Tag Archives: Pyongyang

Pyongyang’s SLBM launch signifies progress in missile development, use of pressure tactics in talks – Korean Peninsula Analysis

Executive Summary:

North Korea’s October 2 test of a Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) indicates considerable progress in its solid-fuel weapons program.
The launch may be viewed as part of a strategy to intensify pressure on the US in order to gain maximum concessions in view of Pyongyang’s perceived advantageous position.
Denuclearization talks are unlikely to yield concrete results over the coming months given the US and North Korea’s differing expectations from the process.
This is given that Washington appears to be pushing for a cessation of nuclear weapons development and Pyongyang is effectively attempting to secure a deal wherein it is allowed to maintain the requisite deterrence capabilities.
Japan is likely to increasingly step up its role in negotiations relating to the Korean Peninsula. This follows PM Abe’s efforts to secure support for constitutional revisions towards increased militarization by citing the purported threat posed by North Korea.
Travel to Seoul may continue at this time, while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.
We advise against nonessential travel to Pyongyang and North Korea given the risk of detainment of foreign travelers.

Current Situation:

On October 2, North Korea tested the two-stage, solid-fuel Pukguksong-3 SLBM off its east coast near Wonsan. The missile traveled an approximate distance of 451-km in an easterly direction at a maximum altitude of 909-km. It is believed to have been launched from a submersible barge instead of an actual submarine. North Korea first test-launched a Pukguksong-1 missile, or an earlier variant of the latest device, from an underwater platform in 2016.
The development, which represents the 11th missile test by Pyongyang since May, came hours after it agreed to hold working-level talks with the US on October 5.
North Korea’s chief negotiator Kim Myong-gil claimed that denuclearization talks on October 5 failed after his US counterpart, Stephen Biegun, refused to offer a new negotiating strategy. He also expressed doubt on whether the US will be able to amend its negotiation terms before the next meeting between the two sides in the coming weeks, while reiterating that Pyongyang is unwilling to negotiate with Washington if it does not amend its “hostile policies”.
A US spokesperson refuted Kim’s claims, stating that the official’s comments did not reflect the spirit of the discussion. The spokesperson further described the talks as positive. In April, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un demanded that Washington alter its current “maximum-pressure” sanctions strategy against Pyongyang by the end of the year.
At present, the US administration is believed to be prepared to offer North Korea a three-year suspension of UN sanctions on textile and coal exports in exchange for the dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and a halt on the production of enriched uranium.
According to reports from October 3, Washington “unofficially” promised Pyongyang low-level sanctions relief including a partial resumption of tourism at Mount Geumgang in North Korea.

Assessments & Forecast:

SLBM launch indicative of significant progress in solid-fuel missile development

The October 2 test is extremely notable for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Pukguksong-3 is the longest-range solid-fuel missile tested by Pyongyang to date. This fact gains further significance as the missile was launched at a lofted trajectory instead of a standard path that would have helped it to cover a larger distance. This may have been intentionally done so as to avoid threatening US territory such as Guam, which could have precipitated a much stronger response from Washington.
Overall, the development is indicative of significant leaps in North Korean solid-fuel missile development over the past months, considering that this represents another step in its quest to perfect a solid-fuel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of striking targets in the US. This is given that solid-fuel systems have an advantage vis a vis liquid-fuel systems in being more stable. Moreover, the generally compact nature of solid-fuel missiles allows them to be launched from mobile launchers. This makes it hard to counteract a potential strike given that these launchers can be moved immediately after engaging a target and can be quickly deployed from hidden structures such as tunnels.
In addition, the potential deployment of an SLBM from a submarine is hard to detect, making these target packages immune to the first strike by enemy elements. In this context, and given that the Pukguksong-3 is a medium-range missile capable of hitting Japan and South Korea, the test represents a notable escalation in the paradigm of ongoing processes aimed at eventual peninsular denuclearization. In terms of signaling, a test in the eastward direction serves to deliver the message that Japanese territory is still accessible to North Korean warheads despite Tokyo’s acquisition of the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense systems. This is indicated by the missile’s landing in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The test is also a more carefully-calibrated message to Washington, given that it is reflective of North Korean capabilities to target the US’ western seaboard from locations in the Pacific Ocean.

Weapons testing in quick succession likely part of ongoing effort to maximize leverage in relation to talks with US

The spate of missile testing by Pyongyang from May-October appears to be aimed at pressuring the US to adhere to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s year-end ultimatum regarding sanctions. Moreover, this may be an effort to persuade the US to forego perceived hostile actions such as joint military exercises with South Korea, with the last such drills concluding on August 20. The SLBM test, in particular, can be viewed as part of Pyongyang’s planned strategy to head into the October 5 talks from a position of strength, especially when considering the test occurred just hours after it agreed to meet with Washington.
At the same time, the fact that a high-profile test was conducted immediately prior to scheduled talks speaks to a degree of confidence in Pyongyang with regard to its perceived upper hand in negotiations as well as its broader understanding of Washington’s reaction and escalation patterns. FORECAST: As the year-end deadline approaches, similar attempts to pressurize Washington can be expected in the form of missile tests and escalated rhetoric. The timing of the launch amid growing calls for US President Donald Trump’s impeachment could potentially also suggest that Pyongyang will view such domestic diversions in the US as opportunities to push its testing program in the future.
North Korea’s decision to participate in working-level talks was likely primarily motivated by the removal of US National Security Advisor John Bolton in the month prior, as this likely created expectations among North Korean officials that his departure will prompt the US to pursue a fresh and more lenient negotiating strategy, given his hawkish stance on the issue of peninsular denuclearization. The subsequent failure of talks may be attributed to the absence of a new strategy employed by Washington, and the resultant gulf in expectations regarding potential meeting outcomes. Conflicting claims by US officials regarding the outcome of talks, as well as their reported agreement to meet again in Sweden in the coming weeks for additional negotiations, further lend credence to the prevailing divergence in perceptions over negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. FORECAST: This suggests that the current stalemate will prolong into the near future, although channels of communication at multiple levels will likely remain open in the absence of a defining change to the status quo by either side.
US President Trump’s decision to move forward with the October 5 meeting in spite of the SLBM test suggests that further testing is unlikely to jeopardize denuclearization talks, at least for the time being. His relative restraint is likely tied to a desire to rehabilitate his political image through a major foreign policy victory ahead of the US presidential elections in November 2020. FORECAST: It is important to note, however, that domestic pressure on President Trump is liable to increase as a consequence of the most recent test. This is due to Pyongyang’s launch of an SLBM, as this particular type of weapon, if perfected, will ultimately extend North Korea’s maritime reach and increase the threat level towards Washington. Over the long term, sustained pressure in this regard may prompt President Trump’s administration to take an incrementally hardline approach, raising the potential for backlash by Pyongyang and further scuttling the prospects of a larger de-escalation. This may comprise a potential backtracking on proposed initiatives such as the aforementioned low-level sanctions relief package with eased restrictions on tourism.

Japan to escalate calls for tougher stance on Pyongyang, seek more active role in regional talks

Pyongyang has repeatedly condemned South Korea’s efforts to boost its deterrence capabilities, which most recently included Seoul’s purchase of F-35 stealth fighter jets from a US-based company. In this light, South Korea’s display of the newly-acquired aircraft during a patrol over the East Sea on October 1 may have factored into the North’s latest test. Precedent for this was established in the string of short-range tests by North Korea that began in July to rebuke the aforementioned US-South Korea military drills in August. Nevertheless, Seoul’s failure to condemn the short-range tests likely signaled to Pyongyang that its weapons development efforts will continue to be viewed as not posing an imminent existential threat. South Korea’s August decision to not renew the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, which was forged on the basis of both countries’ shared threat perception of North Korea in 2016, likely reinforced notions that Seoul places the current threat from Pyongyang on a lower scale.
Japan expectedly condemned the SLBM test; however, October 4 reports indicate that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reiterated his desire to meet with Kim Jong-un to discuss the longstanding issue of Japanese nationals purportedly abducted by North Korean agents. PM Abe’s request for a one-on-one meeting may have to do with the fact that Tokyo and its interests have been sidelined in the format of the current negotiations, even as Washington has largely refused to strongly condemn the North Korean threat or advocate on Japan’s behalf. The call for a meeting is likely also an attempt to increase nationalistic sentiments among his electorate by drawing attention to the alleged threat posed by Pyongyang. FORECAST: This will work favorably for PM Abe as he pursues initiatives to boost Japanese military capabilities through constitutional revisions in the coming months. Further, Tokyo will likely capitalize on the SLBM test to potentially restore security coordination with Seoul, as evidenced by its offer to renew the GSOMIA pact on October 3.

Recommendations:

Travel to Seoul may continue at this time, while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.
We advise against nonessential travel to Pyongyang and North Korea given the risk of detainment of foreign travelers.
During periods of armed escalation between North and South Korea, we advise against all nonessential travel to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Yeonpyeong-do Islands.

Annual joint US-South Korea military exercises to begin on April 1; US, North Korea display commitment to upcoming bilateral talks – Korean Peninsula Analysis

Current Situation

On March 19, the US Department of Defense confirmed that the annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve joint military exercises with South Korea will begin on April 1 and last approximately one month. A spokesperson said that the exercises will be on a scale similar to previous exercises, and involve 23,700 US and 300,000 South Korean troops. There have been no announcements regarding the involvement of US aircraft carriers. Last year’s exercises lasted two months and involved the nuclear supercarrier USS Carl Vinson. According to recent reports, South Korea is considering procuring Apache heavy-attack helicopters and anti-artillery surface-to-surface missiles, to be used in the event of a ground war.

The US and South Korean presidents are preparing for individual summits with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. South Korean President Moon Jae-in is planning to meet with Kim in late April, and US President Donald Trump has tentatively agreed to meet with Kim in May, although no details of the latter meeting have been confirmed, including the location. A South Korean envoy reported that Kim said he understands that joint exercises must continue, but that he expected them to be readjusted in the future if bilateral developments remain positive.

Background

Kim delivered a speech on New Year’s Day suggesting a restart in bilateral negotiations with South Korea and offered to send a delegation to the 2018 Olympics in Pyeongchang. South Korea accepted, and the two sides held a series of meetings leading up to and following the Olympics, resulting in the North Korean offer of bilateral talks with both South Korea and the US.

No sitting US president has ever agreed to meet with North Korean leadership; President Bill Clinton and President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang after leaving office.

North Korea has not held a nuclear weapon or missile test since November 28, 2017.

Assessments

US, North Korea appear committed to talks, although deep distrust remains

The announcement of a U.S.-North Korea summit marks the first ever for a sitting US President, and is made more notable by Pyongyang’s stated willingness to discuss denuclearization. The main reason to doubt a North Korean commitment to denuclearization is the fact that it views its nuclear arsenal as the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. Other, more realistic objectives for the summit might be reaching an agreement on an indefinite ban of missile or nuclear testing in exchange for limits on US-South Korea exercises or a sanctions relief.

In the immediate term, a positive outcome is the North’s offer to temporarily suspend missile tests ahead of the talks, without presenting pre-conditions such as freezing military exercises or requesting sanctions relief. This suggests Kim’s willingness to begin negotiating in good faith, although similar strong starts have collapsed in the past.

The upcoming US-led exercises look to be an in-kind response to this good faith despite public claims to the contrary that the 2018 military exercises are on a similar scale to previous years. The decision to exclude aircraft carriers and halve the length of the drills demonstrates reciprocal flexibility following statements from Pyongyang showing increased tolerance for the exercises. Pyongyang’s stated tolerance and the drawdown of exercises by the US are signals that the desire for talks is, for the time being, sincere.

Despite this projected sincerity, the exercises are perceived as highly provocative by Pyongyang. By not delaying them entirely until talks, the US may be testing Pyongyang’s restraint, as the spring exercise season is normally notorious for North Korean weapons tests. The tenuous nature of the potential US-North Korean harmony is underscored by South Korea’s military tenders for equipment that has little use outside of war with the North.

Major areas of discussion include disarmament, sanctions, detentions

There is significant divergence in the expectations of such a process, as the US views denuclearization as the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, while North Korea views denuclearization as the complete withdrawal of US forces from the region. At present, neither side has shown willingness to satisfy the other’s demands on the issue. The US appears equally unwilling to ease sanctions in the short term, as the current belief in Washington is that economic pressure is one of the few things that brought North Korea to negotiations in the first place. Other areas may prove more easy to reconcile, including the transfer of foreign detainees out of North Korea prisons. The prisoners serve little strategic value for North Korea, and their release would constitute a strong showing of good faith ahead of more contentious issues.

The unprecedented meeting could have positive outcomes even if the primary goal of complete denuclearization of the peninsula is not achieved, including a more general de-escalation of tensions between Washington and Pyongyang. A more comprehensive solution is less likely, as it would be particularly difficult for an agreement to be reached based on a few days of talks, especially given the short preparation time for the Kim-Trump summit. It also remains possible that the lack of preparation, along with the remaining uncertainty over a neutral location for the meeting, might lead to abandoning or delaying the summit. Ultimately, whether or not agreements are made, just holding the summit at all would mark a significant breakthrough.

Recommendations

Travel to Seoul may continue at this time, while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.

We advise against nonessential travel to Pyongyang and North Korea given the risk of detainment of foreign travelers.

During periods of armed escalation between North and South Korea, we advise against all nonessential travel to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Yeonpyeongdo Islands.

Which options are on the table for Trump and Kim Jong-Un amid rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula? – Korean Peninsula Analysis

*** THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS WAS DISTRIBUTED TO MAX CLIENTS AT 18:00UTC ON 14 AUGUST ***

Situation: North Korea Tensions

On August 10, North Korea released a statement detailing a planned missile test that would be operational by mid-August. Using four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the statement threatened that it was “seriously examining the plan for an enveloping strike at Guam.” The statement also included details about the trajectory of the launch, noting that the missiles “cross the sky above Shimane, Hiroshima, and Koichi Prefectures of Japan,” fly for 3,356 kilometers over 1,065 seconds and would “hit the waters 30 to 40 km away from Guam.” This statement is part of a series of back-and-forth diplomatic provocations between the US and North Korea following Pyongyang’s recent breakthroughs in their weapons program.

On July 28, North Korea launched the second of two intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) test that month. The projectile traveled approximately 3,000 km in an upward trajectory, leading observers to speculate that the missile is capable of traveling up to 10,000 km on a standard trajectory, making both Los Angeles and Chicago within its theoretical range. In the aftermath of the test, a new US-led sanctions regime was adopted by the UN Security Council, potentially causing up to one billion USD in economic damage for Pyongyang out of an estimated three billion USD in annual export revenues.

Meanwhile, the annual joint Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercises between the US and South Korea will take place between August 21-31 and include the participation of tens of thousands of troops over sea, land, and air simulations.

Assessments & Forecast

Long-range test necessary for continued advancement of North Korean weapons program; US, allies unlikely to initiate wide-scale conflict in the event of launch

While test missile launches are certainly provocative, they are also a necessary component of developing a viable weapon, and the major underlying motivation for their continued execution. Until now, North Korea has almost exclusively conducted high-arc missile tests. While these tests have provided valuable information on ballistics in the initial launch stage, as well as reentry, their value is limited as such a trajectory is not equal to real-world conditions. Whereas Pyongyang has refrained from long-distance tests, likely due to concerns over a strong reaction from Tokyo as such a test would have to travel over Japanese territory, the weapons program has accelerated to such a point that this type of trajectory has become increasingly necessary. Testing missiles at varying launch trajectories provide different insights on how to improve tactical abilities. More traditional trajectory, as opposed to the high arc trajectories North Korea has typically employed, would provide Pyongyang great tactical insight that could not be divined from previous tests, including information regarding guidance, aerodynamics, and engine power. As such, the ratcheting up of rhetoric by President Trump, which fits into Pyongyang’s narrative of a belligerent Washington, also provides North Korea the justification for carrying out a missile test that is very necessary for the improvement of their capabilities.Given their close coordination and adherence to international norms and agreements, any action undertaken by the US, South Korea, or Japan is extremely unlikely to be unilateral in nature. These countries essentially have three immediate options in the event of a launch, which are not mutually exclusive: interception, military intervention, or diplomatic/economic retaliation. In terms of military intervention, this can also be divided into two options: an all-out assault with

Given their close coordination and adherence to international norms and agreements, any action undertaken by the US, South Korea, or Japan is extremely unlikely to be unilateral in nature. These countries essentially have three immediate options in the event of a launch, which are not mutually exclusive: interception, military intervention, or diplomatic/economic retaliation. In terms of military intervention, this can also be divided into two options: an all-out assault with pre-emptive positioning of ships towards the Korean Peninsula as well as artillery, or limited action in the form of tactical strikes. Nonetheless, of the three, military intervention remains the least likely due to the tremendous risk of such actions leading to a full-scale war. In this regard, it’s important to note that Seoul is situated only about 56 km from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), thereby limiting the US military option, given that even conventional, short-range missiles, which North Korea is known to have in its arsenal, could strike the South Korean capital in retaliation. The diplomatic and economic track also does not seem a likely immediate response, as a launch would signify that even the recent far-reaching sanctions and offers of negotiation were not enough to dissuade Pyongyang. Overall, the US is likely to seek to exhaust all diplomatic measures before turning to military action, and at this time, a nuclear escalation remains unlikely.

The most likely immediate reaction would be the activation of the missile defense capabilities wielded in the Pacific. These include land, sea, and air-based interceptors. In preparation for the strike, Japan deployed land-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile interceptors to bases in three of the four prefectures that were mentioned by North Korea in the notice. Knowing the North Korean plan, and that the missiles are only intended to pass over Japan, these batteries would most likely only be used if the missiles were to appear to be falling short in their trajectory and thus threatened the island nation. However, beyond the PAC-3s, Japan has also deployed an Aegis ballistic missile defense system to the waters between Japan and the Korean Peninsula, which is able to track approximately 100 missiles simultaneously and fire interceptors to take out ballistic projectiles. While these may be used to halt the missiles in mid-flight, the Aegis is not without limitation. It must be in the exact right part of the sea to intercept the missile and while it has been successful in intercepting ballistic missiles during tests, it has not been used to take out one in a live combat situation.Additionally, there are local airfields in South Korea and Japan from which fighter jets can be scrambled to intercept the missile during its boost phase. Along with Patriot missiles, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) is also currently deployed at the Anderson Air Force Base in Guam and could be used to try and take down the missiles, however, missiles falling outside of the immediate landmass may also not be interceptable by the system.

Additionally, there are local airfields in South Korea and Japan from which fighter jets can be scrambled to intercept the missile during its boost phase. Along with Patriot missiles, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) is also currently deployed at the Anderson Air Force Base in Guam and could be used to try and take down the missiles, however, missiles falling outside of the immediate landmass may also not be interceptable by the system.Despite a range of tools available, Japanese, Korean, and US forces may still choose not to intercept the tests should they occur. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, while the action would likely be presented as defensive, a failed interception would greatly undermine the credibility of the countries’ missile defense systems, which may embolden North Korea to carry out future tests. The stakes of a failed interception are especially high because four missiles have threatened to be shot. Even if just one of the missiles breaks though, it would still be a huge strategic blow to US defenses in the region. Secondly, if the North Korean missiles were shot down, Pyongyang may view this as an escalation worthy of a further military response.

Despite a range of tools available, Japanese, Korean, and US forces may still choose not to intercept the tests should they occur. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, while the action would likely be presented as defensive, a failed interception would greatly undermine the credibility of the countries’ missile defense systems, which may embolden North Korea to carry out future tests. The stakes of a failed interception are especially high because four missiles have threatened to be shot. Even if just one of the missiles breaks though, it would still be a huge strategic blow to US defenses in the region. Secondly, if the North Korean missiles were shot down, Pyongyang may view this as an escalation worthy of a further military response.

Meanwhile, Beijing has publicly indicated a willingness to defend North Korea in the event of an American first strike, but also not to intervene in the event of a North Korean first strike. The language of this statement was purposefully vague, and allows for a bit of maneuvering in the event of a launch on Guam, as such an event can be viewed as a North Korean first strike, and likewise can an American military response. In all actuality, China would most likely be reticent to involve itself militarily in any large-scale conflict (as would the US and its allies), although limited tactical strikes would likely engender a swift diplomatic rebuke.

FORECAST: Given these factors, a North Korean test launch into the waters of Guam remains a valuable strategic goal, although a military response by the US and its allies is undesirable by all sides in the current context. Should North Korea decide to attempt a launch towards Guam in the immediate future, it would likely coincide with the upcoming joint US-South Korea exercise, as such exercises have in the past served as a backdrop for weapons tests.

Pyongyang may seek to launch alternate tests in attempt to de-escalate, save face

One of the largest advantages on both sides is the element of unpredictability. President Trump does appear to be genuinely impetuous, which more than anything else is likely weighing on Pyongyang’s calculus before missile tests. This is likely compounded by the aforementioned opening given to the US to retaliate in the event of a North Korean first strike. As such, the next North Korean launch may be a test of a different missile in an attempt to still project military might while avoiding a potential confrontation.

Satellite imagery since June has suggested increased activity at North Korea’s Sinpo naval shipyard. In particular, activity towards the end of July led many to speculate that a submarine missile test was imminent; instead, North Korea launched an ICBM from a base in the almost exact opposite area of the country. Threatening to launch specific land-based missiles and then instead launching a different projectile would fit with Pyongyang’s established modus operandi of distraction and disinformation. A submarine launch would likely involve the solid-fuel Pukguksong-1 missile variant, as the liquid fueled Hwasong-12, which Pyongyang threatened to launch near Guam, is incapable of submarine launch.Additionally, if the major underlying motivation behind the test is scientific, as opposed to provocation, Pyongyang may still seek to launch a missile along a different flight path. This would still give their missile program largely the same information about the weapon ballistics and guidance, while potentially averting a major incident. Additionally, Pyongyang would be able to claim that the test intended to attack Guam but simply misfired, which would contribute to their disinformation campaign. However, such a path would still likely travel over Japan, risking the possibility of the projectile being shot down.

Additionally, if the major underlying motivation behind the test is scientific, as opposed to provocation, Pyongyang may still seek to launch a missile along a different flight path. This would still give their missile program largely the same information about the weapon ballistics and guidance, while potentially averting a major incident. Additionally, Pyongyang would be able to claim that the test intended to attack Guam but simply misfired, which would contribute to their disinformation campaign. However, such a path would still likely travel over Japan, risking the possibility of the projectile being shot down.

Ambiguous nature of US statements contrast explicit North Korean threats; highlights apparent willingness to follow through on Guam plan

The relatively bellicose rhetoric used by President Trump marks the first time that the US threatened a first strike against North Korea. Previous presidents had typically reiterated a willingness to retaliate to a North Korean strike, most likely as a means of assuring allies in Seoul and Tokyo. However, President Trump’s initial statement on August 8, in which he threatened “fire and fury”, was reportedly unvetted by his own aides, suggesting that the announcement itself was improvised. This, coupled with recent statements from other officials stressing a more diplomatic approach, suggest that the President’s statements were more bluster or posturing and not an actual expression of actual intent.On the North Korean side, while the hostile rhetoric has remained a consistent part of its foreign policy vis-a-vis the US, the release of the strike plan was similarly unusual, as it served as the first time such a notice was given for a missile test. Comparing the nature of the threats from both sides, the US government appears uncoordinated and ambiguous, while North Korea’s seems explicit and exceptionally detailed.

On the North Korean side, while the hostile rhetoric has remained a consistent part of its foreign policy vis-a-vis the US, the release of the strike plan was similarly unusual, as it served as the first time such a notice was given for a missile test. Comparing the nature of the threats from both sides, the US government appears uncoordinated and ambiguous, while North Korea’s seems explicit and exceptionally detailed.The main limiting factor that would prevent Pyongyang from launching such a test is the fear of a US response. President Trump’s overtly offensive posture, at least on face value, would seem to suggest a wide spectrum of possible responses, from tactical strikes on key North Korean facilities to full-scale war on the Peninsula. In this sense, Trump’s tone may be an asset, or even the result of an explicit plan, although this latter possibility is unlikely.

The main limiting factor that would prevent Pyongyang from launching such a test is the fear of a US response. President Trump’s overtly offensive posture, at least on face value, would seem to suggest a wide spectrum of possible responses, from tactical strikes on key North Korean facilities to full-scale war on the Peninsula. In this sense, Trump’s tone may be an asset, or even the result of an explicit plan, although this latter possibility is unlikely.

Recommendations

We advise against non-essential travel to Pyongyang and North Korea given the risk of detainment of foreign travelers.
Travel to Seoul may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.
During periods of armed escalation between North and South Korea, we advise against all non-essential travel to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Yeonpyeongdo Islands.
While the potential that a North Korean missile strike would have a direct physical impact on Guam remains low, given the current climate we advise against all non-essential travel to the island over the coming weeks.

Contact MAX Operations: If you plan to travel to / or are currently operating in South Korea:

MAX Global Operations Center is available 24/7 for operational support
Consult with MAX Senior Advisor prior to your visit
Share your itinerary in advance and have MAX Ground Support
Use MAX Consultancy service to create Evacuation & Business Contingency Plans

MAX offers strong on-ground capabilities in South Korea and our teams are standing by ready to provide you with secure transportation, executive protection, and evacuation services. For on-ground support now, contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434/5