in the downtown area, as well as the neighborhoods of Puerto Madero, Recoleta, and Retiro, where a number of dignitaries will be staying.

Buenos Aires’ Aeroparque Jorge Newbery (AEP) airport and El Palomar Airport (EPA), the city’s recently inaugurated low-cost airport, will be closed to commercial and civil flights between November 29 and December 1. Ezeiza International Airport (EZE), Argentina’s main international airport, is expected to remain open, though its service will be affected by the summit.

Maritime restrictions will be in place between November 29 and December 2 when the commercial port of Buenos Aires will suspend operations. All recreational sailing activities in the Rio de la Plata, as well as parts of the nearby Tigre Delta, will be banned for the duration of the summit. That said, passenger ferry services operating to and from the Buquebus Terminal in the Puerto Madero neighborhood are not slated to be affected.

Over 20,000 police personnel, plus an undisclosed number of military personnel, will be participating in security operations associated with the summit. November 30 will be declared a public holiday in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area in order to ease foot and vehicular traffic.

Opposition actions

A counter-summit with prominent speakers such as former Argentinian President Cristina Kirchner, former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, former Uruguayan President Jose Mujica, the leader of the Spanish far-left Podemos party, Pablo Iglesias, and the leader of the far-left La France Insoumise party, Jean-Luc Melenchon, took place in Buenos Aires on November 19-23, the week before the G20 summit.

A number of unions, local and international anarchist groups, and far-left groups associated with former President Cristina Kirchner have announced their intention to hold protests against not only the G20 Summit itself, but also against the presence of International Monetary Fund (IMF) head Christine Lagarde, UK Prime Minister Theresa May, and US President Donald Trump. According to reports citing Argentinian security officials, at least 33 protests are planned to take place throughout Buenos Aires during the summit, with over 100 local and international groups participating. The exact time and location of many protests have not been disclosed as of the time of writing and other smaller or unannounced protests are expected to occur.

On November 14, two attempted pipe bomb attacks were recorded in Buenos Aires. The first took place in the Belgrano neighborhood, where one individual was reportedly arrested after throwing a pipe bomb into the house of a judge who is currently investigating former President Cristina Kirchner in a number of high-profile corruption cases. Authorities reportedly defused it shortly afterward. The second attempt took place on the same day in the Recoleta neighborhood cemetery, where two individuals were wounded and subsequently arrested when a pipe bomb they were placing in the mausoleum of a controversial historical figure exploded unintentionally.

On November 15, ten individuals were arrested in a squatter house used by anarchists in Pavon Street, San Cristobal neighborhood over the November 14 attempted pipe bomb attacks.

Background

Argentinian political landscape in the run-up to the G20 summit

The 2018 Buenos Aires G20 summit comes amid a marked deterioration in the economic situation in Argentina over the last six months, partly due to a costly drought in the country’s farm belt and a sharp increase in the price of financing for emerging countries, whose economies have some characteristics of a developed economy, but do not satisfy all of the standards. This situation has fostered a significant devaluation of the Argentinian Peso, which has become one of the world’s worst-performing currencies in 2018. This situation, in turn, exacerbated the country’s inflation, which is expected to reach a rate of 45 percent in 2018.

This financial situation has prompted President Macri to request a USD 57 billion standby loan from the IMF and accept the required cuts to public spending. As such, and considering that the IMF is widely disliked in the country, perceived by many to be one of the main causes of the last economic collapse of Argentina in 2001, President Macri’s approval rating fell from over 45 percent to 35 percent in November. With regards to these developments, social movements and labor unions, including Argentina’s largest union, the Confederacion General del Trabajo (CGT), have regularly taken to the streets to protest, with participation often reaching into the high thousands.

The G20 Summit and its symbolic importance for the anti-globalization movement

Violent protests by the anti-globalization movement, a catch-all social movement critical of free trade and consumer capitalism, have become a common feature of G20 & G7-8 summits since the mid-1990s. Multilateral summits are perceived by supporters of the anti-globalization movement as a powerful symbol of the shortcomings of the current system of global governance. These summits also provide a valuable opportunity for the movement’s supporters to make use of the public and international spotlight and bring further attention to their cause.

This situation is evidenced by the fact that widespread unrest has been witnessed in several multilateral summits, such as the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) Seattle summit, which is perceived as a pivotal moment in the formation and consolidation of the anti-globalization protest movement. Widespread unrest was also witnessed in the 2001 Genoa G8 Summit, the 2010 G20 Toronto summit, the 2011 G20 Cannes summit, and, most recently, the 2017 G20 Hamburg summit, which recorded a level of unrest rarely seen in modern Germany.

Assessments & Forecast

Expected disruptions in BA’s Belgrano, Nunez, Palermo, Puerto Madero, and Retiro neighborhoods

Considering that the Illia and Lugones highways, as well as Avenida Figueroa Alcorta, will all be closed to the general public, widespread traffic disruptions will likely occur in the Belgrano, Nunez, Palermo, and Retiro neighborhoods. Although in Belgrano and Nunez only areas adjacent to the closed roads will likely be affected by the summit, in Palermo, Recoleta, and Retiro more areas are likely to be affected besides those in the immediate vicinity of the highways and Avenida Figueroa Alcorta.

In Palermo, Recoleta, and Retiro, Avenida del Libertador is likely to be at least partially blocked to traffic given that is one of the major routes that link the Costal Salguero complex, where the summit will take place, with the hotel areas where several dignitaries will be staying. Moreover, in Palermo, Puerto Madero, Recoleta, and Retiro, locations in the vicinity of large upscale hotels are liable to be closed to both vehicular and foot traffic, given the likelihood of summit participants staying there. Additionally, considering that unconfirmed reports claim that a gala dinner with all of the attending leaders will take place at Teatro Colon, much of the downtown area of Buenos Aires is likely to be closed off to non-residents during the evening hours on November 30.

Taking into account that strikes disrupting commercial aviation have intensified in recent months, the possibility that a strike disrupting air trafficking control services takes place during the summit cannot be ruled out. On November 12, the head of the Asociacion de Pilotos de Lineas Aereas (APLA) union claimed that the union may carry out a 72-hour strike during the summit, leaving open the possibility that other unions in the air sector could join an APLA-led strike if the government ignores their requests over labor-related issues. Nonetheless, government sources have confirmed that, if this were the case, personnel from the Fuerza Aerea Argentina (FAA) could take control of air trafficking services if necessary. Aerolineas Argentinas workers affiliated to aviation workers’ unions announced their intent to hold a 24-hour strike on November 26, although over unrelated issues.

Violent protests expected throughout Buenos Aires, particularly in neighborhoods bordering restricted areas

Considering the expected number of protesting groups, coupled with their organizing capacity and sizeable support bases, particularly the unions and far-left groups associated with Cristina Kirchner, it is likely that the turnout for the anti-G20 protests will be in the mid-to-high tens of thousands for the two-day summit. Given that protestors will not be able to reach the premises of the summit, it is likely that the protests will take place in traditional points for such protests, including Plaza del Congresos, Plaza de Mayo, outside the Presidential Palace, and near the Obelisk. Protests are also likely to take place outside the Brazilian, German, UK, and US embassies.

If the areas in the vicinity of the aforementioned locales remain closed off to the general public, as unconfirmed reports suggest, these protests will likely be moved to nearby areas outside of the no-go zones. As such, neighboring districts that would have only experienced disruptions, such as Belgrano, Palermo, and parts of Recoleta, will likely see increased protests and unrest. Considering precedent of the previous G20 in Hamburg, coupled with the heightened anti-government sentiment within sectors of Argentinian society, there is a high potential for localized acts of violence, particularly vandalism against private businesses associated with Western multinationals.

Due to the high-profile nature of the event, if the protests turn violent, a crackdown by security forces is likely, including the use of tear gas and other forcible dispersal measures, such as rubber bullets. This assessment is underscored by the police reportedly forming a “special command center” to jointly monitor the events with the military and the government, placing all security forces directly under the command of the Ministry of Defense for the duration of the summit, something unseen since the return of democracy to the country in 1983.

There is also an elevated risk of protesters mounting roadblocks at the various entry points to the city that will not be closed off by authorities, such as 9 de Julio highway, 25 de Mayo highway, Avenida General Paz, Dellepiane highway, Perito Moreno highway, and Riccieri In such instances, security forces are liable to carry out mass arrests and forcibly disperse protesters.

In light of the previous IED attempts carried out by various anarchist elements, the potential remains that additional groups will attempt to detonate bombs during the summit. However, given the known capabilities of these groups and the unprecedented levels of security in the city, it is unlikely that any such explosions will affect the summit or cause significant damage or injury. Rather, the likelihood remains that they will either be neutralized prior to explosion or cause low-level superficial damage, akin to vandalism.

Given the number of foreign nationals expected to arrive in the city, coupled with the fact that Buenos Aires’ security forces will likely be overstretched, an uptick in opportunistic crime is liable during the summit and the following days. Tourist neighborhoods such as La Boca, Palermo Soho, the area around the Recoleta cemetery, and San Telmo are likely to be the main areas affected by such crime.

Effects of the G20 Summit on Argentina’s political landscape

Given that this will be one of the most high-profile multilateral events ever held in Argentina, if properly organized, the summit has the potential to improve President Macri’s public image, and further cement the perception of a structural change in Argentinian foreign policy since the Kirchner era. As such, the G20 summit has the potential to help position the country as a Western facing regional leader in South America, particularly considering the ongoing political situation in Brazil and the reputation of President-elect Jair Bolsonaro. Moreover, given that Argentina’s main current source of external financing is the IMF, and considering the clout that Western powers have over the IMF’s decision-making process, a properly organized G20 Summit could have a positive effect regarding Argentina’s political capital in future fiscal negotiations.

That said, the possibility remains that, if the protests get out of hand and security forces end up using excessive force, the summit could erode President Macri’s standing internationally and domestically. In light of the heightened political tensions between the government and the supporters of former President Cristina Kirchner, and the consistent deterioration of the economic situation throughout 2018, this potential scenario would almost certainly devolve into more violent demonstrations throughout December

Recommendations

Summit Recommendations

Travel to Buenos Aires can continue while maintaining vigilance for an increase in violent crime and protests between November 30-December 1. Avoid all protests given the potential for violence.

Avoid nonessential travel to the Belgrano, Palermo, Puerto Madero, Recoleta, and Retiro neighborhoods, as well as around the Brazilian, Germany, UK, and US Embassies in the event of protests.

Avoid nonessential travel via Avenida General Paz, Dellepiane Highway, Perito Moreno Highway, Riccieri Highway, 9 de Julio Highway, and 25 de Mayo Highway in the event of protests.

Allot for disruptions to pedestrian and vehicular traffic in Belgrano, Palermo, Puerto Madero, Recoleta, and Retiro neighborhoods, due to the slated road closures and the possibility of security checkpoints.

General Recommendations

Foreign nationals and visitors are advised to increase vigilance against possible crime in light of the potential for attacks by criminal networks targeting foreigners and high profile individuals.

If confronted by muggers, it is advised to cooperate fully and not engage in any behavior that could raise tensions and lead to violence.

Travelers should avoid exposing jewelry or other items that may make them a target for theft. Store your valuables in your hotel room safe.

Refrain from divulging travel itinerary information to strangers.

As a general security precaution, avoid revealing to strangers your position or affiliation with foreign-based firms, as your response could attract a negative reaction from locals.

Take necessary precautions to ensure business continuity during the event, given that various government offices and other public services may experience disruptions.

Allot extra time for travel, due to likely traffic and public transportation congestion resulting from the summit. Seek alternative means of transportation.