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Killing of at least 137 civilians in Tahoua Region on March 21 highlights role of ethnicity, communal conflicts in ongoing insurgency – Niger Analysis

Executive Summary

  • The killing of at least 137 civilians, primarily Tuareg, in Tahoua Region marks the deadliest ever militant attack in Niger. It aligns with a recent trend of high-casualty attacks against civilians in Niger in 2021 and is a notable departure from the Islamic State in Greater Sahara’s (ISGS) usual modus operandi of only small-scale violence against the civilians in Niger.
  • This lends credence to sources indicating that the attacks were perpetrated by local militias affiliated with the ISGS, suggesting that the attack may not have been motivated by jihadist ideology or ordered by central command but rather was conducted independently by the militia in pursuit of personal or communal aims.
  • The precedent of hostilities between the Tuareg and the Fulani communities in the Tahoua Region suggests that a Fulani militia may have been responsible and portends a spate of reprisals and attacks over the coming weeks. This aligns with the broader Sahelian trend of ethnically motivated violence against civilians, with communal militias being a large contributor of insecurity across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
  • We advise against all travel to Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua regions in the west along the borders of Mali and Burkina Faso, with the exception of Niamey, due to the ongoing risk of militancy.

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Please be advised

  • Reports indicate that at least 137 civilians, primarily of Tuareg ethnicity, were killed by armed men on motorbikes who attacked Intazayene, Bakorat, and Wistane in Tillia Department in Niger’s Tahoua region on March 21.
  • Some sources indicate that the attack was perpetrated by militias affiliated with Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), with one source stating that the militia responsible for the attack started associating with the ISGS In 2018.
  • Sources from March 23 indicate that Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM) denied perpetrating the attacks and promised to take revenge on those responsible.

Location of armed attacks in Niger on March 21

Assessments & Forecast

  1. These coordinated raids, with 137 dead and the death toll still likely to rise, mark the deadliest attack on Nigerien soil since the beginning of the jihadist insurgency. It is particularly notable that the attack targeted civilians, primarily ethnic Tuareg, which aligns with the recent trend established by the January 2 attack that killed 100 civilians and the March 16 attack that killed 58, both in Tillaberi Region’s Ouallam Department. While violence against civilians perpetrated by the jihadists has always been prevalent in Niger, predominantly in the form of militant raids and assassinations of local leaders and government collaborators, this violence had largely been small-scale before 2021. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) was likely oriented toward presenting the group as a viable alternative to state presence to local communities in western Niger. Thus, these recent attacks are a marked departure from the group’s usual modus operandi in Niger.
  2. This lends credence to reports suggesting that the attacks were conducted by local communal militias affiliated with the ISGS. There is an important distinction between ISGS and affiliated militias conducting the attack because it potentially implies that the attack was not ordered by the ISGS leadership, but was rather carried out by the militias autonomously. This highlights a broader theme of local militias affiliated with larger jihadist groups sometimes acting independently from the central command, with their actions motivated by personal and communal grievances and not jihadist ideology or strategy. This potentially explains some of the larger casualty attacks, and even some smaller-scale raids, against civilians that have not been claimed by the jihadist groups over the past years. The leadership of the jihadist groups may tacitly support the militias’ activities since they serve to intimidate the population, making them more susceptible to the jihadists’ overtures of protection. However, the jihadists likely want to maintain some plausible deniability as they recruit from numerous ethnic communities, some of which have long-standing disputes.
  3. Within this context, the latest attack targeting the Tuareg in Niger was likely rooted in communal and local conflicts, possibly over some resource dispute or as a reprisal for some action perpetrated by Tuareg militiamen. The assailants likely belonged to a militia that was ethnically Fulani and the attack was probably a manifestation of the cyclical violence between the Arab and Fulani militias in Tahoua Region, given the precedent of hostilities between the two communities, with multiple attacks and reprisals reported over the past years. The conflict between the two communities has been heightened since 2017 when the Arab Malian militias, sanctioned to operate in the country by the Nigerien government, were perceived to be indiscriminately targeting the Fulani under the guise of fighting militancy. To that point, the attack aligns with the broader Sahelian trend of high-casualty attacks against civilians being ethnically motivated, with communal militias being a large contributor to the ongoing violence and insecurity across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Militants exploit this dynamic by escalating communal hostilities and engendering perceptions of marginalization to exacerbate insecurity and facilitate recruitment and their entrenchment.
  4. The authorities’ hardline response exacerbates this tension, thereby benefiting the militants by further giving rise to sentiments of disenfranchisement. This was exemplified in Niger when the government authorized Malian ethnic militias to operate in the country in 2017-2018 to combat rising jihadism. These militias, which were largely composed of ethnic Tuareg and Daosahak, engaged in biased targeting, extrajudicial killings, and large-scale violence, primarily against the Fulani, leading to the creation of communal militias and accelerating the militarization of the border. While the government attempted to take a more conciliatory approach towards the border communities following this, the perception that the government-sanctioned the targeting of border communities, particularly the Fulani, had taken root, driving both the recently formed and existing militias to align with the ISGS. In fact, the militia allegedly responsible for the latest attack in Tahoua was reportedly formed in the early 2000s but started being associated by the ISGS in 2018, likely in the aftermath of the Malian militia’s activities.
  5. FORECAST: In line with the constant spate of attacks and retaliation that characterize these ethnic conflicts, the latest attack is liable to elicit a swift reprisal. Arab militias operating in the area are liable to pursue the militia responsible for the attack and may even target civilians, likely Fulanis. Even JNIM may get involved given leader Iyad ag Ghaly’s Tuareg heritage and as suggested by their denial of complicity and promise of revenge. This has the potential to devolve into clashes between JNIM and ISGS, as the latter is likely to take umbrage with JNIM operating within its strongholds. As such, insecurity is likely to persist in the Tchintabaraden Department along the Malian border over the coming weeks.
  6. FORECAST: The government is also likely to intensify operations in Tahoua Region to catch the perpetrators of the attack over the coming weeks. This is especially likely since newly elected President Mohamed Bazoum will likely want to demonstrate his ability to handle the ongoing insurgency. These operations may succeed in temporarily incapacitating the activities of the armed groups operating in the region, however, they are unlikely to be successful in curtailing the groups’ activities in the long-term. This aligns with the limitation of hard-line military response against the jihadists and other armed actors to adequately combat the insurgency since it fails to address the conditions that lead to radicalization and ethnic conflicts.

Recommendations

  1. We advise against all travel to Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua regions in the west along the borders of Mali and Burkina Faso, with the exception of Niamey, due to the ongoing risk of militancy.
  2. Avoid all travel to the border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, given the extreme risks of militancy, ethnic conflict, and violent crime.
  3. Travel to Niamey can continue while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding crime.

Senegalese security forces dismantle militant cell linked to Katiba Macina in Senegal’s Kidira, bordering Mali – Sahel Situation Update

Executive Summary

  • The reported dismantling of a militant cell within Senegal and a UN report on the presence of jihadists in the country embodies the risk of militancy spilling over into the coastal countries from the ongoing insurgency in Burkina Faso and Mali.
  • While these reports are plausible due to an increasing entrenchment of militants in Mali’s Kayes Region, which borders Senegal, it is likely that the jihadist encroachment into Senegal, if present, is nascent.
  • However, in the absence of decisive counter-militancy operations and as militants solidify their hold over Mali’s Kayes Region, the jihadist presence in Senegal is likely to grow, though it may be a slow-moving process. This is likely to manifest as an exploitation of grievances to create tensions and facilitate recruitment as well as attempts to entrench themselves.
  • The Senegalese government is likely to scale up the military presence along its border with Mali and may also attempt to establish lines of communication with Mali and Mauritania to facilitate a regional coordinated response.

Please be advised

Across the region, the following notable incidents have been reported:

 

Mali

Map # Region Cercle Locale Date Description
1 Timbuktu Timbuktu Ber February 6 At least 10 wounded including women, children as vehicle hits IED
2 Timbuktu Gourma-Rharos Tinwoussouk February 8 15 militants killed, 22 motorbikes destroyed by Barkhane strike
3 Sikasso Kolondieba Kolondieba February 8 Several police officers injured as armed men arrived on motorcycles, opened fire, attacked the police station while shouting “Allahu Akbar”

 

Burkina Faso

Map # Region Province Locale Date Description
4 Sahel Seno Dori February 1-7 Security Forces carry out operations with air support to secure markets, places of worship

 

Senegal

Map # Region Department Locale Date Description
5 Tambacounda Bakel Kidira January 20-22 Three alleged members of “sleeper militant cell” linked to Katiba Macina arrested, authorities seized several cell phones

Notable Developments

  • Reports indicate that Ivory Coast’s government spokesperson stated that the authorities are maintaining permanent vigilance in response to the French revealing on February 1 that Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) leadership held a meeting in February 2020 to discuss expansion into Gulf of Guinea countries.
  • Reports indicate that Burkinabe PM Christophe Dabire stated that the government was not against negotiating with jihadists in response to a question in Parliament on February 4.
  • The 27th report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning Islamic State and al-Qaeda to the UN Security Council (UNSC), published on February 3, mentions the encroachment of JNIM elements, backed by “radical Islamic influencers,” into Senegal. The report specifically mentions Bakel in the Tambacounda Region, Ferlo Reserve in the Matam Region, and the gold-extraction areas of Saraya in the Kedougou Region.

Assessments & Forecast

  1. Sahelian militant groups’ intent to extend their operational theater across borders into the coastal states is well-documented, with the French releasing information about a meeting between JNIM and AQIM leadership to purportedly discuss expansion into the Gulf of Guinea countries. Militant chatter, their past attacks, and areas of entrenchment in Burkina Faso suggested that the risk of militant spillover was particularly elevated for Benin and Ivory Coast, resulting in much of the discourse around this issue is focused on these two countries. However, while there is a very present and heightened risk of militant activity in northern Benin and Ivory Coast, they are by no means the only countries at risk. The proliferation of militancy within the Sahelian countries over the past year has raised the threat of jihadism encroaching into other bordering countries as well, as embodied by reports of jihadists being present in Senegal.
  2. The marked increase in militant activity in Mali’s Kayes Region, which borders Senegal, in the past year with JNIM claiming attacks in January and February 2020 not only highlighted the breadth and scope of JNIM’s operations within Mali but also elevated the threat of militants crossing over into Senegal. To that point, JNIM affiliate Katiba Macina leader Amadou Kouffa’s call to the Fulani in West Africa, including Senegal, to embrace jihad and the establishment of Katiba Macina cells a few hundred kilometers from the Senegalese border in the Kayes Region as per reports on November 2020 do somewhat support the UN’s assertion of jihadist presence in Senegal. That said, there have been no reports of overt militant activity in the country over the past year, which suggests that any jihadist encroachment into the country is in its initial stages and makes it unlikely that there is significant jihadist presence in the locations mentioned in the UN report, which span Senegal’s eastern border. While it is not entirely implausible that militants have been covertly infiltrating and setting up cells across eastern Senegal, it is more far more likely that the jihadists may have dispatched recruiters and radical preachers to assess the potential for radicalization among the populace, particularly the Fulani, and judge the size of the recruit pool in the locations mentioned in the UN report.
  3. The report on the dismantling of the militant cell in Kidire, on the other hand, is far more plausible given its location on the border with Mali’s Kayes Region. It is prudent to note that the alleged militants were arrested on the basis of material on their cell phone that revealed that they belonged to groups on social media platforms advocating armed jihad and none of the reports note any weapons on their persons or at their homes, though it remains possible that this information has not been disclosed yet. Neither do the reports indicate any sign to suggest that this alleged “sleeper” cell was planning an attack imminently or even possesses the capabilities to launch an attack. This seems to suggest that if indeed it was a Katiba Macina cell, it was composed of newly radicalized members.
  4. While there is a very present risk of militant encroachment into Senegal and this risk is only going to heighten as the militants solidify their hold over Mali’s Kayes Region, based on the reports at this time, it seems like that their presence in Senegal is nascent. FORECAST: However, unless decisive counter-militancy actions are taken, the jihadist movement in Senegal is liable to grow over the coming year. Based on precedent, this encroachment is likely to manifest as the exploitation of socio-political and ethnic grievances to facilitate recruitment and create localized militant cells as well as attempts to enforce Sharia law and eliminate religious and state leadership at the local level to enable jihadist entrenchment. Eventually, once they gain a foothold, the jihadists are liable to expand their modus operandi to include small-scale attacks against security forces and other state symbols. This may be a slow-moving process that takes years, as is the case in Ivory Coast where there have been gradual signs of militant entrenchment with the militants conducting an attack in Savannes Region in June 2020 after years of militant presence across the border in Burkina Faso’s Cascades Region.
  5. Senegal started construction of a military camp in Goudiry, Tambacounda Region, as per reports in July 2020 and reportedly conducted capacity building operations to streamline cooperation among the Defense and Security Forces, gendarmes, police officers, and other officials in the area in November 2020. FORECAST: Following the publication of these reports, the government may reinforce security at the border. In addition, it is possible that the country will attempt to establish lines of cooperation and communication with Mali and Mauritania and try to work together to contain any spillover of jihadist elements over its borders. Finally, apart from martial measures, authorities in Senegal may follow Mauritania’s example and adopt some soft counter-militancy approaches, given the failure in Mali and Burkina Faso to combat the insurgency with military means alone.

Recommendations

  1. We advise against all travel to the border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, given the extreme risks of militancy, ethnic conflict, and violent crime.
  2. Avoid all travel to northern and central Mali, including Timbuktu, Kidal, Gao, Mopti, and northern Segou region, given the threat from militant and rebel groups operating in the area, as well as ongoing ethnic tensions and intercommunal violence.
  3. Avoid all travel to northern and eastern Burkina Faso, particularly Sahel, Est, Centre-Est, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions due to the ongoing threat of militancy and violent crime. Avoid nonessential travel to outlying areas of the southern and western regions due to the increased risk of attacks.
  4. We advise against all travel to Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua Regions in the west along the borders of Mali and Burkina Faso, with the exception of Niamey, due to the ongoing risk of militancy.

AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel killed by France in Mali; likely to hinder al-Qaeda operations in Maghreb, not expected to affect militancy in Sahel – Maghreb & Sahel Analysis

Executive Summary

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel was killed by French forces in Mali, a significant symbolic loss that will likely exacerbate the ongoing decline in al-Qaeda operations in Algeria and Tunisia.

This will likely result in the continued diversion of resources and focus to the Sahel, reducing the operational support given to Algerian and Tunisian groups as well as diminishing morale and recruitment in the Maghreb.

The impact on al-Qaeda in the Sahel will likely be limited given the decentralized nature of AQIM’s control and the broader success of Malian leaders of the other constituent groups within the al-Qaeda coalition in the Sahel, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM).

Although France and Mali are expected to tout this as a success, which will further justify France’s increasingly unpopular presence in the Sahel, this is nonetheless not expected to disrupt militancy in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

Current Situation

On June 5, France’s Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly stated that French forces with the “support of partners” killed the Emir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Abdelmalek Droukdel, also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, along with “several of his close collaborators” at an unspecified location in northern Mali on June 3.

Reports indicate that Droukdel was killed in Talhandak in Mali’s Kidal Region, close to the border with Algeria.

On June 6, reports emerged that al-Qaeda jihadists and supporters were eulogizing Droukdel in internal communication, but as of the time of writing, no announcement was officially published by al-Qaeda.

The US Africa Command (AFRICOM) issued a press release on June 8 acknowledging France’s announcement and further stating that AFRICOM has confirmed Droukdel’s death in an independent assessment.

Background

Abdelmalek Droukdel was the Emir of AQIM, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combatant (GSPC), which was an offshoot of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which fought in the Algerian civil war of the 1990s. Droukdel assumed the leadership of the GSPC in mid-2004 and pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in September 2006. In 2007, the GSPC was officially renamed as AQIM. Droukdel is considered one of the founding members of AQIM and held a highly symbolic position within the group’s hierarchy, also due to his direct ties with Osama bin Laden, as well as his previous involvement in the Afghan civil war.

Under Droukdel, AQIM supported several jihadist movements in other parts of Africa, particularly Mali, where several AQIM affiliates formed from 2011 onward. In March 2017, AQIM’s Sahara branch, al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine, and Macina Liberation Front announced that they would be unifying under a single al–Qaedacoalition, Jamaat Nusrat al–Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM), with Ansar Dine leader Iyad ag Ghali as its leader. In 2014, Droukdel also sponsored a merger betweenAnsar al–Sharia in Tunisia (AST) and the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade (OIB), two local jihadist groups that were outlawed by the Tunisian government. Over recent years, AQIM has almost completely shifted its center of gravity from Algeria toMali due to intensive counter-militancy operations by the People’s National Army (ANP) in Algeria. JNIM is now the strongest al-Qaeda group in the region, with Algeria serving mostly as an auxiliary effort. AQIM’s remaining presence in Algeria can mainly be attributed to Droukdel’s historical ties to the country and his effort to restore the lost prestige of the organization.

Although AQIM did not officially confirm Droukdel’s death and France has in the past prematurely claimed to have killed high-level al-Qaeda leaders in the Sahel such as Amadou Kouffa, the leader of the JNIM constituent Katiba Macina, there is a strong likelihood that Droukdel was in fact killed. This is supported by the reported internal communication between al-Qaeda members and the duration of time between when the incident occurred and when it was announced by France and then the US, which may have gone at least in part to confirm the successes of the operation, as well as the fact that it was officially announced by both countries.

Assessments & Forecast

Loss of Droukdel likely to adversely impact AQIM operations in Algeria, Tunisia, possibly trigger slight resurgence in IS activity in Algeria

AQIM activity in Algeria has significantly declined over recent years amid successful counter-militancy operations by the People’s National Army (ANP), most recently aggravated by the ANP killing ten of the militant group’s local leaders during counter-militancy operations in the northeastern Jijel and Skikda provinces in 2018. This resulted in militant attacks becoming rare and small-scale when they do occur, with AQIM itself not claiming responsibility for an attack in the country since August 31, 2017, when it claimed a suicide bombing against a security headquarters in Tiaret. Due to its continued operational constraints, the jihadist group was forced to operate in a highly decentralized fashion in Algeria, with local leaders having more influence over the group’s on-ground tactics and activities. Leaders, such as Droukdel, who are much higher in the group’s hierarchy, are generally involved in outlining the group’s ideology and overarching goals, while also acting as symbolic figures for the group’s fighters. FORECAST: Therefore, while Droukdel’s death will not have any immediate direct impact on AQIM’s on-ground capabilities in Algeria, it nonetheless constitutes a significant symbolic loss, which would therefore have a long-term negative effect on its capabilities in North Africa.

Despite the decline in operations, militants and their infrastructure remain entrenched in Algeria’s northern outlying areas, which is underscored by near-daily discovery of hideouts and weapons caches, as well as arrests of militants and their supporters. Furthermore, the ANP frequently discovers caches of weapons, which likely originate from Libya, along Algeria’s southern borders, that are likely mostly intended to be transferred into the Sahel, which indicates the continued connection between operations in Algeria and the Sahel. However, it is possible that some of these weapons are diverted toward maintaining activities in Algeria. FORECAST: As Droukdel was the most prominent historical and symbolic link between AQIM and Algeria, his killing may prompt al-Qaeda to reduce the investment of resources in Algeria, which may be perceived as wasteful given the group’s inability to act there, and shift it entirely toward the Sahel, where it has been much more successful in recent years.

This, in turn, may have an adverse impact on AQIM-affiliated OIB’s operations in western Tunisia. Since the construction of a border obstacle between Tunisia and Libya, smuggling activity between the countries reduced significantly, leading to OIB supply lines from Libya to be extended through Algeria and facilitated by and dependent on AQIM’s operations there. FORECAST: Therefore, if AQIM were to divert resources away from Algeria toward the Sahel, in the long term, this will also constrict AQIM-affiliated OIB’s supply lines and reduce its operational capabilities in Tunisia. Nonetheless, in the short term, a decrease in focus on operations in Algeria may mean that whatever assets are still left in the country would be diverted to support OIB in Tunisia, which despite its own significant challenges, is still considered more successful in recent years than the group in Algeria.

FORECAST: This development will also have a negative effect on the morale of AQIM fighters across the Maghreb, as the militant group’s prestige in the North Africa region diminishes with the increased diversion of resources and focus of operations toward the Sahel. This will make it difficult for AQIM to attract additional recruits and support from among segments of the local population of Algeria and Tunisia. The Islamic State (IS), which maintains a limited operational presence in Algeria and Tunisia, may attempt to capitalize upon this dynamic to attract AQIM fighters to bolster its ranks. IS is specifically known to maintain at least some capabilities in southern Algeria. This is evidenced by the IS-claimed vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attack targeting a military facility in Bordj Badji Mokhtar Province’s Timiaouine on February 9 as well as the IS-claimed killing of eight ANP soldiers during clashes in Tamanrasset Province’s Taoundart on November 21, 2019. Both incidents involved militants with links to IS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which is active in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Regardless, a decrease in AQIM activity in Algeria may provide IS militants with a greater degree of operational freedom in southern Algeria due to the lack of competition.

FORECAST: There has also been an increase in IS activity in southern Libya in May and June following a lull in operations by the militant group over the past year. This has mainly been facilitated by the security vacuum that has been created in southern Libya due to Libyan National Army’s (LNA) increased diversion of resources toward northwestern Libya for its offensive against the Government of National Accord (GNA)-linked forces. This has provided IS militants in southern Libya with a greater degree of freedom of movement and operations. However, despite this recent increase in IS activity in Libya, the militant group’s capabilities in terms of personnel and infrastructure are still limited, as underscored by the small-scale nature of most of its recent attacks as well as various other video publications released by the group that showcase a limited number of fighters in the country. Nevertheless, AQIM’s decline could present IS with an opportunity to expand from Libya into southern Algeria. However, IS has not yet shown any indication that it is interested in such a strategy, and Algeria’s border with Libya is relatively more secure than that with Mali and Niger. Hence, even if IS is interested in expanding from Libya into Algeria, this risk is slightly lower.

Droukdel’s killing unlikely to have significant operational impact on JNIM activities in Sahel, expected to be portrayed as victory for counter-militancy efforts by France

Even though the death of Droukdel is a very notable symbolic blow to al-Qaeda in North and West Africa, its spiritual impact in the Sahel is likely to be somewhat limited given that JNIM and AQIM in Algeria have grown more distant in recent years. Over time, the high-profile leadership, as well as the constituency, of the al-Qaeda outfit in the Sahel has become more local. This wedge between al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and the Sahel was further aggravated after leaders of AQIM’s Sahara branch, Yahya Abou Hammam and Abu Abd al–Rahman al–Sanhaji, also known as “Ali Maychou”, who were central figures in the establishment of JNIM, were killed by France in 2019.

Given this growing distance, it remains unlikely that Droukdel’s death will translate into a substantial operational impact or reduced militant capabilities in the Sahel. AQIM’s control over its branches is decentralized while the Sahara branch of the organization is just one of the components that form JNIM, where the different constituent groups maintain their own spheres of influence. This suggests that while there exists some potential for the operations of the Sahara branch of AQIM to be slightly affected in Droukdel’s absence, the operations of the larger coalition are likely to continue unhindered under the direction of the leader of JNIM constituent Ansar Dine, Iyad ag Ghali, as well as the leader of Katiba Macina, Amadou Kouffa.

In fact, rather than Droukdel’s death detrimentally impacting on-ground militant capabilities, it is possible that JNIM will see operational benefits as resources may be diverted from al-Qaeda outfits in Algeria and Tunisia to Mali and Burkina Faso in the long term. FORECAST: Regardless, the trend of militancy in the Sahel is expected to persist. Additionally, it remains possible that attacks directed toward French Barkhane forces, who are attractive targets for militants, will see an uptick in the coming weeks in symbolic retaliation for the death of Droukdel.

Nonetheless, due to Droukdel’s status, his killing in northern Mali marks a momentous symbolic victory for counter-militancy efforts in the Sahel. The French, who have been facing mounting criticism from the populations of the Sahelian countries, are likely to capitalize on the success of this airstrike to justify their continued operations in the tri-border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The perception of success following this operation is particularly important due to JNIM’s acceptance of the Malian government’s offer for a dialogue on March 8, contingent upon the withdrawal of international forces. The Malian government has not yet responded to JNIM’s conditional acceptance, likely due to the blow that the withdrawal of French forces would pose to counter-militancy efforts in Mali.

FORECAST: Considering that the killing of Droukdel is going to be presented as a great success by the French and Malian authorities, it is likely that the government’s pro-French position will become further entrenched following this operation. Conversely, given French leadership of the operation, should the government attempt to negotiate the conditional acceptance, JNIM is likely to be unyielding in their demand for the withdrawal of French forces. This has the potential to further exacerbate dissatisfaction among the Malian populace who have been clamoring for a dialogue with the jihadists as well as widen the political divide where a coalition of opposition parties held a large-scale march on June 5 demanding the resignation of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.

FORECAST: Ultimately, the center of gravity of al-Qaeda activities had already moved from Algeria to the Sahel, and going forward, given the decentralized nature of al-Qaeda operations, there is unlikely to be any significant change in militancy in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. While there remains a chance that the international and national militaries will launch bolstered offensives to press their perceived advantage accorded by Droukdel’s death, it is unlikely to significantly affect JNIM activities beyond the near-term.

Recommendations

Maghreb

Travel to Algiers, Oran, and Tunis may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary and contingency support options.

We advise against all nonessential travel to Algeria’s outlying areas. Those conducting business essential travel to the region are advised to avoid nonessential travel to the mountainous parts of northern Algeria’s outlying areas due to the underlying threat of militant activity. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations and ground support options.

It is further advised to avoid all travel to the vicinity of Algeria’s borders with Mali, Niger, and Libya due to the increased threat of militant activity in these regions.

Avoid all travel to Tunisia’s Kasserine, Kef, and Jendouba governorates, in addition to all border areas, due to jihadist activity and military closures. Furthermore, avoid all travel to within 50 km from the border with Libya, due to the threat of attacks originating from Libya targeting Tunisian interests.

Sahel

We advise against all travel to the border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, given the extreme risks of militancy, ethnic conflict, and violent crime.

Avoid all travel to northern and central Mali, including Timbuktu, Kidal, Gao, Mopti, and northern Segou region, given the threat from militant and rebel groups operating in the area, as well as ongoing ethnic tensions and intercommunal violence.

Maintain heightened vigilance in Mali’s Koulikoro, Kayes, and Sikasso regions due to the rapidly expanding militant operational theater and growing insecurity.

Avoid all travel to northern and eastern Burkina Faso, particularly Sahel, Est, Centre-Est, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions due to the ongoing threat of militancy and violent crime. Avoid nonessential travel to outlying areas of the southern and western regions due to the increased risk of attacks.

We advise against all travel to Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua Regions in the west along the borders of Mali and Burkina Faso, with the exception of Niamey, due to the ongoing risk of militancy.

Militancy along Burkina Faso’s southern borders increases possibility of spread into Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast – West Africa Special Analysis

Executive Summary

With militancy firmly entrenched across northern and eastern Burkina Faso, militants are incentivized to expand their presence to spread the message of jihad, gain new recruits, and over-stretch counterinsurgency efforts.

The rapid proliferation of militancy across Burkina Faso to its southern borders have created fears of spillover, further heightened by a warning by Burkinabe authorities to Ghana, Togo, and Benin. This porous southern border remains vulnerable due to existing criminal and smuggling routes.

Benin and Togo are particularly at risk of militant attacks due to their border with Burkina Faso’s Est Region, where jihadists are entrenched and highly active. The risks are comparatively lower to Ghana and Ivory Coast due to the relative stability of the border regions in Burkina Faso and Mali.

The likely trajectory will be smaller-scale militant attacks targeting border communities and security forces, as well as enforcing jihadist ideology and way of life on the villages. They are also likely to exploit economic, inter-communal, and inter-religious conflicts to create instability and fuel recruitment.

Togo, Benin, and Ghana have already intensified security measures at the border in response to this elevated threat of militant spillover and can be expected to continue maintaining a reinforced presence in the coming months, with the potential for international assistance.

Current Situation

Mali has seen sustained levels of militancy, as approximately 583 suspected militant attacks recorded in all of 2018 and similar patterns expected with about 365 attacks between January to July 2019.

Both Burkina Faso and western Niger have witnessed an uptick in militancy levels during the same period. To illustrate, 321 attacks were reported in Burkina Faso between January to July 2019, as compared to 194 in the entirety of 2018.

Similarly, 56 attacks were reported in Tillaberi, Tahoua, and Niamey regions of western Niger in between January and July 2019, a significant uptick from the 34 attacks recorded in 2018.

Burkina Faso’s Est Region has displayed pervasive entrenchment of militancy since September 2018, with 98 suspected militant incidents over that time period. In fact, 149 suspected militant incidents have been recorded from July 2018 to July 2019 in Burkinabe regions that lie on the southern border, namely Cascades, Centre-Est, Centre-Ouest, Centre-Sud, Sud-Ouest, and Est Regions.

Reports from April indicate that the intelligence forces of Burkina Faso warned Ghana, Togo, and Benin of the threat of militant infiltration after security forces captured a local militant leader in Est Region and found evidence that he was in contact with suspected militants in the three countries.

Suspected Militant Attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger July 2018 - July 2019

Assessments & Forecast

Advantages of militant encroachment coupled with viable avenues of infiltration make the threat of southward expansion credible

The fears of jihadist attacks in Ghana, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Benin are not new, with Ghana’s immigration services issuing a memo in 2016 about possible encroachment into Ghana and Togo. However, the rapid proliferation of militancy across Burkina Faso over the past year, coupled with a direct Burkinabe warning in April, has put this threat into a new light. With militancy largely entrenched across northern and eastern Burkina Faso, jihadists are able to widen their attention on consolidating power across their current operational theater and to expand their geographical reach. Expanding territory accomplishes the militants’ primary ideology of spreading the message of jihad while also providing them with new recruits, and serves to over-extend security forces and counter-militancy efforts. Another incentive to open a new front of militancy in a previously untouched country is that it could give the militants heightened attention, further putting countries next to jihadist-entrenched regions at risk.

Given the current militant entrenchment across the Sahel, the countries bordering Burkina Faso’s southern boundary are most at risk, whereas it is less the case to the north and west. Although Algeria was once al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) primary base of operations, the center of gravity has since shifted to Mali. This is further evidenced by the lack of notable jihadist activity in Algeria in recent years. Thus, militants and weapons are more likely to move south from Algeria to Mali rather than vice versa. In Mauritania, following a string of high-profile attacks until 2011, the country has largely deterred large-scale jihadist encroachment through firm state control, conventional counter-militancy efforts, and a tacit permissiveness toward soft radical preachings. Moreover, documents from 2010 indicate that AQIM proposed a truce with the Mauritanian government in exchange for millions of dollars, though its implementation was never confirmed. Altogether, these efforts diminish the likelihood of militant activity expanding to the north or west from Mali.

On the other hand, Burkina Faso’s porous southern border and the fact that all of its southern neighbors are coastal countries makes southward expansion an attractive target. Jihadists in West Africa have been confined to land-locked states until now and, as such, they might be incentivized to expand to coastal states for access to strategic infrastructure. The presence of cross-border smuggling and bandit groups further makes the threat of militant infiltration plausible. The expansion of militancy in Burkina Faso suggests a symbiotic relationship between banditry and jihadism with militants providing bandits with advanced weaponry and hard cash in exchange for access to manpower and logistical support. Given that smuggling and bandit networks straddle the border between Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast, it is possible co-opting these routes will provide the militants with an avenue to infiltrate Ghana and Ivory Coast. Similarly, the entrenched criminality in the forests between Burkina Faso, Togo, and Benin is going to be conducive to militancy expansion since the existing smuggling routes will help the militants bypass border patrol. The advantages of militant encroachment in these countries, and the isolated instances of militancy in Benin and Ivory Coast, make the possibility of militant infiltration into these countries a credible threat.

Risk Level of Cross-Border Militancy in West Africa

Threat of militant infiltration higher in Benin, Togo due to shared borders with Burkina Faso’s Est Region

The proximity of Benin and Togo to Burkina Faso’s militant-entrenched Est Region makes the risk of spillover particularly high. The porous border enables the militants to carry out cross-border operations. FORECAST: This suggests that, as the militants attempt to expand southward from Burkina Faso, they are likely to focus their attention on northern Benin and Togo, particularly on the W-Arly-Pendjari ecological complex in Benin that extends into Burkina Faso and Niger and has long been a hub of smuggling and criminal activities. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara’s (ISGS) abduction of two French tourists from Pendarji National Park in northern Benin on May 3, who were later rescued in northern Burkina Faso by security forces, exemplifies this threat.

Moreover, the risk of infiltration into Benin is somewhat heightened by its current political turmoil. In Burkina Faso, the weakened security apparatus after the fall of former President Blaise Compaore was extremely conducive to the infiltration and proliferation of militancy. The recent political strife in Benin during its legislative elections in April and the overall systematic elimination of opposition parties and leaders since then led to widespread unrest. To an extent, this has compromised the stability of the country and local grievances are heightened. This is liable to disenfranchise citizens from the government in the long-term, making them more susceptible to radicalization. The largely Fulani demographic of northeastern Benin further makes this possibility likely given that the militants are likely to attempt to find common cause and have previously used ethnic identity as a recruitment tactic in Mali and Burkina Faso.

In contrast, the threat to Ghana is comparatively lower than Benin and Togo because it borders regions in Burkina Faso that have not shown pervasive militant entrenchment. However, Centre-Sud Region, which shares a border with Ghana, has recorded two suspected militant attacks in July, bringing the tally of total purported militant attacks in the region to three. These attacks continue to suggest that militants are slowly attempting to expand across all regions of Burkina Faso, including those in the south that are distant from the origins of the threat at the border with Mali, and consequently, Ghana’s borders continue to remain at risk. That said, Ghana’s relative political stability and the history of religious tolerance make militant encroachment in the country more difficult than Togo and Benin.

While the relative stability in southwestern Burkina Faso and southeastern Mali makes the risk of militant spillover into Ivory Coast relatively low, the previous al-Qaeda attacks recorded in the region, as well as the economic importance of both Ghana and Ivory Coast, suggests that it remains a target. In this context, the AQIM attack in Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast in 2016 as well the dismantling of a jihadist cell in Mali’s Sikasso Region in December 2018 that allegedly intended to carry out attacks in three West African cities, including Abidjan, indicates that militants have aspirations in Ivory Coast.

High probability of cross-border incursions and small-scale attacks, efforts to impose jihadist ideology

FORECAST: The relative nascency of this threat indicates that while militants might have a presence in these countries, they are unlikely to be entrenched yet. As such, they are unlikely to possess the capability or the logistical network to launch large-scale attacks. Consequently, the precedent set in Burkina Faso indicates a heightened likelihood of smaller-scale attacks against security forces and government infrastructure in border communities to dislodge state presence as militants attempt to entrench themselves in the coming months. That said, while the possibility of large-scale attacks remains relatively lower, it cannot be completely discounted as jihadists might attempt to conduct a high-profile attack to announce their presence.

However, the patterns of the spread of militancy in Burkina Faso suggests that the militants are inclined towards establishing their foothold into an area before undertaking large-scale or attention-grabbing attacks. In fact, militant attacks in Burkina Faso’s Est Region began at least a year before the al-Qaeda front Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed their first attack therein. The delay in announcing their presence was in all probability a strategic move to allow the militants ample time to establish themselves before drawing attention to their activities and eliciting a security response. FORECAST: Thus, militant activity for the immediate future is likely to be confined to village incursions and small-scale attacks to entrench jihadism in the border regions.

Reports of suspected militants carrying out cross-border incursions in Togo and Benin and asking locals to stop selling alcohol not only emphasize the credibility of the threat of jihadism in these countries but also provide insight into the likely modus operandi the militants are liable to adopt. FORECAST: As such, in line with their proliferation across central Mali and Burkina Faso, the militants are liable to attempt to enforce their way of life in bordering villages as part of their efforts to integrate themselves into the community. JNIM’s primary modus operandi in their expansion of targeting Western symbols and practices suggests that their efforts will include the burning and targeting of schools and bars. They are liable to start preaching in mosques and enforce a ban on alcohol, prostitution, and any other activity perceived to be Western or non-Islamic. These efforts are aimed at persuading and, if that fails, forcing the locals to adhere to the group’s ideological understanding of Islam. These attempts to impose jihadist ideology are particularly dangerous because once the ideology takes root and the locals are radicalized, even complex security operations are often insufficient to dislodge the threat.

FORECAST: Along with destroying Western symbols, militants are also likely to continue targeting the government and infrastructure as well as village leaders and clerics. Eliminating local leadership, both state and communal, serves to destabilize the area and create a leadership vacuum, which in turn facilitates radicalization and militant recruitment. Similarly, the targeting of the state or security services is motivated both by jihadist anti-government ideology and in a bid to weaken state presence and consequently, fray the connections between the state and the people by slowly disenfranchising them.

Heightened likelihood of militants aggravating existing inter-communal, inter-religious conflicts to fuel recruitment, create instability

One of the primary tools exploited by jihadists worldwide is aggravating inter-community strife and either capitalize on a sense of marginalization, or create a perception of it. In Burkina Faso, exploitation by the local religious leaders who were perceived to be enriching themselves at the expense of locals provided Malam Ibrahim Dicko, the founder of the home-grown jihadist group Ansarul Islam, with the means to radicalize his followers. Militants tend to find common cause with one side of the conflict while actively working against and targeting the other side, destabilizing the area further. The Fulani ethnic group are a case in point. Militants first tapped into their feelings of abandonment and then radicalized them. This created the perception of Fulanis filling militant ranks, which caused them to be targeted by other communities and security forces alike, further heightening their perception of marginalization. This has resulted in a vicious cycle of marginalization, radicalization, and persecution in both Mali and Burkina Faso. The resultant insecurity with ethnic self-defense groups perpetrating large-scale attacks that have extremely high casualty counts and prompt violent reprisals is extremely beneficial to the militants’ agenda because it weakens state security apparatus and undermines local confidence in the government.

FORECAST: Following this precedent, militants are liable to exploit local grievances, stemming from economic exclusion and poverty, to foster feelings of disenfranchisement and abandonment. To that end, the areas around Benin’s borders with Burkina Faso are mired in steep poverty and lack basic services like electricity. Militants could possibly attempt to recruit them by providing them with basic necessities while fueling anti-government sentiment. Similarly, the protected status of W-Arly-Pendjari ecological complex has incited conflicts over control of land and caused widespread displacement. The militants were quick to seize upon these grievances, which contributed to pervasive militant entrenchment in Burkina Faso’s Est Region. It is likely that, as militants aim to expand into Benin, they will capitalize on these feelings to facilitate infiltration by providing the disenfranchised with an alternative.

FORECAST: Militants are also liable to foster inter-religious strife to their advantage. To illustrate, the recent spate of attacks targeting Christians in Burkina Faso and Niger have already created fear within Ghana’s Christian majority. Ghana has always had peaceful inter-religious relations but the Christians’ concerns that their churches are at risk has the potential to create tensions between the religious communities, which the militants might attempt to exploit. It is possible that this turn in the militants’ strategy to target Christians was motivated in a bid to further cause divisions within communities. Should they continue to target Christians, the resultant threat perception in these countries has the potential to result in actual marginalization of Muslims. Lastly, similar to their encroachment across Burkina Faso and Mali, militants will likely attempt to exacerbate existing inter-communal conflicts between rival ethnic groups.

Location of Attacks targeting Christians and Churches in Burkina Faso & Western niger in 2019

Security operations at the border to be intensified with heightened potential for cross-border cooperation

Following Burkinabe intelligence’s warning, Benin launched “Operation Djidjoho” and deployed 1,000 soldiers along its northeastern borders in April to identify and neutralize infiltrators. Togolese authorities also carried out intensive counter-militancy operations and reportedly apprehended about 20 suspected jihadists, said to be fleeing from Burkina Faso. FORECAST: Despite these intensified security measures at their borders, existing smuggling routes, the dense landscape around some of these borders, and the poor demarcation, will make it difficult to completely deter cross-border militant incursions. Moreover, given that the borders in much of these areas were imposed on top of communities, people have family on both sides and in both countries, and so it would be difficult for security forces to completely close off the border. Regardless of these limitations, the intensified border deployments are expected to continue. Should further instances of militancy be reported in these West African countries, elevating the perception of the threat of militant spillover, security measures are likely to be fortified with additional troop deployment and stricter checkpoints at the border. In the event of confirmed imminence of large-scale militant encroachment in any of these countries, the authorities may close their borders with Burkina Faso.

FORECAST: There is increased potential for international cooperation as they figure out how to adequately combat the jihadist threat. That the threat of militancy comes from Burkina Faso’s borders suggests that the countries will likely collaborate with the Burkinabe authorities to contain the threat. Additionally, as the severity of the threat increases, international actors can be expected to take an interest in the situation, particularly in Ghana and Ivory Coast, and potentially lend their military expertise in the form of on-ground training or logistical and intelligence support. To that end, international forces that maintain a presence in the Sahel, such as the French Barkhane forces, might expand their theater of operations into these countries to deter the jihadist threat. However, until militancy spillover is confirmed, international presence in these countries remains a distant possibility. That said, the recent expansion of French forces into northern Burkina Faso could possibly be a precursor to intensified French operations across Burkina Faso. Should that happen, given the potential threat of spillover, the forces might focus their attention on border-adjacent regions to contain the militancy.

FORECAST: Apart from the government and the security forces, the local population in these countries are also likely to heighten their vigilance. Alarmed by the recent targeting of churches and Christians by militants in Burkina Faso and Niger, the Christian populations in Benin, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast are liable to enact stringent preventive measures. To that point, a major church in Accra, Ghana banned backpacks as part of its new security directives, while churches in Ghana’s Upper East Region bordering Burkina Faso are reportedly evaluating security proposals such as the installation of body scanners at entrances as a safeguard against possible militant attacks.

However, given that this is new ground for both security services and civil society, they are likely to struggle to come up with an adequate response to combat this potential threat. As such, there is potential for these preventative measures to border on overzealousness and instead fuel feelings of marginalization and abandonment. That said, it is possible that the preemptive measures adopted could possibly deter large-scale militant encroachment. Despite overt signs of radicality, the Burkinabe government took no preventive measures against Malam Dicko, the founder of Ansarul Islam, or to stop the cross-border movement from Mali when the jihadist threat was at its peak there. This likely made the spread of militancy much easier because the foundations were already set. However, these countries have taken the threat of militancy seriously. As such, by taking proactive measures to deter the spread of militancy into their own territory, these countries are already in a better position to combat this threat than Burkina Faso was.

Recommendations

We advise against all travel to the border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, given the extreme risks of militancy, ethnic conflict, and violent crime.

Avoid all travel to northern and central Mali, including Timbuktu, Kidal, Gao, Mopti, and northern Segou region, given the threat from militant and rebel groups operating in the area, as well as ongoing ethnic tensions and intercommunal violence.

Avoid all travel to northern and eastern Burkina Faso, particularly Sahel, Est, Centre-Est, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions due to the ongoing threat of militancy and violent crime. Avoid nonessential travel to outlying areas of the southern and western regions due to the increased risk of attacks.

We advise against all travel to Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua Regions in the west along the borders of Mali and Burkina Faso, with the exception of Niamey, due to the ongoing risk of militancy.

Avoid nonessential travel to the W National Park area in Benin on the tri-border region with Niger and Burkina Faso due to the presence of criminals and militants.

 

This report was written by Aarushi Tibrewala, MAX Security’s Senior Analyst for West Africa & reviewed by  Rachel Jacob, MAX Security’s Regional Director of Intelligence, Sub-Saharan Africa

Security to continue deteriorating as jihadist groups expand geographically, intensify attacks, increase regional threat – Burkina Faso Special Analysis

Written by Ishita Singh – MAX Security’s Senior Analyst for West & Central Africa

Edited by Rachel Jacob – MAX Security’s Regional Director of Intelligence, Sub-Saharan Africa

Executive Summary

Since September 2018, there has been a dramatic increase in militant attacks in Burkina Faso, now affecting 11 of the 13 regions. The majority of this activity targets security forces, local authorities, and schools.

Militant groups have increasingly targeted the mining sector through theft, extortion, and active control over mines. However, security operations that close mines even temporarily are liable to create resentment and encourage militant recruitment.

Jihadists exploit intercommunal tensions to drive recruitment, especially among the Fulani, instigating retaliatory cycles of violence that can create large death tolls and alienate the population from the government.

As attacks continue to spread throughout the country, there is a growing threat to Burkina Faso’s southern neighbors, which will have to bolster their defensive efforts despite their own political challenges to prevent a spillover of violence.

Avoid nonessential travel to outlying areas of Burkina Faso given the ongoing threat of militancy and violent crime, while avoiding all travel to Sahel, Est, Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions due to the risk of attacks.

Key Points & Forecast

Where previously there were about seven attacks per month in Burkina Faso, between September 2018 and February 2019, militants conducted an average of 34 attacks per month. Most were in Sahel, Est, Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, but these trends continue to spread toward the west and south, particularly in Centre-Nord, Hauts Bassins, and Cascades regions.

The vast majority of jihadist activity targets security forces, local government authorities, and Western-style schools. This will remain the broad focus of militant groups as they solidify their areas of control in the north and continue to expand their geographical presence.

Jihadist groups increasingly target the mining sector, with theft and extortion expected to remain significant especially in Sahel and Est regions given how profitable these attacks can be. At the same time, military escorts for mining companies have also given militants new opportunities to attack security forces and thus increases risks to civilian travelers.

Foreign nationals have come under attack repeatedly over the past six months, with at least five incidents since September 2018 in which foreigners were abducted or killed. This threat will remain high in all remote areas of Burkina Faso, particularly in the northern and eastern regions, and along the borders of Mali and Niger.

The dual role of “Koglweogo” self-defense militias, with some factions supporting the government while others cooperate with militants, creates another layer of insecurity in outlying regions and will continue to exacerbate the situation.

Security forces have been shown to use violence against civilians both to deter them from collaborating with jihadist groups as well as punish them for doing so. Their heavy-handed measures will alienate the local population and hamper security efforts, as well as further drive jihadist recruitment.

Militancy is expected to continue spreading throughout the rural areas of the country as jihadists grow entrenched in the north and east and mobilize toward the west and south. Moreover, there remains the possibility of a high-profile attack in Ouagadougou, as has been seen periodically.

The spread of militancy has already reached Burkina Faso’s southern borders and has the potential to affect its neighbors Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin, and these countries may not be able to bolster their security sufficiently to prevent the spillover of violence.

Current Situation

In December 2018, the government of Burkina Faso declared a state of emergency in 14 provinces across seven regions, including the Hauts-Bassins, Boucle du Mouhoun, Cascades, Centre-Est, Est, Nord, and Sahel regions.

Over the past year, from February 2018 to February 2019, approximately 270 militant attacks were reported across Burkina Faso.

Between February and August 2018, militants conducted around seven attacks per month. Between September 2018 and February 2019, militants conducted an average of 35 attacks per month.

The Governor of Est Region ordered the temporary closure of mining sites in all provinces on March 20 and called upon stakeholders to clear all mining sites. An official communique stated that this was “in the pursuit of the securitization of the administrative district.”

Militant Groups in Burkina Faso

Ansarul Islam – The first jihadist group to be established in Burkina Faso, it was founded in November 2016 by the now-deceased Ibrahim Malam Dicko. Ansarul Islam remains largely based in the Djibo, Soum Province area, though the group has conducted attacks throughout Sahel and Nord Regions and remains highly active in these areas. Dicko was an ethnic Fulani but Ansarul Islam is not a solely ethnicity-based group, with Dicko using Islam to challenge local dynamics and hierarchies to bring different ethnicities and classes together. Ansarul Islam engages not only in militant attacks against the state and ideological targets but also common banditry. At the same time, it also functions as a self-defense group in certain areas to protect its supporters from banditry and intercommunal violence perpetrated by others.

Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM) – The al-Qaeda coalition formed in Mali in March 2017 including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara branch, Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and Macina Liberation Front under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghaly. JNIM serves as a united front for its strategic and militant operations based in Mali, where it controls territory and conducts hundreds of attacks each year in the northern and central regions. Additionally, the group has carried out large-scale attacks in the capital cities of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Ivory Coast. Over the past year, JNIM has increasingly expanded its area of operations into Burkina Faso, at least into Sahel, Est, Centre-Est, Centre-Nord, Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions.

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) – Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahraoui pledged allegiance to the Islamic State on behalf of al-Mourabitoun in May 2015, though was subsequently ousted by rival leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Al-Sahraoui and ISGS later claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in Burkina Faso and Niger and was acknowledged by the Islamic State central organization in October 2016. ISGS has since expanded its area of operations, focusing on the border of Mali and Niger, particularly in the Ansongo Menaka Partial Wildlife Reserve, as well as along the Niger-Burkina Faso border. However, the group has retained a much smaller profile in terms of propaganda. Their most notable attack was the October 2017 ambush of a US special operations team near Tongo Tongo, Niger.

Assessments & Forecasts

Growth of militancy a result of weakened security apparatus, as similar patterns of jihadist activity spread from northern, eastern regions into central, western regions

Over the past six months, Burkina Faso has seen a dramatic shift in its security as the intensity as well as geographical scale of militant attacks has rapidly expanded. Where there was once several attacks per month, largely concentrated in Sahel and Nord regions, this has grown to an average of 34 security incidents per month being reported in at least 11 of the 13 regions. This threat was long present due to Burkina Faso’s proximity to Mali, in the midst of a civil war and prolonged jihadist insurgency. Former Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore was believed to have forged deals with Malian armed groups to prevent their entering Burkina Faso, though this would have ended with his ouster in 2014. Compaore’s resignation after a popular uprising was followed by a failed coup by the Presidential Security Regiment (RPS) in 2015. This period of political instability, as well as the disbanding of the RPS with other reforms, weakened the security apparatus to the point where criminality and militancy could grow.

Ansarul Islam emerged as Burkina Faso’s first jihadist group when it conducted its earliest known attack against a military outpost in Sahel Region in December 2016. The insurgency continued to grow over the following year, mostly concentrated in Soum and Oudalan provinces. This came alongside a relationship with the Mali-based Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM) al-Qaeda coalition, with the two groups likely working in tandem for some attacks both in Burkina Faso as well as in Mali. It is probable that this cooperation led to the evolution of Ansarul Islam’s tactics from small arms to the use of IEDs, which began in late 2017 and continued since. With these connections, Burkina Faso’s Sahel and Nord regions could function as an area for Malian jihadists to escape the pressure of local and international military operations inside of Mali while continuing to launch attacks targeting Mali. At the same time, the persistent but less frequent attacks on Burkinabe security forces in late 2017 and early 2018 helped to destabilize the border region, expanding the militants’ influence and allowing greater cross-border movement for jihadists that would come to facilitate JNIM’s movement southward into Burkina Faso by late 2018.

While Ansarul Islam’s earliest attacks solely targeted security forces, this evolved into attacks against government officials, village leaders, religious clerics, and teachers who all represented the Burkinabe state and opposed jihadist ideology. Militants subsequently burned down schools for teaching French or Western-style education and forcibly gathered residents to preach more radical forms of Islam. In some areas, militants have also banned alcohol, prostitution, and smoking. In that sense, Ansarul Islam was able to establish a sufficient level of control over its area of operations to impose its ideology. Moreover, this pattern of influence and violence came to become a model for subsequent efforts in other parts of Burkina Faso, first in Est Region and beyond.

In Est Region, reports of jihadist cells and camps being dismantled in March and April 2018 were early indicators of an expansion of militant activity. Attacks against security forces in Est began in July 2018, which then led to the targeting of local government officials and schools, with at least ten arson incidents against schools being reported and most schools closing down. The number of attacks in Est and as a whole dramatically increased in September 2018, likely due to a concentrated effort by militants when it became clear that Burkinabe security forces were more vulnerable than they first appeared. This can also be seen as militants began this pattern anew in Boucle du Mouhoun Region only one month later, when the number of incidents jumped from five incidents along the border between January and September 2018 to 14 attacks between October and December 2018. In that sense, this strategy has been highly effective in destabilizing fairly large areas of rural Burkina Faso and imposing jihadist ideology.

FORECAST: Using the precedent set first in Sahel and Nord, and then in Est and Boucle du Mouhoun, these patterns are expected to continue farther to the south and west. This has already begun in Centre-Nord, with early attacks against security forces in January, with the number of attacks increase to 12 reported in February and March, including those targeting village leaders and schools. Centre-Nord is thus expected to see an intensified level of jihadist activity in the coming months. At the same time, the early warning signs are likewise being seen in Hauts-Bassins and Cascades regions, which lie on Burkina Faso’s southernmost borders with Mali and Ivory Coast, and further attacks are expected in those regions as well.

Mining industry assets targeted as sources of revenue as jihadists grow further entrenched in local economies

Over the past six months, militant activity has increasingly targeted the mining sector. This is especially important in the north and east where economic activity is mostly tied to mining or pastoralism. With mines in these areas being highly productive, militant groups have not only attacked assets for direct theft but also use violence to extort “protection” payments from facilities. Moreover, there are increasing indications that jihadists have taken control of mining sites. When several miners died in a landslide in Kompienga Province, Est Region in October 2018, the government was unable to access the affected area because the mine was under militant control. With mines creating employment and revenue, militant control over sites also provides them with the opportunity to establish themselves as the local authority, further embedding themselves into local communities and economies.
FORECAST: It is likely that direct control over mines will remain fairly limited given that it would require more resources from the militants and is more likely to attract larger security responses. However, with overall activity targeting mines being highly lucrative for militants, extortion and theft is expected to continue, especially in the Sahel and Est regions.

To some extent, this can also be viewed as an attack on the government, given that about 75 percent of Burkina Faso’s export revenue comes solely from gold mining. The theft of revenue, as well as the effect of the violence on mining companies’ decisions to invest in the country, could be substantially detrimental to the economy. Because of this, the government began providing military escorts for mining convoys. However, this also gave the militants new opportunities to attack security forces, with a number of convoys being targeted with IEDs and ambushes. Although mining employees have reportedly not been harmed in these incidents, this underscores the way in which the militants’ interest in attacking security forces can cause collateral damage to civilians.

Foreign nationals have been specifically targeted in the context of attacks on mining facilities over the past six months. In September 2018, two foreign nationals were abducted after leaving a Ghanaian-owned gold mine in Soum Province, suspected to have been taken into Mali. Separately, in January, a foreign national with a Canadian-owned gold mining company was abducted and killed while visiting a mining site in Yagha Province. It is likely that both abductions were intended for ransom purposes with the latter incident being botched in some way. This is suggestive of the militants’ understanding that foreign-owned mining facilities are likely to have foreign nationals traveling to and from the site who can be kidnapped.
FORECAST: Although both incidents took place in the Sahel Region, which remains the most volatile and least secure region of the country, this is reflective of an increasingly widespread instability that can affect travelers in many remote areas.

Foreign nationals increasingly targeted for ransoms, jihadist violence in remote regions

Beyond the association with the mining industry, foreign nationals have come under attack repeatedly in rural areas of Burkina Faso over the past six months. This has included a Canadian and Italian disappearing in Hauts Bassins Region in December 2018, a Czech national killed in Centre-Est Region’s Koulpelogo Province on January 23, and a Spanish priest being killed by JNIM in Centre-Est’s Boulgou Province on February 15. Moreover, an Italian priest was abducted by ISGS in Niger’s Tillaberi Region only 15 km from the border in September 2018, after which he was taken back into Burkina Faso’s Est Region. Given the lack of uniformity, this has also made it clear that foreign nationals may be targeted with violence for their identity without the involvement of kidnapping. As abductions also serve a financial purpose, this is illustrative of the way in which militants use criminality to support their operations.
FORECAST: It is increasingly clear that militants deliberately target foreign nationals when they become aware of their presence for the purposes of ransoms as well as international attention and propaganda, and these attacks are expected to continue in rural areas in the foreseeable future.

Local self-defense militias complicate security dynamics, while jihadists exploit intercommunal tensions for recruitment, regional goals

Another symptom of the poor presence of the state in many rural areas has been the development of “Koglweogo” self-defense militias, which operate as localized security organizations across the country. At times, they are supported by local authorities, either openly or tacitly, though there are areas in which they operate fully independently from the government. The latter dynamic could be seen during the February 15 JNIM attack on a customs post in Boulgou Province during which Koglweogo militia arrived but were asked to leave by militants and evidently did so because the target of the attack was security personnel and not civilians. That the militants did not engage with the Koglweogo and let them go safely illustrates the clarity of the jihadists’ objectives in attacking security forces, but also suggests that self-defense militias in parts of the country are willing to cooperate with or allow militant operations so long as it targets the government rather than civilians.

As Koglweogo militias operate independently of one another rather than as a unified network, there are other instances of the self-defense groups confronting militants. On January 1, militants assassinated the village chief of Yirgou in Centre-Nord Region’s Sanmatenga Province, a common type of attack against local authorities. In retaliation, the local Koglweogo militia killed at least 47 ethnic Fulanis in Yirgou and its environs. In that sense, the dual role played by self-defense militias adds another layer of instability as additional active armed groups in outlying regions of the country, and ones that not only retaliate against jihadists but can perpetrate abuses against civilians that further drive jihadist recruitment.

That the Koglweogo militia retaliated against the ethnic Fulani population, in that case, is illustrative of another social and ethnic dynamic in the region, one that mirrors the situation in the neighboring Mali’s Mopti Region. Fulani pastoralist communities often conflict with farming communities, with Fulanis viewing themselves as marginalized by the government while other ethnic groups perceive Fulanis to be in collaboration with jihadists as both JNIM and Ansarul Islam have heavily Fulani factions. This intercommunal violence has made Fulanis further susceptible to recruitment by militant groups. In this context, jihadist groups have deliberately instigated attacks against other communities in anticipation of retaliatory attacks against Fulanis, which would then drive Fulanis closer to the militants. As seen by the incident in Yirgou, this can create high death tolls even within a single day.

JNIM’s use of ethnic violence as part of its strategy for recruitment and mobilization has been highlighted in its propaganda as well. In November 2018, JNIM released a video featuring Macina Brigade leader Amadou Kouffa, who was preaching in Pulaar, the language of the Fulani people. This was meant to appeal to the broad Fulani audience across the region, which he made clear by calling upon Fulanis to mobilize for the jihadist cause, not only in Mali but also in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon. To this point, JNIM has sought to capitalize on their successes in recruiting Fulanis amid these intercommunal conflicts. This not only aims to mobilize Fulanis for jihadist effots but speaks to JNIM’s wider regional goals in terms of expanding its influence throughout West Africa.

Increased security response, escalating reports of human rights abuses risks alienating local population from government, while role of international forces likely to grow

As attacks have multiplied across the country, security forces have consequently launched a number of campaigns targeting militants in Sahel, Est, Centre-Est, Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, with at least 17 operations reported since September 2018. While these may have been effective to some degree, the intensified response has also exposed Burkinabe security forces’ indiscipline and overall lack of capabilities. This was exemplified by the military’s claim to have killed 146 militants in a security operation in Loroum Province, Nord Region and Kossi Province, Boucle du Mouhoun Region on February 4. Human rights organizations later documented evidence that the victims were largely civilians who had been killed while asleep, with no indication that they were linked to militants. This aligns with repeated reports of security forces carrying out extrajudicial killings and arbitrarily detaining locals.

The claim to have killed such a large number of militants was likely meant simply for government propaganda to portray the military as successful. However, reports have shown security forces to use violence against civilians for the purpose of deterring them from collaborating with militants as well as to punish them for supporting any militant groups. Such behavior has the dual effect of alienating local populations, which then hampers security forces’ efforts to collect intelligence or otherwise utilize the cooperation of local residents, as well as further driving jihadist recruitment. This additionally overlaps with existing ethnic dynamics, with security operations in heavily Fulani areas particularly causing resentment and motivating local collaboration with jihadist groups, which portray themselves as defenders of the Fulani. FORECAST: In the absence of accountability for security forces, as well as the continued proliferation of militant attacks like to create similar security responses, this cycle is expected to continue, with further abuses against civilians pushing further cooperation between locals and militants.

Other government efforts also risk alienating the population in separate ways. In recognition of the role that mining facilities can play for jihadists, new measures were launched to conduct security operations in and around these sites. The Governor of Est Region’s March 20 announcement that all mining sites in the entire region would be shut down, followed by the High Commissioner of Yagha Province in Sahel Region announcing the same on March 22, suggests a deliberate effort to clear these crucial economic sites of militants.
FORECAST: However, the full closure of these mines will likely impact the local economy, as they provide a significant amount of employment for thousands of local residents. Removing their source of employment is liable to create resentment toward the government as well as increase the susceptibility of locals to joining jihadist groups over discontent as well as a financial incentive.

In addition, there has been increased French involvement in Burkina Faso in recent months. France has periodically supported Burkinabe security forces in recent years, with the bulk of Operation “Barkhane” focused on combating militancy and crime in Mali but operating throughout the region, including in Niger and Chad. This growing French involvement has largely taken the form of air operations, with French aircraft supporting Burkinabe forces in Est Region in October 2018 and in Sahel Region in January, though there have also been sporadic reports of French ground forces in Burkina Faso close to the border of Mali.
FORECAST: French air support is likely to increase in the coming months, particularly in light of Burkina Faso’s air force having few aircraft and generally inexperienced pilots and crew. More broadly, as militancy continues to spread throughout much of Burkina Faso, including incidents along the borders of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin, France will likely be additionally motivated to assist in a large-scale effort to prevent the destabilization of the wider region.

Militants to reinforce gains, continue expanding in central, western provinces, while pursuing wider regional vision

As has been seen with JNIM’s activity in Mali, it is likely that militant groups will seek to cement their gains in Burkina Faso while also keeping an eye toward steady expansion. FORECAST: This will mean that the bulk of JNIM and Ansarul Islam’s attacks will remain in Sahel, Nord, and Est regions to solidify their grip on those regions, with individuals or facilities linked to security forces and the government being the primary target. At the same time, the pace of attacks in other areas will likely be continuous if somewhat less frequent, with Boucle du Mouhoun, Centre-Nord, and Centre-Est the most prominent areas of targeted expansion over the coming weeks and months, with Hauts Bassins and Cascades likely to be a longer-term goal. This large geographical focus is somewhat ambitious but is likely to be effective given that Burkinabe security forces lack a comprehensive strategy or the capabilities necessary to secure much of these regions. Even if international forces increase their intervention, it is likely that Burkina Faso will increasingly see a scenario similar to Mali’s, in which some regions of the country are within jihadist areas of control while the government is only able to secure a wider zone in the vicinity of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso.

FORECAST: This will necessarily increase the threat against Ouagadougou as well. The capital city has periodically been the target of large-scale militant attacks, with JNIM and its constituent groups conducting attacks against government targets, hotels, and restaurants in Ouagadougou in March 2018, August 2017, and January 2016. Moreover, there have been other intermittent reports of security forces foiling attacks in Ouagadougou, such as in December 2018 and May 2018, suggesting that this aim remains a priority for militants in the region even as the insurgency intensifies in the rural areas of Burkina Faso. There is continued evidence of some militant presence operating in Ouagadougou and an attack against a Western or high-profile target remains possible, even as Burkinabe and French intelligence mobilize particularly to prevent it.

As militant groups strengthen their grip on the outlying regions of Burkina Faso, this will also increasingly affect the security posture of the countries on its borders. In addition to heavy activity by JNIM and ISGS along the border with Niger, JNIM attacks have already been reported along the borders of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin. Further movement into those countries would adhere to the wider vision of jihadist groups that seek to spread their influence throughout the region. FORECAST: Given the speed with which militancy has spread to the southern border, these neighboring countries are expected to bolster their security presence to the degree that they are able. While all four countries are generally stronger than Burkina Faso at this point, political instability or unrest in countries such as Togo and Ivory Coast may affect their ability to deploy enough forces to secure their northern borders. Accordingly, this heightens the potential for militancy to spill over into these countries, which would likely be in the form of small-scale attacks against security forces relatively close to Burkina Faso. With that said, this is likely to be a much more limited threat and part of a longer-term effort with the focus on Burkina Faso as conditions continue to deteriorate across the country.

Recommendations

Travel to Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso may continue while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding crime and potential militancy.

Avoid nonessential travel to outlying areas of Burkina Faso given the ongoing threat of militancy and violent crime, while avoiding all travel to Sahel, Est, Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions due to the risk of attacks.

Avoid all travel to areas along the border with Mali and Niger given the threat of cross-border militancy and violent crime, including abductions.

Growing wedge between al-Qaeda affiliates in Maghreb and Sahel to have adverse impact on long-term capabilities – Algeria & Mali Analysis

Executive Summary

The mass surrendering of Mali-based Algerian fighters, as well as militants in southern Algeria, is increasingly driving a wedge between al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM) in Mali, which may force the groups to shift from regional operations to a more local focus.

So far in 2018, 120 militants have surrendered to Algerian security forces compared to 28 in 2017, and most of them are likely a part of the AQIM contingent in southern Algeria and northern Mali.

Despite this trend, and the reduction in their propaganda, the Mali-based al-Qaeda coalition JNIM, were able to maintain, and in some cases improve, their scope and scale of operations in 2018.

While groups in Mali may seek to use Niger as an substitute option for logistical purposes, should these trends persist and no effective alternatives be utilized, it will inevitably have an adverse effect on AQIM and JNIM’s operational capabilities in the coming months and years.

Current Situation

According to reports from April 2018, “France, Algeria, and Mali are operating a secret agreement, signed in July 2017, to offer Sahel militants immunity in return for them laying down arms…this policy will give them immunity from prosecution.”

So far in 2018, 120 militants have surrendered in Algeria to the People’s National Army (ANP), compared to a total of 28 militants in 2017. Moreover, in 2018, 114 out of the 120 who surrendered did so in Adrar and Tamanrasset provinces, located just north of Algeria’s border with Mali and Niger, while in 2017, 21 out of the 28 militants who surrendered did so in Adrar and Tamanrasset provinces.

Additionally, according to reports from May, Algeria expelled 105 Malians on charges of links to Ansar Dine, a Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam waal Muslimeen (JNIM) constituent group. According to Algerian authorities, it was facing an influx of illegal migrants from Mali and Niger into its southern border provinces.

However, in Mali, JNIM has consistently carried out about 35 attacks per month in 2018 thus far, an increase from 2017, which saw approximately 25 attacks per month following the coalition’s founding in March. The primary exception was in July 2018, when JNIM increased its activity in efforts to undermine the presidential elections. As a whole, the majority of JNIM’s attacks are smaller-scale, though they have conducted at least 36 complex attacks in 2018.

Background

AQIM’s roots can be traced back to the Salafist Group for Preachment and Combatant (GSPC), an offshoot of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which fought in the Algerian civil war of the 1990s. In 2006-7, the GSPC distanced itself from the GIA, largely due to the fact that the GIA had lost much of its local support due to indiscriminate killings, and aligned itself with al-Qaeda.

As al-Qaeda’s strongest affiliate in Africa at the time, AQIM in Algeria supported jihadist efforts in other parts of the Maghreb, including in Mali. However, intensive counter-militancy campaigns by the ANP, which involved the use of airstrikes as well as ground raids, gradually reduced the power and influence of AQIM in Algeria, and drove some if its fighters and assets into northern Mali.

In March 2017 in Mali, AQIM’s Sahara branch, al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine, and Macina Liberation Front announced that they would be unifying under a single al-Qaeda coalition, JNIM. Although the individual groups have continued to act within their general spheres of influence in the northern and central regions, JNIM has presented a united front for its strategic and militant operations in Mali.

This completed a shifting of AQIM’s center of gravity from Algeria to Mali, with JNIM now the strongest and most potent al-Qaeda group in the region and Algeria serving mostly an auxiliary effort. However, this move was likely only reluctantly accepted by AQIM in Algeria, whose Emir, Abdelmalek Droukdel (also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud), an important figure within al-Qaeda’s hierarchy, seeks to restore the lost prestige of the organization.

Assessments & Forecast

Militant surrenders in southern Algeria likely to persist given militants’ apparent low morale

The ANP’s counter-militancy campaign has been largely successful in dislodging the threat of militancy in Algeria, as highlighted by the lack of a large-scale militant attack on Algerian soil in at least two years. The success of this campaign can be attributed to its focus on four key variables: the militant group’s ranks, support base, infrastructure, and supply lines. First, by targeting fighters, the ANP has significantly diminished the ranks of AQIM in both northern and southern Algeria. Second, at the same time, the security apparatus has attempted to dismantle the local support base of militants in these regions in order to deprive them of the ability to evade security operations. This is in light of the fact that a local support base, which is sustained due to a high rate of radicalization among youth residing in outlying areas of Algeria, provides militants with a pool of potential recruits as well as logistical support, likely in the form of safehouses, supplies, and information on security forces’ movements. Third, this counter-militancy campaign has resulted in the large-scale dismantling of militant infrastructure, which includes hideouts and weapons caches located in the mountainous parts of northern Algeria. Finally, Algeria has tightened its security along its porous borders with Mali, Niger, Tunisia, and Libya. This includes increased checkpoints as well as patrols along these borders in order to prevent the cross-border smuggling of fighters, weapons, and supplies into the country.

Over recent months, the majority of AQIM’s activity has become restricted to areas along the Tunisian border, such as Tebessa and Khenchela provinces, as this region allows the militant group to coordinate with its affiliate in western Tunisia. Therefore, in response, the Algerian security apparatus increased its intelligence sharing and cooperation with the Tunisian security apparatus in order to combat this threat of cross-border militancy. This strategy has been particularly successful for both sides, as demonstrated by several instances in which the ANP has successfully neutralized militants who escaped the jurisdiction of the Tunisian military by crossing the border into Algeria.

Aside from this, the ANP has been very successful in dismantling the senior local leadership of AQIM since the beginning of 2018. According to the Algerian Ministry of Defense, the ANP arrested two senior AQIM leaders in Skikda Province in July, and killed eight senior AQIM leaders in counter-militancy operations in Jijel Province in February. These factors have likely had a significant adverse impact on the Sunni jihadist groups’ prestige in Algeria. This, in turn, is liable to have impacted the morale of their fighters in the country, who have may have become disillusioned. Taking all these factors into consideration and combining them with reports of an “amnesty deal” put in place by Algeria, France, and Mali, may give a plausible explanation for the large-scale surrenders of militants to the authorities in Tamanrasset Province since the beginning of January 2018.

The timing of this amnesty agreement, when conjoined with the low morale of ground fighters, would provide for the required incentive needed for militants to voluntarily surrender to authorities. In light of southern Algeria’s porous borders with northern Mali, it is highly possible that militants who have managed to infiltrate from Mali into Algeria are capitalizing on Algerian authorities’ reintegration policies to leave AQIM. While several of these militants have been of Malian nationality, the majority of them are Algerians who were fighting for JNIM in Mali, indicating that the amnesty deal only applies for militants of Algerian nationality. This is further underscored by Algeria’s decision to extradite 105 Malian nationals suspected of belonging to JNIM’s Ansar Dine.
FORECAST: Therefore, this ongoing trend of Mali-based militants attempting to surrender to the ANP in southern Algeria will likely continue over the coming months. The majority of these militants will likely be of Algerian nationality as they attempt to return to the country to seek advantage of the reported “amnesty deal”.

FORECAST: However, AQIM leadership continues to be interested in maintaining an operational base in Algeria, likely due to the country’s historical and symbolic significance to the group. This has been demonstrated by an uptick in militant attacks conducted by the group in Algeria over recent months. As the group’s leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, is likely still alive, he will attempt to keep the group active for as long as possible. Therefore, the coming months may see an increase in militant attacks in Algeria. These will be focused in areas that have been considered relatively secure and witness lower security protocols. However, militant groups in the country likely do not possess the necessary capabilities to mount a large-scale attack at this time and such attacks will likely utilize low sophistication IEDs or ambushes.

JNIM continues to pose a significant threat to Mali’s security, further attacks are expected to occur in coming months

Since its founding, JNIM has exhibited a strong media strategy, frequently publishing claims of responsibility for attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso that detail the incidents and their locations as well as releasing sophisticated video propaganda. However, a downtick in publications since mid-2018 has created the perception that JNIM’s activity itself may have also declined. This perception was heightened as it came alongside reports of the amnesty deal in Algeria, as well as a series of French “decapitation” airstrikes that targeted JNIM leaders and positions in northern Mali’s Timbuktu and Mopti regions. However, despite these factors, as demonstrated, JNIM has remained as active as ever in its main theater of operations in northern and central Mali. In contrast, the group has conducted approximately ten more attacks per month in 2018 than they were able to do in 2017, suggesting that any loss of fighters has not been detrimental to their operations.

The numbers indicate that, since their emergence in March 2017, JNIM has conducted about 600 attacks in Mali, including at least 355 in 2018 alone. The vast majority of these attacks are small-scale, including tactics such as emplacing IEDs, shootings, and simple ambushes. These have enabled the militants to target and undermine security forces across a wide geographical area and reinforce their presence. At the same time, JNIM has also been able to carry out complex and large-scale attacks at least once a month, generally against high-profile targets such as airports or military camps. A multi-pronged attack against a French-UN base at the Timbuktu Airport in April 2018 highlights their offensive capabilities, as it involved at least three suicide vehicle-borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) disguised as UN and Malian army vehicles entering the base and detonating, as well as exchanges of rocket and small-arms fire. This exemplifies their persistent ability to exploit security forces’ vulnerabilities and marshal the necessary manpower and firepower to conduct sophisticated attacks against even fortified targets.

To this point, it appears that the surrender of Algerian militants has had little to no direct impact on JNIM or the overall security landscape in Mali. Although AQIM originated in Algeria, the base of the organization’s power has clearly shifted to Mali. With the exception of Yahya Abu Hammam, the emir of AQIM’s Sahara branch, JNIM’s top leadership is Malian, with the Tuareg Malian Iyad Ag Ghaly at the head of the group. It is possible that the departure of any Algerian jihadists has had little impact due to a successful transfer of knowledge in terms of weapons or capabilities to the Malian organizations over the years. Moreover, as al-Qaeda groups expanded into Mali from Algeria, they entrenched themselves in local communities and built recruitment networks that are based in local ethnic dynamics, with Tuaregs and Fulanis in particular representing a significant constituency for JNIM’s component groups. These populations would then mitigate the loss of any Algerian jihadists.

FORECAST: Given these trends and the difficulty that domestic and international armed forces have had in degrading JNIM, there is little to indicate that the pace and scale of attacks in northern and central Mali will be reduced in the immediate term. The group continues to retain the knowledge, resources, and capabilities to be a significant threat in their area of operations in Mali as well as the tri-border region with Burkina Faso and Niger. Their activity is likely to persist along the same lines, largely as small-scale, low-capability attacks against security forces, while larger, more complex assaults against high-profile targets will occur intermittently.

Changing dynamics to disrupt cooperation between AQIM in Algeria, JNIM in Mali, potentially to force shift from regional to local operations, hinder operational capabilities

As noted, the unprecedented uptick in Algerian militants crossing the border from Mali in order to surrender to the ANP appears to confirm the reports of an amnesty deal. Moreover, the effect is almost exclusively restricted to southern Algeria, with only 6 of the 120 militants who surrendered having done so in northern Algeria, indicating that most of the militants who turned themselves in were part of AQIM’s contingents in southern Algeria and northern Mali. While the impetus is clearly the low morale of the fighters, the reason why this is only affecting Algerian fighters in southern Algeria and northern Mali and not the ones in northern Algeria remains unclear. Reasons can range from a rift between the Algerian “foreigners” and the local fighters in Mali over prestige to objectives of the militancy campaign to Algerian fighters simply becoming disillusioned and exhausted after many years of fighting abroad.
FORECAST: While the reasons remain speculative, the ramifications are clear, namely the deteriorating ability of AQIM in Algeria and JNIM in Mali to cooperate, which may in turn lead to an effective split between the groups.

This process is driven by the changing dynamic on the ground rather than a shift in strategy by al-Qaeda. Depleting number of Algerians in Mali means that there are fewer people who can serve as liaisons between AQIM and JNIM, and fewer people who can exploit their naturally better knowledge of Algeria to physically assist in cross-border activities. This is aggravated by the dwindling number of AQIM militants operating in southern Algeria due to the surrenders, which adds a geographical dimension to the distancing of the groups.
FORECAST: This would lead to more difficulties in the physical transfer of weapons, recruits, and supplies, as well as the exchange of knowledge and information.

Some of these losses can be compensated for by al-Qaeda. For example, AQIM in Algeria has increased its interaction and cooperation with its affiliate in Tunisia, Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade (OIB), and a persistent presence of al-Qaeda elements in southern Libya can also serve as a mitigating factor to the reduced interaction between Algeria and Mali. Nonetheless, they cannot fully replace the critical Algeria-Mali link, simply because of the distance, which would overstretch some elements of al-Qaeda’s supply lines from the Mediterranean coast into the Sahel. These can therefore not fully compensate for the wedge being driven between AQIM in Algeria and JNIM in Mali.

FORECAST: Overall, this means that the prospects for cross-border militant activity in cooperation between AQIM and JNIM has likely significantly dwindled and will continue along those lines in the coming months, forcing both groups to assume a much more local approach instead of being a part of a regional effort. Those in Mali may attempt to replace the use of southern Algeria with an alternative, such as using Mauritania and Niger for the movement of weapons, supplies, and manpower. In this regard, northern Niger is a more likely option for logistical purposes, as it would provide Mali-based groups with potential direct routes to Libya, whereas Mauritania would be a more roundabout and difficult approach. However, should the trends in Algeria persist, with no effective alternatives being utilized, it will inevitably have negative implications for both groups’ operational capabilities.

Recommendations

Algeria

Travel to Algiers and Oran may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations.

Avoid nonessential travel to Kabylie, due to the heightened threat of militant attacks and general unrest in the region. Those conducting business essential travel to the region are advised to avoid the mountains between Tizi Ouzou, Bouira and Saharidj due to the heightened militant presence and activities in this area.

We advise against all nonessential travel to Algeria’s outlying areas. For business-essential visits, consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations and ground support options.

In Algiers and other major cities, remain vigilant in the vicinities of public squares, government buildings, and police stations, as these serve as focal points for protests and militant attacks.

Mali

Travel to Bamako may continue time while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding criminal activity and potential militancy.

We advise against all travel to northern and central Mali, as well as its border regions with Niger and Burkina Faso, given the threat from militant and rebel groups operating in the area, as well as ongoing ethnic tensions.

West Africa Analysis: Islamic State recognizes ISGS as West African affiliate following increased attacks in recent months, despite 17 month silence

Executive Summary:

  • The Islamic State-linked Amaq News Agency issued a statement on October 30, recognizing Islamic State in the Greater Sahara’s (ISGS) pledge of allegiance to Islamic State (IS) following 17 months of silence after the group’s initial pledge in May 2015. The initial silence, which is not characteristic of IS, appears to illustrate lack of coordination between ISGS leader, Abu Walid al-Sahraoui, and IS, as well as doubts in ISGS’s capabilities.
  • Islamic State’s decision to accept ISGS was likely influenced by recent spate of ISGS attacks in border area between Niger and Burkina Faso, through which the latter illustrated some level of capabilities, whereas this was previously in question. The acceptance of ISGS was also connected to Islamic State losses in other theaters, such as Libya, Iraq, and Syria, and the need for the organization to illustrate continued strength and expanding geographical scope.
  • IS’s recognition will likely bolster ISGS’s standing in region, likely enhancing recruitment capabilities. ISGS to carry out further attacks in coming months, in effort to build regional status, both along Burkina Faso-Niger-Mali border areas. Furthermore, while their capabilities remain to be seen, they may seek to carry out more high-profile attacks in West Africa for similar purposes. However, ISGS is not likely to emerge as considerable rival to al-Qaeda linked groups in the area due to latter’s entrenchment.
  • Those operating in or traveling to the West Africa region are advised to contact us for itinerary-based consultations and ground support options.
Islamic State acknowledgement of ISGS and accompanying video of al-Sahraoui pledging allegiance
Islamic State acknowledgement of ISGS and accompanying video of al-Sahraoui pledging allegiance

Current Situation:

  • Islamic State (IS)-linked Amaq News Agency released a statement on October 30, in which they acknowledge the pledge of allegiance from Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahraoui and his Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) militant group. Amaq also published an accompanying video, dated to October 30, in which al-Sahraoui and his men  pledge their allegiance to IS and leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Al-Sahraoui previously pledged allegiance to IS in May 2015 on behalf of al-Mourabitoun, when he was the disputed leader of the group, which was a merger between Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s al-Mulathameen Brigade and Movement for Oneness [Tawhid] and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), where al-Sahraoui was previously a spokesperson.
  • The 2015 statement by al-Sahraoui was denied by Belmokhtar, who reaffirmed al-Mourabitoun’s allegiance to al-Qaeda and leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Belmokhtar emphasized that al-Sahraoui was speaking on his own behalf. This led to infighting between supporters of the rival factions of al-Mourabitoun, during which al-Sahraoui and his supporters lost considerably, with reports that al-Sahraoui was severely wounded, and afterwards, the group was inactive.
  • While not being active following their May 2015 pledge, ISGS has claimed responsibility for a handful of attacks in Burkina Faso and Niger in recent months. ISGS first claimed responsibility for an attack on a border post in the Oudalan Province of Burkina Faso that killed two during the overnight hours of September 1-2. Later on, the group claimed responsibility for attacking a security outpost in the town of Intagom, Burkina Faso, 5 km from the Malian border on October 12, killing three policemen. Furthermore, on October 17, the group claimed responsibility for an attempted prison break attack on the Koutoukale Prison in Niger, located 50 km northwest of Niamey. The Koutoukale Prison is a high-security prison that holds many suspected Boko Haram members, as well as jihadist militants of other groups. Additionally, there have been numerous attacks that have went unclaimed in Burkina Faso and Niger, which may have been conducted by ISGS.

Attacks in Tri-Border Area

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Assessments & Forecast:

  1. The nature of Islamic State’s acknowledgement of ISGS is notable due to numerous factors. For one, the extended silence by IS is not characteristic of the group, which is often quick to acknowledge pledges of allegiance even from smaller groups, similar to ISGS, often devoting considerable coverage to such affiliations, such as the Skikda Brigade and Jund al-Khilafah in Algeria, and al-Mumin’s al-Shabaab breakaway in Somalia. It was also presented in a much vaguer and low profile manner when compared to other groups pledging allegiance to IS in the past. Previous claims are also often preceded by “teaser” publications stating that an important announcement is coming soon. We assess that the silence was indicative of a lack of communication between al-Sahraoui and official IS networks, whereas pledges were often made following a period of direct communication with IS leadership. Additionally, IS likely had doubts regarding the capabilities of al-Sahraoui and his faction, especially following the fighting with Belmokhtar’s men. Al-Sahraoui’s credibility may have also been a source of concern for IS in light of the fact that his pledge, made on behalf of al-Mourabitoun, was rejected soon after by Belmokhtar.
  2. In this context, recent months have seen several attacks claimed by al-Sahraoui via al-Akhbar, a Mauritanian news outlet, while other attacks suspected to have been carried out by ISGS have gone unclaimed. The timing of the spate of attacks ahead of the announcement leads us to assess that this was either done to prove to IS that ISGS is a capable group, or because IS demanded such actions ahead of the acceptance of the pledge as a means to draw greater attention to the announcement. Additionally, the statement comes amid considerable IS territorial losses in the Middle East, including the almost complete loss of its strongholds in Libya, the loss of the symbolic city of Dabiq in Syria, the namesake of their monthly magazine, and  the ongoing battle being waged by various armed forces to recapture  Mosul, Iraq from IS.  With this in mind, the affirmation of an affiliate group in the western Sahel, especially one that has been carrying out more attacks in recent months, is likely an attempt by IS to bolster perceptions of its strength and global reach in an effort to maintain relevance and appeal.
  3. FORECAST: Going forward, we assess that the affiliation is likely to bolster ISGS’ status in the region, possibly assisting in their recruitment efforts. Additionally, ISGS will be able to claim responsibility through official IS and IS-linked publications, giving them wider recognition, under a larger umbrella, rather than through al-Akhbar, as was the case in the past. Regarding its operations, ISGS will likely continue carrying out attacks along the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso borders in coming months, with an expected focus on security forces. The majority of these attacks will likely continue to be small-scale ones, but ones such as the attempted Koutoukale Prison break are also anticipated. At the same time, the group may also attempt a more high profile attack, in urban centers within these countries, and possibly others in West Africa, in order to announce their presence in the region in a “louder” manner.
  4. FORECAST: Nevertheless, al Qaeda and its regional affiliates, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine are expected to remain the prominent jihadist militant groups in the western Sahel, and are deeply entrenched and influential in the region, in part due to the local and popular focus of their activities and messaging. ISGS remains a small group, with limited resources and capabilities, which is unlikely to see an exceptional shift at this time, even after the official affiliation to IS.
  5. This is due to al-Qaeda’s strength in the region, as well as the fact that IS is currently struggling in the Middle East, and at this stage it appears that the group has limited resources to disperse to its affiliates such as ISGS. FORECAST: Instead, IS will likely seek to divert efforts to other more established and priority locations, such as Libya and even, to a lesser extent Nigeria. This was highlighted by recent the recent statement from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi for IS supporters who can not reach Syria or Iraq to instead go to Libya. At the same time, with IS losses in Libya, there is a distinct possibility for some militants from there, especially ones from West Africa, to join ISGS.

Recommendations:

Those operating in or traveling to the West Africa region are advised to contact us for itinerary-based consultations and ground support options.

MAX Analysis Mali: Government, Tuareg relations deteriorate ahead of July 16 meeting; revamped French mission likely to improve security in long term July 15, 2014

MAX Analysis - Mali
MAX Analysis – Mali

Current Situation
A meeting between Tuareg separatists and the Bamako government is scheduled to take place on July 16 in Algiers. This will be the first meeting between the Tuareg rebels and the Bamako government since violent protests in May during the visit of Prime Minister Moussa Mara to Kidal, which was followed by the Malian army’s attack of rebel positions, in which 50 government troops were killed.

  • Despite the planned holding of an international dialogue in Algiers on July 16, there has been a clear deterioration in the security situation in the north of the country and militants have reportedly deployed to key locations, stockpiling weapons and food in an apparent preparation for a return to conflict.
  • Clashes were reported in Anefife, near Kidal on July 11 in which at least 35 combatants were killed. Anefife was previously under the control of the Tuareg rebel National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). An MNLA statement claimed that the group attacked a coalition of pro-Bamako militias including the Arab Movement for Azawad (MAA), elements of the Malian Army, and militants of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA). Military sources have denied these claims, attributing the violence to in-fighting amongst separatists, and claiming that the majority of those killed were members of the MNLA and the MAA.

Continue reading MAX Analysis Mali: Government, Tuareg relations deteriorate ahead of July 16 meeting; revamped French mission likely to improve security in long term July 15, 2014

Intelligence Analysis: Jihadist influences in Tanzania

“I pointed out to you the stars, and all you saw was the tip of my finger.” Today, this locally revered Tanzanian proverb should resonate deeply within the minds of anyone who fears the spread of Islamic extremism in Africa. On Tanzania’s island paradise of Zanzibar, the killing of a Catholic priest by Muslim extremists on February 23 points to series of mounting and long-ignored signals that the continent’s jihadist wave is expanding south and affecting security. Since October 2012, this traditionally tranquil tourism hub has been awash with sectarian strife. It began when a dispute between two local schoolchildren resulted in the defilement of a Koran, sparking outrage in Tanzania’s large Muslim community.At least four churches across the country were attacked in the aftermath, in what may just prove to be a watershed moment in Tanzania’s modern history.

In February 2013, religious tensions in Zanzibar continued to simmer due to a dispute over butchering rights, sparking titfor- tat attacks between Christians and Muslims, ultimately resulting in the beheading of one priest and the fatal shooting of another inside his own church. A self-proclaimed local al-Qaida branch calling itself “Muslim Renewal,” took credit for the shooting as its inaugural attack.Fourteen years before the Zanzibar unrest, Tanzania took center stage, with all fingers pointing at al-Qaida militants after a deadly bombing attack at the US embassy in Dar es-Salaam. This event, along with the bombing of the United States embassy in Nairobi, brought names like Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al- Zawahiri into the public sphere for the first time. Then-US president Bill Clinton responded by launching cruise missiles at al-Qaida bases in Sudan and Afghanistan. Despite the participation of local East Africans in the attacks, however, few concrete measures were taken to curb radicalization in the region.

Muslim residents of Zanzibar set fire to a Christian church.
Muslim residents of Zanzibar set fire to a Christian church.

By May 2012, the global jihad network would rear its ugly head in Tanzania once more, after a bombing attack occurred in the Kenyan capital, targeting a prominent shopping district. While blame was placed squarely on Somalia’s al-Shabaab, the arrest of a German national in Tanzania in connection to the attack largely went unnoticed. The man, reportedly of Turkish descent, had undergone training in al- Qaida camps in Pakistan.
Continue reading Intelligence Analysis: Jihadist influences in Tanzania

Intelligence Analysis: Jihadist militant threats in North Africa and the Sahel

By now the name Mokhtar Belmokhtar is familiar to anyone watching security-related events unfold in Saharan Africa. Since a January 16 raid executed by his “Masked Brigade” in Algeria, which led to the deaths of dozens of hostages, the one-eyed smuggler extraordinaire’s picture has been broadcast across TV and computer screens worldwide. As Western policymakers continue to adjust their strategy in the war on terror, it is important to understand Belmokhtar’s accomplishment in its true context: a victory of a thriving jihadist operational network.

The logo of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
The logo of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

As it turns out, the Masked Brigade’s attack was not, as reports originally indicated, a reprisal for French intervention in northern Mali. In fact, Western security officials recently stated that the attack was planned before January 11, when France intervened. This instead was simply intended to be a standard kidnap-and-ransom mission – a fundraiser and terrorist attack rolled into one.

However, northern Mali does play a role in the attack’s execution. The region has become a sanctuary for militants from Nigeria to Somalia who need free range to learn from experienced veterans of Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Belmokhtar’s men trained for and planned their attack in northern Mali. They raised funds by ransoming kidnap victims and smuggling drugs, as well as Belmokhtar’s trademark product, Marlboro cigarettes. They also smuggled fighters and weapons, many of which came from the caches of Libya’s former dictator, Moammar Ghaddafi.

Continue reading Intelligence Analysis: Jihadist militant threats in North Africa and the Sahel