Tag Archives: IS

Islamic State releases first video of leader al-Baghdadi since June 2014; aimed at boosting morale of fighters, supporters worldwide – Global Analysis

Executive Summary

On April 29, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State (IS), openly appeared in a video for the first time in almost five years.

The main objective of the video is to showcase to IS followers that al-Baghdadi is alive and still in command of the organization, and to rally his followers to increase their rate of activities.

Additional goals of the video include portraying al-Baghdadi as a combat leader and successor of Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, as well as to bolster the image of the organization’s global operations.

Lastly, the video includes some insights into IS’s current organizational structure and into its affiliated groups around the world.

Forecast

There is likely to be an increase in the rate, scope, and scale of attacks by IS and by sympathizers of the group over the coming weeks and months, particularly during the upcoming holy month of Ramadan.

During this time frame, IS will put a greater emphasis on conducting high-profile attacks against soft targets, including in regions that so far did not witness an attack by the group.

Over the longer term, IS will invest in building up its local affiliates, particularly in Africa and Central Asia, to compensate for its recent losses in the Middle East and its current inability to fully rehabilitate itself there.

Current Situation

  • On April 29, al-Furqan Media Foundation, the main Islamic State (IS) propaganda branch responsible for the release of messages by the group’s senior leadership, released an 18-minute video of IS’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who is openly seen for the first time since an IS video on June 2014 showed him giving a sermon at al-Nouri Mosque in Mosul, Iraq.
  • In the video, al-Baghdadi is addressing his followers through a long speech delivered to three companions whose faces have been blurred, and who are likely senior leaders in the organization.

 Al-Baghdadi and the three companions  seen in the video

Assessments & Forecast

Video aims to showcase al-Baghdadi is alive, well, and still heads the group, boost the morale of fighters and supporters

Throughout the first part of the video, al-Baghdadi names “martyrs” who have been killed during the Baghouz campaign in Syria, which concluded in March 2019 as IS lost its last pocket of control over an urban terrain and a population. Thus, the timing of the video is highly symbolic and meant to highlight to IS followers that the “Caliph” and “Amir al-Mu’minin” (“leader of the faithful”) is alive and well and still heads the group, despite its continues strategic losses in recent years. This is especially so as it comes after years of various rumors about al-Baghdadi being killed by different actors, and at times that he has been overthrown from the leadership of the group. It is important to note however, that despite seemingly being healthy, al-Baghdadi appears to be very weary, and the video cuts several times, likely to allow him to rest and to refer back to his notes. There are clear efforts made by IS to prove that the video is contemporary, including by al-Baghdadi referencing current events such as the ongoing political unrest in Algeria, the ongoing revolution in Sudan, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s victory in the Israeli elections.

However, the only time when the video does not show al-Baghdadi is when he speaks about the Sri Lanka Easter attack from April 21, as the video shows footage released by international media showing the aftermath of the attack, as well as by the IS-linked Amaq news agency showing the militants prior to the attack, with an audio recording by al-Baghdadi of different quality than that of the video. Thus, it is possible that the original video was made and edited prior to the Sri Lanka attacks, with IS later adding a reference to it, due to the event’s importance.

Overall, mentioning the loss of Baghouz and the Sri Lanka attack is meant to mobilize IS fighters, as well as the group’s supporters around the globe, to conduct attacks as part of the “Revenge for al-Sham (Syria)” Campaign, an ongoing effort that commenced after IS lost Baghouz, during which the group increased the rate, scope, and quality of their operations worldwide. While it remains unclear if this was intentional or not, the video was also released shortly before the holy month of Ramadan, which begins around May 6, a period of time that traditionally experiences an uptick in jihadist attacks, with the release of the video likely to serve as a further conducive factor for such attacks. Moreover, the references to Algeria and Sudan were emphasized by stating that “unfortunately Muslims did not wise up to the fact that they keep replacing one tyrant by another, and that the only way to deal with these tyrants is through Jihad for Allah”, thus trying to appeal to persistent widespread perceptions of marginalization among Muslims in order to increase the support base for IS.

 

Al-Baghdadi affirms strategic shift of IS from state-like structure to primarily asymmetric warfare

In the video, al-Baghdadi glorified the resistance of the Baghouz defenders and highlighted that “no IS territory was ever lost without a fight”, also mentioning by name the lost of Sirte, IS’s de facto capital in Libya, in December 2016. Later, he praised the recent actions of the fighters in Libya, especially their raid on the town of al-Fuqaha and their conduct of a “war of attrition” in their attacks on enemy infrastructure and supply lines, as well as the attackers of the az-Zulfi police station in Saudi Arabia, hoping for more such attacks.

This provides further support for the longstanding assessment, supported by evidence from conflict zones, that with the demise of the “physical Caliphate” of IS in Syria and Iraq, the group has shifted its strategy toward asymmetric warfare. This means that, at least at the current stage, the group will not be attempting to regain territory and revive its government or country-like structure. Instead, it will be focusing primarily on conducting attacks varying from small-scale hit-and-run to large-scale raids, to maximize enemy casualties on the one hand, and minimize the militants’ exposure and thus potential casualties in their ranks on the other.

 

Al-Baghdadi seeking to portray himself as a combat leader, successor of Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

Al-Baghdadi himself makes an effort to bolster the image of the organization now being active as a guerilla group. Namely, al-Baghdadi is seen with an assault rifle and combat gear as if to imply that he is now a combat leader and not just a political and spiritual leader. Notably, the type of rifle, an AKS-74U, is the exact same model traditionally seen with Osama bin Laden, founder of al-Qaeda, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the group that preceded IS, indicating that al-Baghdadi is also trying to draw a parallel between himself and the two revered jihadist leaders. Another important factor is that the room in which al-Baghdadi is sitting is covered entirely by white sheets. This is based on tradecraft adopted by Osama bin Laden and meant to protect operational security (OPSEC) and prevent giving out any clues that could be used to geolocate the area in which he is staying, thus fortifying that the group is now operating covertly and underground, as opposed to the recent past when it was operating more overtly and as a state-like and military-like entity.

Al-Baghdadi (left) Osama bin Laden (center) and al-Zarqawi (right) with the same firearm and a sheet covering their surroundings

Al-Baghdadi highlights role in countries other than Iraq and Syria to project image of global success and encourage bolstering activity there

Most of the regions referred to by name by al-Baghdadi in the video, aside for Baghouz, are areas outside of the “core territory” of IS in Syria and Iraq. This includes the aforementioned references to Sri Lanka, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, but also congratulating the “brothers from Burkina Faso and Mali for joining the Caliphate”, as well as welcoming the groups in Khorasan (Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran) who joined the “Mujahideen”. This is meant to project a sense that, despite the loss of its core territory, IS is continuing to grow and is successful in other regions around the world.

This point is also highlighted by the fact that the only seemingly living person al-Baghdadi names throughout the video is Adnan Abu al-Walid al-Sahraoui, leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which has merged with the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) in recent months. In addition to the gesture showing great respect to al-Sahraoui and bolstering the image of Africa and its importance to IS, there are two other important factors. First, that al-Baghdadi is trying to dispel the persistent rumors that al-Sahraoui has been killed by stating “we ask Allah that he may protect…our brother Aba al-Walid al-Sahraoui”, implying that he is still aliveSecond, that it comes amid other persistent rumors that the leader of ISWAP, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, has been relieved from leadership of the group. Taken together with ISGS merging with and possibly coming under ISWAP, this may serve as an indication that al-Sahraoui is now the leader of ISWAP, though this still remains unclear.

Since al-Baghdadi realizes that it will be difficult to rebuild his forces in Syria and Iraq in the coming months and possibly years, he wants to bolster IS’s strength in other parts of the world, something that has been evident for months as the group has been calling on its supporters to make “Hijra” (religious immigration) to countries other than Iraq and Syria. To serve this purpose, al-Baghdadi has to emphasize the importance of these other countries in order to attract more supporters to go there, as they are often perceived as less desirable destinations for jihad.

 Video hints at current organizational structure to underscore global outreach

The video concludes by al-Baghdadi reviewing 12 notebooks with the names of IS affiliates. These are, by order, Wilayat Iraq, Wilayat al-Sham (Syria), Wilayat Khorasan (Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran), Wilayat West Africa, Wilayat Sinai, Wilayat Libya, Wilayat Somalia, Wilayat Yemen, Wilayat Central Africa, Wilayat Caucasus, Tunisia, and Wilayat Turkey.

In IS’s terminology, “Wilaya” is a reference to a region in which a direct local affiliate purportedly has any of the following or a combination of them: territorial control, control over a population and at least a basic governmental structure. In this context, the fact that Tunisia did not have the Wilayat prefix (as has been the norm in IS claims thus far) is further indication that IS does not presume to have any of the above in the country, and that in their view Tunisia is currently strictly an area of attacks. Additionally, this is the first time an official reference was ever made to a “Wilayat Turkey”, whereas in IS attacks in the country, the last officially claimed one being the attack against a nightclub in Istanbul on New Years 2017, it was referred to only as “Turkey”. Despite the lack of overt IS offensive activity in Turkey, there is widespread logistical activity by the group in the country, with this gesture by al-Baghdadi denoting the strategic significance the country maintains in the group’s structure.

al-Baghdadi reviewing a notebook titled “Wilayat Turkey”

There are two other notebooks left at the feet of the companions, however their titles are not visible. At least three known IS affiliates: East Asia, Algeria, and (mainland) Egypt were missing from al-Baghdadi’s review. It is possible that any of the two, with East Asia being the highest likelihood given its overall success, are the two notebooks left by the companions, and that at least one of the two others are officially considered disbanded by the central leadership, most likely Algeria given its inactivity in recent years. That being said, it cannot be ruled out that the two other notebooks are of different regions that IS is trying to maintain a secret and therefore are not exposed.

Overall, the point of this staged scene is twofold. First, to underscore IS’s global operations and presence, and second, to project an image that the group still maintains a centralized command structure in which sub-organizations conduct operations in their regions but all report back and fall under the direct command of al-Baghdadi.

At least 310 killed in nationwide bombings on April 21; indicative of extensive network, potential transnational link – Sri Lanka Analysis

Please be advised

  • At least 310 people have been killed and hundreds injured in multiple suicide bombings that occurred in Colombo, Negombo, and Batticaloa on April 21, Easter Sunday.
  • Authorities indicated that the attacks involved seven suicide bombers. The targets comprised three churches, including the St. Anthony’s Shrine in Kochchikade, Katuwapitiya Church in Negombo, the Zion Church in Batticaloa, as well as the Shangri-La, Cinnamon Grand, and The Kingsbury hotels in Colombo. Two more explosions took place at a guesthouse near the Dehiwala Zoo and a suspected militant hideout in Dematagoda. At least 39 foreigners are believed to have been killed in the attack.
  • On April 23, the Islamic State (IS)-linked Amaq News Agency reported on the incident, but the group has not released an official claim, as of publication.
  • According to reports from April 23, security forces have arrested at least 40 individuals in connection with the blasts, including a Syrian national. According to sources, at least nine of the suspects were remanded until May 6. The country’s defense minister stated on April 23 that the attacks were in retaliation for the killing of Muslims in the attack in Christchurch, New Zealand in March.
  • One individual was reportedly arrested in the Kandana area in north Colombo along with communication devices, per April 22 reports. No specific information on the nature of the devices has been released. Four others were reportedly arrested from Gampola and Katugastota, located in Kandy District.
  • During the evening hours (local time) on April 22, two suspects were arrested during a security operation at a house located in the vicinity of a church on Enderamulla road in the Wattala area of north Colombo. Security forces closed off Colombo Main Road in Welisara area of Wattala following the reported discovery of a suspicious vehicle parked near Nawaloka ground during that time as well. However, no explosives were found on the site. Meanwhile, the police spokesperson announced that a total of 87 detonators were found at a private bus stand in Pettah within the Fort area of Colombo on April 22.
  • During the afternoon hours on April 22, an explosive device was detonated in the vicinity of St. Anthony’s Church in the Kochchikade North area of Colombo 13. Police reportedly attempted to conduct a controlled detonation of the device, which was placed inside a vehicle, with various reports stating the device exploded before they could do so. No casualties were reported as a result of the operation.
  • Alleged IS supporters posted images of three militants allegedly involved in the explosions on April 21. The images were shared through the pro-IS al-Ghuraba media channel. One of the pictures appears to feature Zahran Hashim, the alleged leader of the National Thowheeth Jama’ath (NTJ).
  • On April 21, police also reportedly discovered an alleged safe house in the Panadura area of south Colombo, in which suspected militants are said to have lived for almost three months prior to the explosions. The police of Wellawatta area, located in south Colombo, also seized a vehicle, along with its driver, on suspicion of transporting some suspects related to the explosions.

Assessments and Forecast

Perpetrators suspected to be local, but likely linked to IS or group’s affiliates

  1. While investigations are currently ongoing, based on the target selection, the attack was perpetrated by an organized group of individuals either inspired by jihadist ideology or with links to transnational jihadist groups such as Islamic State (IS) or al Qaeda (AQ) or their affiliates. Based on the modus operandi used, targets, and ideological spheres of influence, it is more likely to be IS-inspired or led than AQ, as further suggested by the Amaq media report. The travel of 32 Sri Lankan nationals to Syria and Iraq to join the IS in 2016 is indicative of this trend in local Islamist radicalization. Given the absence of previous major jihadist attacks in Sri Lanka, as well as the broad scope of the Easter bombings, we assess that the involvement of an external militant actor in helping sympathetic locals scale up their tactics is highly probable. While the government has attributed the attack to the NTJ, an organization with no confirmed external links, it is important to note that the group has splintered in recent years, based on sources of funding for factions. The Easter attack is likely to have been conducted by one of these factions that may have drawn on IS-inspired tactics and target selection.
  2. At the time of writing, it is unclear what level of cooperation, if any, this may have involved. That said, the orientation of the plot towards Christian targets, despite the predominance of inter-community conflicts between hardline Sinhala Buddhists and Muslim minorities, may indicate the influence of global jihadist ideology in target selection. It also represents a prioritization of symbolism in their target choice, given that attacking Christians and hotels frequented by Western nationals and affluent classes were more likely to draw global media attention. The staging of the attack in the capital was also intended to undermine the Sri Lankan government and stir up inter-religious hostilities with the Sinhala Buddhist majority. The choice of attacks on hotels, in addition to churches, may have been intended to maximize casualties at Easter social events known to take place during the morning-afternoon hours. As regards the defense minister’s assertion that the attack was in response to the Christchurch attacks, since the scale of the operations required greater advance planning, his theory appears to be debatable. However, the incident in New Zealand may have reaffirmed the militants’ commitment to the plots and the targeting of Christians.

Emerging reports from investigations indicate close coordination and planning, as well as extensive network of militant cells

  1. There is little confirmed information regarding the explosives material used, or the profiles of the suspects apprehended. However, the recovery of explosives material and detonators from a suspected militant cell in Puttalam in January appears to have been an early warning sign of growing radicalization. The materials seized in January, such as ammonium nitrate and nitric acid, are characteristic of relatively less sophisticated household-manufactured explosives. Should similar materials have been used in the attack, it may explain the relatively inconsistent death tolls and damage caused, which varied from each individual attack. However, casualties appear to have been maximized by the strategic planning, coordination of multiple plots, logistics, and deployment of operatives to successfully stage the attacks. Some of the attacks also indicate the usage of shrapnel, such as ball bearings or nails placed in the backpack of the suicide bomber who was dispatched to the Kochchikade church, in order to increase secondary casualties. The suspects are also likely to have had bases in the capital, as explained by their familiarity with the targets and access to them.
  2. While it remains to be confirmed that all suspects arrested during security operations were linked to the explosions, the large number of detainees underscores the potential for an extensive network involved in the attacks, ranging across more than one province. The arrests of four suspected operatives in Kandy District are also significant given that the area has witnessed substantial inter-religious tensions between the Muslim minority and hardline Sinhalese Buddhists, which escalated into communal violence in March 2018. The arrests in Kandy may lead police to probe the potential involvement of individuals radicalized following the aforementioned Kandy violence.

Recovery of undetonated explosives, anti-militant raids elevates security risks in the capital in the immediate term

  1. The discovery of an IED inside a vehicle on April 22 near St. Anthony’s Church is also notable given its proximity to the site of the first blast on the day prior. While it is currently unclear at what time the vehicle was parked in the area, its location suggests that it may have been intended as a secondary attack targeting rescue operations attending to the initial blast. The discovery of a large number of detonators, along with the pipe bomb found near the international airport, also indicates that additional attacks may have been planned in a similar fashion. It appears likely that more explosive devices may be discovered during ongoing security operations, increasing the need for situational awareness and heightened vigilance if traveling in Colombo.
  2. FORECAST: There is an elevated potential for additional security incidents in the capital over the coming hours. Security forces are expected to continue to conduct raids, arrests, and security operations across Colombo and in the Central Province over the coming hours, while an enhanced deployment of law enforcement will remain in place in the capital city for the foreseeable future. There is also a potential for ad-hoc road closures and evacuations due to heightened public sensitivities at present, evidenced by the security operation in Wattala. Raids also bear the latent risk of collateral damage to those in the vicinity, as raided safehouses may contain explosives, or suspects may use these devices or gunfire in an armed confrontation. This was indicated in the Dematagoda raid. Further, as security forces are on greater alert, evacuations of public spaces may occur with increased frequency over the coming days, based on the identification of suspicious objects. Intermittent curfews are liable to be enforced, based on concerns of further attacks or the potential for inter-religious clashes between Muslims and hardline Sinhala Buddhist groups. As witnessed since the attack, security will remain heightened in neighboring countries that are at risk of copycat attacks, such as the Maldives and India.

Recommendations

  1. Those operating or residing in Colombo on April 23 and in the coming days are advised to avoid nonessential outdoor travel within the capital and avoid any large gatherings.
  2. Avoid the immediate vicinity of all churches, mosques, or Buddhist temples in the country over the coming hours due to the risk of retaliatory attacks/further detonations.
  3. Given the targeting of religious sites, we advise to avoid the display of religious imagery and avoid overt or critical statements of any religious institutions both in public spaces and online, including social media.
  4. If traveling in the city, use only secure methods of transportation with vetted drivers.
  5. We advise allotting for disruptions to travel across Colombo over the coming hours, due to the heightened security measures and the likely establishment of vehicular checks and road blockades following the blasts.
  6. Given the reported heightened security measures implemented at the Bandaranaike International Airport (CMB), we advise allotting for extra-time to travel by air and reconfirm flight itineraries.
  7. Ensure when traveling that you have sufficient means of identification and can evidence if required, exactly where you are going.
  8. Allot for disruptions to communication due to the impact of curfew measures on social media access and messaging platforms.
  9. Remain cognizant of your surroundings, including any suspicious behavior of individuals, which may include a person wearing winter clothing during warm weather and/or seemingly wandering around, as well as items that look out of place, such as bags or containers.
  10. Immediately alert authorities of any suspicious behavior or items. Ensure that places of stay are properly secured, alter travel routes, and avoid disclosing sensitive itinerary information to unknown individuals.
  11. Foreigners, particularly Westerners, should maintain a low profile, and exercise heightened vigilance in the vicinity of locales frequented by foreign, particularly Western nationals, including US and Western diplomatic missions and interests, due to the increased potential for militant attacks.
  12. If scheduled to visit the country, delay travel or reconsider nonessential stay until the situation stabilizes.
  13. For contingency plans and on-ground operational support, contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434.

Prospects for Stability & Development in Libya – Libya Special Intelligence Report

This report was written by: Akshita Aggarwal – MAX Security’s Associate Director of Intelligence, Middle East & North Africa

And reviewed by: Tzahi Shraga – MAX Security’s Chief Intelligence Officer, ret. LTC from the Israeli intelligence community

Oded Berkowitz – MAX Security’s Deputy Chief Intelligence Officer

Executive Summary

Control over territory in Libya remains contested between the House of Representatives (HoR), the Government of National Accord (GNA), and tribal militias. As neither of these entities are willing to compromise upon their interests, the current political landscape in Libya will remain unstable.

Multiple militias with rival territorial, economic, political, and ideological interests operate in the country. As there is often no clear demarcation between their respective areas of influence, sporadic armed clashes between these groups will continue over the coming months.

Militant groups continue to take advantage of the lack of a unified security apparatus to operate across Libya. Although these groups currently do not have the ability to regain territorial control in the country, the sophistication and scale of their attacks will increase over the coming months.

The Libyan economy is largely dependent upon the oil industry. The ongoing political and security instability will continue to deprive the government of the ability to invest in development and infrastructure, as well as protect oil facilities from potential militant attacks.

Overall, the security environment in Libya remains extremely volatile and is set to further deteriorate in the foreseeable future.

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Background

Multiple political and armed actors are currently operating across Libya. In many cases, there is no clear territorial demarcation between their respective spheres of influence, and therefore, at times these tend to overlap. The fringes of these territories also provide a conducive environment for the proliferation of militant groups, such as the Islamic State (IS), as well as local and foreign criminal militias. Moreover, internal divisions exist even within seemingly cohesive political factions and armed units, due to differing interests and ideologies, which contribute to the already volatile security environment in the country.

The overarching geographical areas of control are as follows:

Western Libya: Largely under the control of militias aligned with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). However, the majority of these militias have rival economic and territorial interests, which often lead to hostilities between them.

Eastern Libya: Largely controlled by the House of Representatives (HoR) and its allied Libyan National Army (LNA).

Southern Libya: Largely ungoverned territory, with rival tribal militias in control of isolated towns and production facilities. Although the LNA managed to recently extend its influence over parts of southern Libya, tribal militias in control of the town hold shifting allegiances.

Main Actors & Interests

The Government of National Accord (GNA): The GNA is based out of the Tripoli Naval Base and is a product of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), signed in Skhirat, Morocco in December 2015. The LPA allows for the transition of the House of Representatives (HoR) and the General National Congress (GNC) into the GNA’s legislative body and advisory State Council, respectively. However, this transition was to be ratified by a special majority vote of the HoR within a period of one year, which was renewable only once. The HoR is yet to convene the needed quorum for this vote. On December 17, 2017, the Libyan National Army (LNA) Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar declared that “All bodies resulting from this agreement [LPA] automatically lose their legitimacy, which has been contested from the first day they took office.” Regardless, the GNA continues to be considered the “internationally recognized” government and enjoys the support of the UN. Its sphere of influence extends through western Libya, particularly in greater Tripoli and Misrata.

House of Representatives (HoR): The previously “internationally recognized” government, the HoR’s parliament is based in Tobruk and the executive branch in al-Bayda. Its sphere of influence is generally in eastern Libya, with some pockets of support in the west, particularly southwest of Tripoli. The HoR is currently supported politically, militarily, and economically by several countries, most prominent of whom are France, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt. While these countries generally recognize and support the LPA, they capitalize on the fact that the HoR has not ratified the agreement as a pretext to consider it as non-valid at this time, in order to continue supporting the HoR and not the GNA.

Other groups: Both the ungoverned and the governed areas of Libya are dominated by politics based on tribal, clan, and ethnic backgrounds, as well as place of residence and origin. It is not uncommon for cities that both support the same political body to be at odds due to historical or other rivalries among their residents. Similarly, militias from the same city who support the same political organ may have a strife over tribal or other rivalries.

Armed Groups

The GNA is currently almost completely reliant on local armed militias to exert influence over its territories. The most prominent GNA-linked militia are the Misrata forces, based out of the northwestern town of Misrata. Misrata forces also maintain their own air force, which was initially formed in 2015 as the Libya Dawn Air Force (LDAF), and later in 2016, aligned itself with the GNA. Misrata has very few operational pilots and aircraft, which were most recently operationally used in 2016 in hostilities against the LNA and the Islamic State (IS). Several other militias, like the al-Radaa Special Deterrence Forces, the Abu Salim Battalion, and the Tripoli Revolutionaries’ Brigade, are formally under the command of the GNA’s Ministry of Defense (MoD), and hold territorial control over different parts of Tripoli.

The Libyan National Army (LNA) and its allied militias are led by Supreme Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA is allied with the HoR, based out of Tobruk. It has a clearer command and control structure, with several commanders in charge of different battalions and areas of LNA-controlled territories. Although the majority of LNA forces are anti-Islamist, certain factions within the forces hold a Salafist ideology. Presently, the LNA’s main area of operations is in and around the Oil Crescent, Jufra District, Fezzan Region, Kufra District, Benghazi, Derna, and Tobruk. It also has some influence in areas southwest of Tripoli through their association with Zintan-based militias. The LNA also maintains an air force, the Libyan Air Force (LAF). LAF aircraft are used primarily to conduct aerial reconnaissance and airstrikes against militant and militia convoys in the Sirte Basin and Fezzan Region.

Tribal militias, mostly consisting of either Tebu or Tuareg ethnic tribes, control most of southern Libya, including Sebha. These tribes are at times supported by fellow tribesman from neighboring countries, such as Chad and Sudan. They hold shifting allegiances towards the various players in the country.

Islamist militant groups, such as the Islamic State (IS) as well as the al-Qaeda-linked Revolutionary Shura Council of Benghazi (RSCB), Derna Protection of Force (DPF), and Saraya Defend Benghazi (SDB), continue to operate across Libya. The IS and the SDB are currently the most prominent of these groups.

Political Stability

The efforts of the Head of the UN Special Mission to Libya (UNSMIL), Ghassan Salame, over the past year have at least partly prompted the HoR and the GNA to work towards unification of all institutions in the country and end the ongoing political stalemate. The HoR approved the referendum law on September 14, which allows for a referendum on Libya’s draft constitution. Subsequently, in November, the HoR successfully voted on a constitutional amendment, which legally validates the referendum law. It also divides the country into three constituencies – Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. According to the amendment, the approval of the draft constitution would require an absolute majority vote in each region as well as a two-thirds majority vote nationwide. At the same time, the HoR approved the restructuring of the Presidential Council (PC), whose membership will now reduce from nine to three. It will now be consist of a President and two deputies, and a separate Prime Minister as the Head of the government.

Assessments & Forecast: Recent measures aimed at unifying political institutions unlikely to lead to nationwide elections

While on paper, the aforementioned developments portray that the GNA and the HoR have made substantial progress towards a nationwide election process and the unification of political institutions in the country, these measures have substantially tilted the scales in favor of the latter. Members of the GNA had previously opposed the amendment of Article 6 of the LPA, which divides Libya into three distinct constituencies as well as the restructuring of the PC. If the constitutional referendum does not pass, the current law assigns Cyrenaica with a veto power, which would essentially allow the HoR to activate an article of the referendum law that would pass on the responsibility of drafting the new constitution to the HoR, thus allowing the eastern-based government to alter Article 8 of the LPA.

Article 8 of the LPA has been a highly controversial point between the GNA and the HoR. This article excludes anyone with dual citizenship from holding either a political or military post in the country. LNA Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar holds both US and Libyan citizenship, and therefore, this will exclude him from Libya’s future political landscape. The HoR’s insistence on amending this article stems from the fact that it currently extends territorial influence over eastern Libya due to its alliance with the LNA. Moreover, the LNA is in control of much of Libya’s oil infrastructure, which has gained Haftar increasingly international legitimacy over the past year, as underlined by his inclusion in both the Paris Conference in May and the Palermo Conference in November.
FORECAST: These conditions provide the HoR with an upper hand in negotiations, and therefore, it is unlikely to concede to the GNA on any key issues pertaining to the country’s future. Such a scenario will provide France with significant influence over Libyan politics vis-a-vis its regional rival, Italy. Therefore, both countries will attempt to intervene in Libya in order to ensure a more favorable outcome for themselves. This, in conjunction with the lack of electoral infrastructure, will further delay the slated March 2019 nationwide election process. If and when elections do take place, the turnouts will be very low due to the inability of either the GNA or the HoR to provide the required security to secure electoral booths from the threat of militancy. Moreover, as Libya is based on tribal culture, with a council of elders responsible for governing each town, any federally constituted government will face resistance on the local level.

Threat of Militancy

Islamic State (IS): Although IS does not control any territory in Libya as of December 2016, it has managed to rebuild some of its capabilities in the country over the past year. Initially, the majority of IS attacks were directed against LNA checkpoints in the Sirte Basin and Jufra District, which mainly utilized vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs). Gradually, IS shifted towards conducting more sophisticated multi-pronged attacks against government infrastructure in western Libya. For example, IS claimed multi-pronged attacks against the Misrata Courts Complex on October 4, 2017, against the Tripoli Electoral Commission on May 2, 2018, and the National Oil Corporation (NOC) Headquarters in Tripoli on September 10, 2018. And finally, IS militants launched two large-scale attacks against the towns of al-Fuqaha, Jufra District, and Tazirbu, Kufra District, on October 28 and November 23, respectively.

Saraya Defend Benghazi (SDB): In June 2017, the SDB indicated its willingness to disband after Misrata forces refused to provide them refuge in the city of Misrata, following the former’s loss all its territories in the Jufra District to the LNA. While reports did indicate that SDB fighters were still operating in parts of western and southern Libya, the group remained dormant for approximately a year. However, in June 2018, SDB fighters, led by the former Petroleum Facilities’ Guard (PFG) commander Ibrahim al-Jathran, launched a large-scale attack against the Ras Lanuf and Sidra oil terminals, located in the Oil Crescent. However, following the LNA’s recapturing of the Oil Crescent, the group has again gone dormant and not launched any significant attacks in Libya.

Assessments & Forecast: Although militant groups unlikely to regain territorial control in Libya, the sophistication of their attacks is likely to increase

Several factors have allowed militant groups to regain part of their ranks and capabilities in Libya over the past year. First, militants either planning to go fight for IS in Syria or Iraq, or fleeing the group’s territorial losses in these countries, view Libya as an alternative arena for their activity, and therefore have bolstered the ranks of the Sunni jihadist militant group in the country. Second, the LNA’s preoccupation in hostilities in other parts of the country, such as in Benghazi, Sebha, Derna, and the Sirte Basin, over the past year likely allowed militants to regroup in southern Libya, which remains largely controlled by tribal militias, without being detected by security forces. Third, widespread cross-border smuggling of weapons and fighters across Libya’s southern borders with Sudan and Chad, likely allowed both IS and the SDB to reinforce their offensive capabilities.

While both groups continue to remain interested in destabilizing the security environment in the country, neither of the groups currently maintain the ability to regain a territorial foothold in Libya. However, they do have the capability to launch attacks against more high-value targets, such as government offices, oil, and other infrastructure, in Libya. The lack of sufficient security protocols around these facilities allows the groups’ fighters to circumvent existing measures to gain access to their interiors. Such attacks allow militant groups to not only project their heightened capabilities to attract support and recruits, but also deprive the authorities of the necessary revenues to invest in their counter-militancy campaign. Aside from this, IS’s particularly increased focus on attacking towns in southern Libya are part of an attempt by the group intimidate locals and gain ransom from kidnappings at the same time. Overall, all these efforts are directed towards further destabilizing the security environment in the country, with the ultimate aim of expanding influence and re-establishing a territorial foothold.
FORECAST: Despite efforts by both the LNA and GNA-linked militias to dislodge militancy from the country, both IS and the SDB will continue to utilize the vast desert terrain of southern Libya as well as the fringes between GNA and LNA-held territories to regroup and rebuild their capabilities. They will the use these bases as launchpads for further attacks against government and security installations. The sophistication of these attacks may gradually increase as the militant groups attempt to launch more symbolic operations. The lack of a unified security apparatus, combined with insufficient military equipment and training, will overstretch the LNA and local militias, which will continue to hinder their ability to effectively combat this threat of rising militancy in Libya.

Economic Stability

The Libyan economy is largely dependent upon the export of oil. Oil production facilities are operated by foreign companies, with permission from the National Oil Corporation (NOC), based in Tripoli. The oil revenues then accrue to the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), based in Tripoli, which then distributes the revenue to the GNA, the HoR, the LNA, and GNA-aligned militias.

Assessments & Forecast: Political divisions, security volatility, global oil prices unlikely to significantly increase government revenues

Tensions have persisted between the GNA and the HoR regarding control have over Libya’s monetary policy and revenues, which prompted both parties to form parallel central banks based in Tripoli and al-Bayda in 2014. After retaking control of the Ras Lanuf and Sidra oil terminals from the SDB in June 2018, Haftar decided to hand over control of revenue from these oil terminals to the eastern-based NOC. However, in 2017, when PFG commander Ibrahim al-Jadhran temporarily took control of the Oil Crescent and attempted to directly sell the oil from these facilities on the international market, European countries imposed an embargo on this oil. They further stated that only oil bought from the Tripoli-based NOC would be considered as legal. Therefore, Haftar’s decision was likely prompted by an attempt to not undermine the Tripoli-based NOC, whose head Mustafa Sanalla, is popular both among the GNA and the HoR, but rather to force the GNA to replace the CBL head, Sadiq al-Kabir, whom the LNA considers as corrupt and illegitimate. This is supported by the fact that Haftar eventually agreed to hand over control of revenue from the oil terminals back to the Tripoli-based NOC on July 10. The underlines the divisions instability arising from the bipolarity between the country’s economic institutions.The widespread threat of militancy, as well as militia activity, poses a further threat to oil infrastructure in the country. The majority of these facilities are secured by local militias who have their own interests in mind.

Therefore, they often utilize these facilities as bargaining chips in their negotiations with the GNA. For example, in recent weeks, a movement under the name “Anger of Fezzan” threatened the Sharara Oil Field if their demands for development in southern Libya were not met. Moreover, the militiamen who are in charge of securing oil fields are neither well-equipped nor well-trained, and therefore are usually incapable of protecting these facilities from a well-executed attack. Oil pipelines in the country tend to run across territories held by different militias with rival interests which pose a further threat to business continuity. This, combined with the instability of global oil prices, makes Libya’s economy highly unpredictable and unstable for the foreseeable future.
FORECAST: As the aforementioned political and security issues will persist for the foreseeable future, Libya’s economy is unlikely to witness any form of stability. This will adversely impact the GNA’s already declining popularity in the country. July witnessed widespread anti-GNA protests in Tripoli and its surroundings over the UN-backed government’s inability to provide locals with water and electricity. These eventually provided local militias with conditions conducive to launch an assault against each other in order to advance their personal territorial interests, thereby sparking large-scale inter-militia hostilities in the designated capital. Therefore, an unstable economy will lead to civil unrest in the future, which, in turn, will increase the threat posed by militant groups and armed militias.

Infrastructure & Development

Political, security, and economic stability have a direct impact on the prospects for infrastructure and development.

Assessments & Forecast: Economic, political, security instability to prevent the government from investing in development, infrastructure

The lack of sufficient revenue has denied the GNA and the LNA with the ability to invest in development and infrastructure. Airports in Libya are generally controlled by local militia groups, who are under-trained and under-equipped to employ proper security protocols for air travel. This includes the lack of a secure perimeter around airports, which allows militias and militant groups to use weapons of relatively lower sophistication to target these facilities. This is highlighted by the frequent mortar shelling of the Mitiga International Airport as a result of inter-militia hostilities in Tripoli. The GNA has also been unable to reopen the Tripoli International Airport as militias frequently attempt to take control of the facility from their rivals. Aside from attacks, service disruptions at airports remain frequent due to staff strikes, particularly over unpaid salaries. This is due to the lack of sufficient funds under the control of the GNA, as it depends largely on the country’s oil reserves.

Commercial ports are also susceptible to attacks, as underscored by the temporary shut down of the Tripoli Seaport on October 17, 2017, due to clashes between GNA-linked militias near the facility. The majority of the country’s seaports are located in northwestern Libya. The Libyan Coastguard has frequently intercepted foreign vessels off the coast of northwest Libya on suspicions of illegal smuggling activity, as local militias in the area have been known to disguise as GNA officials to sell oil and fund their operations. With regards to seaports in eastern Libya, the LNA has been unable to fully operationalize the Benghazi and Derna ports following their capture from militants in June 2017 and May 2018, respectively. Moreover, the LNA Navy has designated Libyan territorial waters off the coast of Benghazi as a “no-sail” zone (until al-Tamimi, 280 km east of Benghazi), and therefore entering it requires prior authorization. This is particularly important as vessels that do not obtain such authorization and escort from the LNA Navy are automatically suspected of carrying support for militants, and may be intercepted or even targeted by airstrikes.
FORECAST: The lack of revenues will prevent the GNA and the LNA from substantially raising security protocols at infrastructural facilities in Libya. This will make such facilities an easy target for attacks by militant groups as well as militias. Militias operating in Tripoli and its environs will continue to attempt to seize control of vital airports and seaports in order to increase their negotiating power vis-a-vis their rivals. This will have an adverse impact upon operations at these facilities, even when militias try not to directly target them.

Recommendations

It is advised to defer all travel to Tripoli and Benghazi at this time due to ongoing violence, threats against foreigners, and the risk of a broad deterioration of security conditions. We advise at this time that those remaining in Tripoli and Benghazi should initiate contingency and emergency evacuation plans due to deterioration in the security situation. Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary and contingency support plans.

For those remaining in Tripoli, we advise avoiding nonessential travel to the outskirts of the city, particularly the Janzour and Tajoura neighborhoods, as well as to the Mitiga and Tripoli International Airports, given that these are focal points of ground clashes in the city.

Avoid all nighttime travel, including to and from the airport, due to the elevated risk for militant attacks, clashes, and acts of unrest during this time.

Travel to Misrata and Tobruk should be for essential purposes only while adhering to all security precautions regarding civil unrest and militancy. We advise against all travel to outlying areas of the country, due to the threat of militancy, kidnapping, and general lawlessness in such areas.

Avoid entering Libyan territorial waters in the area between Benghazi and al-Tamimi without prior authorization, as a no-sail zone is currently in effect in this area and several naval vessels had been intercepted or attacked due to not following proper procedures.

Those planning to conduct air travel to, from and inside Libya should avoid entering the area between Marsa al-Brega, Sirte and Sebha, as it was declared a no-fly zone by the Libyan National Army (LNA).
We further advise against all travel to Libya’s border areas at this time due to persistent violence and lawlessness in these regions.

For those operating in or conducting business with oil facilities, it is advised to consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations and ground support options.

Avoid the immediate vicinity of government buildings, police stations, media outlet offices, and political party and militia headquarters, given that these locales have been targeted by militia groups in the past and recently by militants, and thus remain at increased risk for violence and unrest.

Westerners, particularly US citizens, operating in Libya are advised to maintain a low profile and exercise heightened vigilance in light of prevailing anti-Western sentiment and increasing attacks against foreigners.

Nationwide, take precautions to mitigate the risk of being targeted for kidnapping. Refrain from travelling in luxury vehicles and maintain a generally low profile. Routinely alter travel routes and refrain from divulging sensitive itinerary information to strangers.

 

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IS attack against Tazirbu police station on November 23 indicative of increase in militant group’s ranks, capabilities in Libya – Libya Analysis

Executive Summary

The modus operandi of the November 23 attack against the Tazirbu police station is very similar to the October 28-29 Islamic State (IS)-claimed attack against a police station in al-Fuqaha, Jufra District. The scale of these attacks, combined with the short time span within which they occurred make them highly noteworthy.

This shift in IS strategy from localized small-scale attacks across Libyan territory towards more focused large-scale attacks against towns in southern Libya, which witness lower security presence, indicates that the militant group has to some degree managed to reinforce its ranks as well as rebuild its capabilities over the past year.

Similar to the al-Fuqaha attack, IS militants kidnapped ten people, including government officials and security personnel from Tazirbu. IS’ increased focus on kidnappings can be attributed to its interest in using the abductees as bargaining chips for ransom. This would allow the group to replenish its revenues, purchase supplies and weaponry, and ramp up its operations in Libya.

We advised against all travel to the southern outlying areas of Libya at this time due to the general lack of governance and security protocols in this region, which makes it conducive for militant activity and attractive targets for attacks.

Current Situation

According to reports, suspected IS militants aboard ten armed vehicles launched an attack targeting a police station in Tazirbu, located in the Kufra District, during the night hours of November 23.
At least nine civilians and policemen were killed, and 15 were wounded as a result of the attack.
Reports further indicate that the militants kidnapped at least ten people, including the Mayor of Tazirbu and a member of the municipal council, and fled the scene.
The Libyan National Army (LNA) has diverted forces from other parts of Kufra District towards the town of Tazirbu to secure it.

Assessments & Forecast

The modus operandi, target, and location of the attack suggest that it was carried out by IS militants. The Sunni jihadist militant group recently conducted a very similar attack against the al-Fuqaha police station, located in the Jufra District, during the overnight hours of October 28-29. The scale of these two attacks, along with the short time span within which they occured make them highly noteworthy. In the time period between IS’ complete loss of territories in Libya in December 2016 and October 2018, the majority of the militant group’s attacks had been relatively small-scale as well as spread out over a long period of time and territory. The majority of these attacks utilized suicide vehicle-borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) against security checkpoints or small-scale raids against police stations. For instance, the July 24 raid against the al-Uqaylah police station killed two LNA soldiers and wounded three others, while the June 2 raid against the al-Qunan police station killed one civilian and wounded five others.

Over the past year, IS was likely operating in groups of 10-12 fighters in the country. This allowed its militants to avoid attracting security forces’ attention and move relatively undetected across a larger swathe of territory. The lack of sufficient personnel and weaponry may have compelled IS to operate in this manner, which, in turn, had an impact upon their ability to launch larger-scale attacks. The recent attacks in al-Fuqaha and Tazirbu may indicate that IS has managed to bolster its ranks, partly through militants fleeing the group’s territorial losses in Syria and Iraq and partly through new recruits who now consider Libya as a more attractive arena. This has allowed IS to concentrate its forces towards launching larger-scale attacks against entire towns, rather than just security checkpoints or isolated government infrastructure, for example, in Tripoli in May and September as well as in Misrata in October 2017.

While, on the one hand, this indicates that IS has managed to rebuild its capabilities in Libya to some degree since its loss of territories to Misrata forces in December 2016, the location of the recent attacks suggest that these capabilities are still limited. Although al-Fuqaha and Tazirbu are both located within LNA-held territories, the towns witness relatively lower security presence as compared to areas located further north in the Sirte Basin and the Oil Crescent. The security forces of southern towns are largely comprised of local militias, who maintain small armed fighting units that are neither well-equipped nor well-trained. Therefore, it is possible that IS decided to focus its efforts in southern Libya, as this would increase the militant group’s chances of success.

As witnessed in the attack on the al-Fuqaha police station, the focus on conducting kidnapping of government officials and security forces stands out in the recent incident. Unconfirmed reports from November 10 indicated that IS is seeking to negotiate the release of four out of the ten hostages abducted in the attack on al-Fuqaha. If confirmed, this would suggest that through such kidnappings-for-ransom, the Sunni jihadist militant group is aiming to replenish its revenues, which, in turn, would allow it to purchase supplies and weaponry to ramp up its operations in Libya. This would also explain the recent kidnapping of the Mayor of Tazirbu, who by the prerogative of his position within society would demand a higher ransom. Aside from the ransom, such an abduction allows IS to project the Libyan authorities as incapable of securing its own civilians, thereby allowing the group to showcase its relatively higher capabilities.
FORECAST: IS will claim responsibility for the attack over the coming hours, as its scale will allow the militant group to significantly raise its profile in Libya. Meanwhile, the LNA will divert forces towards Tazirbu in order to secure the town over the coming hours and days. It will increase security protocols in Kufra District, which may include increased security checkpoints along main roads. The LNA may also tighten security along Libya’s southern borders with Sudan and Chad, as the porosity of these borders allows militant organizations to engage in the cross-border movement of fighters, supplies, and weaponry. While this may facilitate LNA forces in gathering vital intelligence and intercepting IS convoys, it will also provide the militant group with additional targets for attacks. On a more strategic level, the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may utilize this attack to highlight the LNA’s inability to secure its held territories and attempt to leverage this in its political negotiations with the latter.

Recommendations

It is advised to defer all travel to Tripoli and Benghazi at this time due to ongoing violence, threats against foreigners, and the risk of a broad deterioration of security conditions. We advise at this time that those remaining in Tripoli and Benghazi should initiate contingency and emergency evacuation plans due to deterioration in the security situation. Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary and contingency support plans.

For those remaining in Tripoli, we advise to avoid nonessential travel to the outskirts of the city, particularly the Janzour and Tajoura neighborhoods, as well as to the Mitiga and Tripoli International Airports, given that these are focal points of ground clashes in the city.

Avoid the immediate vicinity of government buildings, police stations, media outlet offices, and political party and militia headquarters, given that these locales have been targeted by militia groups in the past and recently by militants, and thus remain at increased risk for violence and unrest.

We advised against all travel to the southern outlying areas of Libya at this time due to the general lack of governance and security protocols in this region, which makes it conducive for militant activity and attractive targets for attacks.

Westerners, particularly US citizens, operating in Libya are advised to maintain a low profile and exercise heightened vigilance in light of prevailing anti-Western sentiment and increasing attacks against foreigners.

Nationwide, take precautions to mitigate the risk of being targeted for kidnapping. Refrain from traveling in luxury vehicles and maintain a generally low profile. Routinely alter travel routes and refrain from divulging sensitive itinerary information to strangers.

Lone-wolf attacks underscore threat from radicals in Europe, despite dwindling connections with militant groups – France Analysis

Executive Summary

The uptick in stabbing and vehicular attacks in France bears a strong resemblance to previous Islamic State (IS)-inspired and linked attacks.

This wave follows the August 22 call to action from IS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who asked supporters to “strike the West” and emphasized vehicular attacks in particular.

IS appears to have been particularly successful in radicalizing young Muslim immigrants in France.

Authorities are likely downplaying the militancy links in order to offset the increasing media attention surrounding such attacks.

Travel to France may continue while remaining cognizant of the increased threat of militant attacks. 

Current Situation

On September 14, a car-ramming attempt was recorded along Rue Racine in Nimes, southern France, during the early morning hours. The assailant reportedly intended to drive his car into pedestrians before being stopped by security barriers at around 01:30 (local time). The suspect was consequently subdued by locals in the area and later arrested by police. Reports quoting local eyewitnesses during the incident stated that the suspect shouted “Allahu Akbar”.

On September 10, an individual was detained for reportedly forcibly driving through multiple barriers and entering the runway of Lyon-Saint-Exupery Airport (LYS) in Lyon. The suspect was subsequently arrested following an extensive police pursuit. The incident caused significant delays and cancellations to flights. Following the arrest, a member of Lyon Prosecutor’s office reportedly stated that the assailant had alluded to a militant motive, claiming he was instructed to carry out the incident by Allah. However, this was later retracted.

The incident followed a September 9 stabbing attack in the 19th Arrondissement of Paris, when an assailant reportedly stabbed and injured at least seven people, including two British tourists, on Quai de Loire Street and Rue Henri Nogueres during the late night hours. The suspect was reportedly an Afghan national.

Authorities appeared reluctant to label all three attacks as being militant-related, calling the Nimes attack a “deliberate homicide”, and saying that the assailant who carried out the September 9 Paris stabbing attack did not appear to have militant motives. All three incidents were carried out by individuals of Muslim backgrounds and all three methods align with modus operandi that has been explicitly and repeatedly called for by the Islamic State jihadist group.

Background

On August 22, the (IS) al-Furqan media released an audio recording of the group’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who called upon the group’s supporters to “strike the West” through stabbings, bombings, and vehicular rammings, particularly emphasizing the last method. Al-Baghdadi then stated that “one such attack equals one thousand attacks in the Middle East and North Africa”.

On August 23, an assailant killed one and injured two in a knife attack in Trappes, Yveline, located 26 km from central Paris. The attacker reportedly shouted ‘Allahu Akbar’ and threatened police officers who arrived at the scene, and was later neutralized. Shortly after, IS-linked media reported that the assailant was a soldier of the Caliphate and conducted the attack in response to the group’s calls to “target the coalition countries”, referring to the US-led coalition of states that orchestrated a number of airstrikes against IS strongholds in 2014. Following the 2014 offensive, an IS spokesman had specifically singled out France as a target for future attacks.

Assessments & Forecast

Series of attacks likely lone-wolf incidents inspired by Islamic State methods and ideology, even if not ordered by IS in Middle East

Despite authorities’ reluctance to label the above-mentioned incidents as being IS-inspired militant attacks, various factors indicate that they may, in fact, have some connection to the group’s ideology and professed methods. In particular, the assailants resorted to stabbing and vehicular attacks in locations with a considerable civilian presence, which, in recent times, have been IS-linked lone-wolf actors’ chosen modus operandi. The assailants also chose to indiscriminately target these civilians and intended to cause widespread harm.

The known profiles of the attackers, who belong to immigrant communities who widely follow Islam, and the chanting of ‘Allahu Akbar’ during the attacks in at least two confirmed cases, is consistent with the details from similar previous IS-linked attacks. This lends credence to the possibility that the attackers’ actions were informed by a religious and ideological motive, in addition, it is equally likely that psychological instability also played a part in their motivations.

The link to IS is also strengthened by Baghdadi’s specific emphasis on the effectiveness of vehicular attacks in the August 22 call to action, which in turn was likely precipitated by the April 2018 airstrikes carried out by France and other countries in Syria, in response to the alleged use of chemical weapons by the state. In this case, the call was rather a wider propaganda piece, which was answered, and there is no evidence to suggest that any of the attackers had specific contact with IS in the Middle East or had been in touch with handlers.

Attacks likely catalyzed by individual feelings of disenfranchisement within community, which benefit IS’ recruitment

Due to the targeted locations being distant from one another, and absence of uncovered network between the suspects, it is likely that the attacks were not related, despite being conducted in quick succession. However, the attacks point to the potential success of IS propaganda and recruiting in France. The group has emerged as a viable outlet for Muslims who feel alienated from the wider community, exploiting feelings of disenfranchisement by offering them an alternative, in terms of belonging to the larger radical Islamist community.

Particularly, feelings of alienation among Muslim immigrants have likely been heightened by government policies such as the 2010 ban on religious face veils and head coverings, seen as being exclusionary, which have consistently prompted a backlash from both minority communities and their supporters, as well as anti-immigrant groups. Domestic factors such as a high unemployment rate and job discrimination against Muslims, religion-based tensions, as well as the general political culture of government criticism, also continue to contribute to making the immigrant population more susceptible to radicalization.

As has been seen in the past, IS also provides a useful narrative to psychologically-disturbed individuals, who then carry out copycat lone-wolf attacks using IS modus operandi, seeking to capitalize on media attention surrounding the IS ideology.

Authorities seeking to minimize impact of attacks through reluctance to make militant connection to avoid further media attention for such groups

Further, it is notable that authorities have not indicated that any of the September attacks were militant-related, despite suggestions, as evidenced above, that the assailants were at least influenced by IS, if not directly linked. This reflects a reluctance to label such lone-wolf attacks as Islamist militancy, possibly to discourage the media narrative against, and resultant disaffection within, Muslim immigrant communities in the country.

This unwillingness to attribute the incidents to militancy could also be a result of a conscious government decision to reduce the inadvertent aiding and abetting of IS’ operations, as the group has been known to use such official statements after attacks to legitimize itself as a threat to the West. Additionally, the government could be seeking to avoid heightened criticism of its security policy, especially amid the current administration’s declining public approval ratings.

FORECAST: IS’ online presence and recruitment methods, in addition to the persistent domestic factors alienating the Muslim community in France, the global trend of young men using mass violence as an outlet for psychological frustration, and IS has tapping into this trend to further its agenda, makes it likely that further such attacks will occur in France over the coming weeks and months. Given the apparent shift in executive security policy towards mitigating the media clout of militant attacks in general, it is likely that authorities will continue miIslamist islamist motives in such attacks.

Recommendations

Travel to France may continue while remaining cognizant of the increased threat of militant attacks.

IS-linked media validation after IED attack in Isulan, Mindanao on August 28 may inspire further local militant plots – Philippines Alert

Please be advised

At least two people are reported to have been killed and 34 others wounded in an IED blast that took place along a highway in Isulan town in Sultan Kudarat Province, Mindanao on August 28. The Islamic State (IS)-linked Amaq News Agency reported the incident, while also stating that 3 Filipino soldiers were killed in the incident.

Authorities are believed to have defused two other IEDs after the initial blast, which took place as local residents were commemorating the local Hamungaya harvest thanksgiving festival. Local officials have indicated that the IS-linked Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) were behind the incident.

Security was previously raised across the southern region of Mindanao on August 3 after the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) claimed that IS-affiliated Abu Sayyaf group was plotting militant attacks in the aftermath of the July 31 vehicular IED attack in Basilan.

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Assessments

The incident is indicative of the continued risk of militancy, specifically from explosives-based plots, in Mindanao. The fact that IS-affiliated groups such as BIFF and Abu Sayyaf have been able to stage intermittent attacks in civilian areas across the southern region despite facing concerted AFP operations indicates the high degree of operational sustainability that they continue to possess. Their increased activity also appears in tandem with the IS’ reframing of its network of global affiliates in late July, with the East Asia affiliate now being referred to as a Wilayat or a Province.

The staging of the IED attacks during a festival is indicative of attempts to attract increased public attention, especially if the blast in a relatively crowded spot had resulted in a higher death toll, as seemingly intended. However, the fact that the Amaq report only references casualties among security personnel signals the transnational group’s intention to be perceived positively among locals, potentially to attract recruits. These forms of messaging, despite the lack of accuracy, can be expected to provide on-ground validation to groups like BIFF and Abu Sayyaf, sustaining the risk of continued low-level explosives plots in the southern Mindanao region over the near term.

Recommendations

Travel to Metro Manila may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols given the latent threat of militancy, crime, and unrest.

We advise against all travel to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Sur, and the Sulu Archipelago, including the islands of Basilan, Jolo, Tawi Tawi, given the high threat of militancy, criminality as well as the elevated risk of kidnapping of foreign travelers. Those continuing to operate in Mindanao are advised to limit movement outside major cities such as Davao and General Santos.

Remain cognizant of your surroundings, including any suspicious behavior of individuals, which may include a person wearing winter clothing during warm weather and/or seemingly wandering around, as well as items that look out of place, such as bags or containers.

Immediately alert authorities of any suspicious behavior or items.

Ensure that places of stay are properly secured, alter travel routes, and avoid disclosing sensitive itinerary information to unknown individuals.

Barcelona stabbing, one year after La Rambla attack, underscores continuing link between psychological instability and militant style attacks – Spain Analysis

Current Situation

On August 20, around 05:00 (local time), an individual armed with a knife reportedly attempted to enter a police station in Cornella de Llobregat, Barcelona and attack personnel, while shouting “Allahu Akbar”, before being shot dead. Reports indicate that the attacker was of Algerian origin and had lived in the area for several years.

The incident is reportedly being treated as a militant attack by authorities. However, police have claimed that they have no reason to believe that there are any direct links to major militant networks or that the assailant was connected to the cell that carried out the Barcelona attacks one year earlier. In addition, the testimony of his ex-wife indicated that the attacker had recently come out as homosexual, and was reportedly experiencing serious psychological instability and was suicidal due to confusion over how this could fit in with his Muslim faith. Some sources within the investigation have claimed that they do not believe the attack to be linked to jihad.

On August 16, a pro-Islamic State (IS) group published a poster on social media calling for attacks targeting police in Spain in both English and Spanish.

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Background

The August 20 attack is the latest in a series of violent or militant-related incidents involving North Africans or individuals of North African origins in south and south-west Europe over the past year.

In addition, on July 22, a 29-year old Canadian national of Pakistani origin, Faisal Hussain, killed two and injured three in a shooting in Greektown, Toronto. Hussain was allegedly also known to have had a history of psychological instability and had reportedly expressed concerns about his employment and financial situation to a friend prior to the incident. On July 25, the Islamic State (IS)-linked media outlet, al Amaq, reported that the attack was carried out by a soldier of the Caliphate in response to their call to target citizens of coalition nations.

Assessments

Attack on police station underscores growing trend of violence copying Islamic State methods among psychologically unstable Muslim males

Despite claims that the attacker had a number of problems in his personal life, the possibility of links to wider militant trends cannot be ruled out. On the contrary, the fact that the attacker shouted “Allahu Akbar” and carried out the attack on the specific target that pro-IS groups had called for four days prior indicates that, even though he was likely not linked to any established militant cell, broader ideas of jihad informed part of his motivation. That is to say, while he may not have been looking to aid the goals of the Islamic State or avenge the deaths of Muslims, it is likely that, within his psychological instability, when thoughts of suicide arose, the concept of carrying out a jihadist attack was seen as a viable method. Possibly copying previous ‘suicide by cop’ attacks, in which the perpetrator intends to be killed by security forces. This assessment is further bolstered by the reports that his confusion over homosexuality was, in part, caused by an uncertainty about how it fit in with Islam.

With this in mind, the incident comes amid a continuing trend of psychologically unstable individuals, most of whom are migrants who adhere to the Muslim faith, carrying out attacks that mimic IS-inspired lone wolf incidents. Such attacks tend to be conducted by young males with mental health issues, who are, in part, influenced by the concept of jihadist militancy as a form of anti-establishment violence that has entered the West’s collective consciousness. Psychologically unstable individuals, and immigrants who perceive themselves to be disenfranchised and socially isolated from their community, whether it’s the Muslim or wider community, are copying IS-methods of attacks. In this sense, the media coverage of the various IS shootings and the general global trend of young men using mass violence as an outlet for frustration and disenfranchisement have merged.

Regardless of the psychological issues of the attacker, the fact that the incident came following the call from pro-IS groups means that online jihadist communities, and even Islamic State-linked media organizations, are likely to attribute the event to part of their ideology and larger plan. This is especially the case given the timing of the incident around the anniversary of the August 2017 attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils. In turn, this will perpetuate the aforementioned trend merging psychological instability and attacks that appear to be militant in nature.

Finally, the August 20 attack in Barcelona constitutes the latest in an ongoing trend of incidents related to violent attacks linked to Islamism from within the local North African community in north-eastern Spain and southern France. IS and IS-linked operatives have put a particular emphasis on recruiting in the region, due to the fertile ground for radicalization born from the feelings of disenfranchisement in both the established North African community and among North African migrants. These sentiments, which come partly due to perceptions of otherness within Spanish society and partly due to pressures put on from the local community, have the potential to lead young men towards violence, sometimes personally and sometimes linked to a militant organization.

Recommendations

Travel to Spain can continue while maintaining vigilance, due to the elevated threat of militancy.

IS claims killing of Western nationals in July 29 armed attack in Khatlon Province; likely involvement of sympathizers – Tajikistan Alert

Please be advised

The Islamic State (IS) claimed a car ramming and stabbing attack that resulted in the deaths of four Western tourists in Danghara District, approximately 90 km south of Dushanbe. Meanwhile, Islamic State (IS)-linked Amaq News Agency reported on July 30, that “soldiers of the caliphate” conducted the attack in response to calls to target citizens of coalition countries.

IS claims killing of Western nationals in July 29 armed attack in Khatlon Province; likely involvement of sympathizers - Tajikistan Alert | MAX Security


IS claims killing of Western nationals in July 29 armed attack in Khatlon Province; likely involvement of sympathizers - Tajikistan Alert | MAX Security
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Assessments

While over 1,000 Tajik citizens are believed to have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join IS, the July 31 claim appears to be the first such acknowledgment by the group of an attack within Tajik boundaries and is therefore notable. The extent to which the operation was guided by the IS leadership in Syria and Iraq remains unclear at this juncture.

At present, it appears more likely that the attack was conducted by radicalized individuals that were inspired by IS rather than trained operatives of the group itself. This is indicated by the reference to targeting Coalition citizens in the Amaq report issued on July 30, which derives from a landmark statement by IS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in 2014, that called for sympathizers to perpetrate low-intensity attacks against individuals in nations comprising the military coalition against the IS.

The IS-linked media’s reference to “soldiers of the caliphate” further suggests that the perpetrators were likely self-radicalized, considering the use of such phrasing in previous attacks by individuals influenced by IS ideologies but possessing no evident links to IS functionaries. This is also consistent with the lack of sophistication of the attack, as well as the reported numbers of extremist sympathizers in the country leading from long-standing anti-Islamist government policies.

Recommendations

Travel to Tajikistan may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols given the latent threat of militancy, crime, and unrest.

Those operating or residing in Dushanbe are advised to maintain heightened vigilance due to the risk of crime and militancy while avoiding unsecured travel to the country’s rural districts such as Danghara.

We advise against nonessential travel to outlying areas in Tajikistan near the country’s borders with Afghanistan, given the threat of militant activity and criminality, including drug smuggling.reat of radicalization in Central Asia, read our in-depth report.

AQIM-OIB claims attack against National Guard patrol in Jendouba Governorate’s Ghardimaou on July 8 – Tunisia Alert

Please be advised

According to the Ministry of Interior (MoI), a group of militants killed six National Guardsmen in an ambush targeting two vehicles patrolling the Tunisian-Algerian border near Ain Soltane village, located in Jendouba Governorate’s Ghardimaou District, during the morning hours of July 8.

The militants reportedly detonated an IED against the patrol, which was then followed by gunfire against the National Guardsmen. The assailants reportedly fled the scene following the attack and are still at large.
The attack was later claimed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)-affiliated Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade (OIB). According to their statement, nine National Guardsmen, including an officer, were killed in the attack. The militants seized eight rifles, a handgun, and a machine gun before fleeing the scene of the attack.

According to reports, a man was arrested in Kairouan Governorate for expressing support for the AQIM-OIB claimed attack on July 9.

In addition, members of the security services of Beja staged a protest in front of the National Guard’s headquarters demanding that the Minister of Interior (MoI) support new legislation meant to protect servicemen on July 9.

Tunisia Alert (UPDATE): AQIM-OIB claims attack against National Guard patrol in Jendouba Governorate’s Ghardimaou on July 8; avoid all travel to area | MAX Security

Assessments & Forecast

The attack is highly notable since it is the largest militant attack on Tunisian soil since March 2016, when Islamic State (IS) militants infiltrated Medenine Governorate’s Ben Guerdane from Libya. This incident highlights the increased risk of militancy near Tunisia’s western borders with Algeria, with the latest attack in the area recorded on May 31, when security forces foiled an AQIM-OIB attack in Kasserine Governorate. Although, AQIM-OIB is known to maintain an operational base along the Tunisian-Algerian border, the majority of its attacks over the past year have been mainly focused in the southwest, namely Kasserine Governorate, rather than in Jendouba, which is located in the northwestern part of the country.

Furthermore, all of these attacks have been of a lower sophistication, mainly involving the use of landmines or shootings. However, the latest attack utilized a relatively more sophisticated modus operandi. The multi-pronged nature of attack highlights the militant group’s resilience to security forces’ ongoing operations in western Tunisia, as well as their fighters’ abilities to regroup in the aftermath of such operations. It is also indicative of their ability to plan and execute coordinated attacks in order to achieve maximum casualties.

The timing of the attack is further significant. It was likely conducted in response to several developments that undermine the group’s interests in the area. These developments include the recent heightened security protocols put in place by Tunisian security forces along the border area in coordination with their Algerian counterparts.

This has led to a decline in the militant group’s abilities to operate along the border area, as witnessed in February, when Tunisian security forces neutralized a leader of AQIM-OIB in Kasserine Governorate based on intelligence from the Algerian intelligence apparatus. The militant had reportedly been sent from Algeria to reorganize the Tunisian affiliate.

Security protocols along the western border have also hindered smuggling operations, which provide militant groups with supplies and revenue, and cement their codependence with local smugglers, as the latter also depends on these operations as a source of income. Mitigating these operations not only damages the militant group’s supply lines, but also erodes their influence over the local population, as its members inevitably seek other sources of income.

Therefore, the attack likely seeks to compel security forces to divert resources away from Kasserine Governorate, which is AQIM-OIB’s primary area of operations in the country, towards Jendouba Governorate. This will overstretch the resources at the disposal of the Tunisian security apparatus, thus allowing militants to operate more freely in the area.

The latest attack follows the June 3 IS-claimed attack against a gas pipeline near Kasserine Governorate’s Sbeitla. In light of the ongoing competition between IS and AQIM over weapons, supplies, and personnel in western Tunisia, it is highly likely that the latest attack was meant to be symbolic in nature. This would project AQIM-OIB as the more prominent Sunni jihadist group in the country, allowing it to attract supporters and recruits at the expense of IS.

FORECAST: In response, the Tunisian Armed Forces (TAF) will launch intensified counter-militancy operations in western Tunisia, including in Jendouba, Kef, and Kasserine governorates. These will likely include increased security patrols as well as artillery shelling against potential militant hideouts in the mountainous regions. Security protocols will also be elevated along the Algerian border in order to prevent militants from crossing into Algeria and evading arrests.

However, this increase in security presence may provide militants with additional targets, leading to further clashes between security personnel and militants. Moreover, the increase in AQIM-OIB activity may prompt IS to heighten operations in the country in the near term. Overall, given the continued entrenchment of militants in western Tunisia’s mountainous areas due to their demonstrated ability to adapt and evolve, further similar sporadic attacks are likely to take place in the coming weeks and months.

Recommendations

Travel to Tunis may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Those operating or residing in Tunisia are advised that we maintain operational capabilities in the country.

Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary and contingency support options.

Those operating or residing in Jendouba District on July 8 should avoid all travel to the Ghardimaou District in light of the anticipated counter-militancy operations following the attack, as well as the likelihood for further clashes in the area over the coming days.

Avoid all travel to the Kasserine, Kef, and Jendouba Governorates, in addition to all border areas, due to jihadist activity and military closures. Furthermore, avoid all travel to within 50 km from the border with Libya, due to the increased threat of attacks originating from Libya targeting Tunisian interests.

 

Recent spate of coordinated IS-linked attacks, new modus operandi in Surabaya exhibits increased operational capabilities of local cells – Indonesia Analysis

Executive Summary

IS-linked suicide attacks in Surabaya likely stem from active attempts by the JAD to offset leadership setbacks and mobilize sympathizers.

The coordinated nature of the attacks and use of an unprecedented modus operandi indicate increased operational capabilities of local jihadist cells.

Increased visibility of consecutive IS-linked incidents in Java within the same week may spur additional attacks by cells or lone-wolves in urban centers and elsewhere, including Jakarta and Bali.

Those operating or residing across Indonesia are advised to maintain heightened vigilance in the vicinity of government buildings, transportation hubs, iconic public areas, military bases, restaurants, high-value soft targets, shopping centers, and religious centers including mosques and churches, as they remain potential targets for militant attacks.

Indonesia Analysis: Recent spate of coordinated IS-linked attacks, new modus operandi in Surabaya exhibits increased operational capabilities of local cells | MAX Security

Friction Points | MAX Security

Current Situation

On May 14, a family of five individuals, arriving on two motorcycles, detonated their explosives outside the police headquarters in Surabaya, East Java. The attack was claimed by Islamic State (IS)-linked Amaq News Agency. On the same day, six militants part of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), a local outfit affiliated to IS, were arrested in Surabaya and nearby Sidoarjo Regency. Two other suspects were killed in the raid, including the second-in-command of the Surabaya cell of the JAD.

A family of six, including three minors, carried out a series of coordinated suicide attacks involving the use of vehicles, at three churches in Surabaya on May 13. Both IS Central and Amaq News Agency claimed the attack. The adult male in the family was later identified as the leader of the JAD Surabaya cell. An explosion was also recorded in Sidoarjo Regency south of the city on the same day. A man, suspected to be a militant, his wife, and their son were found dead at the scene, while two other minors were rescued from the apartment alive.

A riot situation in a military detention center in Depok, which lies 16 km south of the capital city of Jakarta in western Java, was resolved on May 10 after high-risk militant detainees seized firearms from prison guards and killed five security personnel on May 8. IS Central claimed the prison attacks on May 8, while an IS-affiliated media agency released pictures from inside the facility on May 9. The founder of the JAD, Aman Abdurrahman, is incarcerated in the same prison. Two suspected militants of the JAD’s Bandung cell were killed on May 10 while traveling from Bandung to a detention facility in Depok, with the intent to aid rioting prisoners.

Between April 9 and 30, pro-IS social media groups released a host of propagandist material appearing to target Western institutions and practices.

On March 14, IS-linked media sources confirmed the death of Bahrumsyah, a top-ranked militant and recruiter hailing from Indonesia, in a mismanaged suicide attack in Syria on March 13. Meanwhile, on February 13, Abdurrahman was indicted for his role in the 2016 attacks in Jakarta. Zainal Anshori, head of the JAD, was sentenced to seven years in prison on February 12, over his plans to smuggle weapons from the southern Philippines.

Assessments & Forecast

Attacks likely planned ahead of time, tied to leadership setbacks incurred by JAD

We assess that the plots in Surabaya on May 13-14 were informed by a combination of factors. The time period between February and May has seen the indictment of JAD’s founder, the sentencing of its senior-most leader, as well as the death of an influential recruiter in Syria who was known to leverage his contacts within the IS leadership to recruit sympathizers and remotely organize plots through the JAD in Indonesia. Collectively, the developments represent a host of challenges to the senior leadership of the outfit, potentially impacting the morale of its cadre and ability to newly recruit radical elements. Thus, the attacks were likely driven by a desire to signal to authorities the negligible effect of leadership setbacks on the operational capabilities of local cells, to publicly undermine recent counter militancy efforts, and to boost the morale of existing sympathizers.

The attacks also appear to have been organized well ahead of time, a fact that is illustrated by the surge of pro-IS messaging in the month of April. The timing of the attacks, only days prior to Ramadan, further hints at this possibility. There is an observable, general uptick in jihadist plots across the world during this time period over perceptions that the heightened religiosity of Ramadan would offer greater spiritual rewards for those engaging in jihad against non-believers. The difficulty in assembling high-grade triacetone triperoxide (TATP) explosives, which were believed to have been used in the Surabaya church bombings, as well as the time needed to activate JAD sleeper cells without attracting scrutiny suggests the low likelihood of the attacks being organized in an ad-hoc manner.

In terms of planning, it is likely that the attacks were devised with assistance from Indonesian functionaries in Syria. The current incarceration of top JAD leaders within the country and precedent of previous high-profile plots being organized by Indonesian militants fighting in Syria suggests that this may have been the case. The May 13 claim by IS Central, only the second attribution of the kind in three years of IS-linked attacks in Indonesia, is a potential sign of increased overseas involvement in the attacks, as is the comparative high-degree of coordination per local context.

Change in modus operandi, coordinated nature of plots indicates increase in operational capabilities

The most notable feature of all three attacks in and around Surabaya is the unprecedented modus operandi of using cells consisting of whole families, including women and children. While relatives of militants have been known to detonate explosives to avoid being captured during security operations in Syria, and in Bangladesh, this marks the first use of family units to conduct offensive attacks.

This tactical shift, the relative success of which may signal an emerging trend, is likely connected to active efforts to increase the scale and tempo of militant attacks in the country. More specifically, using multiple suicide bombers serves to increase the effect of the planned explosion, while employing members of a family unit helps to avoid the cells from being identified as potential threats and makes security forces more reticent to engage in hostilities. The fact that the JAD sleeper cells remained undetected until after the attacks despite the strict vigilance of counter-militancy units points to the discretion offered by using a family-based suicide squad.

Attacks by local cells, low-intensity plots by sympathizers possible over increased activity, visibility

FORECAST: The developments in Depok, when taken alongside the Surabaya attacks, signal a period of significant activity for local jihadists, compounded by increased visibility aided in view of the IS Central claim for both the church bombings and the prison riot. The ongoing month of Ramadan allows individuals or groups to sustain this exposure by conducting attacks, highlighting the continued risk of militancy across the nation, and especially on Java, where there is a noted presence of JAD cells.

The recent attacks have generated a significant amount of momentum and media coverage for the JAD and other jihadist sympathizers in the country. The perceived successes of recent efforts will embolden militant handlers to maintain a pace of operations in Java for as long as their manpower can sustain. While there have been no reported instances of encounters in the capital as of this report, it is highly likely that militants observed traveling to Depok had been using Jakarta as a transport hub. The ability for such elements to reach the capital in the face of significant police deployments underscores the heightened potential for attacks in Jakarta over the coming days. Whereas the JAD traditionally targeted government installations in the past, the church bombings may indicate that civilian targets have also become desirable. In addition to Jakarta, the tourist hotspot of Bali would also be a high-priority target for the group in this scenario.

Islamic State linked news agency claims May 13,2018 attack | MAX Security

Recommendations

Travel to Jakarta may continue at this time while maintaining heightened vigilance throughout the city given the risk of militancy.

Those operating or residing across Indonesia are advised to maintain heightened vigilance in the vicinity of government buildings, transportation hubs, iconic public areas, military bases, restaurants, high-value soft targets, shopping centers, and religious centers including mosques and churches, as they remain potential targets for militant attacks.

Remain cognizant of your surroundings, including any suspicious behavior of individuals, which may include a person wearing winter clothing during warm weather and/or seemingly wandering around, as well as items that look out of place, such as bags or containers.

Immediately alert authorities of any suspicious behavior or items.

Ensure that places of stay are properly secured, alter travel routes, and avoid disclosing sensitive itinerary information to unknown individuals.