Tag Archives: Protest

China’s national security law accused of eroding “one country, two systems” – Hong Kong Analysis

Executive Summary

China announced on May 21 that it would bypass the Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) to pass the “Hong Kong national security law.”

The timing of the law is likely aimed at taking advantage of the distraction offered by the COVID-19 pandemic, limiting the resurgence of street protests.

The legislation will act as a base for increased curbs on freedom of speech, activism.

Increased control by Beijing on Hong Kong’s judicial affairs will worsen tensions between the US, China.

Civil unrest will increase in the near term, however, the implementation of restrictions will dampen anti-government activism over a longer period of time.

Travel to Hong Kong can continue while adhering to security precautions regarding civil unrest, crime, and protests.

Current Situation

China announced on May 21 that it would bypass the Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) to pass the “Hong Kong national security law.” The legislation seeks to criminalize secessionist or subversive activity against Beijing, terrorism, and foreign interference in the city. The draft bill was presented to Beijing’s National People’s Congress (NPC) on May 22 and a vote is set for the end of the body’s two-sessions meeting on May 28.

Similar legislation was introduced in Hong Kong’s LegCo in 2003, known as Article 23, but was tabled after its introduction prompted hundreds of thousands of individuals to march in protest on July 1 of the same year. The date marks Hong Kong’s handover from the UK to China in 1997. Small-scale commemorative events were held on this day prior to 2003, while events in the years that followed saw participation in the high thousands.

Assessments & Forecast

Introduction of national security law informed by failure to control 2019 protests, distraction offered by COVID-19 pandemic 

The legislation represents China’s most overt and assertive attempt to increase control over the special administrative region since its 1997 handover. As the NPC is largely symbolic, an overwhelming majority is expected and the law will take effect in the coming months, although an exact timeline for its implementation remains unclear. Regardless, the development will stoke prevailing anti-China sentiment in the city that fueled the anti-government protest campaign in the past year. This will be compounded by long-standing sensitivities among pan-democrats over contentious national security legislation, particularly Article 23, that would strengthen Beijing’s influence in the city if enacted.

The timing of the move is informed by multiple factors. The anti-government protest campaign that emerged in 2019 was accompanied by high levels of violence, with officials labeling certain incidents part of the resistance as “terrorism” and citing these as cause for stronger national security laws. Meanwhile, the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and associated restrictions on mass gatherings have significantly impacted the protest campaign in recent months, with participation numbers sinking to the high dozens to low hundreds and the tempo of events decreasing. In this light, Beijing is likely using the global health crisis as a distraction and perceives the lull in protests as an opportunity to assert its control.

More broadly, the protest campaign and the authorities’ failure to placate anti-government activists highlighted obstacles to local governance that were likely to resurface after the pandemic abated. This was especially likely in the event that Article 23 was re-tabled in the LegCo, a possibility that officials have often hinted at, and given ongoing efforts by Beijing to attain control over the city’s affairs. Thus, the cognizance of these obstacles to city authorities’ governance likely contributed to Beijing’s decision to supersede the LegCo.

Further, the timing of the legislation can be attributed, in part, to the LegCo elections slated to be held in September. The pro-democracy camp’s significant win in the District Council polls in November 2019 spoke to the high levels of anti-China and anti-government sentiment, while a rebound in the campaign in recent weeks raised the potential for reigniting anti-government sentiment that could jeopardize the pro-establishment camp’s electoral prospects.

Legislation to provide grounds for severe curbs on protest activity, freedom of speech in near-to-medium term

There are a number of implications arising from the passage of the legislation in its current form later in the week. First, such a development will signal a clear change to Beijing’s “one country, two systems” policy, given that residents of Hong Kong will now be on par with citizens of mainland China in the way they are treated for criticizing the ruling dispensation. This will feed into fears of diminished judicial independence and significantly increased curbs on speech and protest freedoms. Moreover, in light of Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s statement that the local government will comply with the integration of the national security legislation, the passage of the draft bill will also indicate an increased willingness on the part of the Hong Kong government to cede issues such as criminal laws to Beijing. This opens the space for the secession of other powers that were earlier held by the local government.

In practical terms, the enforcement of the legislation will pave the way for the preemptive detention of protesters under allegedly vaguely defined security provisions, as well as their incarceration without trial for extended periods of time over the coming months. Moreover, the local government will retain the imperative to pick up anti-government activists for questioning and authorize their remand, if necessary, simply on the basis of their online activity or statements in other mediums. At the same time, Chinese security forces may also expand their monitoring activities within the city in the near-to-medium term, likely through liaison with the Hong Kong Police Force and surveillance units part of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) garrison in the city. However, Beijing is not likely to increase its on-ground security presence through the mobilizing of additional PLA troops, given the empowerment of the HKPF should suffice in maintaining law and order and considering the negative signal such a move would send to the international community in terms of violating the 1997 agreement.

Developments will exacerbate US-China tensions, impact Hong Kong’s status as regional financial hub over long-term

Once the terms of the legislation begin to be enforced over the coming months, there is an increased risk of retaliatory action by Washington DC, either through the revocation of the special status accorded to the territory under US law or by the increasing of sanctions on Chinese entities and interests. It is also possible that US action will comprise a combination of these measures for maximum effect, more so given the government and Congress’ convergent opinions regarding strict actions against purported Chinese belligerence. The primary effect of this will be on the annual trade of goods and services between the US and Hong Kong, estimated to be worth approximately 67 billion USD, with Hong Kong likely to lose its preferential tariff rate of zero percent on US goods. Additionally, visa regimes for US businesses may also change, with investment patterns likely to be impacted as well. While countries like the UK may not have such a drastic reaction, their policy alignment with the US on certain trade matters, and Chinese counter-measures over perceptions of foreign interference in internal matters, will, over the next half-decade, make China a less attractive option for global business houses, should economic measures by both sides kick in.

With respect to the broader US-China relationship, the introduction of national security legislation will emerge as the latest sticking point impeding rapprochement on issues, such as the ongoing trade conflict and China’s actions in the South China Sea (SCS) and Taiwan Strait. This stands to precipitate a new round of tariffs and counter-measures by either side, with Washington likely to increase pressure on Beijing by advocating closer defense ties and further cooperation with Taiwan. Simultaneously, it will aim to oppose Chinese agendas on other fronts by backing opposition from Vietnam, Malaysia, and other claimants involved in territorial disputes with China in the SCS, and providing support for investigations into China’s alleged role in concealing the spread of COVID-19 in its territory, among others. Overall, the next two years will see increased friction between the two countries, with aspects like China’s increasing control on Hong Kong and generally growing isolationism across the world acting as fuel.

Civil unrest to peak in coming weeks, though national security legislation likely to cripple anti-government movement over extended period

Thousands of anti-government activists protested across Hong Kong Island on May 24 in reaction to the proposed law. Per reports, the protest saw similar methods to those seen in the 2019 campaign, including the lack of an organizer for the event itself and activists dispersing to other parts of the city to evade police action. This is a preliminary indication that protests over the legislation will increase in the near term off the back of heightened anti-China and anti-government sentiments, with elevated turnouts and a high risk of violent clashes.

Further, these tensions will bolster attendance at events on highly sensitive days, such as the annual June 4 vigil to mark the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown and the July 1 pro-democracy march. Further, June 9 and 12 mark two notable events in the 2019 campaign, with the former featuring protests involving at least one million individuals and the latter seeing a notable clash in Admiralty between protesters and police.

Radical sections of protesters may also look to target Chinese installations in the city, including the Hong Kong Liaison Office, during this period, with vandalism and attacks on police facilities also likely to see an uptick. However, as previously mentioned, the implementation of the national security law will cripple the anti-government movement to a great extent over the long term, with police officials likely to arrest notable activists and organizers prior to events being held. The wholesale imprisonment of anti-government protesters based on opinions espoused on fora like social media will also result in the curtailment of anti-government dissent.


Travel to Hong Kong can continue while adhering to security precautions regarding civil unrest, crime, and protests.

Those operating or residing in Hong Kong are advised to avoid nonessential travel near protests and further maintain heightened vigilance throughout the city due to the potential for continued demonstrations and unrest. This may include the use of teargas and rubber bullets by police, the hurling of incendiary objects such as petrol bombs, or the throwing of bricks and projectiles by protesters.

Avoid the vicinity of police stations, checkpoints, or other security installations as they remain susceptible to arson attacks or vandalism.

Maintain particular vigilance around government buildings on Hong Kong Island which are often used as protest sites, such as the LegCo Building, Central Government Complex, Hong Kong Police Headquarters, Hong Kong Liaison Office, and Chief Executive’s Office.

Avoid carrying any sensitive material either on electronic devices or clothing that puts forward controversial political opinions, particularly anti-Beijing stances, when crossing over by land due to heightened security checks.

MAX Security has strong on-ground capabilities for executive protection and facilitating business travel to Hong Kong. For contingency plans and on-ground operational support, contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434.

Protesters to remain steadfast on remaining demands, will influence November’s District Council elections – Hong Kong Analysis

Executive Summary

Chief Executive Carrie Lam invoked emergency legislation on October 4 to ban the use of masks during all protests in the city, a month after she formally announced the complete withdrawal of the extradition bill.

The significant escalation in protest tactics and forceful dispersal methods has resulted in a deterioration in all-around security in Hong Kong, while the protest lobby will continue to pressure the government to address all five of their demands.

The discovery of an IED in Mong Kok on October 13 for the first time during the ongoing wave of protests is highly notable. Despite its isolated nature, the incident is likely to be used by authorities to further justify a more heavy-handed crackdown on protesters, including mass arrests, over the coming weeks.

The anti-government campaign is liable to impact the upcoming District Council polls, slated for November, with election-related violence anticipated in the coming weeks.

Travel to Hong Kong can continue while adhering to security precautions regarding civil unrest, and avoiding the vicinity of all protests.

Current Situation

Hong Kong authorities officially withdrew the contentious extradition bill, via a statement by Secretary for Security John Lee at the Legislative Council (LegCo) on October 23. The move follows Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s announcement of the bill’s complete withdrawal on September 4 after it sparked anti-government protests since March. CE Lam also announced a ban on the use of masks in all protests by invoking emergency legislation on October 4.

Notable recent developments have included a significant uptick in protest tactics as well as police dispersal methods in the months of September and October. The most recent was a low-level IED explosion in Mong Kok during a protest in the area, during which demonstrators also threw at least 20 petrol bombs at the Mong Kok Police Station. Further, October 1 and 4 saw two separate instances of young protesters being shot by police personnel.

The US House of Representatives passed three pieces of legislation in support of Hong Kong on October 15. These include the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, which seeks an annual review of Hong Kong’s autonomy and the city’s special treatment as a separate trade entity if it becomes law. The second measure, the Protect Hong Kong Act, seeks to ban the commercial exports of military and crowd-control equipment that the police could use against protesters. The third measure passed by the House is a non-binding resolution recognizing Hong Kong’s relationship with the US, supporting the residents’ right to vote, and condemning China’s alleged interference in their domestic affairs.

Key Events in Anti-government Protests in Hong Kong

Assessments and Forecast

Escalation in violence, increased confrontations despite bill’s withdrawal signals entrenched position of protesters 

Recent tactics adopted by both the security forces and anti-government protesters, mainly consisting of Hong Kong’s youth, represent notable escalations. The first instances of protesters being shot by police forces have thus far aggravated radical groups and have sustained their use of more violent means of protests in recent weeks. FORECAST: The continuation of demonstrations despite CE Lam’s announcement of the formal withdrawal of the bill shows how the movement has evolved into a larger anti-government campaign, and as such, shows no signs of quelling in the near term.

Status if Demands by Anti-government Protesters

The introduction of the anti-mask law by emergency legislation served to further antagonize protesters against CE Lam. It also raised concerns about further restrictions on freedoms and the potential implementation of a full emergency in the city.  While this latter measure is less likely in the immediate term, sustained protest violence may be used to justify the usage of increased emergency measures in the long term, as was witnessed with the anti-mask regulation. Calls for CE Lam’s resignation are expected to continue gaining traction in the near term, evidenced by pan-democrats’ heckling of CE Lam during her policy address on October 16.

Vandalism, arson, and the use of petrol bombs can be expected with continued frequency by radical anti-government groups. The slightly diminished participation in protests may be attributed to various reasons. This may include the disengagement of more moderate groups who have now been placated by the withdrawal of the extradition bill or those driven away by the increase in violent protest tactics. Despite these factors, local solidarity with the anti-government campaign as a whole appears unlikely to abate, signaled by moderate groups dubbing their radical counterparts as “the braves” for continuing the movement. Specific incidents of escalation, such as the alleged police excesses or the use of live rounds to disperse protesters, may prompt a sudden spike in turnouts at rallies, especially on the weekends.

Authorities likely expected the extradition bill’s complete withdrawal to placate the protest movement. Instead, the withdrawal emboldened participating groups to continue pushing for their four remaining demands, likely due to perceptions that the withdrawal of the bill was a result of the pressure they put on the government. This continuation of protests has likely informed the increased intensity of forceful dispersal measures witnessed in the aftermath of the bill’s withdrawal. FORECAST: Police are liable to continue with this approach, using tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and bean bag rounds, with the latent risk of isolated incidents involving live ammunition usage in the near term. The increasing frequency of MTR cancellations ahead of protests appear to have also created perceptions among protesters that the MTR corporation is siding with the police by restricting protesters’ movement. As such, MTR stations are likely to continue to remain hotspots, especially for acts of arson and vandalism.

The discovery of an IED in Mong Kok on October 13 for the first time during the ongoing wave of protests is highly notable, although it appears to have been crudely constructed and caused limited damage with no injuries. FORECAST: Nevertheless, the incident is likely to be used by authorities to further justify a more heavy-handed crackdown on protesters, including mass arrests, over the coming weeks. An increase in the deployment of riot police is also expected city-wide. However, it is unlikely that IED attacks will become commonplace in Hong Kong, as the aforementioned instance appears to have been an isolated event.

Anti-government campaign liable to inform trends in upcoming election

The protesters’ recent targeting of Chinese-owned banks and businesses in the city further highlights heightened anti-Beijing sentiments, which has largely energized the clashes between pro-democracy and pro-Beijing individuals in Hong Kong. FORECAST: This may further deepen social polarization within the city, especially ahead of the November District Council elections. Pro-democracy lawmakers may attempt to capitalize on current sentiments to gain visibility for their campaigns, potentially by staging election rallies during or close to predetermined anti-government events.

Voter turnout and support for these groups may see an uptick as smaller pro-democracy parties draw support by association with the protests. Turnouts in the election are liable to be high, based on the record number of citizens enrolled to vote. Incidents of election-related violence are also likely, potentially targeting pro-government lawmakers and their offices. This risk pertains to pan-democrat candidates as well, evidenced thus far in the October 16 attack on CHRF convenor and Lek Yuen constituency candidate Jimmy Sham.

FORECAST: Precedence suggests that the government will enforce stringent electoral rules to exclude pan-democrat candidates. This was witnessed in the barring of pro-democracy leader Joshua Wong, per an October 29 announcement. Authorities may also attempt to disqualify elected pro-democracy representatives following the polls. Such moves will exacerbate anti-government sentiment, potentially spurring a new wave of rallies or violence in the aftermath of the elections. Another trigger that could instigate such unrest is the cancellation of polls in specific areas due to security concerns. This is likely as such a move would be perceived as a rejection of protesters’ demand for universal suffrage.

FORECAST: Though the District Council polls are not expected to significantly impact the shaping of the Legislative Council, they will inform representation in the committee that selects the city’s chief executive. This is significant considering protesters’ calls for incumbent CE Lam’s resignation. While such a result is less likely at present, pan-democrats will seek to maximize poll participation in order to ultimately bolster their committee representation. In this light, Beijing will monitor the elections closely and may push to escalate the local government’s crackdown on pan-democrat candidates or their camp as a whole in the months that follow. This is especially likely in preparation for the Legislative Council elections set to occur in 2020.

Assult Incidents on Pro-democracy Activist

China may use punitive trade measures to discourage international support, risk of direct military intervention still low

The month of October saw China exerting its influence on US-based businesses that were perceived as supporting the protest movement in Hong Kong. The developments underscore China’s economic influence on US-based businesses by virtue of its large market access, especially those perceived to take an anti-China stance. This is bolstered by multiple Chinese businesses dropping sponsorship deals with a large US-based sporting franchise over perceived support for the protests.

FORECAST: The US House of Representatives’ votes in favor of several pieces of legislation to support Hong Kong on October 15 are likely to embolden pro-democracy demonstrators, especially as the votes coincided with a mass protest in Hong Kong in support of the legislation. The passage of these bills may be raised at ongoing trade talks between the US and China, as Beijing condemns Washington for interfering in affairs it views as domestic.  CE Lam’s recent statements that the administration will not hesitate to take Beijing’s assistance in quelling protests is likely a form of signaling; as such, direct intervention by the Chinese government or security forces still remains less likely in the immediate term. However, the level of security cooperation between Beijing’s security establishment and the Hong Kong police is expected to increase as protests sustain for the foreseeable future.

US Legislation in Support of Hong Kong


Travel to Hong Kong can continue while adhering to security precautions regarding civil unrest, crime, and protests.

Those operating or residing in Hong Kong are advised to avoid all travel near protests and further maintain heightened vigilance throughout the city due to the potential for continued demonstrations and the unrest. This may include the use of teargas and rubber bullets by police, incendiary objects such as petrol bombs, or the throwing of bricks and projectiles by protesters.

Avoid the vicinity of police stations, checkpoints, or other security installations as they are being increasingly targeted with arson attacks or vandalism in the latest wave of protests. This is particularly likely after multiple arrests occur at protest rallies.

Maintain particular vigilance around government buildings on Hong Kong Island, which are often used as protest sites, such as the LegCo Building, Central Government Complex, Hong Kong Police Headquarters, and Chief Executive’s Office.

Minimize nonessential travel to sensitive areas where the propensity for violence is greater at present. These primarily include Tin Shui Wai, Ma On Shan, Sha Tin, and Sheung Shui in the New Territories; Tsim Sha Tsui, Sham Shui Po, and the West Kowloon Train Station in Kowloon; and North Point in the Eastern District of Hong Kong Island.

Allot for disruptions if taking the MRT service given that authorities are known to close off specific lines to prevent protesters’ movements, especially during multiple simultaneous demonstrations across the city.

Avoid carrying any sensitive material either on electronic devices or clothing that puts forward controversial political opinions, particularly anti-Beijing stances, when crossing over by land due to the heightened security checks.

MAX Security has strong on-ground capabilities for executive protection and facilitating business travel to Hong Kong. For contingency plans and on-ground operational support, contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434.

Protest movement to gain momentum and see increased unrest amid rising anti-government sentiment – Colombia Analysis

Executive Summary:

The ongoing protests against President Ivan Duque’s administration have seen hundreds of thousands participating in planned and spontaneous demonstrations in Bogota, Cali, Medellin, and other urban centers.

Protests are anticipated to continue and gradually gain momentum as the national dialogue between the protesters and the administration takes place over the coming weeks, with violent unrest remaining highly likely.

The government is liable to make significant concessions in terms of policy and personnel changes to stem growing unrest and calls for President Duque to step down.

Travelers are advised to avoid nonessential travel to Bogota, Cali, Medellin, and other urban centers over the coming weeks due to the high potential for unrest.

MAX has strong on-ground capabilities in Central and South America, for support or evacuation. Please contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434.

Please be advised:

Following nationwide mass protests against President Ivan Duque that began on November 21 leaving three dead and 272 injured on the day, the mayor of Bogota declared a curfew for the city until November 23. The protests were called for by several groups, including labor unions, LGBT activists, pensioners, healthcare workers, education workers, students, and indigeneous groups against the administration’s policies.

Apart from planned demonstrations, several spontaneous rallies by citizens banging pots and pans, a traditional Latin American form of protest called ‘cacerolazo’, have also been recorded.

On November 21, the Ministry of the Interior reportedly issued a decree to enact increased security measures during the day, including closing international borders and banning the carrying of firearms.

Flight cancelations were reported at Bogota’s El Dorado International Airport (BOG) until November 23 and more than half of the 138 Transmilenio bus stations have been destroyed amid the unrest. Thousands continue to gather at President Duque’s private residence in Usaquen, chanting anti-government slogans.

On November 23, deployed riot police from the Escuadron Movil Antidisturbios (ESMAD) shot an 18-year old student, leaving him in critical condition with life changing injuries. Subsequent protests took on an increasingly violent tone, prompting the Attorney General to open an investigation into the case.

Reports from November 24 indicate that nearly 300 officers have been injured since the start of the violent protests. Separately, a bomb attack was recorded at a police station in Santander de Quilichao, Cauca on November 23 which left three officers dead, although no group has officially claimed responsibility for the attack.

President Duque announced the beginning of a national dialogue in Colombia on November 24 “to strengthen the social agenda in the country”. Mayors and elected governors from across the country will take place in the dialogue, as well as labor union leaders.

Assessments & Forecast

Protests to continue, increase in intensity over coming weeks

Against the backdrop of ongoing social protest movements across Latin America, such as in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, the Colombian protests are liable to gradually gain momentum and continue calling for President Duque’s resignation. The protests in Bogota are expected to be the most well-attended, with turnouts in the hundreds of thousands, and mid-to-high tens of thousands anticipated in other urban centers.

Protesters are likely to use Molotov cocktails and conduct targeted vandalism and arson attacks on public infrastructure, with the ESMAD likely to respond using forcible dispersal measures such as tear gas, rubber pellets, water cannons, and possibly live ammunition. Roadblocks are likely to be erected on key highways nationwide with severe travel disruptions anticipated to be witnessed at ports of entry and border crossings as well, particularly if the curfews continue. The anticipated delays in negotiations and policy changes are likely to stoke such protests and contribute to a rise in disruptive acts.

In Bogota, potential protest locations include government buildings and past focal points of unrest such as Parque Nacional, Plaza Bolivar, and President Duque’s residence at Calle 145. The curfew in Bogota could be extended further if instances of unrest are continued to be recorded.

Focal Points of Protests in Bogota

Government expected to make major concessions during national dialogue

Given intense backlash against the ESMAD’s handling of the protests, which has contributed to a rise in anti-government sentiment, as well as long-held grievances among the public over economic policies and the peace process, the national dialogue is likely to be protracted and result in the administration having to make several concessions to the opposition and civil society groups.

Specifically, as seen in the case of Chile, President Duque is likely to make several personnel changes to stem calls for his resignation, to which he is unlikely to agree. In particular, high ranking officials in the departments of health, defense, education, and his cabinet are likely to be replaced, possibly with individuals holding slightly more left-wing views. This is likely to anger his political patron, former President Alvaro Uribe, and his supporters, increasing the likelihood of political stalemates in the days to come.

In addition, President Duque may agree to restart dialogue with the Ejercito Liberacion Nacional (ELN) and other Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)-dissident groups in the face of intense pressure from indigenous communities who argue that the failed peace talks have resulted in increased violence in their regions. Calls for such a scenario have been bolstered further following the resignation of former Minister of Defense Guillermo Botermo on November 6 over a failed raid on a FARC-dissident camp that led to the deaths of eight minors and against the backdrop of the FARC rearmament announcement on August 29.


Travelers are advised to avoid nonessential travel to Bogota, Cali, Medellin, and other urban centers over the coming weeks due to the high potential for unrest.

Allot for disruptions to all forms of travel and public services over the coming days due to protests and the associated labor action. Reconfirm itineraries prior to air travel.

Remain cognizant of authorities’ updates regarding curfews and possible road closures. In the event that a security checkpoint is encountered, act respectfully and patiently, while cooperating fully with security personnel.

Wave of anti-government protests highlighting growing disaffection with establishment parties may exacerbate political tensions – Balkans Analysis

Executive Summary

Several countries in the Balkans have seen intense anti-government protest movements in recent months, exacerbating nationalist sentiments and political tensions.

In Albania, protesters are calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama amid perceptions of systemic corruption. Snap elections would likely see Rama retain power, leading to a period of intense opposition protests.

Montenegro’s President was the subject of anti-corruption protests. A period of resisting protester demands will culminate in early elections, which he will likely win.

In North Macedonia, the opposition VMRO-DPMNE party are expected to rekindle protests surrounding the naming agreement with Greece. Disputes over the election of the President are liable to be the key motivator.

Serbia’s President is liable to heed protesters’ demands and call for early elections. Vucic’s continued support from non-urban voters will preserve the ruling party’s status in government


During the course of 2018-19, several countries in the Balkans experienced anti-government protests stemming from issues including corruption, media manipulation, and territorial disputes. Protest movements remain ongoing in urban centers of Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia by both newly created organizations and established political parties, while demonstrations surrounding the name deal with Greece have temporarily abated in Macedonia as of the beginning of 2019. Protests have witnessed instances of unrest and violence, including clashes between protesters and police in capital cities and major urban centers.

Ethnic Composition of Balkans

Regionwide protest movements could lead to rekindling of nationalistic sentiment and exacerbate ethnic tensions

The protest movements throughout the Balkans are liable to lead to a rekindling of nationalist sentiments spurred by disaffection to systemic corruption and a lack of economic prosperity. Factions in each country seek to remove governments with the support of protest movements, and movement leaders have widely adopted nationalist stances to garner support for the changes in government. The various protest movements and leaders have promised to guarantee better governance and have capitalized on the existing nationalist tendencies. The rise in nationalist sentiments could see a shift in voting patterns with traditionally center-right to right-wing parties gathering traction and support by moving further to the right, particularly on issues of ethnonationalism.

The increasing influence of nationalism on political and government policies risks disrupting the already fragile coexistence of the multiple ethnicities within the region. Incumbent leaders are taking stronger stances on pre-existing issues, such as Serbian President Aleskander Vucic’s strategy in ongoing negotiations with Kosovo, which has included proposing a territorial exchange with Pristina and seeking to end the tariffs on Serbian goods through talks hosted by the EU. Vucic, in order to garner support from nationalist and right-wing elements, is liable to pursue a policy towards Pristina that does not include the possibility of recognition and call for the establishment of semi-autonomous ethnic Serb authority within Kosovan borders. The implications of the aggravation in Kosovo-Serbia relations could increase tensions between the Albanian diaspora in other nations, as well as other ethnicities. With this, a growth in the Albanian representation in North Macedonia and Montenegro has been recorded, as well as Bosnian and Hungarian parties in Serbia seeing an increase in support.


Initial protests against the Albanian government commenced in November 2018, when residents of the Astir neighborhood rallied against the construction of the Unaza e Madhe or Great Ring Road. Following the Great Ring protests, student organizations began staging mass demonstrations in Tirana and other urban centers. The protests called on the government to improve the education budget and the overall status of institutions in Albania, among other grievances.

Since February 2019, the main opposition party, Partia Demokratike e Shqiperise (PD) and other political entities have staged anti-government demonstrations in Tirana. The PD has called for Prime Minister Edi Rama of the Partia Socialiste e Shqiperise (PS) to resign and call for snap elections. Thousands continue to attend weekly protests in Tirana, which have seen widespread unrest with protesters targeting the PM’s office and parliament buildings. The PD accuses Rama’s cabinet of corruption and links to organized crime, as well as vote manipulation during the 2017 general election. All 65 opposition MPs vacated their parliamentary seats on February 18 in protest against Rama. The PD and other opposition parties have stated they intend to boycott the upcoming local elections if PM Rama refuses to step down.

Leaders & Protest Groups in Albania

Opposition demands for snap elections unlikely to translate into increase in political power

The protests are reflective of the perceived inability of the administration to reform the economy and tackle corruption, which remains a core public grievance and is often viewed as the chief hindrance to the country joining the EU. A continuation in the violence witnessed at political demonstrations could negatively impact potential negotiations with Brussels.

The increasing pressure on Rama caused by the protest movement and threatened resignation of President Ilir Meta, who has clashed with Rama in the past, indicate that a snap election is increasingly likely, possibly coinciding with the local elections in June. However, in light of the possible opposition boycott of the local elections, the PD and other parties could denounce such a decision and refuse to participate in any elections until Rama formally steps down, increasing the potential for an increase in political volatility at associated demonstrations.

Given that Rama’s PS gained 74 of 140 seats in Parliament in 2017 and that the protest movement has failed to gain sizeable traction outside Tirana, the PS could retain control of the parliament in snap elections. Rama’s victory would further elevate the discontent among the opposition, leading to large-scale protests, accusations of electoral fraud, and violence at protests.

Considering PD leader Luzlim Basha’s statements and the widespread discontent emanating from student organizations, residents of Tirana, and opposition members, protests are liable to continue in the near-to-medium term in Tirana. The protests could see an increased turnout if PM Rama refuses to engage in dialogue, call early elections, or put forth his resignation. Demonstrations will continue targeting government buildings and could witness further unrest. Further elevating the propensity for unrest are recurring accusations of corruption within Rama’s government, which have led to two senior ministers resigning since the protests began.


Since February, large-scale anti-government protests calling for the resignation of President Milo Djukanovic and his government have been recorded in Podgorica surrounding government buildings. The protests have included episodes of unrest, such as on March 16 when demonstrators launched projectiles at security forces who then proceeded to use tear gas and force to disperse the unruly gatherings.

Following the detention and subsequent release of an opposition leader in December 2018 which incited protests, a video was released in January showing Dusko Knezevic, a prominent businessman and former ally of Djukanovic, giving illicit campaign funding to a member of Djuaknovic’s Demokratska Partija Socijalista Crne Gore (DPS) party.

On March 30, leaders of the Odupri se protest movement and 39 Members of Parliament called for opposition parties to campaign together against the DPS should elections be called. A second anti-government protest movement supporting Knezevic was created under the banner of “Do Slobode” (To Freedom). The leaders of the Odupri se movement have continued to denounce Dusko Knezevic, who has attempted to set up his own political party. On May 9, the High Court in Podgorica convicted 14 individuals for their involvement in the October 2016 coup plot. Among the convicted are the leaders of opposition parties such as the Demokratska Narodna Partija (DNP) who are one of the chief protagonists of the ongoing anti-government protests.

Leaders & Protest groups in Montenegro

Djukanovic liable to call snap elections; could see right-wing, Serb-interest parties making gains

The anti-incumbency sentiment towards Djukanovic, who has been in power for nearly 30 years, was exacerbated by corruption accusations and a failure to address the activities of criminal and drug trafficking organizations, who continue to operate in port cities and are known to conduct targeted killings.

Djukanovic’s denouncement of the protest movement will likely translate into a prolonged resistance by his administration to enact its demands which include the resignation of top officials and forming a transitional government to hold elections. With Djukanovic unlikely to acquiesce, a continuation of large-scale protests can be expected in the immediate term focusing on government buildings in Podgorica. Tensions with the opposition could be exacerbated by the conviction of opposition leaders for their involvement in the 2016 coup plot. Odupri se, whose leaders immediately denounced the conviction, will likely rally behind the DNP and other opposition leaders and seek to invoke perceptions of the persecution of opponents of President Djukanovic.

The unification of the Odupri se protest movement and leaders of the opposition is liable to increase pressure on Djukanovic to call snap elections. However, the emergence of the “Do Slobode” organization could see rival protests manifesting and scuffles among rival groups.

If snap elections are called, the DPS is liable to see a decrease in its overall seats but may still be able to form a governing coalition, while right-wing and pro-Serb interest parties stand to make gains. An increase in the political power afforded to Serb interest parties could result in further political polarization over future relations with the EU and neighboring countries, in particular, Serbia.

North Macedonia

Beginning in 2018, anti-government demonstrations organized by the main opposition VMRO-DPMNE party and other nationalist organizations were witnessed in Skopje and other urban centers. The protests were incited by the Prespa Agreement with Greece, under which the country will legally change its name to the Republic of North Macedonia in exchange for the removal of Greek opposition to joining the EU and NATO.

Protesters denounced PM Zoran Zaev’s decision to resolve the long-standing dispute with Greece due to the multiple concessions during negotiations and perceptions of a change in the country’s national character. Clashes between protesters, mainly members of nationalist organizations, and police were reported surrounding the Parliament and other government buildings in Skopje.

The agreement was ratified by the North Macedonian parliament on January 11. Protests have temporarily abated as political attention has been focused on the Presidential elections. The first round on April 21 resulted in no clear winner, with both the VMRO-DPMNE and government-backed candidates garnering 42 percent of the vote. The second round of the elections on May 5 resulted in a victory for the ruling Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) candidate, Stevo Pendarovski with 51 percent of the total vote. VMRO-DPMNE officials immediately denounced the election results due to claims of voter manipulation.

Leaders & Protest groups in North Macedonia

Presidential elections highlight political polarization, protests expected to restart

Following the results of the Presidential elections and the possibility of both NATO and the EU calling for further concessions during membership negotiations, protests led by the VMRO-DPMNE could see a resurgence. Judging by VMRO-DPMNE officials immediately denouncing the election results, allegations of electoral fraud and corruption are liable to continue to be levied against Zaev’s administration. The VMRO-DPMNE will likely call on their supporters and members of nationalist organizations to stage demonstrations in urban centers, possibly motivated by President-elect Pendarovski’s approval of laws surrounding the name deal such as the changing of signs and constitutional amendments.

Instances of unrest stemming from nationalist organizations remain a distinct possibility going forward as nationalist elements have been galvanized by Zaev’s concessions during talks with Athens. Additionally, the VMRO-DPMNE could call for demonstrations if further party members are detained on allegations of corruption, as has occurred several times in recent years.


On December 8, 2018, the first anti-government protest was staged in Belgrade following an attack on the leader of the Levica Srbije party, Borko Stefanovic, in Krusevac, by unidentified assailants. The protests have continued and recorded crowds in the high thousands in Belgrade. The protest movement has manifested under the banner of “1od5Milliona” (One of Five million), which is a play on President Aleskander Vucic’s statement to the initial protest in which he said he would not compromise even if there were five million people in the street. The movement has spread to other major cities such as Nis and Novi Sad. Protesters are calling for the immediate resignation of President Aleskander Vucic of the ruling Srpska Napredna Stranka (SNS) party amid accusations of the manipulation of media and an increase in political violence.

On February 6, the opposition parties announced their intention to boycott parliament and proposed a manifesto containing reforms based on protesters’ demands. The protests were initially peaceful, however, on March 16 protesters attempted to enter the New Palace, the seat of the Presidency, as Vucic was inside, as well as the offices of the state broadcaster. Opposition leaders have reportedly given the government a May 4 deadline in order to heed their demands for widespread reforms.

President Vucic has stated that SNS officials are willing to call snap elections in order to gauge their popularity. On April 19, thousands convened in Belgrade for a pro-government rally.

Leaders & Protest Groups in Serbia

Vucic to remain in power despite mass protest movement due to entrenched support and opposition disunity

Anti-government demonstrations in Belgrade and other urban centers are unlikely to abate unless President Aleskander Vucic accepts demands for widespread reforms or calls snap elections. Instances of unrest cannot be ruled out with protesters expected to gather at known focal points in Belgrade, such as the New Palace, the National Assembly, the public broadcaster’s office, and the University of Belgrade’s campus. Any allegations of media suppression or acts of political violence could incite larger turnouts and heighten the disaffection towards the Vucic.

If Vucic does not adequately respond to protesters demands following the May 4 deadline, demonstrations are liable to increase in both frequency and size. This increased pressure could lead Vucic to instruct Prime Minister Ana Brnabic to dissolve the government and call snap elections. As with protests against Vucic in 2017, which arose due to accusations of voter and media manipulation, the current wave of protests may lead to little substantial change and are liable to eventually be discontinued.

Judging by Presidential elections in 2017, where Vucic secured 53 percent of the total vote, and the relatively smaller attendance at anti-government demonstrations outside Belgrade, the SNS would likely maintain their sizeable majority in parliament in snap elections. In such a scenario, political instability could arise from protest groups refusing to accept the results and accusing Vucic of manipulating results.

G20 Buenos Aires summit 2018 – November 30-December 1 – Argentina Special Analysis

Written and edited by Federico Sujarchuk and Ollie Wiltshire

Executive Summary

Between November 30 and December 1, Argentina will hold the 13th leaders’ summit of the Group of Twenty (G20) in Buenos Aires.

A number of security checkpoints will be established on the roads that lead to the complex hosting the summit and in the vicinity of the hotels where the heads of state and government will be staying.

Anarchist and left-wing groups are expected to hold mass protests throughout the city, many of which will lead to significant instances of violence.

Major disruptions to traffic and business continuity will occur due to security provisions, protests, roadblocks, and public closures during the summit.

Travel to Buenos Aires can continue while maintaining vigilance for an increase in violent crime and protests between November 30-December 1.

Avoid all protests given the potential for violence.

Please be advised

G20 summit

Between November 30 and December 1, Argentina will hold the 13th leaders’ summit of the Group of Twenty (G20). The meeting will be the first-ever G20 summit to be hosted in South America and the most high-profile multilateral event ever held in Argentina.

The city will reportedly host 8,000 summit participants, including foreign leaders, ministers, politicians, and officials. Moreover, at least 2,500 journalists have been granted clearance to cover the event and around 1,000 people will work on the summit’s logistics. The leaders of 19 member nations, plus the European Union, and seven guest nations will meet in Buenos Aires’ Costa Salguero complex, located in the Palermo neighborhood, less than a kilometer away from Jorge Newbery International Airport (AEP).

Official security around the summit

A number of security checkpoints will be established on the roads that lead to the complex and in the vicinity of the hotels where the heads of state and government will be staying. These include Arroyo Street, Avenida Dorrego, Avenida del Libertador, Avenida Alvear, Avenida Ramos Mejia, and Avenida Sarmiento. Moreover, a number of key roads and highways will be closed off to the public for the duration of the summit. These include Avenida 9 de Julio, Avenida Figueroa Alcorta, and Illia and Lugones highways. Subway and other rail services will not operate during the summit. A bolstered security presence has also been confirmed in the downtown area, as well as the neighborhoods of Puerto Madero, Recoleta, and Retiro, where a number of dignitaries will be staying.

Buenos Aires’ Aeroparque Jorge Newbery (AEP) airport and El Palomar Airport (EPA), the city’s recently inaugurated low-cost airport, will be closed to commercial and civil flights between November 29 and December 1. Ezeiza International Airport (EZE), Argentina’s main international airport, is expected to remain open, though its service will be affected by the summit.

Maritime restrictions will be in place between November 29 and December 2 when the commercial port of Buenos Aires will suspend operations. All recreational sailing activities in the Rio de la Plata, as well as parts of the nearby Tigre Delta, will be banned for the duration of the summit. That said, passenger ferry services operating to and from the Buquebus Terminal in the Puerto Madero neighborhood are not slated to be affected.

Over 20,000 police personnel, plus an undisclosed number of military personnel, will be participating in security operations associated with the summit. November 30 will be declared a public holiday in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area in order to ease foot and vehicular traffic.

Opposition actions

A counter-summit with prominent speakers such as former Argentinian President Cristina Kirchner, former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, former Uruguayan President Jose Mujica, the leader of the Spanish far-left Podemos party, Pablo Iglesias, and the leader of the far-left La France Insoumise party, Jean-Luc Melenchon, took place in Buenos Aires on November 19-23, the week before the G20 summit.

A number of unions, local and international anarchist groups, and far-left groups associated with former President Cristina Kirchner have announced their intention to hold protests against not only the G20 Summit itself, but also against the presence of International Monetary Fund (IMF) head Christine Lagarde, UK Prime Minister Theresa May, and US President Donald Trump. According to reports citing Argentinian security officials, at least 33 protests are planned to take place throughout Buenos Aires during the summit, with over 100 local and international groups participating. The exact time and location of many protests have not been disclosed as of the time of writing and other smaller or unannounced protests are expected to occur.

On November 14, two attempted pipe bomb attacks were recorded in Buenos Aires. The first took place in the Belgrano neighborhood, where one individual was reportedly arrested after throwing a pipe bomb into the house of a judge who is currently investigating former President Cristina Kirchner in a number of high-profile corruption cases. Authorities reportedly defused it shortly afterward. The second attempt took place on the same day in the Recoleta neighborhood cemetery, where two individuals were wounded and subsequently arrested when a pipe bomb they were placing in the mausoleum of a controversial historical figure exploded unintentionally.

On November 15, ten individuals were arrested in a squatter house used by anarchists in Pavon Street, San Cristobal neighborhood over the November 14 attempted pipe bomb attacks.


Argentinian political landscape in the run-up to the G20 summit

The 2018 Buenos Aires G20 summit comes amid a marked deterioration in the economic situation in Argentina over the last six months, partly due to a costly drought in the country’s farm belt and a sharp increase in the price of financing for emerging countries, whose economies have some characteristics of a developed economy, but do not satisfy all of the standards. This situation has fostered a significant devaluation of the Argentinian Peso, which has become one of the world’s worst-performing currencies in 2018. This situation, in turn, exacerbated the country’s inflation, which is expected to reach a rate of 45 percent in 2018.

This financial situation has prompted President Macri to request a USD 57 billion standby loan from the IMF and accept the required cuts to public spending. As such, and considering that the IMF is widely disliked in the country, perceived by many to be one of the main causes of the last economic collapse of Argentina in 2001, President Macri’s approval rating fell from over 45 percent to 35 percent in November. With regards to these developments, social movements and labor unions, including Argentina’s largest union, the Confederacion General del Trabajo (CGT), have regularly taken to the streets to protest, with participation often reaching into the high thousands.

The G20 Summit and its symbolic importance for the anti-globalization movement

Violent protests by the anti-globalization movement, a catch-all social movement critical of free trade and consumer capitalism, have become a common feature of G20 & G7-8 summits since the mid-1990s. Multilateral summits are perceived by supporters of the anti-globalization movement as a powerful symbol of the shortcomings of the current system of global governance. These summits also provide a valuable opportunity for the movement’s supporters to make use of the public and international spotlight and bring further attention to their cause.

This situation is evidenced by the fact that widespread unrest has been witnessed in several multilateral summits, such as the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) Seattle summit, which is perceived as a pivotal moment in the formation and consolidation of the anti-globalization protest movement. Widespread unrest was also witnessed in the 2001 Genoa G8 Summit, the 2010 G20 Toronto summit, the 2011 G20 Cannes summit, and, most recently, the 2017 G20 Hamburg summit, which recorded a level of unrest rarely seen in modern Germany.

Assessments & Forecast

Expected disruptions in BA’s Belgrano, Nunez, Palermo, Puerto Madero, and Retiro neighborhoods

Considering that the Illia and Lugones highways, as well as Avenida Figueroa Alcorta, will all be closed to the general public, widespread traffic disruptions will likely occur in the Belgrano, Nunez, Palermo, and Retiro neighborhoods. Although in Belgrano and Nunez only areas adjacent to the closed roads will likely be affected by the summit, in Palermo, Recoleta, and Retiro more areas are likely to be affected besides those in the immediate vicinity of the highways and Avenida Figueroa Alcorta.

In Palermo, Recoleta, and Retiro, Avenida del Libertador is likely to be at least partially blocked to traffic given that is one of the major routes that link the Costal Salguero complex, where the summit will take place, with the hotel areas where several dignitaries will be staying. Moreover, in Palermo, Puerto Madero, Recoleta, and Retiro, locations in the vicinity of large upscale hotels are liable to be closed to both vehicular and foot traffic, given the likelihood of summit participants staying there. Additionally, considering that unconfirmed reports claim that a gala dinner with all of the attending leaders will take place at Teatro Colon, much of the downtown area of Buenos Aires is likely to be closed off to non-residents during the evening hours on November 30.

Taking into account that strikes disrupting commercial aviation have intensified in recent months, the possibility that a strike disrupting air trafficking control services takes place during the summit cannot be ruled out. On November 12, the head of the Asociacion de Pilotos de Lineas Aereas (APLA) union claimed that the union may carry out a 72-hour strike during the summit, leaving open the possibility that other unions in the air sector could join an APLA-led strike if the government ignores their requests over labor-related issues. Nonetheless, government sources have confirmed that, if this were the case, personnel from the Fuerza Aerea Argentina (FAA) could take control of air trafficking services if necessary. Aerolineas Argentinas workers affiliated to aviation workers’ unions announced their intent to hold a 24-hour strike on November 26, although over unrelated issues.

Violent protests expected throughout Buenos Aires, particularly in neighborhoods bordering restricted areas

Considering the expected number of protesting groups, coupled with their organizing capacity and sizeable support bases, particularly the unions and far-left groups associated with Cristina Kirchner, it is likely that the turnout for the anti-G20 protests will be in the mid-to-high tens of thousands for the two-day summit. Given that protestors will not be able to reach the premises of the summit, it is likely that the protests will take place in traditional points for such protests, including Plaza del Congresos, Plaza de Mayo, outside the Presidential Palace, and near the Obelisk. Protests are also likely to take place outside the Brazilian, German, UK, and US embassies.

If the areas in the vicinity of the aforementioned locales remain closed off to the general public, as unconfirmed reports suggest, these protests will likely be moved to nearby areas outside of the no-go zones. As such, neighboring districts that would have only experienced disruptions, such as Belgrano, Palermo, and parts of Recoleta, will likely see increased protests and unrest. Considering precedent of the previous G20 in Hamburg, coupled with the heightened anti-government sentiment within sectors of Argentinian society, there is a high potential for localized acts of violence, particularly vandalism against private businesses associated with Western multinationals.

Due to the high-profile nature of the event, if the protests turn violent, a crackdown by security forces is likely, including the use of tear gas and other forcible dispersal measures, such as rubber bullets. This assessment is underscored by the police reportedly forming a “special command center” to jointly monitor the events with the military and the government, placing all security forces directly under the command of the Ministry of Defense for the duration of the summit, something unseen since the return of democracy to the country in 1983.

There is also an elevated risk of protesters mounting roadblocks at the various entry points to the city that will not be closed off by authorities, such as 9 de Julio highway, 25 de Mayo highway, Avenida General Paz, Dellepiane highway, Perito Moreno highway, and Riccieri In such instances, security forces are liable to carry out mass arrests and forcibly disperse protesters.

In light of the previous IED attempts carried out by various anarchist elements, the potential remains that additional groups will attempt to detonate bombs during the summit. However, given the known capabilities of these groups and the unprecedented levels of security in the city, it is unlikely that any such explosions will affect the summit or cause significant damage or injury. Rather, the likelihood remains that they will either be neutralized prior to explosion or cause low-level superficial damage, akin to vandalism.

Given the number of foreign nationals expected to arrive in the city, coupled with the fact that Buenos Aires’ security forces will likely be overstretched, an uptick in opportunistic crime is liable during the summit and the following days. Tourist neighborhoods such as La Boca, Palermo Soho, the area around the Recoleta cemetery, and San Telmo are likely to be the main areas affected by such crime.

Effects of the G20 Summit on Argentina’s political landscape

Given that this will be one of the most high-profile multilateral events ever held in Argentina, if properly organized, the summit has the potential to improve President Macri’s public image, and further cement the perception of a structural change in Argentinian foreign policy since the Kirchner era. As such, the G20 summit has the potential to help position the country as a Western facing regional leader in South America, particularly considering the ongoing political situation in Brazil and the reputation of President-elect Jair Bolsonaro. Moreover, given that Argentina’s main current source of external financing is the IMF, and considering the clout that Western powers have over the IMF’s decision-making process, a properly organized G20 Summit could have a positive effect regarding Argentina’s political capital in future fiscal negotiations.

That said, the possibility remains that, if the protests get out of hand and security forces end up using excessive force, the summit could erode President Macri’s standing internationally and domestically. In light of the heightened political tensions between the government and the supporters of former President Cristina Kirchner, and the consistent deterioration of the economic situation throughout 2018, this potential scenario would almost certainly devolve into more violent demonstrations throughout December


Summit Recommendations

Travel to Buenos Aires can continue while maintaining vigilance for an increase in violent crime and protests between November 30-December 1. Avoid all protests given the potential for violence.

Avoid nonessential travel to the Belgrano, Palermo, Puerto Madero, Recoleta, and Retiro neighborhoods, as well as around the Brazilian, Germany, UK, and US Embassies in the event of protests.

Avoid nonessential travel via Avenida General Paz, Dellepiane Highway, Perito Moreno Highway, Riccieri Highway, 9 de Julio Highway, and 25 de Mayo Highway in the event of protests.

Allot for disruptions to pedestrian and vehicular traffic in Belgrano, Palermo, Puerto Madero, Recoleta, and Retiro neighborhoods, due to the slated road closures and the possibility of security checkpoints.

General Recommendations

Foreign nationals and visitors are advised to increase vigilance against possible crime in light of the potential for attacks by criminal networks targeting foreigners and high profile individuals.

If confronted by muggers, it is advised to cooperate fully and not engage in any behavior that could raise tensions and lead to violence.

Travelers should avoid exposing jewelry or other items that may make them a target for theft. Store your valuables in your hotel room safe.

Refrain from divulging travel itinerary information to strangers.

As a general security precaution, avoid revealing to strangers your position or affiliation with foreign-based firms, as your response could attract a negative reaction from locals.

Take necessary precautions to ensure business continuity during the event, given that various government offices and other public services may experience disruptions.

Allot extra time for travel, due to likely traffic and public transportation congestion resulting from the summit. Seek alternative means of transportation.

Political instability increases after Supreme Court orders immediate release of nine opposition leaders – Maldives Analysis

Current Situation

Political instability increases after Supreme Court orders immediate release of nine opposition leaders - Maldives Analysis | MAX Security

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On February 1, the Supreme Court overturned the convictions of nine opposition leaders including the former President Mohamed Nasheed and reinstated 12 members of the Parliament who had been stripped of their posts. In its verdict, it stated that the prosecutors and judges were influenced “to conduct politically motivated investigations” against them. The Supreme Court’s ruling stated that all those named “should be freed immediately in order to facilitate the retrial and investigation of the cases according to law”.

The ruling drew wide international support from the US, EU, and UN. India, which rarely issues statements regarding Maldivian domestic political developments, stated that it was “imperative for all organs of the government of the Maldives to respect and abide by the order of the apex court.” Nasheed, who took political asylum in the UK following charges of terrorism leveled against him in 2015, welcomed the court order and stated that President Yameen must resign, mentioning that he would soon return to the country to contest elections.

In the minutes following the verdict, the nation’s police force indicated that it would obey the Supreme Court ruling. Shortly after, President Abdulla Yameen fired the chief of police.

On February 3, Attorney General Mohamed Anil reiterated his intention to comply with the order, stating that they were “working at top speed” to move the process forward. However, he did add that the government had several “legal concerns” and that the offenses in some of the cases were very serious, including charges of terrorism, embezzlement, and fraud. During the press conference, both the Defense Minister and army chief were present. At the time of writing, over two days after the court ruling was issued, the Abdulla Yameen government has yet to begin implementing the order.

In response to the recent developments, hundreds of people rallied in the capital Male on February 1 and February 2, calling on the President to comply with the order. At the protest in front of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) headquarters, police used violent riot dispersal measures to break up the gatherings. Two people were arrested. Other protests were reported at the Male Prison and along Majeedhee Magu Road, the latter of which was also forcefully dispersed.

Assessments & Forecast

Specter of political instability significantly increases as government’s next move, loyalty of security apparatus remain unclear

The government’s ambiguous position regarding the enforcement of the court ruling has significantly elevated the specter of instability in the country. The statements from the attorney general suggest that the government will adhere to the decision. However, the removal of the police chief and apparent slowness in complying with the order suggests that President Yameen may be using this time in the immediate aftermath of the ruling to consolidate power ahead of a possible reversal of this compliance.

The security apparatus appears split on its support for the current administration. While the former police chief indicated that the police would comply, following his removal from office, opposition protesters were violently dispersed. Additionally, the Defense Minister and army chief’s conspicuous presence at the attorney general’s press conference may have been an indication that the defense establishment has still not completely abandoned the Yameen administration.

Ultimately, both the military and police may comply with the ruling due largely to international pressure. The West has become increasingly concerned with Yameen’s close relationship with China, and Nasheed has consistently been highly critical of Beijing’s influence on the country. India, arguably the most threatened by increasing Chinese influence in the Maldives, appears especially resolute, and its rare, relatively strong statement of support for the court ruling suggests that it is considering the possibility of intervention to ensure that the verdict is enforced and as a pretext to reassert its influence.

President Yameen likely stalling enforcement of verdict in attempt to consolidate power, plan next moves

Aware of his limited recourse, President Yameen is likely attempting to stall the process over the coming days as a means of exploring his potential options. The language of the ruling is unclear but suggests that the court has only found fault with the procedures but not the charges. As such, the government may attempt to seek to immediately reopen trials against them in more legally acceptable methods and will release them only after consultation with the Supreme Court and negotiations regarding the logistics of their release. In order to buy more time, President Yameen may cancel the opening session of parliament, currently slated February 5.

FORECAST: For President Yameen, staying in the country after allowing the lawmakers to return could be a potential risk, as the opposition, which will then have a simple majority, could petition for a probe into a number of allegedly corrupt activities he has carried out, including the recent trials themselves. It would likely still be difficult for the opposition to successfully muster enough political support for impeachment proceedings, which would require two-thirds majority. However, should the lawmakers be released, and Nasheed return to the country from his exile, the opposition would likely be favored to win the elections that are slated to take place later this year if they successfully capitalize on the anti-Yameen sentiment over ongoing events.

FORECAST: In fear of these seeming inevitabilities and the potential that the military and police apparatus may succumb to external pressures, it remains entirely possible that President Yameen will oblige opposition requests to step down and take refuge overseas, which would most likely happen in China, Saudi Arabia, or Singapore.

Political instability increases after Supreme Court orders immediate release of nine opposition leaders - Maldives Analysis | MAX Security

Violent protests likely to continue in Male as opposition attempt to pressure government, major tourist areas likely to remain insulated from unrest

Until the positions of the Supreme Court, security apparatus, ruling government become more clear, the situation on the ground will remain highly tense. In order to continue exerting pressure on the ruling party, opposition leaders will only increase their calls for protest until the government takes more concrete steps in carrying out the court’s ruling. This will put the police in a difficult position and may compel its leadership to clarify their position on the developments by their reaction to future demonstrations. As long as the police, in its actions, remains on the side of the government, the dispersal of any gatherings in the immediate future are likely to be similarly violent to what was witnessed on February 2.

Regardless of major instability among the local population in Male, international tourism remains the cornerstone of the Maldivian economy. Like similar instances of widespread unrest in the past, the military will like take concerted efforts to prevent any sort of unrest from reaching heavily touristed areas, which are mostly insulated from the rest of the country and far outside of the capital.


Travel to the Maldives and the capital Male can continue while maintaining heightened vigilance because of existing tensions relating to the country’s political situation.

Those operating in Male should avoid the immediate vicinity of any political gatherings given the high likelihood that they may devolve into unrest. MDP offices and Artificial Beach should be considered flash points for such activity and avoided when possible.

If confronted by security forces, it is advised to cooperate fully and not engage in any behavior that could raise tensions and lead to violence.

Those planning on traveling to the Maldives are advised to contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary-based consultation and contingency planning.