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Likely passage of constitutional referendum likely to have domestic, global ramifications; violence surrounding vote date remains likely – Turkey Analysis

Current Situation

On April 16, the Turkish public will vote on a referendum which, if passed, will enact major reforms to the national constitution. At the core of the referendum is the decision to replace the existing parliamentary system of government with an executive presidency. The passing of this referendum will thus reform all of Turkey’s branches of government.

The Executive
If the referendum is to pass, the prime minister’s post would be abolished, and thus its powers would be transferred to the president. With this in mind, the president would be responsible for selecting and approving the government’s ministers.
In addition, the referendum would remove the parliament’s power to enact a vote of confidence to force out the executive. Instead, in order for the president to be removed from office, he must first be charged with a crime by a majority of MPs. Then, the president must be tried by 17 judges of the Constitutional Court.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the term length of the president would remain set at five years, and an individual can serve no more than two terms. However, due to the refined role created by the referendum, current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would be permitted to seek two additional terms. Thus, if elected, he could remain in power until 2029.

The Judiciary
The referendum would significantly increase the number of appointments to the judiciary allowed by the president. With the new proposals, the president would be responsible for selecting 69% of Turkey’s senior judges, as opposed to 46% today.
In addition, the president would be responsible for appointing 14 of the 17 members of the Constitutional Court, which is the highest judicial body in Turkey.
Finally, the referendum would prevent the judiciary from picking any members sitting on the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), the disciplinary body of Turkey’s legal system, and instead, assign these appointments to the president and the parliament.

The Parliament
The parliament’s ability to launch investigations against members of the executive would be abolished entirely under the proposed referendum. Furthermore, these powers would not transfer to any other body.
In addition, the power of parliament to submit questions to the president regarding sensitive issues would be ridded as well.
Finally, the ability for parliament to motion a censure, which could effectively unseat a member of the executive, would be abolished by the new referendum as well.

Likely passage of constitutional referendum likely to have domestic, global ramifications; violence surrounding vote date remains likely - Turkey Analysis | MAX Security

Assessments & Forecast

Vast public support still enjoyed by Erdogan and underlying threat of militancy indicate referendum likely to pass
While public opinion polling has largely shown support and opposition to the referendum to be close, we assess that at least 51% of the populace will ultimately vote yes on the proposed constitutional reform, thus gaining the required amount of votes needed for it to pass. This support largely emanates from members of Erdogan’s own political organization, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), as well as individuals from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). In opposition to the proposed referendum is the more moderate Republican People’s Party (CHP), and a large portion of the Kurdish community, including the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP). With this in mind, this likelihood of the referendum passing is due to several factors.

First, public support currently experienced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will likely encourage Turkish nationals to back the referendum. This favorability can be heavily attributed to his anti-militancy campaign, which has resulted in both downtick in Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-perpetrated attacks, as well as a general absence of large-scale acts of militancy in Turkey’s major cities in recent months. In this context, as Erdogan continues to portray himself as the one who reinforced Turkey’s security apparatus, moderate, secular portions of the Turkish population who may have been less willing to back the president may ultimately vote in favor of the referendum due to this notable decrease in militant attacks in the country. Thus, by continuing to campaign on this anti-militancy platform, Erdogan will likely rally more support in favor of the constitutional referendum, and increase the chances of the reform successfully passing. Moreover, even if a large-scale militant attack were to emanate in the coming days, Erdogan would likely attribute it to the lack of a strong executive, thereby further strengthening his counter-militancy campaign. Therefore, such an incident occurring is unlikely to decrease the potential for the referendum to pass.

In addition, Erdogan’s mass efforts to stifle his opposition have significantly reduced the influence of his opponents. The President has conducted mass arrest raids against multiple segments of Turkish society who have voiced opposition against him or the proposed constitutional referendum. Such raids have particularly been seen with operations targeting those who support US-based cleric Fethullah Gulen, who the Turkish government has linked to the failed military coup in July 2016. As the threshold has been lowered and the scope has been broadened by the president for such arrests to take place, the opposition has had less of a platform to campaign against the proposed referendum.

Moreover, those in Turkish media who have attempted to voice their opposition to the referendum have largely been silenced by the government. For instance, in early February, a prominent news anchor was fired by a Turkish news agency after stating his opposition to the proposed constitutional reform via social media. Moreover, in mid-February, one of Turkey’s leading newspapers cancelled an interview with a Nobel-Prize winning Turkish novelist following his public opposition against the referendum. Thus, Erdogan has further limited the opposition’s abilities to organize and successfully wage their campaign.

That said, it is important to note that the possibility for the referendum not to pass remains, particularly as recent opinion polls show the vote in a virtual tie. If such an outcome were to occur, it is unlikely that President Erdogan would drop the proposed constitutional reform as a result. Instead, Erdogan would likely revamp the “yes” campaign’s image in order for it to gather broader support, and then attempt to push a newly drafted proposal through Parliament once again. Potential addendums for this changed referendum may be slightly more restrictions on the executive, such as allowing Parliament more oversight in the system. However, such changes would be minimal, as the goal of the constitutional reform would likely remain to strengthen the power of the presidency at the expense of the Parliament.

Passage of referendum likely to impede potential negotiations between PKK and Turkish government, cause problems for economic development, and further tensions between Turkey and the EU
While in the immediate short term, the effects of a successful referendum are unlikely to be notable, particularly as Erdogan has already exercised abilities that have surpassed boundaries set by the office of the presidency, multiple domestic issues are likely to be heavily affected in the months to come.

First, constitutional reform that expands the powers of Erdogan is likely to significantly decrease the chances of successful negotiations occurring between Turkish authorities and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As Erdogan has stated in the past that the Turkish government will not stop “until the PKK is eradicated,” it remains unlikely that a system fully run by the president with relatively unchecked powers would work towards compromises with the Kurdish group. Thus, the passing of the referendum is likely to only lead to additional intensified measures against the Kurds, thereby provoking the militants to engage in additional acts of militancy against Turkish security forces. Moreover, it is important to note that if Kurdish communities view the passing of this constitutional reform as oppressive, militants groups such as the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) will be more likely to recruit frustrated individuals more susceptible to radicalization.

Also, the passing of the referendum is likely to cause additional pitfalls for Turkey’s economy in the coming months. Reports have continously highlighted elevated concerns of international investors regarding the stability of Turkey’s political system under a new government system. While a stronger executive would be expected to alleviate such woes, in light of Erdogan’s increasingly negative rhetoric towards European nations, as well as his staunch opposition against the Central Bank’s rising of interest rates to help promote growth in the declining Turkish Lira, additional authority granted to the president will likely only escalate worries of potential international investors. Thus, international entities may be less willing to invest, which will likely stifle economic development in the country. This would be significantly detrimental as the Turkish government has committed itself to multiple large-scale projects, including the building of a new airport in Istanbul. A lack in revenue to fully pay for such projects will only hurt the general populace who will have to make up for this shortage, thus leading to an even further declining lira as citizens are less willing to save and invest.

Meanwhile, geopolitical implications exist for the passing of such constitutional reform, particularly in regards to relations between Turkey and the EU. During the course of the referendum campaign, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has made persistent efforts to reach out to Turkish nationals living in Europe, in efforts to gain their support. However, European countries have blocked multiple efforts by Turkish politicians to campaign within the countries themselves, including Germany and the Netherlands, which has thus led the Turkish government to retaliate in the diplomatic sphere. Thus, the campaign has ultimately caused tensions between Turkey and the EU, and if the referendum is to pass, relations between these parties are likely to remain strained. Such cooling in tensions will likely lead to complications in multiple regional issues, including the current Syrian refugee crisis, as well as the outward threat of militancy, as Turkey may be less willing to coordinate with its European counterparts.

Acts of violence likely to materialize prior to the referendum vote date
Over the coming days, pre-vote violence emanating from tensions surrounding the passing of the referendum is likely to materialize, similar to what has been seen surrounding parliamentary elections. Such violence is likely to target parties who oppose the passing of the referendum, and be perpetrated by ultra-nationalists with no affiliation to the Turkish government, but who heavily support constitutional reform, namely those who support the MHP, who have been linked to precedent incidents of violence. Furthermore, such violence is likely to remain small-scale and unsophisticated, such as shooting attacks or the use of homemade IEDs against entities affiliated with the opposition. For instance, on March 21, an individual shot at a tattoo studio after mistaking it for a pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) office in the city of Denizli. In addition, on December 17, 2016, an IED was detonated near an HDP office in Istanbul.

These incidents highlight the threat of such armed attacks by these ultra-nationalists, and potential for additional violence around the date of the referendum. Thus, prior to April 16, security forces are likely to intensify measures at campaign rallies, and entities connected to the referendum in order to prevent such attacks from unfolding. However, in light of existing tensions, the potential for acts of violence remains increased at this time. Furthermore, the possibility exists that militant groups, namely Islamic State or the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), may take advantage of any disarray caused by large rallies or heightened tensions in order to stage attacks in major locales.

Recommendations

Travel to Istanbul and Ankara may continue, although travelers are advised to maintain heightened vigilance in central areas due to the threat of militancy, as well as regular anti-government protests and occasional incidents of unrest in these locales. Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary and contingency support options.

Furthermore, on April 16, avoid nonessential travel to the vicinity of polling stations nationwide given the threat of politically-linked acts of violence emanating at these locales. In addition, on April 16 and the days prior, avoid nonessential travel to all campaign events and rallies regarding the referendum due to this risk of violence, as well as the threat of militancy unfolding at these events, albeit limited.

Avoid nonessential travel to the immediate vicinities of government buildings, police stations, political party offices, popular public places and shopping centers, as well as Western institutions and places frequented by Westerners, and places of worship due to the threat of militancy.

Be advised that in Istanbul, areas that frequently record protests include the vicinity of Taksim Square, Galatasaray Square, along Istiklal Caddesi, Kadikoy’s Bull Statue (Boga Square), in the Fatih District, Beyazit Square, and Istanbul University.

In Ankara, such locales include Yuksel Street, Sakarya Square, as well as Guvenpark Memorial, Kurtulus Park, the Grand National Assembly, Ataturk Boulevard, Middle East Technical University, and other university campuses in the city.

Avoid nonessential travel to Turkey’s southern and eastern provinces, while also avoiding all travel to border areas with Syria and Iraq, given the increased risk of militancy and spillover violence.

Those conducting essential travel to Turkey’s southern and eastern provinces are advised to defer all travel to areas witnessing curfews due to the elevated risk of violence in these locales.

 

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Intelligence Analysis: Domestic and Regional Factors in Turkish-Israeli Reconciliation

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on March 22 and offered Israel’s apology for the 2010 ‘Mavi Marmara’ incident. In that incident, nine Turkish nationals were killed by Israeli Special Forces who raided the Marmara as it sailed to the Gaza Strip as part of a larger flotilla. The incident resulted in an unprecedented crisis in the relations between the two countries, with Turkey demanding an official apology before restoring ties between the two nations.

Israeli-Turkish relations cooled after the 2010 Marmara incident.
Israeli-Turkish relations cooled after the 2010 Marmara incident.

The recent development was reportedly mediated by the US administration, and particularly by Secretary of State John Kerry, who arrived in Israel on March 19 ahead of President Obama’s visit. The President himself was present at the time of the conversation between the two leaders on March 22, shortly before leaving to Jordan.

Netanyahu apologized for operational mistakes that led to the loss of life, and pledged to compensate the families of those killed via a humanitarian fund. He also stressed that Israel has lifted certain limitations on the entry of civilian goods to the Gaza Strip in the time that passed since the incident. Those three have issues constituted Turkey’s demands for reconciliation since the incident.

Continue reading Intelligence Analysis: Domestic and Regional Factors in Turkish-Israeli Reconciliation

Intelligence Analysis: Risks of PKK-Turkey disarmament talks

In recent weeks, dialogue efforts between the Turkish government and Abdullah Ocalan, a prominent imprisoned Kurdish separatist leader have intensified, with the stated aim of disarming the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), after three decades of conflict and over 40,000 deaths. On January 8, Turkish media outlets published reports which cautiously indicated that negotiations with Ocalan had yielded a potential four-point roadmap for PKK disarmament in exchange for minority rights and amnesty for thousands of Kurdish prisoners in Turkish jails. Notably, calls for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey were not mentioned as part of Ocalan’s demands.

Kurdish PKK militants stand in formation.
Kurdish PKK militants stand in formation.

While the both sides have refused to verify reports of an agreement, the Erdogan administration did concede that pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) deputy Ayla Akat Ata and Kurdish politician Ahmet Turk met with Ocalan on December 29 on Imrali Island, where he has been imprisoned since 1999.   Until that visit, the infamous PKK founder had only been permitted to speak with Turkish military and intelligence officials. Ocalan, long considered the godfather of terrorism in Turkey, reportedly told the Kurdish lawmakers that the time for armed struggle has ended.

2012 was reported as the deadliest year of PKK related violence in over a decade with a noticeable uptick in civilian casualties. While the PKK has traditionally focused its attacks on Turkish security installations and personnel, the recent spike in attacks targeting civilians suggests more radical offshoots such as the the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) are gaining influence.  With that being said, Ankara’s renewed efforts to formulate a ceasefire are likely an attempt to quell the increased radicalism within the Kurdish separatist camp while also attempting to discontinue the perpetuation of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict over the long term.

Continue reading Intelligence Analysis: Risks of PKK-Turkey disarmament talks

Strategic Analysis: Curbing the rise of Kurdistan

On July 27, thousands of Iraqi troops, tanks, and artillery set out to seize the FishKhabur border crossing with Syria in Iraq’s northern Zumar district. But the days when Iraq could impose its will over the scrappy and restive Kurdish north are over. Blocking them were some 3,000 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, along with artillery – intent on proving that Baghdad’s supremacy is no more.  A tense standoff between the Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga ensued, only to alleviate with American pressure and a fragile agreement between the two sides. The standoff reflected the situation at large: Iraqi Kurdistan is determined to rid itself of Baghdad, establish itself as a regional player, and use its burgeoning clout to serve as the protector of Kurds throughout the region. Most importantly, attempts by rival states to thwart Kurdish ambitions threaten to ignite a new round of Kurdish wars in a region already in flames.

Peshmerga fighters train in Iraqi Kurdistan

This border area is disputed by the Shiite-led Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). FishKhabur has been under Kurdish military control for years, which Iraq claims is illegal and violates the country’s constitution. The KRG disputes this and is determined not to forfeit their only border crossing with Syria, nor to allow Baghdad to reestablish its influence in an area already “Arabized” and largely depopulated of ethnic Kurds.  Despite Baghdad’s official protestations, the reality is much more strategic. Continue reading Strategic Analysis: Curbing the rise of Kurdistan

Israel-Cyprus relations: Revolutionary alliance or negotiating tactic?

By Dan R.

The discovery of natural gas off the shores of Cyprus and Israel in the eastern Mediterranean has marked the beginning of a new chapter in the Middle East conflict. Reports began to surface last week, claiming that Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, will discuss the stationing of Israeli fighter jets at a Cypriot airbase on his visit to the island nation on February 16. If such reports prove to be accurate, the event has the potential to be a revolutionary strategic alliance. However, the aforementioned discussions may in fact be purely an Israeli negotiating tactic in an effort to bridge the rift between it and its former ally Turkey.

The Middle East is widely known as the staging ground for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, there is a lesser known conflict, greatly overshadowed by that between Israel and her Arab neighbors – that which involves Turkey and Cyprus. The conflict between Turkey and Cyprus, like the Arab-Israeli, also has a history of bloody confrontation on religion, ethnicity, territory and recognition. However, the aspect that reaches headlines above all others is the ongoing dispute over natural gas deposits that lay off the Cypriot southern coast. The discovery launched a thus far rhetorical battle over drilling rights between Greek Cyprus and Turkey as the patron of the Greek Republic’s breakaway Turkish Cypriot counterpart.

American-operated natural gas exploration site Noble Ferrington

Israel has developed and maintained several natural gas drilling and pumping platforms in the eastern Mediterranean Sea in its Exclusive Economic Zone. Moreover, Israeli companies, such as Delek, own a significant share of drilling platforms in Cyprus. Israel thus, likely sees the natural gas reserves as a strategic asset that is vital to ensure Israel’s economic and energy independence.

Israel is well known for its determination and dedication with regard to the protection of its interests positioned outside its borders. That said, the stationing of a permanent air force operation base on foreign soil would essentially be a revolution in Israeli military affairs. If the reports are true, this will be the first time that Israel will deploy IDF airmen outside the borders of Israel (not including Palestinian territories), a step that would likely require legislative action.

When examining the tactical, operational, and strategic military benefits for a deployment of fighter jets in Cyprus, one would have to assess the constant parameters, like the distance from drilling and pumping platforms, coupled with reaction and flight time. Upon their inspection, one would discover that the distance to such drilling installations from either the Cypriot or Israeli air bases is negligible. The similar distances thus make the disproportion in reaction and flight time only a matter of a few seconds, and therefore, providing no significant tactical, operational, or strategic benefits. Continue reading Israel-Cyprus relations: Revolutionary alliance or negotiating tactic?

Erdogan’s Cypriot Quagmire

Turkish warships on maneuvers in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has since backtracked on recent threats against Cypriot natural resource exploration.

By Jay R.

As the Arab Spring has forced successive leaders from their posts, Turkey has been positioning itself to be the hegemon of influence in the region. This effort can be seen through the visits of Prime Minister Erdogan to Egypt and Libya, in addition to his nation’s strong stance against Assad’s Allawite regime in Syria.

Turkey has also been the sole voice of contention with regard to Cyprus’s natural gas exploration efforts in the eastern Mediterranean – a voice that has threatened a gamut of responses from the severing of its ties with the European Union to an all out attack on Cyprus’ drilling installations. This last stance however may have been the bite that was too much for Turkey and quite possibly the reasoning behind its recently softened position on the issue.

Turkish-Cypriot relations persist in contradiction to the rest of the world, as it is the only nation that recognizes the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, while not acknowledging the Greek-administered Republic of Cyprus. This lone fact has led to the espousal of anti-Greek Cypriot rhetoric – rhetoric that seems to have backed Turkey into a corner of which it is now trying to break out of.

Continue reading Erdogan’s Cypriot Quagmire

Erdogan Means Business

By Daniel N.
Meddling in the internal affairs of other nations, sending warships on provocative patrol routes, and threatening regional neighbors with war were, just a short time ago, actions which characterized only the Iranian regime’s pursuit of regional domination.

Amidst the sweeping changes brought about by the Arab Spring, Turkey has found a window of opportunity to demonstrate its competency and capability for assuming a lead role in the Middle East, abandoning its previous “zero problems” foreign policy in the process.

The “zero problems” approach to foreign policy was spearheaded by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) party first came to power in 2002. The term refers to Turkey’s pledge to maintain peaceful relations with its neighbors, as long as they respect Turkey’s interests in return. For many years, Syria seemed to be the major benefactor of this policy even though the two nations almost went to war in the early 1990’s over President Bashar al-Assad’s alleged support of Kurdish separatists. Under the “zero problems” policy, Syria became one of Turkey’s primary trading partners, and at one point the two nations were conducting joint cabinet meetings. Continue reading Erdogan Means Business