Tag Archives: terror

Jihad & the Far-Right: The Dual Terror Threat Facing the West – New Zealand Special Report

Written by Ollie Wiltshire and Ziv Reuben

Executive Summary

Following the deaths of 50 people in the Christchurch Mosque shootings, Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda and Islamic State, called for reprisal attacks on far-right and Christian sites.

The rhetoric of the New Zealand shooter and the publications from the jihadist groups underscore that the two ideologies are catalyzing each other and increasing radicalization and the potential for attacks.

Far-right militants are more likely to be radicalized by the decentralized online community who perpetuate extremist ideologies. They are more likely to attack specific targets with ideological significance.

Jihadist militants are often radicalized by pro-Islamist online messaging groups and are targeted by recruiters to carry out attacks. They are more likely to attack public places in urban areas.

Threats to Global Businesses

This interactive relationship between far-right and jihadist lone-wolves has a number of implications on global businesses:

  1. Potential for attacks will increase around times of heightened tensions between Muslim communities and nationalist communities.
  2. Companies that are deemed by either the far-right groups or jihadists to be opposing one ideology or aiding the other may become specific targets. This threat is particularly relevant with regards to the far-right, who are more likely to attack specific companies.
  3. Those who may be radicalized may not be obviously adhering to extremist ideologies and may be mostly interacting with such groups online. They could be hard to detect and may be working within an organization.
  4. Targets with specific cultural significance are more likely to be attacked. This includes religious sites or overtly religious gatherings.

Christchurch Attack and Aftermath

50 people were killed and 50 others wounded in two consecutive shooting attacks at the Al Noor Mosque and Linwood Islamic Center in Christchurch, New Zealand during the Friday afternoon prayers on March 15. The perpetrator, a 28-year-old Australian identified as Brenton Tarrant, was arrested shortly after; he live-streamed parts of the attack.

The attack was carried out using two assault rifles, two shotguns, and another rifle. These firearms were reportedly bought via an online store. Two undetonated IEDs were found attached to a car in the area.

The suspect released a document detailing his motivations and ideologies, which he also emailed to Prime Minister Jacintha Arden. According to Tarrant, his motivation for the attack was to “crush immigration and deport those invaders already living on our soil”. Tarrant states that he developed his views in 2017, and was influenced by the Stockholm vehicular attack and French elections that year. He claimed that he traveled through Western Europe during this time.

Following the attack, Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ)-linked online groups released a series of messages calling for attacks on churches and Christians as a retaliation for the Christchurch attack.

The media foundations al-Andalus and Az-Zallaqa released a statement on March 18 in response to the attacks on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand calling on supporters to attack members of the far-right. Al-Andalus is the media outlet of al-Qaeda-Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), operating in North Africa, while Az-Zallaqa is the media outlet of Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM), an al-Qaeda coalition operating in sub-Saharan Africa. The statement encourages young Muslims to carry out attacks on members of the far-right for inciting hatred and attacks on Muslims, specifically mentioning those who supported the attack in Christchurch within the media and on social networks.

Relationship between Far-right and Jihadist Radicals

While the New Zealand attack was clearly a part of the ongoing trend of far-right attacks being carried out by individuals radicalized online, the quick and strong response from jihadist groups over the incident is highly notable. It appears that the cycle of violence between the far-right and jihadist groups is escalating, with online communities radicalizing young European individuals to carry out lone-wolf attacks against Muslims and jihadist groups calling on lone-wolf Muslim youth to respond in kind. In this regard, it is important to note that the threat of self-radicalized individuals carrying out attacks now comes from two ends of the extremist ideological spectrum, both far-right and jihadist.

In addition, the rhetoric being used by the far-right and the rhetoric being used by jihadist groups feed into each other, escalating the threat of violence with each attack. That is to say, when a major attack carried by a jihadist militant occurs, far-right online chatter will increase and anti-Muslim sentiment will rise. This has the potential to push certain individuals towards carrying out lone-wolf attacks, which will then increase radicalization among Muslim communities. Although this is likely to happen throughout the world, areas where Muslim communities and communities of European descent meet are likely to be the most affected, including Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand.

Recommendations

Avoid the vicinity of far-right protests, rallies, or buildings due to the potential for jihadists to target such gatherings.

Maintain vigilance in the vicinity of religious sites, refugee centers, or any institution which may be perceived to be linked to immigration.

Remain cognizant of your surroundings, including any suspicious behavior of individuals, which may include a person wearing winter clothing during warm weather and/or seemingly wandering around, as well as items that look out of place, such as bags or containers.

Immediately alert authorities of any suspicious behavior or items.

Public, private, and third sector organizations are advised to increase their awareness of threats on social media through the use of threat monitoring services. Increased awareness of an organization’s political footprint and perceptions from fringe online groups can help uncover potential violent actors and plots before they occur.

 

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Lone-wolf attacks underscore threat from radicals in Europe, despite dwindling connections with militant groups – France Analysis

Executive Summary

The uptick in stabbing and vehicular attacks in France bears a strong resemblance to previous Islamic State (IS)-inspired and linked attacks.

This wave follows the August 22 call to action from IS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who asked supporters to “strike the West” and emphasized vehicular attacks in particular.

IS appears to have been particularly successful in radicalizing young Muslim immigrants in France.

Authorities are likely downplaying the militancy links in order to offset the increasing media attention surrounding such attacks.

Travel to France may continue while remaining cognizant of the increased threat of militant attacks. 

Current Situation

On September 14, a car-ramming attempt was recorded along Rue Racine in Nimes, southern France, during the early morning hours. The assailant reportedly intended to drive his car into pedestrians before being stopped by security barriers at around 01:30 (local time). The suspect was consequently subdued by locals in the area and later arrested by police. Reports quoting local eyewitnesses during the incident stated that the suspect shouted “Allahu Akbar”.

On September 10, an individual was detained for reportedly forcibly driving through multiple barriers and entering the runway of Lyon-Saint-Exupery Airport (LYS) in Lyon. The suspect was subsequently arrested following an extensive police pursuit. The incident caused significant delays and cancellations to flights. Following the arrest, a member of Lyon Prosecutor’s office reportedly stated that the assailant had alluded to a militant motive, claiming he was instructed to carry out the incident by Allah. However, this was later retracted.

The incident followed a September 9 stabbing attack in the 19th Arrondissement of Paris, when an assailant reportedly stabbed and injured at least seven people, including two British tourists, on Quai de Loire Street and Rue Henri Nogueres during the late night hours. The suspect was reportedly an Afghan national.

Authorities appeared reluctant to label all three attacks as being militant-related, calling the Nimes attack a “deliberate homicide”, and saying that the assailant who carried out the September 9 Paris stabbing attack did not appear to have militant motives. All three incidents were carried out by individuals of Muslim backgrounds and all three methods align with modus operandi that has been explicitly and repeatedly called for by the Islamic State jihadist group.

Background

On August 22, the (IS) al-Furqan media released an audio recording of the group’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who called upon the group’s supporters to “strike the West” through stabbings, bombings, and vehicular rammings, particularly emphasizing the last method. Al-Baghdadi then stated that “one such attack equals one thousand attacks in the Middle East and North Africa”.

On August 23, an assailant killed one and injured two in a knife attack in Trappes, Yveline, located 26 km from central Paris. The attacker reportedly shouted ‘Allahu Akbar’ and threatened police officers who arrived at the scene, and was later neutralized. Shortly after, IS-linked media reported that the assailant was a soldier of the Caliphate and conducted the attack in response to the group’s calls to “target the coalition countries”, referring to the US-led coalition of states that orchestrated a number of airstrikes against IS strongholds in 2014. Following the 2014 offensive, an IS spokesman had specifically singled out France as a target for future attacks.

Assessments & Forecast

Series of attacks likely lone-wolf incidents inspired by Islamic State methods and ideology, even if not ordered by IS in Middle East

Despite authorities’ reluctance to label the above-mentioned incidents as being IS-inspired militant attacks, various factors indicate that they may, in fact, have some connection to the group’s ideology and professed methods. In particular, the assailants resorted to stabbing and vehicular attacks in locations with a considerable civilian presence, which, in recent times, have been IS-linked lone-wolf actors’ chosen modus operandi. The assailants also chose to indiscriminately target these civilians and intended to cause widespread harm.

The known profiles of the attackers, who belong to immigrant communities who widely follow Islam, and the chanting of ‘Allahu Akbar’ during the attacks in at least two confirmed cases, is consistent with the details from similar previous IS-linked attacks. This lends credence to the possibility that the attackers’ actions were informed by a religious and ideological motive, in addition, it is equally likely that psychological instability also played a part in their motivations.

The link to IS is also strengthened by Baghdadi’s specific emphasis on the effectiveness of vehicular attacks in the August 22 call to action, which in turn was likely precipitated by the April 2018 airstrikes carried out by France and other countries in Syria, in response to the alleged use of chemical weapons by the state. In this case, the call was rather a wider propaganda piece, which was answered, and there is no evidence to suggest that any of the attackers had specific contact with IS in the Middle East or had been in touch with handlers.

Attacks likely catalyzed by individual feelings of disenfranchisement within community, which benefit IS’ recruitment

Due to the targeted locations being distant from one another, and absence of uncovered network between the suspects, it is likely that the attacks were not related, despite being conducted in quick succession. However, the attacks point to the potential success of IS propaganda and recruiting in France. The group has emerged as a viable outlet for Muslims who feel alienated from the wider community, exploiting feelings of disenfranchisement by offering them an alternative, in terms of belonging to the larger radical Islamist community.

Particularly, feelings of alienation among Muslim immigrants have likely been heightened by government policies such as the 2010 ban on religious face veils and head coverings, seen as being exclusionary, which have consistently prompted a backlash from both minority communities and their supporters, as well as anti-immigrant groups. Domestic factors such as a high unemployment rate and job discrimination against Muslims, religion-based tensions, as well as the general political culture of government criticism, also continue to contribute to making the immigrant population more susceptible to radicalization.

As has been seen in the past, IS also provides a useful narrative to psychologically-disturbed individuals, who then carry out copycat lone-wolf attacks using IS modus operandi, seeking to capitalize on media attention surrounding the IS ideology.

Authorities seeking to minimize impact of attacks through reluctance to make militant connection to avoid further media attention for such groups

Further, it is notable that authorities have not indicated that any of the September attacks were militant-related, despite suggestions, as evidenced above, that the assailants were at least influenced by IS, if not directly linked. This reflects a reluctance to label such lone-wolf attacks as Islamist militancy, possibly to discourage the media narrative against, and resultant disaffection within, Muslim immigrant communities in the country.

This unwillingness to attribute the incidents to militancy could also be a result of a conscious government decision to reduce the inadvertent aiding and abetting of IS’ operations, as the group has been known to use such official statements after attacks to legitimize itself as a threat to the West. Additionally, the government could be seeking to avoid heightened criticism of its security policy, especially amid the current administration’s declining public approval ratings.

FORECAST: IS’ online presence and recruitment methods, in addition to the persistent domestic factors alienating the Muslim community in France, the global trend of young men using mass violence as an outlet for psychological frustration, and IS has tapping into this trend to further its agenda, makes it likely that further such attacks will occur in France over the coming weeks and months. Given the apparent shift in executive security policy towards mitigating the media clout of militant attacks in general, it is likely that authorities will continue miIslamist islamist motives in such attacks.

Recommendations

Travel to France may continue while remaining cognizant of the increased threat of militant attacks.

Boko Haram’s abduction, subsequent release of 104 schoolgirls in Dapchi likely to increase group’s notoriety, legitimacy among locals – Nigeria Analysis

Executive Summary

Militants attacked a government school in Dapchi village, Burasari Local Government Area (LGA) in Yobe State and abducted 110 students and two other children on February 19.

Following extensive negotiations with the Nigerian government that resulted in the safe return of 104 of the schoolgirls and the other two children after one month in captivity, Boko Haram has been able to once again garner international attention and portray themselves as a viable threat in Nigeria’s northeastern region despite extensive counterinsurgency operations.

In light of the upcoming general elections in 2019, the girls’ safe return has been projected by President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration as a triumph, which seems to have paved the way for the government’s appeasement stance toward the insurgency.

However, the incident has highlighted the administration’s propaganda of exaggerated success against the militant group and is poised to create backlash in the form of domestic and international criticism for Buhari’s policies concerning the insurgency.

We continue to advise against all travel to the northeastern Nigerian states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, given the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency and extreme insecurity in the region.

Current Situation

Militants attacked a government school in Dapchi village, Burasari Local Government Area (LGA) in Yobe State and abducted 110 students and two other children on February 19.

President Muhammadu Buhari issued a statement on February 24 expressing his concern about the abduction, claiming that the situation was a “national disaster”. On the same day, the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP) issued a counterstatement blaming Buhari for issuing exaggerated statistics suggesting that Boko Haram had been completely decimated, a situation that they claim put unsuspecting citizens in danger.

On March 12, Borno State authorities announced the closure of all boarding schools in 25 out of the 27 state’s LGAs due to the threat of Boko Haram militants conducting additional abductions. This came in wake of President Buhari’s decision to engage in negotiations for the release of the schoolgirls.

During the early morning hours of March 21, 106 abductees, including 104 schoolgirls and the two additional children, were dropped off in the middle of Dapchi by their captors, who also warned the locals against sending the girls to Western-style schools. While five of the remaining abductees reportedly died due to exhaustion, one Christian girl remains in the militants’ custody. The Nigerian government characterized the release as “unconditional”, though some sources citing locals indicate that authorities did free several militants who joined the kidnappers, while other sources suggest that the Nigerian government had paid a ransom to secure the girls’ release.

On March 23, while receiving the released girls in Abuja, President Buhari announced that his government was ready to grant amnesty to Boko Haram members who were ready to accept unconditional surrender.

Meanwhile, on April 1, at least 29 people were killed, including six militants, in a multi-pronged Boko Haram attack on Akikaranti, Bille Shuwa, and Bale-Galtimari communes surrounding Borno State capital, Maiduguri, coinciding with the Christian Easter holiday.

Boko Haram’s abduction, subsequent release of 104 schoolgirls in Dapchi likely to increase group’s notoriety, legitimacy among locals - Nigeria Analysis | MAX Security

Assessments & Forecast

Assessments: Following extensive counterinsurgency operations targeting Boko Haram strongholds, group attempts to reassert presence, garner international, domestic attention

Despite subsequent large-scale security operations targeting well-documented militant strongholds such as the Sambisa Forest and Lake Chad shores in Nigeria’s northeastern region, the militants successfully launched the well-planned abduction of the Dapchi girls. Indeed, this incident resembles Boko Haram’s April 2014 attack on a school in Chibok, Borno State, when 276 girls were kidnapped. The Chibok attack resulted in an extensive international outcry,  triggered by a domestic campaign started by the families of the Chibok girls. The #BringBackOurGirls movement put the Boko Haram conflict in the international spotlight, particularly when the former US First Lady Michelle Obama endorsed the campaign. In this context, the Dapchi attack was likely motivated by the prospect of achieving similar notoriety. Additionally, the attack came in response to security forces’ triumphant claims of the near-destruction of the militant group’s presence in the region. Through the Dapchi attack, the militants debunked such claims and reasserted their continued operational capabilities across the country’s northeast.

The Dapchi abductions rendered a successful outcome for the militants. While the federal government characterized the negotiations and the subsequent release of the hostages as completely “unconditional”, it contradicted local reports of the authorities’ release of several militants. Such conflicting reports align with previous allegations against authorities for releasing militants and paying ransom for militants, with the latest incident being the February 10 release of three lecturers from the University of Maiduguri, along with ten police officers abducted by Boko Haram last year. Under these circumstances, the suspected hefty ransom payment will likely be utilized by the militants to enhance and develop their operational capabilities in the region, which may have been hampered, to some extent, by the counterinsurgency operations.

Indeed, the government’s repeated payment of ransoms without any resistance is poised to encourage the militant group to carry out similar large-scale kidnappings. Such a concern was further emphasized by the Borno State authorities’ decision to shut down boarding schools across 25 of the 27 LGAs. Furthermore, the release of militants as part of the ransom payment reintroduces experienced and well-trained fighters to the ranks of the militant group, increasing their operational capabilities. This is further highlighted in the latest Boko Haram multi-pronged attack on April 1 that was reportedly coordinated by Shuaibu Moni, a top Boko Haram commander who was released by the government to facilitate the return of 82 Chibok girls in May 2017. Moni had previously appeared in a Boko Haram video on March 7 taunting the Nigerian security forces and threatening to launch additional attacks.

The theatrical grandeur of the return of the abductees as the militants drove into the center of Dapchi hailed as heroes by the local population for safely bringing back their girls was likely a symbolic attempt by the group to embolden its authority in the region. This sheds light on the militant group’s propaganda aimed towards gaining the locals’ trust and consolidate their influence in their areas of operation. As the militants shook hands with the locals and warned them against the return of the girls to schools for Western education, they compelled the latter to adhere to the militant group’s Islamist ideologies. Through the dramatic aspects of the event, the militants effectively portrayed themselves as legitimate actors in the region, with more control than the federal government in Abuja. Given the communities’ grievances against Abuja, as they continue to feel disregarded and neglected by the government, such an image of Boko Haram is poised to render the locals more susceptible to getting recruited by the militant group. Amidst the ongoing insurgency, these circumstances increase the possibility of better cooperation between the local communities and the militants, with the former providing shelter and engaging in economic transactions with the militants for their own survival.

Assessments: With 2019 elections nearing, Buhari makes strategic shift toward developing appeasement stance to overcome Boko Haram insurgency

Since President Buhari came into office in 2015, negotiations with Boko Haram in their kidnap-for-ransom schemes have become a recurring phenomenon, which includes the 2016 release of 21 Chibok girls and another 82 released in May 2017. Such a stance toward the militant group likely stems from large-scale international and domestic attention that these incidents received. Buhari has attempted to make good on his electoral promise of combating Boko Haram in contrast to the perceived failure of former President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration to effectively defeat the militant group. However, Buhari’s administration has also projected a stronger government resistance to the insurgency, which has led to a distorted perception of success over Boko Haram militancy in Nigeria. Continued militant attacks have highlighted the government’s propaganda in displaying exaggerated data regarding the success of counterinsurgency operations and falsely claiming the defeat of the militant group. This may, to a certain extent, reduce Buhari’s international and domestic credibility.

With Nigeria’s presidential elections slated to take place in 2019, such an approach by Buhari for the safe release of abductees is poised to become his legacy. To further add to his administration’s successes against the insurgency, following the Dapchi events, Buhari appears to have embarked towards an appeasement stance with the latest amnesty deal. It is likely that through these propositions Buhari seeks to strategically portray to the international community his efforts for a peaceful resolution in parallel to the continuation of counterinsurgency operations. Under these circumstances, it is likely that Buhari will attempt to negotiate with the militant group to reduce attacks in exchange for reduced military actions in the northeastern region.

However, the administration’s conciliatory attitude towards the militants may be perceived by some as weak, with negative implications particularly by security forces, which may have a  detrimental impact on the fighting morale of the soldiers who are endangering their lives in battle. FORECAST: As such, any attempts by Buhari to negotiate with the militants to reduce attacks in light of the upcoming elections, as well as the latest amnesty deal, may add to Nigeria’s security agencies’ frustration concerning the ongoing nine-year long insurgency and weaken their determination to actively combat it. Additionally, Buhari’s administration is poised to receive substantial criticism from opposition political parties for their weakened stance towards the insurgency and their propaganda of exaggerating military successes, as evidenced by the opposition People’s Democratic Party’s (PDP) statement denouncing the Dapchi deal.

FORECAST: Buhari’s latest amnesty deal offered to Boko Haram is quite similar to an opportunity offered by former President Jonathan in 2013, which Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau outright declined. As such, it seems unlikely that Boko Haram will accept the latest deal, particularly given that the government does not seem to have any substantial negotiating leverage. Furthermore, the latest April 1 multi-pronged Boko Haram attack continues to highlight that the group remains capable of executing sophisticated large scale attacks in their traditional sphere of influence. Given the group’s resilience in remaining a viable threat in Nigeria’s northeastern region despite the large-scale counter-militancy measures, a persistence of the conciliatory approach by the government is liable to be detrimental to their interests.

Recommendations

Travel to Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance and following heightened security protocols regarding criminal and militant activity.

We continue to advise against all travel to the northeastern Nigerian states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, given the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency and extreme insecurity in the region.

We advise to avoid all travel to areas of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad within the Lake Chad Region given the high risk of militancy.

Increase in jihadist messaging reflects competition between IS, AQIS; immediate operational focus likely to be in Kashmir – India Analysis

Current Situation

Increase in jihadist messaging reflects competition between IS, AQIS; immediate operational focus likely to be in Kashmir - India Analysis | MAX Security

Increase in jihadist messaging reflects competition between IS, AQIS; immediate operational focus likely to be in Kashmir - India Analysis | MAX Security

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Between November 22 and December 13, Islamic State (IS) released a series of online messages calling for attacks in India and indicating that the group was soon to develop a presence in the country. Similarly, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) released anti-India messages and videos during the period, making references to alleged right-wing Hindu violence perpetrated by the state towards its Muslim population.

The messages follow a claim by IS on November 18 for an attack in Srinagar, Kashmir, where one police officer was killed. On November 14, an audio clip purportedly from an Islamic State (IS) operative from Kerala State was circulated online via social media. Police have reportedly identified the speaker as Rashid Abdullah, the leader of a Kerala-based IS cell who is reportedly now in Afghanistan with Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP). Abdullah calls for truck, knife, and poison attacks against Hindus at major public religious festivals such as the Kumbh Mela and the Thrissur Pooram.

In recent months, AQI  has increased the frequency of its propaganda messages directed towards India. In July, the group additionally received a pledge of support from Ansar Ghazwatul Hind (AGH), a Kashmiri militant group that broke away from the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).

Increase in jihadist messaging reflects competition between IS, AQIS; immediate operational focus likely to be in Kashmir - India Analysis | MAX Security

Motivations

The recent trend of increasing messaging by transnational groups IS and AQIS targeting India appears to be driven by an underlying competition between the groups to expand their spheres of influence in the country. Since its formation in 2014, AQIS has been dormant operationally in India, largely due to the movement of most of the group’s operatives towards the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, where they have embedded themselves with local militant groups fighting those respective governments. This revival of propaganda activity directed towards India was likely triggered by the pledge of the Kashmiri militant offshoot, AGH, to the group in July. Islamist militancy in Kashmir state has traditionally been non-aligned with global jihadist groups, and its primary intention has been the pursuit of a political, separatist agenda instead of an overtly religious motivation. Given this historic trend, AGH’s pledge of allegiance is a notable departure. It would appear the growing friction over leadership struggles within the local militant group HM has likely resulted in factions such as the AGH attempting to set up their own interests. To this end, their pledge to AQIS was likely in order to gain credibility for itself during its formative months specifically through association with a major jihadist organization.

Meanwhile, IS interest in the Kashmir conflict, from which it has previously stayed away, is likely based on the growing online interest in the group’s banner in the state. Youth in Kashmir appear increasingly disaffected with traditional militant groups such as HM. This sentiment likely extends towards groups that operate across the India-Pakistan border as well, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), who they maintain are driven by political interests and do not represent the true Islamic character of their movement. Specifically, the reported images of the perpetrator with IS insignia prior to the attack likely resulted in their claim of the November attack in Srinagar. The details of the claim were faulty, stating that a Pakistani and not an Indian officer was killed; this throws into question the degree of contact between the perpetrator and IS leadership prior to the attack. However, it is nevertheless reflective of the group’s interests in reaching out to sympathetic locals and existing militant groups in Kashmir.  This interest appears to be growing as IS takes increasing losses in Syria and Iraq, and consequently pivots to newer territories.

Apart from Kashmir, a degree of support for IS also appears to be developing across the country, as witnessed in the recent arrests, primarily in states with notable Hindu-Muslim community tensions. For instance, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh states, where a majority of the arrested suspects were originally from, have witnessed a notable increase in conflicts between Hindu and Muslim communities and political groups. This has especially been the case since the growing presence of the perceived right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in these states and its association with pro-Hindu organizations.

Increase in jihadist messaging reflects competition between IS, AQIS; immediate operational focus likely to be in Kashmir - India Analysis | MAX Security

Capabilities

At the present time, we assess that the operational capabilities of both IS and AQIS across India’s major cities and central areas remain low. Despite sympathies for IS, local cells have failed to actualize any major attacks across the country, due to their inability to reduce their exposure to security force investigations. While local cells in recent times have previously attempted to build explosives or plan attacks, they have been unsuccessful due to raids and arrests that have foiled their plots. It is worth noting that these cells located until now have largely been isolated from each other and there is no evidence of a coordinated leadership hierarchy to guide recruitment and plot development. These solitary efforts are a likely cause for the inconsistencies in the abilities of these cells, and the overall lack of actionable capabilities. In addition, more established local militant groups such as the Indian Mujahideen, which may have been able to assist these efforts, have largely been neutralized in recent years through targeted operations and the arrests of their leaders. That said, the latent potential for less-sophisticated lone-wolf attacks remain, given the low operational threshold required to plan and carry out these attacks.

In Kashmir however, capabilities for transnational jihadist groups remain more potent. This is due to the established presence of militant groups, and the consequent access to weapons and explosives. To this end, AQIS appears to have an advantage over IS, given its established relationship with an on-ground proxy AGH, which is known to have trained operatives capable of staging ambushes on security force convoys and military camps. IS, on the other hand, has only been loosely linked to the November attack, and their connection to local militant groups remains underdeveloped at the present time.

Increase in jihadist messaging reflects competition between IS, AQIS; immediate operational focus likely to be in Kashmir - India Analysis | MAX Security

 Probabilities

In the immediate term, we assess that both IS and AQIS are likely to continue their push to increase spheres of influence in India. Their primary focus is likely to be Kashmir, given the marked escalation of civil unrest since 2016 over the continued military presence and the opportunities this presents for recruitment. Meanwhile, both groups will likely seek to capitalize on the increasing factionalism within established local militant groups such as HM and draw disaffected factions towards their banner. AQIS is likely to attempt this through their local affiliate AGH, whose leader Zakir Musa remains popular among locals in southern Kashmir. Meanwhile, IS interests are likely to be coordinated by their affiliate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, IS Khorasan Province (ISKP). The group may seek to replicate their model of engagement in Pakistan, which has involved carrying out attacks through local low-level militant groups and claiming them as IS attacks, without any formal pledges of allegiance from their proxies.

For the rest of the country, both groups’ prospects will likely remain lower in the immediate term, given that the Indian military has largely sequestered the Kashmir conflict away from the country’s center. However, recent messages have called for Kashmiri militants to attack Delhi, indicating strong intent to expand beyond the state. Such attempts, while rare, are not unprecedented and security forces will likely remain vigilant for this threat.

Instead, in the country’s major cities and central regions, the more immediate threat stems from potential lone-wolf militancy. There remains a palpable intent among certain radicalized sections of the Muslim community, and sympathizers may increasingly take inspiration from IS’s recent calls for lone wolf attacks in places like Europe and North America. In addition, local cells may also increasingly orient their operations towards these forms of attacks should more sophisticated modus operandi continue to yield limited results. This would likely place Hindu religious targets, such as festivals and temples at a specific risk. Attacks against other targets such as synagogues and Western diplomatic or business interests also remain a possibility, given that local radicalized individuals are equally engaged with global jihadist propaganda, which advocates attacking these targets.

Increase in jihadist messaging reflects competition between IS, AQIS; immediate operational focus likely to be in Kashmir - India Analysis | MAX Security

Recommendations

Travel to Delhi and other major Indian cities can continue, while travelers are advised to maintain vigilance for security risks associated with frequent, large demonstrations as well as potential militant threats targeting government buildings, security installations, large crowded public places, or religious sites.

We advise against all travel to Jammu and Kashmir State, with the exception of Jammu and Srinagar cities.  Any overland travel west or south of Srinagar, towards areas such as Tral, Baramulla, Sopore, Shopian, and Anantnag is advised against.

Given the continued militant threat in India, maintain heightened vigilance for suspicious individuals and unattended baggage, particularly in public places including major hotels, government installations, transport hubs, markets, restaurants, entertainment venues, and places of worship.