Annual joint US-South Korea military exercises to begin on April 1; US, North Korea display commitment to upcoming bilateral talks – Korean Peninsula Analysis
Current Situation
On March 19, the US Department of Defense confirmed that the annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve joint military exercises with South Korea will begin on April 1 and last approximately one month. A spokesperson said that the exercises will be on a scale similar to previous exercises, and involve 23,700 US and 300,000 South Korean troops. There have been no announcements regarding the involvement of US aircraft carriers. Last year’s exercises lasted two months and involved the nuclear supercarrier USS Carl Vinson. According to recent reports, South Korea is considering procuring Apache heavy-attack helicopters and anti-artillery surface-to-surface missiles, to be used in the event of a ground war.
The US and South Korean presidents are preparing for individual summits with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. South Korean President Moon Jae-in is planning to meet with Kim in late April, and US President Donald Trump has tentatively agreed to meet with Kim in May, although no details of the latter meeting have been confirmed, including the location. A South Korean envoy reported that Kim said he understands that joint exercises must continue, but that he expected them to be readjusted in the future if bilateral developments remain positive.
Background
Kim delivered a speech on New Year’s Day suggesting a restart in bilateral negotiations with South Korea and offered to send a delegation to the 2018 Olympics in Pyeongchang. South Korea accepted, and the two sides held a series of meetings leading up to and following the Olympics, resulting in the North Korean offer of bilateral talks with both South Korea and the US.
No sitting US president has ever agreed to meet with North Korean leadership; President Bill Clinton and President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang after leaving office.
North Korea has not held a nuclear weapon or missile test since November 28, 2017.
Assessments
US, North Korea appear committed to talks, although deep distrust remains
The announcement of a U.S.-North Korea summit marks the first ever for a sitting US President, and is made more notable by Pyongyang’s stated willingness to discuss denuclearization. The main reason to doubt a North Korean commitment to denuclearization is the fact that it views its nuclear arsenal as the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. Other, more realistic objectives for the summit might be reaching an agreement on an indefinite ban of missile or nuclear testing in exchange for limits on US-South Korea exercises or a sanctions relief.
In the immediate term, a positive outcome is the North’s offer to temporarily suspend missile tests ahead of the talks, without presenting pre-conditions such as freezing military exercises or requesting sanctions relief. This suggests Kim’s willingness to begin negotiating in good faith, although similar strong starts have collapsed in the past.
The upcoming US-led exercises look to be an in-kind response to this good faith despite public claims to the contrary that the 2018 military exercises are on a similar scale to previous years. The decision to exclude aircraft carriers and halve the length of the drills demonstrates reciprocal flexibility following statements from Pyongyang showing increased tolerance for the exercises. Pyongyang’s stated tolerance and the drawdown of exercises by the US are signals that the desire for talks is, for the time being, sincere.
Despite this projected sincerity, the exercises are perceived as highly provocative by Pyongyang. By not delaying them entirely until talks, the US may be testing Pyongyang’s restraint, as the spring exercise season is normally notorious for North Korean weapons tests. The tenuous nature of the potential US-North Korean harmony is underscored by South Korea’s military tenders for equipment that has little use outside of war with the North.
Major areas of discussion include disarmament, sanctions, detentions
There is significant divergence in the expectations of such a process, as the US views denuclearization as the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, while North Korea views denuclearization as the complete withdrawal of US forces from the region. At present, neither side has shown willingness to satisfy the other’s demands on the issue. The US appears equally unwilling to ease sanctions in the short term, as the current belief in Washington is that economic pressure is one of the few things that brought North Korea to negotiations in the first place. Other areas may prove more easy to reconcile, including the transfer of foreign detainees out of North Korea prisons. The prisoners serve little strategic value for North Korea, and their release would constitute a strong showing of good faith ahead of more contentious issues.
The unprecedented meeting could have positive outcomes even if the primary goal of complete denuclearization of the peninsula is not achieved, including a more general de-escalation of tensions between Washington and Pyongyang. A more comprehensive solution is less likely, as it would be particularly difficult for an agreement to be reached based on a few days of talks, especially given the short preparation time for the Kim-Trump summit. It also remains possible that the lack of preparation, along with the remaining uncertainty over a neutral location for the meeting, might lead to abandoning or delaying the summit. Ultimately, whether or not agreements are made, just holding the summit at all would mark a significant breakthrough.
Recommendations
Travel to Seoul may continue at this time, while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.
During periods of armed escalation between North and South Korea, we advise against all nonessential travel to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Yeonpyeongdo Islands.
Which options are on the table for Trump and Kim Jong-Un amid rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula? – Korean Peninsula Analysis
*** THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS WAS DISTRIBUTED TO MAX CLIENTS AT 18:00UTC ON 14 AUGUST ***
Situation: North Korea Tensions
On August 10, North Korea released a statement detailing a planned missile test that would be operational by mid-August. Using four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the statement threatened that it was “seriously examining the plan for an enveloping strike at Guam.” The statement also included details about the trajectory of the launch, noting that the missiles “cross the sky above Shimane, Hiroshima, and Koichi Prefectures of Japan,” fly for 3,356 kilometers over 1,065 seconds and would “hit the waters 30 to 40 km away from Guam.” This statement is part of a series of back-and-forth diplomatic provocations between the US and North Korea following Pyongyang’s recent breakthroughs in their weapons program.
On July 28, North Korea launched the second of two intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) test that month. The projectile traveled approximately 3,000 km in an upward trajectory, leading observers to speculate that the missile is capable of traveling up to 10,000 km on a standard trajectory, making both Los Angeles and Chicago within its theoretical range. In the aftermath of the test, a new US-led sanctions regime was adopted by the UN Security Council, potentially causing up to one billion USD in economic damage for Pyongyang out of an estimated three billion USD in annual export revenues.
Meanwhile, the annual joint Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercises between the US and South Korea will take place between August 21-31 and include the participation of tens of thousands of troops over sea, land, and air simulations.
Assessments & Forecast
Long-range test necessary for continued advancement of North Korean weapons program; US, allies unlikely to initiate wide-scale conflict in the event of launch
While test missile launches are certainly provocative, they are also a necessary component of developing a viable weapon, and the major underlying motivation for their continued execution. Until now, North Korea has almost exclusively conducted high-arc missile tests. While these tests have provided valuable information on ballistics in the initial launch stage, as well as reentry, their value is limited as such a trajectory is not equal to real-world conditions. Whereas Pyongyang has refrained from long-distance tests, likely due to concerns over a strong reaction from Tokyo as such a test would have to travel over Japanese territory, the weapons program has accelerated to such a point that this type of trajectory has become increasingly necessary. Testing missiles at varying launch trajectories provide different insights on how to improve tactical abilities. More traditional trajectory, as opposed to the high arc trajectories North Korea has typically employed, would provide Pyongyang great tactical insight that could not be divined from previous tests, including information regarding guidance, aerodynamics, and engine power. As such, the ratcheting up of rhetoric by President Trump, which fits into Pyongyang’s narrative of a belligerent Washington, also provides North Korea the justification for carrying out a missile test that is very necessary for the improvement of their capabilities.Given their close coordination and adherence to international norms and agreements, any action undertaken by the US, South Korea, or Japan is extremely unlikely to be unilateral in nature. These countries essentially have three immediate options in the event of a launch, which are not mutually exclusive: interception, military intervention, or diplomatic/economic retaliation. In terms of military intervention, this can also be divided into two options: an all-out assault with
Given their close coordination and adherence to international norms and agreements, any action undertaken by the US, South Korea, or Japan is extremely unlikely to be unilateral in nature. These countries essentially have three immediate options in the event of a launch, which are not mutually exclusive: interception, military intervention, or diplomatic/economic retaliation. In terms of military intervention, this can also be divided into two options: an all-out assault with pre-emptive positioning of ships towards the Korean Peninsula as well as artillery, or limited action in the form of tactical strikes. Nonetheless, of the three, military intervention remains the least likely due to the tremendous risk of such actions leading to a full-scale war. In this regard, it’s important to note that Seoul is situated only about 56 km from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), thereby limiting the US military option, given that even conventional, short-range missiles, which North Korea is known to have in its arsenal, could strike the South Korean capital in retaliation. The diplomatic and economic track also does not seem a likely immediate response, as a launch would signify that even the recent far-reaching sanctions and offers of negotiation were not enough to dissuade Pyongyang. Overall, the US is likely to seek to exhaust all diplomatic measures before turning to military action, and at this time, a nuclear escalation remains unlikely.
The most likely immediate reaction would be the activation of the missile defense capabilities wielded in the Pacific. These include land, sea, and air-based interceptors. In preparation for the strike, Japan deployed land-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile interceptors to bases in three of the four prefectures that were mentioned by North Korea in the notice. Knowing the North Korean plan, and that the missiles are only intended to pass over Japan, these batteries would most likely only be used if the missiles were to appear to be falling short in their trajectory and thus threatened the island nation. However, beyond the PAC-3s, Japan has also deployed an Aegis ballistic missile defense system to the waters between Japan and the Korean Peninsula, which is able to track approximately 100 missiles simultaneously and fire interceptors to take out ballistic projectiles. While these may be used to halt the missiles in mid-flight, the Aegis is not without limitation. It must be in the exact right part of the sea to intercept the missile and while it has been successful in intercepting ballistic missiles during tests, it has not been used to take out one in a live combat situation.Additionally, there are local airfields in South Korea and Japan from which fighter jets can be scrambled to intercept the missile during its boost phase. Along with Patriot missiles, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) is also currently deployed at the Anderson Air Force Base in Guam and could be used to try and take down the missiles, however, missiles falling outside of the immediate landmass may also not be interceptable by the system.
Additionally, there are local airfields in South Korea and Japan from which fighter jets can be scrambled to intercept the missile during its boost phase. Along with Patriot missiles, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) is also currently deployed at the Anderson Air Force Base in Guam and could be used to try and take down the missiles, however, missiles falling outside of the immediate landmass may also not be interceptable by the system.Despite a range of tools available, Japanese, Korean, and US forces may still choose not to intercept the tests should they occur. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, while the action would likely be presented as defensive, a failed interception would greatly undermine the credibility of the countries’ missile defense systems, which may embolden North Korea to carry out future tests. The stakes of a failed interception are especially high because four missiles have threatened to be shot. Even if just one of the missiles breaks though, it would still be a huge strategic blow to US defenses in the region. Secondly, if the North Korean missiles were shot down, Pyongyang may view this as an escalation worthy of a further military response.
Despite a range of tools available, Japanese, Korean, and US forces may still choose not to intercept the tests should they occur. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, while the action would likely be presented as defensive, a failed interception would greatly undermine the credibility of the countries’ missile defense systems, which may embolden North Korea to carry out future tests. The stakes of a failed interception are especially high because four missiles have threatened to be shot. Even if just one of the missiles breaks though, it would still be a huge strategic blow to US defenses in the region. Secondly, if the North Korean missiles were shot down, Pyongyang may view this as an escalation worthy of a further military response.
Meanwhile, Beijing has publicly indicated a willingness to defend North Korea in the event of an American first strike, but also not to intervene in the event of a North Korean first strike. The language of this statement was purposefully vague, and allows for a bit of maneuvering in the event of a launch on Guam, as such an event can be viewed as a North Korean first strike, and likewise can an American military response. In all actuality, China would most likely be reticent to involve itself militarily in any large-scale conflict (as would the US and its allies), although limited tactical strikes would likely engender a swift diplomatic rebuke.
FORECAST: Given these factors, a North Korean test launch into the waters of Guam remains a valuable strategic goal, although a military response by the US and its allies is undesirable by all sides in the current context. Should North Korea decide to attempt a launch towards Guam in the immediate future, it would likely coincide with the upcoming joint US-South Korea exercise, as such exercises have in the past served as a backdrop for weapons tests.
Pyongyang may seek to launch alternate tests in attempt to de-escalate, save face
One of the largest advantages on both sides is the element of unpredictability. President Trump does appear to be genuinely impetuous, which more than anything else is likely weighing on Pyongyang’s calculus before missile tests. This is likely compounded by the aforementioned opening given to the US to retaliate in the event of a North Korean first strike. As such, the next North Korean launch may be a test of a different missile in an attempt to still project military might while avoiding a potential confrontation.
Satellite imagery since June has suggested increased activity at North Korea’s Sinpo naval shipyard. In particular, activity towards the end of July led many to speculate that a submarine missile test was imminent; instead, North Korea launched an ICBM from a base in the almost exact opposite area of the country. Threatening to launch specific land-based missiles and then instead launching a different projectile would fit with Pyongyang’s established modus operandi of distraction and disinformation. A submarine launch would likely involve the solid-fuel Pukguksong-1 missile variant, as the liquid fueled Hwasong-12, which Pyongyang threatened to launch near Guam, is incapable of submarine launch.Additionally, if the major underlying motivation behind the test is scientific, as opposed to provocation, Pyongyang may still seek to launch a missile along a different flight path. This would still give their missile program largely the same information about the weapon ballistics and guidance, while potentially averting a major incident. Additionally, Pyongyang would be able to claim that the test intended to attack Guam but simply misfired, which would contribute to their disinformation campaign. However, such a path would still likely travel over Japan, risking the possibility of the projectile being shot down.
Additionally, if the major underlying motivation behind the test is scientific, as opposed to provocation, Pyongyang may still seek to launch a missile along a different flight path. This would still give their missile program largely the same information about the weapon ballistics and guidance, while potentially averting a major incident. Additionally, Pyongyang would be able to claim that the test intended to attack Guam but simply misfired, which would contribute to their disinformation campaign. However, such a path would still likely travel over Japan, risking the possibility of the projectile being shot down.
Ambiguous nature of US statements contrast explicit North Korean threats; highlights apparent willingness to follow through on Guam plan
The relatively bellicose rhetoric used by President Trump marks the first time that the US threatened a first strike against North Korea. Previous presidents had typically reiterated a willingness to retaliate to a North Korean strike, most likely as a means of assuring allies in Seoul and Tokyo. However, President Trump’s initial statement on August 8, in which he threatened “fire and fury”, was reportedly unvetted by his own aides, suggesting that the announcement itself was improvised. This, coupled with recent statements from other officials stressing a more diplomatic approach, suggest that the President’s statements were more bluster or posturing and not an actual expression of actual intent.On the North Korean side, while the hostile rhetoric has remained a consistent part of its foreign policy vis-a-vis the US, the release of the strike plan was similarly unusual, as it served as the first time such a notice was given for a missile test. Comparing the nature of the threats from both sides, the US government appears uncoordinated and ambiguous, while North Korea’s seems explicit and exceptionally detailed.
On the North Korean side, while the hostile rhetoric has remained a consistent part of its foreign policy vis-a-vis the US, the release of the strike plan was similarly unusual, as it served as the first time such a notice was given for a missile test. Comparing the nature of the threats from both sides, the US government appears uncoordinated and ambiguous, while North Korea’s seems explicit and exceptionally detailed.The main limiting factor that would prevent Pyongyang from launching such a test is the fear of a US response. President Trump’s overtly offensive posture, at least on face value, would seem to suggest a wide spectrum of possible responses, from tactical strikes on key North Korean facilities to full-scale war on the Peninsula. In this sense, Trump’s tone may be an asset, or even the result of an explicit plan, although this latter possibility is unlikely.
The main limiting factor that would prevent Pyongyang from launching such a test is the fear of a US response. President Trump’s overtly offensive posture, at least on face value, would seem to suggest a wide spectrum of possible responses, from tactical strikes on key North Korean facilities to full-scale war on the Peninsula. In this sense, Trump’s tone may be an asset, or even the result of an explicit plan, although this latter possibility is unlikely.
Recommendations
We advise against non-essential travel to Pyongyang and North Korea given the risk of detainment of foreign travelers. Travel to Seoul may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea.
During periods of armed escalation between North and South Korea, we advise against all non-essential travel to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Yeonpyeongdo Islands.
While the potential that a North Korean missile strike would have a direct physical impact on Guam remains low, given the current climate we advise against all non-essential travel to the island over the coming weeks.
Contact MAX Operations: If you plan to travel to / or are currently operating in South Korea:
MAX Global Operations Center is available 24/7 for operational support
Consult with MAX Senior Advisor prior to your visit
Share your itinerary in advance and have MAX Ground Support
MAX offers strong on-ground capabilities in South Korea and our teams are standing by ready to provide you with secure transportation, executive protection, and evacuation services. For on-ground support now, contact us at[email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434/5
South Korea presidential election to take place on May 9; economic reform and concerns over North Korea at center of electoral discourse – South Korea Analysis
Current Situation: South Korea Presidential Election
On May 9, early elections will be held for the next President of the Republic of Korea, commonly known as South Korea. The day has been categorized as a public holiday, and as such, schools, banks, and other government services and offices will remain closed. The early election follows the impeachment of former president Park Geun-hye on March 10, the culmination of a series of corruption allegations and mass protests that began in late 2016. Leading the polls are (in order) Moon Jae-in of the liberal Democratic Party, Ahn Cheol-soo of the centrist People’s Party, and Hong Jun-pyo of the Liberty Korea Party, a rebranded iteration of Park’s former Saenuri Party. Hong’s vote share has been steadily increasing in recent polls at the expense of Ahn’s decline.
Elsewhere, North Korea has been the subject of intense international scrutiny for their ongoing ballistic missile and nuclear weapon development programs, launching high-profile tests as recently as April 29. In response to recent North Korean activity, US President Donald Trump ordered the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to the region in early April, in a move perceived as highly provocative by Pyongyang. Additionally, South Korea and the US have accelerated the deployment window for the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile battery in Seongju, which reportedly has already reached minimal operational capabilities.
Mass protests against former President Park, as well as smaller-scale protests against the THAAD deployment, have occurred nearly every Saturday in Seoul since Park’s scandal first broke in October 2016, with a recent protest in Seongju on April 26 resulting in at least 10 injuries during scuffles with security forces. Whereas Moon has advocated rapprochement with North Korea and a freezing of the THAAD deployment, Ahn has switched his stance to be supportive of the deployment, in line with the conservative stance espoused by Hong.
Assessments & Forecast
Economic reform and security issues remain top voter priorities according to recent polling
Hong and Ahn’s volatility in recent polling suggests that the “shy conservative” phenomenon, wherein respondents in polls do not indicate their true intentions to vote for a conservative candidate, may be occurring in the South Korean election. Namely, Park’s negative down-ballot effect on her former political camp has led many people to abandon the party ticket, even though they are generally aligned with the platform. Whereas Ahn was initially able to capitalize on this phenomenon, the recent swing in Hong’s favor suggests that many conservatives may be moving back to Liberty Korea as the Park scandal begins to fade in the face of mounting security challenges posed by North Korea.
While it would appear that Hong’s more hardline approach to North Korea is one of the driving factors behind his recent surge, liberal economic views have buoyed Moon and Ahn, giving them a combined 60 percent share of the last poll. For younger voters, economic stagnation, youth unemployment, and rising wage inequality are perceived as more immediate issues than peninsular security. Reforming the massive family conglomerates, known as chaebols, which dominate the South Korean economy, has been a major part of Ahn and Moon’s respective platforms. Meanwhile, Hong supports deregulating the very same sectors, which may explain why his support base is largely composed of older voters. There is no candidate that offers a package of both market reform and a hardline stance on North Korea, and polls seem to indicate that voters have largely chosen economics as their driving priority.
Moon has remained consistently ahead in recent polls, maintaining approximately 40 percent of the vote share, which is more than enough to emerge victorious in South Korea’s first-past-the-post system. Of the three candidates, Moon advocates the least hardline approach to North Korea, including political and economic engagement, which faltered under Park. Nevertheless, his position remains similar to runner-up Ahn, who also advocates for renewed talks, albeit from a more cautious standpoint. It stands to reason that the election of either candidate would, therefore, see South Korea becoming a more moderating force in regional security planning, as opposed to the previous administration. Meanwhile, under Hong, the current peninsular standoff would not only continue but be likely to escalate in the long term.
One important singular issue that has been at the forefront of the leading candidates’ platforms has been the deployment of the THAAD system by US forces. While Ahn was initially in line with Moon in opposition to the THAAD deployment, recent provocations by North Korea in the form of continued missile tests have likely led him to reverse on the issue, possibly also in an attempt to court the many conservative voters uneasy with voting for any party that may be perceived as having connections to Park. Ahn’s decision underscores shifting public perceptions over the project in the face of a more defiant and unpredictable North Korea, most notably illustrated by his party’s recent dip in favor of Hong Joon-pyo. Moreover, reversing the deployment would essentially be a violation of an agreement with the US, an action that Moon himself has noted despite his opposition to the project. That being said, with the deployment reaching a milestone of limited operational capacity, and Hong Jun-pyo making solid gains in recent polls, it remains unlikely that even Moon will be able to stop it at this point, especially as public opinion seems to be drifting in the opposite direction.
Political stability in the South strengthening, despite looming threat from the North
Pro- and anti-Park protests, which reached a short-lived period of elevated unrest during the Supreme Court hearings on her impeachment, have declined in participation from the mass turnouts that defined late 2016 and early 2017. Approximately four million voters have already cast early ballots by May 4, and the lack of reported unrest near polling stations suggest that the likelihood of such incidents remains similarly low on election day. Overall, what this downward trend suggests is that the country is slowly returning to normalcy following the highly divisive impeachment period.
FORECAST: Nonetheless, there remains a strong, politically active anti-THAAD and anti-Western contingency, whose ongoing protest campaign is unlikely to cease in the near term, given the project’s anticipated continuation. In this context, protests against the THAAD deployment are likely to continue, materialized near the site itself in Seongju as well as Seoul. While these protests have featured varying levels of unrest in the past, participation in these demonstrations is markedly lower than previous, strictly anti-Park rallies, especially due to rising security concerns over North Korea’s weapons programs.
At this point, a new nuclear test has been anticipated for weeks, a conclusion refuted by US security officials based on undisclosed intelligence. For their part, North Korea has stoked this tension, levying threats of a new test as recently as May 1. FORECAST: North Korea normally chooses opportunities for nuclear and missile tests during high-profile political and military developments by adversaries such as the US and South Korea, and as a result, the possibility of a new test during the election window remains. However, it may be part of Pyongyang’s calculus that a new test immediately before the election might influence the outcome in favor of a more hardline candidate. Thus, it remains more likely that should a new test occur, it would take place after voting.
Recommendations
Travel to Seoul may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols regarding protests, crime and the lingering risk of conflict with North Korea. Those operating or residing in South Korea are advised to allot for disruptions to travel and business continuity on May 9, election day, due to the slated closures. Avoid the vicinity of any political or student related demonstrations, as such events carry an underlying potential to witness localized unrest. During periods of armed escalation between North and South Korea, we advise against all nonessential travel to the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Yeonpyeongdo Islands.
