Tag Archives: militant

Senegalese security forces dismantle militant cell linked to Katiba Macina in Senegal’s Kidira, bordering Mali – Sahel Situation Update

Executive Summary

The reported dismantling of a militant cell within Senegal and a UN report on the presence of jihadists in the country embodies the risk of militancy spilling over into the coastal countries from the ongoing insurgency in Burkina Faso and Mali.
While these reports are plausible due to an increasing entrenchment of militants in Mali’s Kayes Region, which borders Senegal, it is likely that the jihadist encroachment into Senegal, if present, is nascent.
However, in the absence of decisive counter-militancy operations and as militants solidify their hold over Mali’s Kayes Region, the jihadist presence in Senegal is likely to grow, though it may be a slow-moving process. This is likely to manifest as an exploitation of grievances to create tensions and facilitate recruitment as well as attempts to entrench themselves.
The Senegalese government is likely to scale up the military presence along its border with Mali and may also attempt to establish lines of communication with Mali and Mauritania to facilitate a regional coordinated response.

Please be advised

Across the region, the following notable incidents have been reported:

Mali

Map #	Region	Cercle	Locale	Date	Description
1	Timbuktu	Timbuktu	Ber	February 6	At least 10 wounded including women, children as vehicle hits IED
2	Timbuktu	Gourma-Rharos	Tinwoussouk	February 8	15 militants killed, 22 motorbikes destroyed by Barkhane strike
3	Sikasso	Kolondieba	Kolondieba	February 8	Several police officers injured as armed men arrived on motorcycles, opened fire, attacked the police station while shouting “Allahu Akbar”

Burkina Faso

Map #	Region	Province	Locale	Date	Description
4	Sahel	Seno	Dori	February 1-7	Security Forces carry out operations with air support to secure markets, places of worship

Senegal

Map #	Region	Department	Locale	Date	Description
5	Tambacounda	Bakel	Kidira	January 20-22	Three alleged members of “sleeper militant cell” linked to Katiba Macina arrested, authorities seized several cell phones

Notable Developments

Reports indicate that Ivory Coast’s government spokesperson stated that the authorities are maintaining permanent vigilance in response to the French revealing on February 1 that Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) leadership held a meeting in February 2020 to discuss expansion into Gulf of Guinea countries.
Reports indicate that Burkinabe PM Christophe Dabire stated that the government was not against negotiating with jihadists in response to a question in Parliament on February 4.
The 27th report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning Islamic State and al-Qaeda to the UN Security Council (UNSC), published on February 3, mentions the encroachment of JNIM elements, backed by “radical Islamic influencers,” into Senegal. The report specifically mentions Bakel in the Tambacounda Region, Ferlo Reserve in the Matam Region, and the gold-extraction areas of Saraya in the Kedougou Region.

Assessments & Forecast

Sahelian militant groups’ intent to extend their operational theater across borders into the coastal states is well-documented, with the French releasing information about a meeting between JNIM and AQIM leadership to purportedly discuss expansion into the Gulf of Guinea countries. Militant chatter, their past attacks, and areas of entrenchment in Burkina Faso suggested that the risk of militant spillover was particularly elevated for Benin and Ivory Coast, resulting in much of the discourse around this issue is focused on these two countries. However, while there is a very present and heightened risk of militant activity in northern Benin and Ivory Coast, they are by no means the only countries at risk. The proliferation of militancy within the Sahelian countries over the past year has raised the threat of jihadism encroaching into other bordering countries as well, as embodied by reports of jihadists being present in Senegal.
The marked increase in militant activity in Mali’s Kayes Region, which borders Senegal, in the past year with JNIM claiming attacks in January and February 2020 not only highlighted the breadth and scope of JNIM’s operations within Mali but also elevated the threat of militants crossing over into Senegal. To that point, JNIM affiliate Katiba Macina leader Amadou Kouffa’s call to the Fulani in West Africa, including Senegal, to embrace jihad and the establishment of Katiba Macina cells a few hundred kilometers from the Senegalese border in the Kayes Region as per reports on November 2020 do somewhat support the UN’s assertion of jihadist presence in Senegal. That said, there have been no reports of overt militant activity in the country over the past year, which suggests that any jihadist encroachment into the country is in its initial stages and makes it unlikely that there is significant jihadist presence in the locations mentioned in the UN report, which span Senegal’s eastern border. While it is not entirely implausible that militants have been covertly infiltrating and setting up cells across eastern Senegal, it is more far more likely that the jihadists may have dispatched recruiters and radical preachers to assess the potential for radicalization among the populace, particularly the Fulani, and judge the size of the recruit pool in the locations mentioned in the UN report.
The report on the dismantling of the militant cell in Kidire, on the other hand, is far more plausible given its location on the border with Mali’s Kayes Region. It is prudent to note that the alleged militants were arrested on the basis of material on their cell phone that revealed that they belonged to groups on social media platforms advocating armed jihad and none of the reports note any weapons on their persons or at their homes, though it remains possible that this information has not been disclosed yet. Neither do the reports indicate any sign to suggest that this alleged “sleeper” cell was planning an attack imminently or even possesses the capabilities to launch an attack. This seems to suggest that if indeed it was a Katiba Macina cell, it was composed of newly radicalized members.
While there is a very present risk of militant encroachment into Senegal and this risk is only going to heighten as the militants solidify their hold over Mali’s Kayes Region, based on the reports at this time, it seems like that their presence in Senegal is nascent. FORECAST: However, unless decisive counter-militancy actions are taken, the jihadist movement in Senegal is liable to grow over the coming year. Based on precedent, this encroachment is likely to manifest as the exploitation of socio-political and ethnic grievances to facilitate recruitment and create localized militant cells as well as attempts to enforce Sharia law and eliminate religious and state leadership at the local level to enable jihadist entrenchment. Eventually, once they gain a foothold, the jihadists are liable to expand their modus operandi to include small-scale attacks against security forces and other state symbols. This may be a slow-moving process that takes years, as is the case in Ivory Coast where there have been gradual signs of militant entrenchment with the militants conducting an attack in Savannes Region in June 2020 after years of militant presence across the border in Burkina Faso’s Cascades Region.
Senegal started construction of a military camp in Goudiry, Tambacounda Region, as per reports in July 2020 and reportedly conducted capacity building operations to streamline cooperation among the Defense and Security Forces, gendarmes, police officers, and other officials in the area in November 2020. FORECAST: Following the publication of these reports, the government may reinforce security at the border. In addition, it is possible that the country will attempt to establish lines of cooperation and communication with Mali and Mauritania and try to work together to contain any spillover of jihadist elements over its borders. Finally, apart from martial measures, authorities in Senegal may follow Mauritania’s example and adopt some soft counter-militancy approaches, given the failure in Mali and Burkina Faso to combat the insurgency with military means alone.

Recommendations

We advise against all travel to the border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, given the extreme risks of militancy, ethnic conflict, and violent crime.
Avoid all travel to northern and central Mali, including Timbuktu, Kidal, Gao, Mopti, and northern Segou region, given the threat from militant and rebel groups operating in the area, as well as ongoing ethnic tensions and intercommunal violence.
Avoid all travel to northern and eastern Burkina Faso, particularly Sahel, Est, Centre-Est, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions due to the ongoing threat of militancy and violent crime. Avoid nonessential travel to outlying areas of the southern and western regions due to the increased risk of attacks.
We advise against all travel to Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua Regions in the west along the borders of Mali and Burkina Faso, with the exception of Niamey, due to the ongoing risk of militancy.

AQIM publishes statement late night on May 8 threatening ‘French, Western companies in area from Libya to Mauritania’ – Africa & MENA Alert

Executive Summary

During the overnight hours of May 8-9, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) issued a threat against Western, and particularly French, companies that operate in the area “from Libya to Mauritania”.

While the threat is not new but rather a reiteration of an existing and proven one, its release in the lead-up to the holy month of Ramadan is indication of a heightened risk of al-Qaeda attacks against Western companies and interests in North Africa and the Sahel region over the coming weeks.

Please be advised

During the overnight hours of May 8-9, the al-Andalus Foundation, the media wing of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), published a “Statement for French and Western Companies”.

In the statement, AQIM threatens to attack Western, and particularly French, companies that operate in the area “from Libya to Mauritania”.

The publication further states that “85 percent of the wealth in this region is controlled by the French, while the rest is in the hands of traitors” and that the “French occupation prevents the prosperity of the region and has corrupted society”.

The statement concluded by warning Muslims to stay away from Western companies’ sites for fear of being hurt by collateral damage in an attack.

Assessments & Forecast

AQIM’s statement does not denote a new threat to Western operations and presence in Africa, but is rather a reiteration of its main strategy: driving Western influence away from what AQIM perceive as their areas of influence, with the intention of consolidating its control and later expanding it while facing diminished resistance. AQIM and organizations that are directly affiliated with it, such as Jamaat Nusratal-Islam Wal Muslimeen (JNIM), have conducted several high profile attacks as part of this strategy. These most notably include the March 2 attack against the French Embassy in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; the October 25, 2017 attack against a French firm in Soumpi, Mali; and the March 18, 2016 attack against the Krechba gas facility in Algeria that was jointly operated by an Algerian government-owned company, and Norwegian- and British-based companies.

This strategy is also the main reason for AQIM’s threat particularly addressing French companies, as the French-led “Operation Barkhane” in the Sahel in support of the G5 countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) is currently the main threat to AQIM and its direct affiliates’ operations. This threat was recently exemplified by French operations on February 14 in Mali that resulted in the deaths of six JNIM leaders, including that of Hasan al-Ansari, co-founder of JNIM, later confirmed by the group itself. However, as noted in AQIM’s latest statement, the threat extends to all Western companies, all perceived as “crusaders” in AQIM’s narrative, which it would attack given the opportunity, as underscored by the March 2016 Krechba attack that targeted Algerian, Norwegian, and British firms. That most of the attacks thus far have been directed against French interests is largely due to the outsized French presence among potential targets in the region and France’s lead role in regional counter-militancy operations.

The references made to the negative impact of the French presence on the region’s economy and society underscores an inherent part of al-Qaeda’s strategy as a whole, and that of AQIM in particular. AQIM, unlike certain other jihadist groups such as the Islamic State (IS), is willing to be more flexible in the implementation of its religious ideology in order to not only gain the support of, but also embed themselves in the local population. Thus, by appealing to material interests such as the state of the economy and society, AQIM is seeking to create an image of “us against them”, rallying as much of the local population as possible in opposition to foreign influence. While this may boost recruitment for the group, this is not the main goal in this case, as al-Qaeda favors quality over quantity with its fighters. The goal is rather to enhance the group’s freedom of operation within the population, which it will utilize to launch attacks and, later, to go into hiding as well as to facilitate logistical support.

FORECAST: Currently, AQIM and its direct affiliates maintain a presence, either of offensive operations or for logistical support, in parts of Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, putting these countries at a high risk, which also corresponds with the message threatening Western companies “from Libya to Mauritania”. Given the current strategy and deployment of the group, as well as precedent, we assess that of these countries Algeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso are at the highest risk. Nonetheless, this foothold could, depending on developments and the dynamics of the situation in the region, be exploited to launch attacks into neighboring countries if needed.

FORECAST: It is important to note that while AQIM’s threat is not new, but rather a reiteration of an existing and proven threat, it does come ahead of the holy month of Ramadan, currently slated to start on May 15. This period of the year historically is when jihadist groups attempt to increase their rate of operations and conduct more high profile and notable attacks, so as to capitalize on the symbolism of the holiday. Accordingly, it is possible that the timing of AQIM’s latest message was similarly motivated, thus highlighting the elevated potential for al-Qaeda attacks against Western interests in North Africa and the Sahel region over the coming weeks.

Recommendations

Western companies operating in the North Africa and Sahel regions are advised to evaluate security procedures pertaining to attacks against installations, and emphasize guideline to their staff.

Examine behavioral patterns of local employees on site to mitigate potential risks arising from influence by Jihadist propaganda.

Monitor MAX Intelligence’s reports, as well as local publications to remain abreast of the dynamics of the threat posed by Jihadist groups in your areas of operations. Potential indications of a change in the level of threat include the rate, scope and rhetoric of Jihadist publications and their attacks, changes in modus operandi, scale and sophistication of attacks, and changes to areas of operations and influence of different groups.

Threat to aviation by anti-tank guided missiles highlighted by al-Arish Airport attack case study – Special Analysis Report

Case study: December 20 attack on al-Arish Airport

On December 20, an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) targeted a helicopter on the ramp of al-Arish Airport, located in Egypt’s North Sinai Governorate. The helicopter carried, among others, the Egyptian interior and defense ministers who disembarked from the aircraft shortly before the attack.

On December 21, the Islamic State (IS)-linked news agency released a report on the attack, alongside a claim of responsibility by the local IS affiliate Wilayat Sinai, stating that the group had prior knowledge of the arrival of the ministers and dispatched a team of militants to ambush the entourage. It further stated that the attack was conducted with the use of a 9M133 “Kornet” ATGM that targeted an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter that was escorting the VIPs.

Initial IS-linked report detailing the al-Arish attack

Later that day, the IS-linked news agency released a video showing the attack itself, in which the ministers and their entourage can be seen next to the helicopter with its navigation lights still on, which contrary to initial publications was a UH-60 “Blackhawk”, as it was hit by an ATGM.

Edition number 111 of IS’s weekly al-Naba newsletter published on December 22 included a more detailed and contradictory account of the attack, stating that militants spotted a helicopter with a “unique shape” and concluded that this would be a high value target.

This prompted militants to dispatch an ATGM team to a position overlooking the airport with the objective of destroying the “unique aircraft”.

It is important to mention that the Egyptian Air Force (EAAF) reportedly operated two Blackhawk helicopters prior to the attack, mainly in the role of VIP transport. These aircraft are much more distinct than others that would commonly be seen in Sinai’s airspace, such as Apaches or Mi-17s.

Report of the al-Arish attack released in IS's weekly newsletter with details contradicting initial reports — Report of the al-Arish attack released in IS’s weekly newsletter with details contradicting initial reports

Analysis of the missile launch:

While there has been no corroboration as to the type of missile used by IS in the attack at the time of writing, Wilayat Sinai have employed Kornets several times in the past, most notably in July 2015 when the group used the missile to attack an Egyptian naval vessel off the coast of North Sinai’s Rafah.

If the missile used was in fact a Kornet as IS claims, given that the missile was in flight for 14 seconds from launch until it hit its target and given that the speed of a standard Kornet missile is between 250 and 300 meters a second, it would place the launcher between 3.5 and 4.2 km from the target, well within the Kornet’s effective daytime range.

By comparing the video and imagery analysis of Al-Arish Airport, we concluded that the missile was launched from an elevated structure or a dirt berm southwest of the helicopter’s position, as can be see in the following map:

Threat posed to aviation from proliferation of ATGMs

The attack does not represent a precedent, but rather serves as an opportunity to highlight the threat posed to aviation from the proliferation of ATGMs in the hands of numerous militant groups in multiple countries. Several accounts of ATGMs being fired against aircraft were recorded in recent years, including successfully targeting aircraft in flight, with the most prominent example being the downing of an Israeli Air Force (IAF) helicopter by Hezbollah in Lebanon on August 12, 2006. This is especially important as this threat is often overlooked in comparison to the more well known threat posed by man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

While MANPADS pose a more prominent threat to aircraft, as they were designed with the specific goal of targeting aircraft, they have several shortcomings compared to ATGMs. These mainly include being more delicate, having parts with short shelf lives, requiring greater expertise and training to successfully operate, and being more rare. ATGMs still require expertise and training, although less than MANPADS, and are generally more durable and can be sustained for operations over longer time and in harsher conditions. Most importantly however, ATGMs are significantly more common than MANPADS, and with the destabilization of countries such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, thousands of these systems, of different generations and capabilities, were taken away from military storage and ended in the hands of militant groups across the world. This is in addition to illegal purchases through stable countries that do not adhere to international norms, such as Belarus and North Korea.

As noted, ATGMs were not designed primarily to hit aircraft and therefore do not excel in it, however, the features for which they were designed, namely attacking a comparatively slow moving target, still make them effective weapons against aircraft. This is mostly relevant during the takeoff and landing stages of both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, when these are most vulnerable due to their low speed and altitude. In addition, while there are several options of countermeasures against MANPADS that can be used by civil aircraft, countermeasures against ATGMs are fewer, and often involve explosives, making them currently non-optional for civil aircraft.

An additional weakness exposed in the recent attack is the dependency on local security forces and their protocols, which can often be low in standard. The attack occurred in a region currently undergoing prolonged and high intensity militant activity, in a city that was hit by the most attacks in the region in recent months. Despite this fact, the VIPs were flown in a distinct helicopter that draws attention, the airport lacks even basic and cheap means in place that may disrupt or prevent a missile attack, such as walls that would block line of sight into the airport, or metal nets that would negate the missile’s shaped charge mechanism. All of these expose the weaknesses of local security protocols, which were a direct factor in the attack.

Recommendations

The threat of ATGMs should be considered as a potential factor while conducting risk and vulnerability surveys, particularly in unstable regions.

Prior to conducting aerial activity in countries with known militant activity, contact us at [email protected] to consult on the possible threat posed by relevant militant groups’ weapons and capabilities and ways to mitigate these.