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Iran likely to influence Iraqi government in proceeding forcibly against Kurdistan Regional Government – Iraq Analysis

Current Situation

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Following the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) passing of an independence referendum on September 25, the Iraqi army, along with Iranian-backed Shiite Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), entered and took control of Kirkuk Province. Since then, hostilities between pro-Iraqi government forces and Kurdish Peshmerga forces have halted as both sides engage in negotiations. The president of the KRG, Masoud Barzani, resigned on October 29, calling into question the future of northern Iraq. Islamic State (IS) has already taken advantage of the disarray to launch its own attacks in attempts to make a comeback as it faces major setbacks elsewhere.

Negotiations between KRG and Baghdad

Negotiations between the Iraqi central government and the KRG remain at a stalemate and were partially stalled following the 7.3 magnitude earthquake taking place along the Iraqi-Iranian border.

Control of border posts is the most recent contentious issue between the two parties. The KRG offered a proposal to share control of the 29 border crossings currently under Kurdish Peshmerga administration; however, the Iraqi government rejected this offer and demanded they be handed over. Iraqi officials threatened military action if border posts remain in KRG-control, but no such actions by the army have taken.

Oil is also a heavily debated issue between the two sides, especially as the KRG economy is heavily reliant on oil revenues. Kirkuk Province previously served as the main supply for oil for the KRG prior to the Iraqi government’s seizure. Officials in the KRG stated that Baghdad was no longer sending oil like it did in the past, to which the Iraqi government responded by guaranteeing fuel deliveries in the coming weeks.

The Iraqi government continues to take punitive measures against the KRG as negotiations remain ongoing. The Central Bank’s decision to call on all banks to “halt operations” in the KRG “indefinitely” and the banning of international flights to and from northern Iraq are examples and both policies remain in place.

In terms of hostilities, fighting between both sides decreased significantly in recent weeks.

Iran likely to influence Iraqi government in proceeding forcibly against Kurdistan Regional Government - Iraq Analysis | MAX Security — Pro-Iraqi government forces at Semalka border crossing between northern Iraq & Turkey

Politics in the KRG

Tensions remain between the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the opposing Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), as the former holds a grudge for the latter’s decision to coordinate with the Iraqi central government and allow troops into Kirkuk at the start of the offensive.

Political tensions led to the resignation of former KRG President Masoud Barzani, whose roles were absorbed by his grandson Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani. For the most part, the prime minister continued expressing the views of his grandfather, stating that the Iraqi government was “violating the constitution” by initiating talks with individual provinces in the KRG, instead of with the Kurdish government as a whole.

Iranian involvement

Following Iranian-backed Shiite Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) heavy support for the Iraqi government in the taking of KRG territory, Tehran stayed involved in the negotiation process and in Iraqi internal affairs.

On November 11, Baghdad and Tehran agreed to export oil from Kirkuk Province to Iran. According to the deal, over 30,000 barrels of oil a day would be exported to western Iran and in exchange, Iranian oil will be sent to southern Iraq.

Additionally, Iraq’s electoral commission authorized two more PMU groups’ political wings to run in upcoming elections in 2018, despite a law prohibiting individuals associated with the PMU from running for political office. The Iranian-backed Kataib al-Tayyar al-Risali and Asaib Ahl al-Haq groups’ political wings were both approved by the electoral commission.

US position

Since the start of the conflict, the US government avoided taking sides and attempted to remain neutral. US officials provided no armed or financial support to either side during the hostilities and pushed for negotiations between the two parties.

Prime Minister Barzani, however, claimed that the US is not playing a neutral role and accused the US of taking Baghdad’s side in the conflict.

Islamic State (IS)

Twin suicide bombings targeted PMU offices in Kirkuk City on November 5, leading to multiple casualties. No group claimed responsibility, yet IS has already taken advantage of prior hostilities to make its own gains of small villages near Kirkuk. As hostilities between the Iraqi army and the Peshmerga have ceased, IS activity has been reduced.

Also, on November 16, IS-linked news agency reported the killing of five Iraqi troops in clashes near Kirkuk Province’s village of al-Riyadh, located about 45 southwest of Kirkuk City.

Assessments & Forecast

The Iraqi government and the KRG both have different core objectives in ongoing negotiations, which has likely led to the current stalemate. Baghdad seeks government control over the entire KRG region, including the armed Peshmerga, which Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said should immediately come under Iraqi command. To achieve this outcome, the Iraqi central government began implementing a “divide and conquer” strategy, namely by promoting divisions within the KRG. The Iraqi government already began holding separate meetings with individual local provincial councils and relying heavily on the opposition PUK. The KRG, however, seeks internal unity so it can negotiate with Iraqi authorities on equal ground. Prime Minister Barzani has led the charge on bringing all factions within the KRG together, as well as calling on Baghdad to honor the Iraqi constitution, which gives regional autonomy to the Kurds in northern Iraq.

A stalemate has ensued between the Iraqi government and the KRG as the parties have failed in settling multiple disputes, including control of the latter’s border posts. International actors now have a chance at shifting the direction of these talks in shaping the future of the KRG. Iran has taken initiative in this respect by pressuring the Iraqi government to stay forceful, as Tehran already did when encouraging Baghdad to seize control of Kirkuk. Iran benefits greatly from the ongoing conflict as the Iraqi government was forced to rely on the Iranian-backed elements of the PMU in order to proceed forward with gains in the KRG. A stronger PMU allows Iran to have greater influence in Iraq and thus, permits Tehran to further influence the future of the KRG. A weak KRG not only supports Tehran’s objectives in Iraq, but also serves as a major blow to Kurdish factions fighting in Iran, as the Peshmerga had been a prime example for Kurdish autonomy in the region. Additionally, a weaker Peshmerga would damage Kurdish militants’ capabilities in Iran itself as such elements are known to train in Iraq. Tehran would also be able to make it harder for these Kurdish-Iranian militants to travel back and forth between the countries.

The US is one party that could ultimately counter such Iranian influence in Iraq. While the US has attempted to stay neutral, it has released statements over the past week demonstrating opposition to the Iraqi army’s military operations in areas other than Kirkuk Province. As hostilities have stalled, however, the US refrained from backing any of the parties and has sent delegates to the region to encourage negotiations. Overall, the US has offered weak responses to Iran’s rising influence in the country, namely through their PMU proxies. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s call for Iranian-backed militias to “go home” stands as the only stated opposition to actions supported by the Iraqi government to date. Additionally, US President Donald Trump’s “America First” platform is only likely to further discourage any serious action by the US, despite Trump’s persistent opposition to Iranian actions taken in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia also has the potential to impact the Iraqi government and sway it away from Iran. The Saudi government made such attempts in October by signing agreements with Iraq which involved multiple political and economic deals including the relaunching of certain flights between the countries and working together to develop new ports and highways. While this approach may strengthen the Iraqi-Saudi alliance, the Saudis are still being cautious, which contrasts greatly from Iran’s more aggressive actions. Iranian-backed Shiite militias would also view such relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia as negative, thus potentially damaging Baghdad’s control of these units and causing further tensions in Iraq between Sunni and Shiite communities.

Without any party willing or fully able to counter Iran’s heavy influence in the country, the Iraqi central government is likely to stay aggressive in its demands going forward, including continuing to call for full control of all border crossings and potentially other disputed territories currently held by the KRG. The Iraqi government’s divide and conquer strategy will likely succeed over Prime Minister Barzani’s attempts to unite the KRG given these already existing internal divisions. Additionally, Barzani’s deep connections to the former president make him unlikely to be the figure that all elements in the KRG will stand behind. Instead, regional governments will likely seek a new KRG leader to support, potentially turning to the PUK, which could thus strengthen the Iraqi government’s hand in negotiations once again.

If negotiations remain at a stalemate and Baghdad is unable to convince the KRG to hand over border crossings and other disputed territories, the PMU may lead the charge in aggressively seizing these areas, even if it goes against the Iraqi government’s wishes. Shiite militiamen have been successful in controlling and administering their own territories close to the KRG border, including in Salahuddin Province’s Tuz Khurmatu, where unconfirmed reports have recently indicated that the PMU has strengthen their numbers. Iraqi authorities’ reluctance to proceed with more force may be countered with Iranian pressure to seek military solutions to the current disputes. Spokesmen of these militias have stated in the past their willingness to turn on the Iraqi government if Iran demanded it, thus underscoring the danger that such militias could ultimately present.

The PMU’s taking of such actions could also provide a larger opening for IS to take advantage of the disarray, as already witnessed in recent weeks. The jihadist group lost its last urban stronghold in Anbar Province on November 17, largely forcing them to retreat to the desert with no territory left to hold. Such developments have pushed the jihadist militants to be more active on other fronts where sleeper cells and sympathizers for the group exist. This includes Kirkuk Province where IS militants have staged multiple attacks since the outbreak of this conflict. While the jihadist group has not been able to consolidate any territorial gains, if the PMU stages offensives on Peshmerga-held areas, IS could change its situation very quickly and move in amidst the disarray to take small villages that it previously held. Additional IS attacks in Kirkuk Province remain likely to occur in the short term.

Recommendations

For those remaining in Baghdad, it is advised to ensure that contingency and emergency evacuation plans are updated. Contact us for itinerary and contingency support options.
We advise against nonessential travel to Basra. If travel is essential, contact us for itinerary-based consultation and on-ground support.

Travel to areas outside of Baghdad and Basra should be avoided at this time, particularly to the north and west of the country, including the Anbar, Nineveh, Salahuddin, Kirkuk, and Diyala Provinces due to ongoing combat operations. This is in addition to avoiding the Babil Province, south of Baghdad. Those operating in these regions are advised to contact us for itinerary and contingency support measures, including evacuation options, given the deterioration in the security situation. Consult with us before traveling to Kirkuk City.

Travel to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah may continue at this time while maintaining heightened vigilance and adhering to standard security precautions regarding the threat of militant attacks. Avoid all nonessential travel in the Kurdistan Regional Government outside of Sulaymaniyah and Erbil.

How will Kurdish referendum effect regional, national, and local ethnic tensions within Kurdistan Regional Government – Iraq Analysis

Current Situation

Reports indicate that the non-binding independence referendum in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held on September 25 passed with a majority of 91.8%. The Iraqi Government denounced the referendum. In reaction, it closed its border crossings into the KRG on September 25. Reports additionally indicate that on September 27, the Iraqi Parliament gave the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) a mandate to deploy troops to the Peshmerga-held Kirkuk region.

Reports from September 22 quoting KRG President Masoud Barzani, affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), indicate that the referendum’s goal is to grant the KRG leader the mandate to negotiate independence. According to unconfirmed reports from September 29, Barzani agreed to postpone the declaration of independence for two years in order to engage in negotiations with Baghdad.

Furthermore, the Iraqi Council of Ministers demanded that the KRG hand over all oil revenues, as well as Erbil International Airport (EBL) and Sulaymaniyah International Airport (ISU) to the central government. During the evening hours of September 29, Iraqi authorities closed the airspace over the KRG for international flights, resulting in the cancellation of flights to and from the Sulaymaniyah and Erbil Airports, with the exception of domestic flights. This followed the ultimatum issued by the Iraqi government to the KRG to cancel the September 25 independence referendum results by September 29 at 18:00 (local time).

Turkish Airlines, Egypt Air, the Lebanese carrier Middle East Airlines, and Royal Jordanian additionally announced a suspension of their flights. Since the results were announced, celebratory events took place throughout the region’s predominantly Kurdish-populated areas, including in Iran, Turkey, and Syria.

• On September 23, Turkey launched a military drill along the KRG border. While President Erdogan has threatened that “all military and economic measures are on the table”, Turkey’s Economy Minister Zeybekci stated on September 26 that he does not expect the referendum to impact trade relations between Turkey and the KRG at this point. At the time of writing, Turkey’s sole border crossing with the KRG, Habur, remains open. On September 28, Turkey’s Minister of Energy also threatened to impose sanctions on oil-related imports from KRG. Iran has threatened to cease all security cooperation with the KRG. Moreover, flights to KRG airports were reportedly suspended, while border crossings between Iran and the KRG were closed one day after the referendum

Assessments & Forecast

Over the short term, any concrete KRG steps towards independence remain unlikely to materialize, given the international community’s lack of acknowledgment, including by countries known for their military and economic support for Erbil, such as the US and the UK. Instead, President Barzani likely held the referendum at this point in order to deflect domestic criticism and bolster his status and popularity among the Kurdish population of the KRG. Such criticism is fanned by the fact that Barzani’s term expired in August 2015, with him staying in office after the Kurdistan Consultative Council extended his mandate for two more years. The measure has contributed to a persisting political crisis in the KRG, as evidenced by the fact that the Kurdistan Regional Parliament has been shut down since October 2015 due to growing disagreements between the KDP and opposition movement Gorran, particularly regarding the aforementioned extension of the presidential term. Barzani likely calculated that finally holding the referendum would assert his political control over the territory for the years to come. However, as Barzani previously stated, the referendum merely meant to grant the KRG the mandate to commence negotiations with the central government for independence, thus not entirely binding him to declare independence. Nonetheless, there remains a potential for some loss of credibility among the KRG’s Kurdish population in the long term, should the final goal of an independent Kurdish state fail to be achieved.

As highlighted by the Iraqi parliament’s mandate to deploy ISF troops to Kirkuk Province, tensions between the central government and Erbil are liable to remain heightened in the coming months. In addition to Baghdad’s interest in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, the KRG bears a significant economic importance, given its oil-rich regions, as well as its oil pipelines which run through its region towards Turkey. That being said, while minor skirmishes between ISF troops and Peshmerga fighters remain possible along the border of KRG-controlled territory and the central government, we assess that full-scale hostilities between the two parties remain less likely at this time. This is likely due to the fact such a scenario may weaken both parties, and thus pave the way for the Islamic State’s (IS) re-emergence in the country. FORECAST: Instead, Baghdad will likely impose political and economic sanctions on the KRG, which would potentially damage Erbil’s economy and cripple its ability to operate a sovereign state. This scenario is further likely in the event of similar sanction implementations by Turkey and Iran.

FORECAST: Within the KRG’s territory, the referendum is liable to exacerbate the longstanding internal sectarian tensions, particularly between the Kurdish population and the territory’s Arab and Turkmen minorities. This is further underlined by the reported clashes in Kirkuk Citybetween Kurds and Turkmen guards, during the night hours of September 18, in front of Turkmen Party Offices, which were triggered by the local Kurds’ celebration of the then-upcoming referendum, resulting in the killing of one Kurdish guard. Given the prevailing sense of marginalization among the Turkmen and Sunni Arab minorities, which would likely be enhanced in the event of the formation of a Kurdish state, it remains possible that some of these elements would be more susceptible to radicalization. In this context, the Sunni Arabs may even be prone to recruitment to Sunni jihadist militant groups, such as IS, as has been witnessed over the past several years. Regardless, localized ethnic-related hostilities between the aforementioned groups remain likely in the KRG over the coming weeks.

Regionally, the referendum is liable to enhance tensions with regional powers, such as Iran and Turkey. As underscored by the celebrations by Kurdish communities in these countries, this can likely be attributed to Tehran and Ankara’s growing concerns that the referendum will encourage the separatist aspirations of these countries’ Kurdish minorities and lead to increasing acts of militancy and civil unrest. With this in mind, Iran and Turkey’s posturing until this point likely intends to reduce the potential for such effects in these countries’ Kurdish-dominated areas. FORECAST: In Iran, groups such as the Party of Free Life

FORECAST: In Iran, groups such as the Party of Free Life for Kurdistan (PJAK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) may intensify the frequency of their attacks against government-affiliated interests throughout the country’s northwestern provinces. In Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as well as its radical offshoot the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) to a lesser extent, will intensify their militant operations across the country, especially across its predominantly Kurdish-populated southeastern regions.

That said, despite Turkey’s increasingly hostile rhetoric toward Erbil, significant punitive measures by Ankara remain unlikely at this time. This is likely because the latter is heavily invested in the KRG’s economy. The aforementioned statement by the Turkish economy minister indicates that economic sanctions on the KRG remain rather unlikely over the coming months. This assessment is backed by the fact that a potential closure of Habur border crossing, the main route for oil exports, would harm not only Turkey but also the Iraqi central government, which obtains the majority of its income from these oil sales. Additionally, should Turkey implement actual punitive measures against the KRG, it may impact the level of militancy across the country’s predominantly Kurdish-populated southern provinces. If Turkey significantly alienates the KRG, it would potentially lead to the latter’s support for Turkey’s main militant threat along the Iraqi-Turkish border, namely the PKK, as the group is known to cross the border back and forth. This is in contrast to the current relations between the two Kurdish groups, in which the PKK and the KDP-led KRG are currently in a state of rivalry.

Iran is highly threatened by a potential independent state, as it would likely have a pro-Western orientation, including in the form of friendly relations with Israel, which is the Islamic Republic’s main adversary in the region. Such a state may be perceived by the Iranians as a potential base of operations for its rivals. As a result, we assess that Tehran is likely to take more significant punitive measures against the KRG. However, should Tehran keep the border with the KRG closed over the long-term, this would be liable to result in increased unrest and an uptick in acts of militancy in Iran’s Kurdish-majority provinces. This is due to the fact that the Kurdish-majority population in the border area depends to a significant extent on cross-border trade, a major source of income for them. Given this possible negative fallout, Tehran may choose to reopen the border crossings over the coming weeks.

FORECAST: Regardless, the Iranian government will likely punish the KRG by instructing Iranian-backed Shiite militias to ignite hostilities with Kurdish Peshmerga forces in disputed areas in northern Iraq, particularly in the Kirkuk and Salahuddin Province’s Tuz Khurmatu area. With this in mind, the risk for such hostilities will likely be elevated over the coming weeks.

Recommendations

It is advised to defer all travel to Baghdad at this time due to the daily threat of militancy in the capital, violence in areas surrounding the city, and the risk of a broad deterioration of security conditions.
Travel to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah may continue at this time while maintaining heightened vigilance and adhering to standard security precautions regarding the threat of militant attacks. Avoid all nonessential travel in the Kurdistan Regional Government outside of Sulaymaniyah and Erbil.

Given the ongoing presence of Islamic State (IS) militants in bordering provinces and subsequent clashes with Kurdish Peshmerga, it is advised to avoid the vicinity of the KRG’s borders, and the disputed areas. For those remaining in Baghdad, it is advised to ensure that contingency and emergency evacuation plans are updated. Contact us for itinerary and contingency support options. We advise against nonessential travel to Basra. If travel is essential, contact us for itinerary-based consultation and on-ground support.

Those operating natural gas or oil facilities are advised to obtain security consultation for facilities in outlying areas, specific to the nationalities and operational needs of their employees. As a general precaution, it is advised that any travel, particularly in outlying areas, be conducted in armored vehicles, with proper security escorts and coordination with authorities.

Read more geopolitical analyses in our security blog.

Political Analysis: Impact of inter-Shiite rivalries in Iraq

A year after America’s withdrawal from Iraq, the country’s struggle for stability and security persists. Sunni protests are continuing following a government raid against Finance Minister Rafie al-Esawi’s home on Dec. 20. The protests, which have recently acquired the backing of some of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s main Shiite rivals – the Sadrists – come as the Shiite-led Iraqi government is already facing increased pressure from a persistent border standoff with Iraqi Kurdistan (KRG). Regardless of whether al-Maliki survives the current campaign against him, the concept of a unified Iraq – shared between its many sects – will continue to suffer.

The protests are sectarian in nature, propagated mainly by Sunni Islamists and aimed at reducing al-Maliki’s influence and that of the Shiites over Iraq. Their demands are unlikely to be met. While Iraq’s government, security forces, and Shiites have faced years of deadly Sunni insurgent attacks, the protests underscore an increased effort by the country’s Sunnis to replicate mass protests held elsewhere in the region and pressure al-Maliki’s Shiite-led government.

Protest leaders are likely aiming to capitalize upon perceived justification for mass protests following the government’s decision to act against al-Esawi. The timing also coincides with increasing pressure against Baghdad from the ongoing Kurdish dispute over territory in northern Iraq. The Kurdish gains and the Sunni revolt in Syria are likely giving many Iraqi Sunnis increased motivation to call for regional autonomy.

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