Tag Archives: IS

IS-linked media validation after IED attack in Isulan, Mindanao on August 28 may inspire further local militant plots – Philippines Alert

Please be advised

At least two people are reported to have been killed and 34 others wounded in an IED blast that took place along a highway in Isulan town in Sultan Kudarat Province, Mindanao on August 28. The Islamic State (IS)-linked Amaq News Agency reported the incident, while also stating that 3 Filipino soldiers were killed in the incident.

Authorities are believed to have defused two other IEDs after the initial blast, which took place as local residents were commemorating the local Hamungaya harvest thanksgiving festival. Local officials have indicated that the IS-linked Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) were behind the incident.

Security was previously raised across the southern region of Mindanao on August 3 after the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) claimed that IS-affiliated Abu Sayyaf group was plotting militant attacks in the aftermath of the July 31 vehicular IED attack in Basilan.

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Assessments

The incident is indicative of the continued risk of militancy, specifically from explosives-based plots, in Mindanao. The fact that IS-affiliated groups such as BIFF and Abu Sayyaf have been able to stage intermittent attacks in civilian areas across the southern region despite facing concerted AFP operations indicates the high degree of operational sustainability that they continue to possess. Their increased activity also appears in tandem with the IS’ reframing of its network of global affiliates in late July, with the East Asia affiliate now being referred to as a Wilayat or a Province.

The staging of the IED attacks during a festival is indicative of attempts to attract increased public attention, especially if the blast in a relatively crowded spot had resulted in a higher death toll, as seemingly intended. However, the fact that the Amaq report only references casualties among security personnel signals the transnational group’s intention to be perceived positively among locals, potentially to attract recruits. These forms of messaging, despite the lack of accuracy, can be expected to provide on-ground validation to groups like BIFF and Abu Sayyaf, sustaining the risk of continued low-level explosives plots in the southern Mindanao region over the near term.

Recommendations

Travel to Metro Manila may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols given the latent threat of militancy, crime, and unrest.

We advise against all travel to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Sur, and the Sulu Archipelago, including the islands of Basilan, Jolo, Tawi Tawi, given the high threat of militancy, criminality as well as the elevated risk of kidnapping of foreign travelers. Those continuing to operate in Mindanao are advised to limit movement outside major cities such as Davao and General Santos.

Remain cognizant of your surroundings, including any suspicious behavior of individuals, which may include a person wearing winter clothing during warm weather and/or seemingly wandering around, as well as items that look out of place, such as bags or containers.

Immediately alert authorities of any suspicious behavior or items.

Ensure that places of stay are properly secured, alter travel routes, and avoid disclosing sensitive itinerary information to unknown individuals.

Barcelona stabbing, one year after La Rambla attack, underscores continuing link between psychological instability and militant style attacks – Spain Analysis

Current Situation

On August 20, around 05:00 (local time), an individual armed with a knife reportedly attempted to enter a police station in Cornella de Llobregat, Barcelona and attack personnel, while shouting “Allahu Akbar”, before being shot dead. Reports indicate that the attacker was of Algerian origin and had lived in the area for several years.

The incident is reportedly being treated as a militant attack by authorities. However, police have claimed that they have no reason to believe that there are any direct links to major militant networks or that the assailant was connected to the cell that carried out the Barcelona attacks one year earlier. In addition, the testimony of his ex-wife indicated that the attacker had recently come out as homosexual, and was reportedly experiencing serious psychological instability and was suicidal due to confusion over how this could fit in with his Muslim faith. Some sources within the investigation have claimed that they do not believe the attack to be linked to jihad.

On August 16, a pro-Islamic State (IS) group published a poster on social media calling for attacks targeting police in Spain in both English and Spanish.

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Background

The August 20 attack is the latest in a series of violent or militant-related incidents involving North Africans or individuals of North African origins in south and south-west Europe over the past year.

In addition, on July 22, a 29-year old Canadian national of Pakistani origin, Faisal Hussain, killed two and injured three in a shooting in Greektown, Toronto. Hussain was allegedly also known to have had a history of psychological instability and had reportedly expressed concerns about his employment and financial situation to a friend prior to the incident. On July 25, the Islamic State (IS)-linked media outlet, al Amaq, reported that the attack was carried out by a soldier of the Caliphate in response to their call to target citizens of coalition nations.

Assessments

Attack on police station underscores growing trend of violence copying Islamic State methods among psychologically unstable Muslim males

Despite claims that the attacker had a number of problems in his personal life, the possibility of links to wider militant trends cannot be ruled out. On the contrary, the fact that the attacker shouted “Allahu Akbar” and carried out the attack on the specific target that pro-IS groups had called for four days prior indicates that, even though he was likely not linked to any established militant cell, broader ideas of jihad informed part of his motivation. That is to say, while he may not have been looking to aid the goals of the Islamic State or avenge the deaths of Muslims, it is likely that, within his psychological instability, when thoughts of suicide arose, the concept of carrying out a jihadist attack was seen as a viable method. Possibly copying previous ‘suicide by cop’ attacks, in which the perpetrator intends to be killed by security forces. This assessment is further bolstered by the reports that his confusion over homosexuality was, in part, caused by an uncertainty about how it fit in with Islam.

With this in mind, the incident comes amid a continuing trend of psychologically unstable individuals, most of whom are migrants who adhere to the Muslim faith, carrying out attacks that mimic IS-inspired lone wolf incidents. Such attacks tend to be conducted by young males with mental health issues, who are, in part, influenced by the concept of jihadist militancy as a form of anti-establishment violence that has entered the West’s collective consciousness. Psychologically unstable individuals, and immigrants who perceive themselves to be disenfranchised and socially isolated from their community, whether it’s the Muslim or wider community, are copying IS-methods of attacks. In this sense, the media coverage of the various IS shootings and the general global trend of young men using mass violence as an outlet for frustration and disenfranchisement have merged.

Regardless of the psychological issues of the attacker, the fact that the incident came following the call from pro-IS groups means that online jihadist communities, and even Islamic State-linked media organizations, are likely to attribute the event to part of their ideology and larger plan. This is especially the case given the timing of the incident around the anniversary of the August 2017 attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils. In turn, this will perpetuate the aforementioned trend merging psychological instability and attacks that appear to be militant in nature.

Finally, the August 20 attack in Barcelona constitutes the latest in an ongoing trend of incidents related to violent attacks linked to Islamism from within the local North African community in north-eastern Spain and southern France. IS and IS-linked operatives have put a particular emphasis on recruiting in the region, due to the fertile ground for radicalization born from the feelings of disenfranchisement in both the established North African community and among North African migrants. These sentiments, which come partly due to perceptions of otherness within Spanish society and partly due to pressures put on from the local community, have the potential to lead young men towards violence, sometimes personally and sometimes linked to a militant organization.

Recommendations

Travel to Spain can continue while maintaining vigilance, due to the elevated threat of militancy.

IS claims killing of Western nationals in July 29 armed attack in Khatlon Province; likely involvement of sympathizers – Tajikistan Alert

Please be advised

The Islamic State (IS) claimed a car ramming and stabbing attack that resulted in the deaths of four Western tourists in Danghara District, approximately 90 km south of Dushanbe. Meanwhile, Islamic State (IS)-linked Amaq News Agency reported on July 30, that “soldiers of the caliphate” conducted the attack in response to calls to target citizens of coalition countries.

IS claims killing of Western nationals in July 29 armed attack in Khatlon Province; likely involvement of sympathizers - Tajikistan Alert | MAX Security


IS claims killing of Western nationals in July 29 armed attack in Khatlon Province; likely involvement of sympathizers - Tajikistan Alert | MAX Security
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Assessments

While over 1,000 Tajik citizens are believed to have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join IS, the July 31 claim appears to be the first such acknowledgment by the group of an attack within Tajik boundaries and is therefore notable. The extent to which the operation was guided by the IS leadership in Syria and Iraq remains unclear at this juncture.

At present, it appears more likely that the attack was conducted by radicalized individuals that were inspired by IS rather than trained operatives of the group itself. This is indicated by the reference to targeting Coalition citizens in the Amaq report issued on July 30, which derives from a landmark statement by IS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in 2014, that called for sympathizers to perpetrate low-intensity attacks against individuals in nations comprising the military coalition against the IS.

The IS-linked media’s reference to “soldiers of the caliphate” further suggests that the perpetrators were likely self-radicalized, considering the use of such phrasing in previous attacks by individuals influenced by IS ideologies but possessing no evident links to IS functionaries. This is also consistent with the lack of sophistication of the attack, as well as the reported numbers of extremist sympathizers in the country leading from long-standing anti-Islamist government policies.

Recommendations

Travel to Tajikistan may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols given the latent threat of militancy, crime, and unrest.

Those operating or residing in Dushanbe are advised to maintain heightened vigilance due to the risk of crime and militancy while avoiding unsecured travel to the country’s rural districts such as Danghara.

We advise against nonessential travel to outlying areas in Tajikistan near the country’s borders with Afghanistan, given the threat of militant activity and criminality, including drug smuggling.reat of radicalization in Central Asia, read our in-depth report.

AQIM-OIB claims attack against National Guard patrol in Jendouba Governorate’s Ghardimaou on July 8 – Tunisia Alert

Please be advised

According to the Ministry of Interior (MoI), a group of militants killed six National Guardsmen in an ambush targeting two vehicles patrolling the Tunisian-Algerian border near Ain Soltane village, located in Jendouba Governorate’s Ghardimaou District, during the morning hours of July 8.

The militants reportedly detonated an IED against the patrol, which was then followed by gunfire against the National Guardsmen. The assailants reportedly fled the scene following the attack and are still at large.
The attack was later claimed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)-affiliated Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade (OIB). According to their statement, nine National Guardsmen, including an officer, were killed in the attack. The militants seized eight rifles, a handgun, and a machine gun before fleeing the scene of the attack.

According to reports, a man was arrested in Kairouan Governorate for expressing support for the AQIM-OIB claimed attack on July 9.

In addition, members of the security services of Beja staged a protest in front of the National Guard’s headquarters demanding that the Minister of Interior (MoI) support new legislation meant to protect servicemen on July 9.

Tunisia Alert (UPDATE): AQIM-OIB claims attack against National Guard patrol in Jendouba Governorate’s Ghardimaou on July 8; avoid all travel to area | MAX Security

Assessments & Forecast

The attack is highly notable since it is the largest militant attack on Tunisian soil since March 2016, when Islamic State (IS) militants infiltrated Medenine Governorate’s Ben Guerdane from Libya. This incident highlights the increased risk of militancy near Tunisia’s western borders with Algeria, with the latest attack in the area recorded on May 31, when security forces foiled an AQIM-OIB attack in Kasserine Governorate. Although, AQIM-OIB is known to maintain an operational base along the Tunisian-Algerian border, the majority of its attacks over the past year have been mainly focused in the southwest, namely Kasserine Governorate, rather than in Jendouba, which is located in the northwestern part of the country.

Furthermore, all of these attacks have been of a lower sophistication, mainly involving the use of landmines or shootings. However, the latest attack utilized a relatively more sophisticated modus operandi. The multi-pronged nature of attack highlights the militant group’s resilience to security forces’ ongoing operations in western Tunisia, as well as their fighters’ abilities to regroup in the aftermath of such operations. It is also indicative of their ability to plan and execute coordinated attacks in order to achieve maximum casualties.

The timing of the attack is further significant. It was likely conducted in response to several developments that undermine the group’s interests in the area. These developments include the recent heightened security protocols put in place by Tunisian security forces along the border area in coordination with their Algerian counterparts.

This has led to a decline in the militant group’s abilities to operate along the border area, as witnessed in February, when Tunisian security forces neutralized a leader of AQIM-OIB in Kasserine Governorate based on intelligence from the Algerian intelligence apparatus. The militant had reportedly been sent from Algeria to reorganize the Tunisian affiliate.

Security protocols along the western border have also hindered smuggling operations, which provide militant groups with supplies and revenue, and cement their codependence with local smugglers, as the latter also depends on these operations as a source of income. Mitigating these operations not only damages the militant group’s supply lines, but also erodes their influence over the local population, as its members inevitably seek other sources of income.

Therefore, the attack likely seeks to compel security forces to divert resources away from Kasserine Governorate, which is AQIM-OIB’s primary area of operations in the country, towards Jendouba Governorate. This will overstretch the resources at the disposal of the Tunisian security apparatus, thus allowing militants to operate more freely in the area.

The latest attack follows the June 3 IS-claimed attack against a gas pipeline near Kasserine Governorate’s Sbeitla. In light of the ongoing competition between IS and AQIM over weapons, supplies, and personnel in western Tunisia, it is highly likely that the latest attack was meant to be symbolic in nature. This would project AQIM-OIB as the more prominent Sunni jihadist group in the country, allowing it to attract supporters and recruits at the expense of IS.

FORECAST: In response, the Tunisian Armed Forces (TAF) will launch intensified counter-militancy operations in western Tunisia, including in Jendouba, Kef, and Kasserine governorates. These will likely include increased security patrols as well as artillery shelling against potential militant hideouts in the mountainous regions. Security protocols will also be elevated along the Algerian border in order to prevent militants from crossing into Algeria and evading arrests.

However, this increase in security presence may provide militants with additional targets, leading to further clashes between security personnel and militants. Moreover, the increase in AQIM-OIB activity may prompt IS to heighten operations in the country in the near term. Overall, given the continued entrenchment of militants in western Tunisia’s mountainous areas due to their demonstrated ability to adapt and evolve, further similar sporadic attacks are likely to take place in the coming weeks and months.

Recommendations

Travel to Tunis may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Those operating or residing in Tunisia are advised that we maintain operational capabilities in the country.

Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary and contingency support options.

Those operating or residing in Jendouba District on July 8 should avoid all travel to the Ghardimaou District in light of the anticipated counter-militancy operations following the attack, as well as the likelihood for further clashes in the area over the coming days.

Avoid all travel to the Kasserine, Kef, and Jendouba Governorates, in addition to all border areas, due to jihadist activity and military closures. Furthermore, avoid all travel to within 50 km from the border with Libya, due to the increased threat of attacks originating from Libya targeting Tunisian interests.

 

Recent spate of coordinated IS-linked attacks, new modus operandi in Surabaya exhibits increased operational capabilities of local cells – Indonesia Analysis

Executive Summary

IS-linked suicide attacks in Surabaya likely stem from active attempts by the JAD to offset leadership setbacks and mobilize sympathizers.

The coordinated nature of the attacks and use of an unprecedented modus operandi indicate increased operational capabilities of local jihadist cells.

Increased visibility of consecutive IS-linked incidents in Java within the same week may spur additional attacks by cells or lone-wolves in urban centers and elsewhere, including Jakarta and Bali.

Those operating or residing across Indonesia are advised to maintain heightened vigilance in the vicinity of government buildings, transportation hubs, iconic public areas, military bases, restaurants, high-value soft targets, shopping centers, and religious centers including mosques and churches, as they remain potential targets for militant attacks.

Indonesia Analysis: Recent spate of coordinated IS-linked attacks, new modus operandi in Surabaya exhibits increased operational capabilities of local cells | MAX Security

Friction Points | MAX Security

Current Situation

On May 14, a family of five individuals, arriving on two motorcycles, detonated their explosives outside the police headquarters in Surabaya, East Java. The attack was claimed by Islamic State (IS)-linked Amaq News Agency. On the same day, six militants part of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), a local outfit affiliated to IS, were arrested in Surabaya and nearby Sidoarjo Regency. Two other suspects were killed in the raid, including the second-in-command of the Surabaya cell of the JAD.

A family of six, including three minors, carried out a series of coordinated suicide attacks involving the use of vehicles, at three churches in Surabaya on May 13. Both IS Central and Amaq News Agency claimed the attack. The adult male in the family was later identified as the leader of the JAD Surabaya cell. An explosion was also recorded in Sidoarjo Regency south of the city on the same day. A man, suspected to be a militant, his wife, and their son were found dead at the scene, while two other minors were rescued from the apartment alive.

A riot situation in a military detention center in Depok, which lies 16 km south of the capital city of Jakarta in western Java, was resolved on May 10 after high-risk militant detainees seized firearms from prison guards and killed five security personnel on May 8. IS Central claimed the prison attacks on May 8, while an IS-affiliated media agency released pictures from inside the facility on May 9. The founder of the JAD, Aman Abdurrahman, is incarcerated in the same prison. Two suspected militants of the JAD’s Bandung cell were killed on May 10 while traveling from Bandung to a detention facility in Depok, with the intent to aid rioting prisoners.

Between April 9 and 30, pro-IS social media groups released a host of propagandist material appearing to target Western institutions and practices.

On March 14, IS-linked media sources confirmed the death of Bahrumsyah, a top-ranked militant and recruiter hailing from Indonesia, in a mismanaged suicide attack in Syria on March 13. Meanwhile, on February 13, Abdurrahman was indicted for his role in the 2016 attacks in Jakarta. Zainal Anshori, head of the JAD, was sentenced to seven years in prison on February 12, over his plans to smuggle weapons from the southern Philippines.

Assessments & Forecast

Attacks likely planned ahead of time, tied to leadership setbacks incurred by JAD

We assess that the plots in Surabaya on May 13-14 were informed by a combination of factors. The time period between February and May has seen the indictment of JAD’s founder, the sentencing of its senior-most leader, as well as the death of an influential recruiter in Syria who was known to leverage his contacts within the IS leadership to recruit sympathizers and remotely organize plots through the JAD in Indonesia. Collectively, the developments represent a host of challenges to the senior leadership of the outfit, potentially impacting the morale of its cadre and ability to newly recruit radical elements. Thus, the attacks were likely driven by a desire to signal to authorities the negligible effect of leadership setbacks on the operational capabilities of local cells, to publicly undermine recent counter militancy efforts, and to boost the morale of existing sympathizers.

The attacks also appear to have been organized well ahead of time, a fact that is illustrated by the surge of pro-IS messaging in the month of April. The timing of the attacks, only days prior to Ramadan, further hints at this possibility. There is an observable, general uptick in jihadist plots across the world during this time period over perceptions that the heightened religiosity of Ramadan would offer greater spiritual rewards for those engaging in jihad against non-believers. The difficulty in assembling high-grade triacetone triperoxide (TATP) explosives, which were believed to have been used in the Surabaya church bombings, as well as the time needed to activate JAD sleeper cells without attracting scrutiny suggests the low likelihood of the attacks being organized in an ad-hoc manner.

In terms of planning, it is likely that the attacks were devised with assistance from Indonesian functionaries in Syria. The current incarceration of top JAD leaders within the country and precedent of previous high-profile plots being organized by Indonesian militants fighting in Syria suggests that this may have been the case. The May 13 claim by IS Central, only the second attribution of the kind in three years of IS-linked attacks in Indonesia, is a potential sign of increased overseas involvement in the attacks, as is the comparative high-degree of coordination per local context.

Change in modus operandi, coordinated nature of plots indicates increase in operational capabilities

The most notable feature of all three attacks in and around Surabaya is the unprecedented modus operandi of using cells consisting of whole families, including women and children. While relatives of militants have been known to detonate explosives to avoid being captured during security operations in Syria, and in Bangladesh, this marks the first use of family units to conduct offensive attacks.

This tactical shift, the relative success of which may signal an emerging trend, is likely connected to active efforts to increase the scale and tempo of militant attacks in the country. More specifically, using multiple suicide bombers serves to increase the effect of the planned explosion, while employing members of a family unit helps to avoid the cells from being identified as potential threats and makes security forces more reticent to engage in hostilities. The fact that the JAD sleeper cells remained undetected until after the attacks despite the strict vigilance of counter-militancy units points to the discretion offered by using a family-based suicide squad.

Attacks by local cells, low-intensity plots by sympathizers possible over increased activity, visibility

FORECAST: The developments in Depok, when taken alongside the Surabaya attacks, signal a period of significant activity for local jihadists, compounded by increased visibility aided in view of the IS Central claim for both the church bombings and the prison riot. The ongoing month of Ramadan allows individuals or groups to sustain this exposure by conducting attacks, highlighting the continued risk of militancy across the nation, and especially on Java, where there is a noted presence of JAD cells.

The recent attacks have generated a significant amount of momentum and media coverage for the JAD and other jihadist sympathizers in the country. The perceived successes of recent efforts will embolden militant handlers to maintain a pace of operations in Java for as long as their manpower can sustain. While there have been no reported instances of encounters in the capital as of this report, it is highly likely that militants observed traveling to Depok had been using Jakarta as a transport hub. The ability for such elements to reach the capital in the face of significant police deployments underscores the heightened potential for attacks in Jakarta over the coming days. Whereas the JAD traditionally targeted government installations in the past, the church bombings may indicate that civilian targets have also become desirable. In addition to Jakarta, the tourist hotspot of Bali would also be a high-priority target for the group in this scenario.

Islamic State linked news agency claims May 13,2018 attack | MAX Security

Recommendations

Travel to Jakarta may continue at this time while maintaining heightened vigilance throughout the city given the risk of militancy.

Those operating or residing across Indonesia are advised to maintain heightened vigilance in the vicinity of government buildings, transportation hubs, iconic public areas, military bases, restaurants, high-value soft targets, shopping centers, and religious centers including mosques and churches, as they remain potential targets for militant attacks.

Remain cognizant of your surroundings, including any suspicious behavior of individuals, which may include a person wearing winter clothing during warm weather and/or seemingly wandering around, as well as items that look out of place, such as bags or containers.

Immediately alert authorities of any suspicious behavior or items.

Ensure that places of stay are properly secured, alter travel routes, and avoid disclosing sensitive itinerary information to unknown individuals.

AQIM publishes statement late night on May 8 threatening ‘French, Western companies in area from Libya to Mauritania’ – Africa & MENA Alert

Executive Summary

During the overnight hours of May 8-9, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) issued a threat against Western, and particularly French, companies that operate in the area “from Libya to Mauritania”.

While the threat is not new but rather a reiteration of an existing and proven one, its release in the lead-up to the holy month of Ramadan is indication of a heightened risk of al-Qaeda attacks against Western companies and interests in North Africa and the Sahel region over the coming weeks.

Please be advised

During the overnight hours of May 8-9, the al-Andalus Foundation, the media wing of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), published a “Statement for French and Western Companies”.

In the statement, AQIM threatens to attack Western, and particularly French, companies that operate in the area “from Libya to Mauritania”.

The publication further states that “85 percent of the wealth in this region is controlled by the French, while the rest is in the hands of traitors” and that the “French occupation prevents the prosperity of the region and has corrupted society”.

The statement concluded by warning Muslims to stay away from Western companies’ sites for fear of being hurt by collateral damage in an attack.

AQIM publishes statement late night on May 8 threatening ‘French, Western companies in area from Libya to Mauritania’ - Africa & MENA Alert | MAX SecurityAQIM publishes statement late night on May 8 threatening ‘French, Western companies in area from Libya to Mauritania’ - Africa & MENA Alert | MAX Security

Assessments & Forecast

AQIM’s statement does not denote a new threat to Western operations and presence in Africa, but is rather a reiteration of its main strategy: driving Western influence away from what AQIM perceive as their areas of influence, with the intention of consolidating its control and later expanding it while facing diminished resistance. AQIM and organizations that are directly affiliated with it, such as Jamaat Nusratal-Islam Wal Muslimeen (JNIM), have conducted several high profile attacks as part of this strategy. These most notably include the March 2 attack against the French Embassy in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; the October 25, 2017 attack against a French firm in Soumpi, Mali; and the March 18, 2016 attack against the Krechba gas facility in Algeria that was jointly operated by an Algerian government-owned company, and Norwegian- and British-based companies.

This strategy is also the main reason for AQIM’s threat particularly addressing French companies, as the French-led “Operation Barkhane” in the Sahel in support of the G5 countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) is currently the main threat to AQIM and its direct affiliates’ operations. This threat was recently exemplified by French operations on February 14 in Mali that resulted in the deaths of six JNIM leaders, including that of Hasan al-Ansari, co-founder of JNIM, later confirmed by the group itself. However, as noted in AQIM’s latest statement, the threat extends to all Western companies, all perceived as “crusaders” in AQIM’s narrative, which it would attack given the opportunity, as underscored by the March 2016 Krechba attack that targeted Algerian, Norwegian, and British firms. That most of the attacks thus far have been directed against French interests is largely due to the outsized French presence among potential targets in the region and France’s lead role in regional counter-militancy operations.

The references made to the negative impact of the French presence on the region’s economy and society underscores an inherent part of al-Qaeda’s strategy as a whole, and that of AQIM in particular. AQIM, unlike certain other jihadist groups such as the Islamic State (IS), is willing to be more flexible in the implementation of its religious ideology in order to not only gain the support of, but also embed themselves in the local population. Thus, by appealing to material interests such as the state of the economy and society, AQIM is seeking to create an image of “us against them”, rallying as much of the local population as possible in opposition to foreign influence. While this may boost recruitment for the group, this is not the main goal in this case, as al-Qaeda favors quality over quantity with its fighters. The goal is rather to enhance the group’s freedom of operation within the population, which it will utilize to launch attacks and, later, to go into hiding as well as to facilitate logistical support.

FORECAST: Currently, AQIM and its direct affiliates maintain a presence, either of offensive operations or for logistical support, in parts of Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, putting these countries at a high risk, which also corresponds with the message threatening Western companies “from Libya to Mauritania”. Given the current strategy and deployment of the group, as well as precedent, we assess that of these countries Algeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso are at the highest risk. Nonetheless, this foothold could, depending on developments and the dynamics of the situation in the region, be exploited to launch attacks into neighboring countries if needed.

FORECAST: It is important to note that while AQIM’s threat is not new, but rather a reiteration of an existing and proven threat, it does come ahead of the holy month of Ramadan, currently slated to start on May 15. This period of the year historically is when jihadist groups attempt to increase their rate of operations and conduct more high profile and notable attacks, so as to capitalize on the symbolism of the holiday. Accordingly, it is possible that the timing of AQIM’s latest message was similarly motivated, thus highlighting the elevated potential for al-Qaeda attacks against Western interests in North Africa and the Sahel region over the coming weeks.

Recommendations

Western companies operating in the North Africa and Sahel regions are advised to evaluate security procedures pertaining to attacks against installations, and emphasize guideline to their staff.

Examine behavioral patterns of local employees on site to mitigate potential risks arising from influence by Jihadist propaganda.

Monitor MAX Intelligence’s reports, as well as local publications to remain abreast of the dynamics of the threat posed by Jihadist groups in your areas of operations. Potential indications of a change in the level of threat include the rate, scope and rhetoric of Jihadist publications and their attacks, changes in modus operandi, scale and sophistication of attacks, and changes to areas of operations and influence of different groups.

Islamic State-linked media reports shooting attack in Nizhny Novgorod on May 6; first 2018 Islamist militant attack in World Cup host city – Russia Analysis

Please be advised

On May 6, the Islamic State (IS)-linked media group, al-Amaq, claimed that a shooting attack which took place in Nizhny Novgorod, western Russia, was committed by a ‘soldier’ of the Sunni-jihadist group. According to a statement from Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) on May 4, an assailant opened fire on police officers during an identity check and barricaded himself inside an apartment in the city. The statement indicated that the perpetrator was later neutralized by security forces.

From 14 June to 15 July 2018, Russia will host the FIFA World Cup in a number of cities, including in Nizhny Novgorod. In the run-up to the tournament, Russian security forces have carried out a large number of raids and arrests, looking to neutralize militant cells made up of both Central Asian migrants, mostly based in major cities, and North Caucasian militants, mostly from the Republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia.

Since the beginning of 2018, at least 38 militant counter militancy raids have been recorded in Russia, the majority focusing on reportedly IS-linked militants. At least five of the raids occurred in or near World Cup cities, including Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, and Rostov-on-Don.

On April 17, three suspected IS-linked militants were arrested near Rostov-on-Don by FSB agents. A number of reports suggested the possibility that the militants were embedded in the city to wait until the start of the World Cup and carry out an attack during the tournament.

Islamic State-linked media reports shooting attack in Nizhny Novgorod on May 6; first 2018 Islamist militant attack in World Cup host city - Russia Analysis | MAX Security
Islamic State-linked media reports shooting attack in Nizhny Novgorod on May 6; first 2018 Islamist militant attack in World Cup host city | MAX Security

Click here to see Map Legend

Assessments

The claim from IS and the reports from the FSB indicate the first case of a successful attack occurring in a World Cup host city in 2018. The most recent Islamist militant attack in one of the host cities was in St. Petersburg in mid-2017. The incident underscores previous assessments that militants, from both Caucasian and Central Asian origins, are looking to focus their operations on the World Cup, so as to maximize exposure during the tournament. In addition, the developments come following the publication IS’ official newsletter, Al-Naba, on May 4 which called on its supporters to conduct attacks across Russia, underscoring the group’s continued interest in projecting its militant capabilities in the country. This assessment gains further credence considering IS’ repeated threats to the World Cup.

While there is no indication as to the origin of the militant at the time of writing, there are three main possibilities, all of which have been previously recorded in Russia. In the event that the attacker was a lone-wolf Central Asian migrant, who was locally radicalized within Russia through online and on ground Islamist networks, the incident highlights that lone-wolves in major cities are heeding to IS’ demands to carry out attacks on World Cup cities, demonstrating the threat in any city with a significant Central Asian diaspora community. In the event that the militant had links to Caucasian militant cells, it highlights attempts by the Caucasian Emirate pro-IS group to embed radicals within major cities, prior to the tournament, who will then carry out attacks. This is likely designed to occur before security in the North Caucasus becomes overwhelming around the time of the World Cup. The third option is that the militant may have had connections with both Central Asian militant networks and Caucasian cells, which would constitute a significant threat as such an assailant would be able to utilize the covert nature of the loosely linked Central Asian networks and the expertise of the well established Caucasian groups.

Going forward, a significant increase in counter-militancy operations in major cities and the North Caucasus will occur in the run-up to the World Cup. Furthermore, the potential for both minor and major attacks in all host cities remains before and during the tournament, likely looking to specifically target stadiums and locales with international attention, so as to maximize exposure.

Recommendations

Travel to Russia may continue while maintaining vigilant given the elevated risk of militancy and crime, particularly in major cities and World Cup host cities. (Click for our special report on threats to the 2018 World Cup).

Remain cognizant of any suspicious individuals or items that look out of place. Immediately alert authorities if identified.

Avoid all nonessential travel to the North Caucasus region, given the high risk of militancy and kidnapping.

Turkey’s military campaign aims to secure interests in northern Syria, mitigate Kurdish militant threat – Turkey & Syria Analysis

Current Situation

Turkish military officials confirmed that operation “Olive Branch” targeting Syria’s northwestern Afrin Province officially began on January 20. The objective is to eliminate the presence of both People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Islamic State (IS).

According to Turkey’s Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, Turkish ground forces entered Syria’s Afrin District from Kilis’ Gulbaba region on January 20 at 11:05 (local time). The prime minister also stated that the “four-phase operation” will aim to create a buffer zone 30 km south of the Turkish border.

Turkish forces targeted YPG positions with artillery fire throughout Afrin Province on January 20-21, including along the Turkish-Syrian border.

Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebels were deployed along Syria’s border with Hatay Province and south of Syria’s Azaz.

YPG forces responded to the aerial bombardments with artillery fire striking Turkish forces in and around the Turkish border town of Kilis.

Russia reportedly withdrew its stationed forces from Syrian’s Afrin To Tel Ajar on January 20, in light of the Turkish operation. Russian authorities called for “reconciliation of warring sides.”

On January 20, the US “encouraged all parties to avoid escalation” and to “focus on the most important task of defeating IS.”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated on January 20 that Syria’s Manbij, located just west of the Euphrates River, will be the “next destination for a Turkish combat operation” following Afrin.

Assessments & Forecast

The operations highlight Turkey’s continued efforts to safeguard its interests in northern Syria. The campaign in Afrin comes amidst persistent concerns by the Turkish government regarding the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) activity along the border with Syria. The Turkish government has repeatedly accused the YPG of cooperating with the PKK, and by launching the offensive in Afrin District, Turkish authorities seek to stem the YPG’s assistance to the PKK. Additional motivation for the operation may include Turkey’s efforts to assert its political influence, as well as that of the elements it supports in Syria, ahead of future negotiations between the various parties in the Syrian conflict.

President Erdogan’s hardline stance regarding the elimination of YPG elements in Syria is linked to his political ambitions regarding the upcoming 2019 election. In the past, Erdogan’s calls for the eradication of PKK militants and all affiliated elements courted ultra-nationalist voters and expanded his base significantly, helping ensure victories such as the April 2017 referendum. A recent endorsement by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)’s chair and a continuing aggressive foreign policy regarding Turkish-Syrian border security will consolidate his base and secure him the presidency. The military operation in Syria’s Afrin will likely cause obstacles for oppositions parties in uniting, mainly the Republican People’s Party (CHP), due to likely labeling of it being weak on militancy. This labeling will likely be triggered by CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu’s recent call for diplomacy as opposed to a military operation into Afrin, as ultra-nationalists will perceive the statement as willing to negotiate with militant elements.

US-Turkish relations are likely to further diminish as a result of the operation, given vocal US opposition against intervention in Afrin. Turkish authorities already expressed much discontent regarding the US’ persistent support of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a group comprised of mostly YPG fighters in northern Syria. The US will likely continue providing the SDF with both weapons and training in order to not only fight IS, but to counter the influence of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the Iranian government. While the Turkish government has voiced its disapproval of Assad in the past, its objective to eliminate Kurdish influence in the region will be the priority, and US intervention will likely only embolden Turkish forces to engage in military operations against the YPG in northern Syria.

While Moscow provides a degree of support for the Kurdish militia, the Turkish operations are unlikely to significantly impact relations between the two countries. This is because the operations in Afrin District are not likely to jeopardize Russia’s strategic interests in Syria, namely the coastal provinces of Tartus and Latakia. Instead, the campaign may serve Moscow’s interests by weakening the US’s most important on-ground ally, decreasing Washington’s influence in Syria. The possible consolidation of a foothold by Turkish-aligned elements may also allow Moscow to better negotiate and enforce agreements across the country.

FORECAST: Given precedent of the previous Euphrates Shield operations, Turkish-backed rebels will initiate the ground offensive from multiple fronts, such as the Azaz and Deir Semaan areas, as well as from within Turkish territory, including Hatay and Kilis provinces. By doing so, the Turkish-backed rebels will compel the YPG to fight on multiple fronts, overstretching their forces. In the initial stages of the offensive, rebels will seek to attain and cut off the Rajo Road, as well as routes 62 and 217, all serving as important supply lines leading to the city of Afrin. Turkish forces will concurrently mainly conduct aerial bombardments and heavy artillery fire against YPG positions. Once areas are cleared of the YPG, Turkish army personnel themselves are likely to enter captured territories and establish administrative control. In response to the operation, as underlined by the YPG’s artillery fire at Turkish forces in the Kilis area, the Kurdish group will likely retaliate with rocket and mortar over the coming days.

Turkey’s military campaign aims to secure interests in northern Syria, mitigate Kurdish militant threat - Turkey & Syria Analysis | MAX Security

Click here to see Map Legend

The Turkish operations in Afrin District are liable to benefit the rebels’ rivals, namely the Islamic State (IS) and the Syrian government, on nearby fronts. Over the past several weeks, both IS and pro-government forces were able to capture multiple areas from rebel forces in southeastern Idlib, northern Hama, and southern Aleppo provinces. In light of the likely deployments of rebel fighters to northwestern Aleppo Province, at the expense of the Aleppo-Idlib-Hama triangle, their adversaries are liable to take advantage of their more dwindled presence in the region to seize additional territories. This is highlighted by the reported capture of Idlib Province’s Abu Dhuhur Military Airbase on January 20 by pro-government forces. As a result, both IS and the Syrian government are likely to intensify their operations in southeastern Idlib, northern Hama, and southern Aleppo provinces over the coming days and weeks.

Recommendations

Recommendations: Turkey

Travel to Istanbul and Ankara may continue, although travelers are advised to maintain heightened vigilance in central areas due to the threat of militancy, as well as regular anti-government protests and occasional incidents of unrest in these locales.   Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary and contingency support options.

Avoid nonessential travel to the immediate vicinities of government buildings, police stations, political party offices, popular public places and shopping centers, as well as Western institutions and places frequented by Westerners, and places of worship due to the threat of militancy.

Avoid nonessential travel to Turkey’s southern and eastern provinces, while also avoiding all travel to border areas with Syria and Iraq, given the increased risk of militancy and spillover violence.

Those conducting essential travel to Turkey’s southern and eastern provinces are advised to defer all travel to areas witnessing curfews due to the elevated risk of violence in these locales.

Recommendations: Syria

We advise against all travel to Damascus and Aleppo, given the general threat of indiscriminate aerial bombardment and artillery shelling from government forces as well as attacks by various militant groups. Attacks by rebel forces may include the use of rocket-propelled grenades, suicide bombings, and mortar attacks.

Those remaining in Damascus should ensure that contingency and emergency evacuation plans are updated due to the potential for a further deterioration in the security situation. Additionally, those remaining in Damascus are advised to avoid all travel to outlying areas of the city given the persistent threat of militancy.

Those continuing to operate or reside in Aleppo are advised to minimize movement in the city and its surroundings, given the frequency and broad nature of fighting in the city.

Avoid all travel to outlying areas and cities including Homs, Hama, and Idlib due to persistent fighting and heightened risk of kidnapping targeting foreigners, particularly in combat zones and rebel-held areas.

What can we learn about the threat of homegrown Islamic State cells and their growing risk to European security – Spain Analysis

Situation

During the afternoon hours of August 17, Spain experienced its first Islamic State claimed attack as a van plowed 500 meters into a crowd of people on the busy La Rambla street in central Barcelona, leaving 13 people killed and over 100 injured. The incident was subsequently claimed by the Islamic State who wrote that it was carried out by “soldiers of the Caliphate in Spain” and was intended to kill “Crusaders and Jews”.

Afterwards, during the evening hours of August 17, police located a second van in the town of Vic (80 km from Barcelona), which was hired at the same time as the van used in the initial attack, and was suspected to be a getaway vehicle.

At around 01:00 (local time) on August 18, a second car ramming incident took place in the city of Cambrils, around 100km southwest of Barcelona, in which one person was killed and six others injured. The attackers attempted to flee the vehicle on foot, allegedly wearing fake suicide belts before all five were killed by police.

More importantly, however, were the events that took place during the evening hours of August 16, less than 24 hours before the first car ramming incident. At this time, a large explosion was recorded in a small house in Alcanar, 160 km southwest of Barcelona and approximately 300 km from Ripoll. A police report, which was later released indicated that the occupants had been preparing a TATP-based explosive device, despite the blast initially being dismissed as a gas leak. The house was reportedly filled with over 100 canisters of propane and butane. Furthermore, sources indicate that the device being prepared in the house may have been intended to target Barcelona’s famous Sagrada Familia church.

What can we learn about the threat of homegrown Islamic State cells and their growing risk to European security - Spain Analysis | MAX Security

Click here to see Map Legend 

Building the Terror Cell

Current reports suggest that the individuals involved in the attack all came from the area around the town of Ripoll, around 90 km north of Barcelona. Particularly, it appears that Abdelbaki Es Satty was the imam in Ripoll and is believed to have been instrumental in the radicalization and encouragement of the other seven younger individuals in carrying out the attack. Es Satty had been the imam since 2015 in Ripoll; however, he allegedly left “abruptly” in June 2017, and is suspected of using the time to start planning a militant attack.

What can we learn about the threat of homegrown Islamic State cells and their growing risk to European security - Spain Analysis | MAX Security

From 2010-2014 Es Satty served a four-year prison sentence in El Castellon, for a series of drug trafficking charges. It was during this time that he met and became friends with Rachid Aglif, who is serving an 18-year sentence for his role in the 2004 Madrid Train Bombings. Es Satty was also implicated in an operation in which he was involved in recruiting five individuals attempting to travel to fight in Iraq in 2006.

Other than Es Satty, the cell itself was built of young men of Moroccan heritage between the ages of 17 and 24-years-old. Reports indicate that all of them were born in Morocco and came to Spain at various times, all spending time or living in the town of Ripoll, where the cell appears to have been formed. Apart from Es Satty, there is no evidence to suggest that the other cell members had criminal records and no reported relations to other known radicals or militant networks. That said, a number of the members were reported posting increasing material on social media which pertained to topics typically associated with Islamism, including posts which spoke about the death of “infidels”, and contained excerpts of anti-Semitism common among radical Muslims.

What can we learn about the threat of homegrown Islamic State cells and their growing risk to European security - Spain Analysis | MAX Security

Assessments & Forecast

Attack underscores emerging threat of homegrown cells in Europe

This attack is notable for numerous reasons, as despite the eventual act seeming to fit within the general pattern of attacks types (i.e. vehicular ramming) witnessed in Europe over the past year, it had the potential to be one of, if not the, deadliest, most damaging, and symbolic militant attacks by any group in Europe in years.

In this context, the incident on La Rambla on August 17 was clearly not the initial plan of attack. The connection between the attackers and Imam Es Satty, who was killed in the Alcanar explosion, as well as the almost immediate action following the explosion paints a clear picture that the explosives in Alcanar were meant to be used by the cell in a spectacular attack, and that the two eventual incidents were taken as a “plan b” method. Indeed, the use of fake explosive belts are indicative of a degree of organizing such a “plan b” approach. Furthermore, it is likely, given the speed with which they were carried out following the explosion on August 16, that the car ramming attacks were expedited in an attempt by the cell to carry out an attack before police investigations into the explosion foiled their plans and led to their arrests.

More telling, however, is the nature of the cell involved and what it says about the evolution and variety of threats from such militants in Europe. Indeed, we have seen that attacks range from Islamic State and copycat-inspired “lone wolf” attacks to much more organized and planned attacks, at times involving instructions from a central organization, such as the case in the Bataclan attack in Paris and the Brussels Airport attack. It is also important to note, that the lone-wolf attacks in and of themselves can range in death toll from one or a few dead from a stabbing, to scores killed in the Orlando night club shooting or Nice vehicular attack, two of the deadliest, yet simpler attacks by IS supporters.

The recent London Bridge and Boroughs Market attack was a new evolution along the range of lone-wolf Jihadist spectrum, as it involved a group of lone wolves cooperating with one another to form a cell. While the structure and formation of the London attack is not entirely clear, it appears that those involved were self-radicalized but connected to one another either by their own volition, namely via Jihadist messaging channels or were introduced to one another through such a channel or otherwise. That said, these individuals do not appear to have been organized by a central body or particularly experienced individual.

What can we learn about the threat of homegrown Islamic State cells and their growing risk to European security - Spain Analysis | MAX Security

The attack in Barcelona, for its part, appears to fall into the category of a “Homegrown Cell”, which has been rare in recent years. The origin of a homegrown cell can vary significantly and can be constructed by one radical and charismatic figure acting alone, such an individual working on behalf of a known group, or by a radical Islamist who has a connection to a known group to one degree or another but was not instructed by them.

In the case of the Barcelona cell, Abdelbaki Es Satty was the likely facilitator and builder of the cell. His recruiting background portrays him as someone with an understanding of the process of identifying targets for potential recruitment and likely having the personality to influence others in such a way. Additionally, he likely developed a greater familiarity with various terrorist techniques and principles during through this relationship with Rachid Aglif. We assess that Aglif and the attack he was involved in, in which 192 people were killed, served as an inspiration for Satty.

Beyond that, it is unclear if he did have guidance or instructions from Islamic State although the speed by which Islamic State released the official claim of the attack, may indicate their prior knowledge of his plans.

What can we learn about the threat of homegrown Islamic State cells and their growing risk to European security - Spain Analysis | MAX Security

Homegrown cells allow for greater reach, more sophisticated, destructive attacks

While the individual “lone wolf” attack has the benefit of being much more challenging to predict and thwart, given that it involves only one individual and minimal planning, they are less likely to have as high of an impact as more organized attacks. Other than rare cases, such as Nice and Orlando, the majority of “lone wolf” attacks only involve a small number of casualties before the attacker is neutralized, even in the case of more advanced lone-wolf attacks, such as in London. On the other hand, while a cell composed of more trained and experienced Jihadists is able to carry out highly effective and destructive attacks, due to their expertise and manpower, the accumulation of many affiliated militants, in one area, alongside their communications and activities, is far more likely to arouse the suspicion of security forces and risk being thwarted.

In that regard, the Ripoll cell is an interesting balance in that it can balance the low-key nature of a lone wolf group with the greater planning and organization of a more advanced Jihadist cell. Islamic State can select known and trusted individuals online, or returning foreign fighters, and instruct them on the formation of a homegrown cell, and in some cases lend them material support or connect them with other experienced or useful individuals.

The Spanish cell was able to plan and almost execute what could have been one of the most significant European attacks, without being thwarted by security, because although they were many in number, their relationships seemed organic enough not to arouse suspicion and the fact that the more suspicious activity they did was conducted in a remote location and not in their home environment.  This allowed them to prepare a highly sophisticated attack plan, with multiple layers and back-ups, without outwardly appearing to be a militant cell.

Further attacks from similar cells should be expected across Europe

While the possibility of typical “lone wolf” attacks remains throughout the world, particularly in Europe and the West, the homegrown cell phenomenon is likely to become more common than previously witnessed. Given that IS have penetrated almost every country in Europe and have propaganda and media communications in most major languages it is likely that there are already similarly structured cells across the continent, built of local radicals bound together by online facilitators or one local IS-affiliate or even one individual who has a greater degree of exposure to Islamist methodologies. Additionally, as seen in the past, the “copycat effect” is likely to take hold, with similar cells conducting attacks in the coming months.

Furthermore, IS regularly encourages attacks throughout the continent and adjusts their instructions to the successes of previous attacks. In this context, it is highly likely that Islamic State, whether involved in the Barcelona attack or not, will learn from its successes and failures.

Thus, and as IS continues to lose territory in the Middle East, and tends to want to balance these losses with an appearance of being a global phenomenon, we assess that Islamic State may actively seek to ‘activate’ such cells in Europe. In this way, the organization will likely want to have more control over how, when, and where an attack will take place, and may currently be reaching out to foreign fighters who returned to Europe, or other connections they may have, in order to encourage them to build their own homegrown cells.

Furthermore, Islamic State will likely learn from the failure of being over ambitious. Es Satty likely looked up to Rachid Aglif and his involvement in the deadly Madrid attacks from 2004, and in seeking to match its casualty level, chose to develop an extremely large explosive device by a large number of terrorists rather than launching an attack earlier and at a lower capacity. With this, we expect that IS will encourage smaller attacks by smaller homegrown cells, but ones that have a far greater potential for success.

Recommendations

On the corporate level

We advise raising the awareness of employees and security personnel to unusual activity and behavior of fellow employees. Encourage your employees to report such observations whether at work or in their personal surroundings. Monitor local unusual developments in order to predict emerging threats in the vicinity of your interests, and follow the global terror trends and modi operandi, in order to adapt your security measures and preparations. Conduct surveys to check and evaluate the relevancy of your current security protocols.

On the institutional level

Additionally, identify the social groups and communities in your area that are more susceptible to radicalization, identify the leading individuals, and monitor their activities. Raise the public’s awareness regarding key indicators of unusual activity.

For more information about the terror threat in Europe and what you can do to be prepared, check out our white paper here. 

Why the July 7 large-scale attack by the Islamic State in North Sinai is likely an effort to challenge regional & local setbacks – Egypt Analysis

Current Situation

A large scale and multi-pronged attack by the Islamic State (IS), involving at least two suicide vehicle-borne IEDs (SVBIED) followed by a ground assault targeted a military checkpoint near the North Sinai village of al-Barth, located approximately 30km south of Rafah, during the morning hours of July 7. According to the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAAF) Spokesperson, 26 casualties were inflicted on the Egyptian military, including the killing of one Colonel, while at least 40 militants from the IS-affiliated Wilayat Sinai were killed and six of their vehicles destroyed in the attack.

Why the July 7 large-scale attack by the Islamic State in North Sinai is likely an effort to challenge regional & local setbacks - Egypt Analysis | MAX SecurityClick here to see Map Legend 

Assessments & Forecast

While attacks by Wilayat Sinai in North Sinai, particularly the triangle area between al-Arish, Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid which is the group’s main area of operation, are common, this recent attack is highly notable due to its large scale, sophistication, and reports that it resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. This is compared to the more frequent, near-daily attacks in the area that largely include small arms fire and IEDs, have a more limited effect, and result in smaller numbers of casualties. In this context, while Wilayat Sinai continues to conduct offensive operations in North Sinai at a high frequency, the scope and volume of its activities had significantly decreased in recent months. Furthermore, while previously the group had conducted attacks outside of its primary area of operations in North Sinai on a regular basis including several times of a month, the last such attack took place in South Sinai’s Saint Catherine’s Monastery on April 18-19, and before that in Mount Halal on March 23, highlighting a continued decrease.


Why the July 7 large-scale attack by the Islamic State in North Sinai is likely an effort to challenge regional & local setbacks - Egypt Analysis | MAX Security

As such, the reasons for the decline in Wilayat Sinai’s scope and volume of activities is likely the result of regional and local developments relating to the Sunni jihadist group. Regionally, as the central organization is continuing to face defeats in Syria and Iraq, it is likely facing more difficulties in lending an active support for its affiliate in North Sinai. Locally, following the October 14, 2016, Wilayat Sinai’s attack on the Zakdan Checkpoint, Egyptian security forces had changed their strategy regarding counter-militancy operations in North Sinai. This entailed a change of focus away from combating the militant group at its “front lines” in the primary area of operations, which did result in killing militants but not in a substantial effect on the group’s overall capabilities. Instead, the focus was turned to the group’s logistic infrastructure such as tunnels, smuggling routes and hideouts and weapons caches in the Central Sinai mountains, which created a more long-term damage and one that is harder to recover from.

Additionally, the attack comes amidst rapprochement talks between the Egyptian government and the Gaza-based Hamas organization, which also include the creation of a buffer zone between Gaza and North Sinai, thus further challenging cross-border activity which benefits Wilayat Sinai and friendly Gaza based-Salafi organizations which are opposed to Hamas. Furthermore, following April 17 when IS prevented a cigarette smuggling operation by members of the Tarabin Tribe, one of the peninsula’s largest and most powerful tribes, parts of the Tarabin tribe, along with later members of the Sawarka Tribe, initiated operations against the militant group, both in their own independent militias, as well as in support of the EAAF. This has likely caused damage to Wilayat Sinai, as it heavily relies on the local population in the region to ensure its freedom of operation.

As such, while the recent attack serves as an indication that Wilayat Sinai still retains significant capabilities that allows it the mount such a large-scale operation, the attack was likely motivated by the aforementioned hardships the group is facing, regionally and locally, and may be the result of perceived despair. In this context, by conducting such a high-profile attack, the group likely seeks to highlight that it is still a viable threat. Moreover, it likely seeks to hinder and deter further counter-militancy operations in North Sinai, by leveraging the civilian population to pressure the government that the investment in North Sinai is not worth the high numbers of casualties caused by it.

If this strategy succeeds, it may allow Wilayat Sinai to at least partially rehabilitate its lost infrastructure and freedom of operation, however at the time of writing, it has low likelihoods of success. FORECAST: Taken as a whole, additional frequent limited-scale attacks by Wilayat Sinai are liable to occur in the al-Arish-Sheikh Zuweid-Rafah triangle area over the coming days and weeks, along with possible larger scale and higher profile attacks in this and other areas in the Sinai Peninsula, however at a significantly reduced rate. Furthermore, Egyptian authorities will likely increase their operations in North Sinai over the coming hours and days, to retaliate against the attack and portray an image to its citizenry that they were able to significantly damage the militant group, thus offsetting any arguments against operations in the peninsula.

Recommendations

Travel to Cairo and Alexandria may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations. Avoid all travel to the North Sinai Governorate and border areas with Libya, Sudan, and Israel due to the persistent risk of militant attacks, kidnappings, and general lawlessness.

We further advise to avoid nonessential travel to the Southern Sinai Peninsula, while maintaining heightened vigilance in the Suez Canal Zone, the Upper Nile area, and the Nile Delta region due to an increased risk of unrest and the heightened risk of militant attacks. Before traveling to Sharm al-Sheikh, confirm that flight operations are continuing and have not been impacted by recent militant threats. As a general security precaution, remain vigilant in areas surrounding and avoid the immediate vicinity of government installations, police stations, and religious centers, particularly churches, as these locations remain under elevated threat of militant attacks. When traveling in central squares, or in areas with persistent police deployments, avoid the immediate vicinity of security forces, particularly fixed traffic booths, as such personnel and facilities have increasingly come under attack by militant elements.

 

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