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End of diplomatic dispute with Saudi-led bloc constitutes notable achievement for Qatar, likely to boost regional cooperation, economic ties – Qatar Analysis

Executive Summary

  • On January 5, Qatar and a Saudi-led bloc of states signed the “al-Ula Declaration” and restored diplomatic ties following a three-year rift. This constitutes a major achievement for the former, which has been able to circumvent the challenges of exclusion by the latter by relying on its resources and strategic alliances with the US, as well as Turkey and Iran.
  • Qatar and the Saudi-led bloc will likely seek to foster economic cooperation and mutual investments to generate revenue. Qatar’s economy will thus likely benefit from the renewed bilateral trade and tourism inflow that the agreement between the parties will facilitate.
  • However, despite this detente, ideological differences will persist between Qatar and the Saudi-led bloc given that Doha will likely continue to pursue an independent foreign policy to bolster its regional influence. Tensions will particularly pertain to Qatar’s relations with Iran and Turkey, which have deepened during the blockade.
  • Travel to Qatar may continue as normal while adhering to cultural norms and avoiding making any statements critical of the Qatari Emir and government officials. Remain cognizant of the continued potential for tensions between Qatar and the Saudi-led bloc.

Current situation

The al-Ula Declaration

  • On January 5, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt agreed to restore ties with Qatar during the 41st summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Saudi Arabia’s al-Ula. The parties signed the “al-Ula Declaration”, according to which, the Saudi-led bloc agreed to lift the official air, sea, and land blockade against Qatar.
  • The Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) reportedly stated on January 5 that the “al-Ula Declaration strengthens the bonds of friendship and brotherhood among our countries”.
  • MbS also emphasized the “need to unite our efforts to…confront the challenges that surround us, particularly the threats posed by Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missile program as well as the terrorist and sectarian activities adopted by Iran”.
  • On January 7, Qatar’s Foreign Minister reportedly stated that the end of the dispute “has no effect on our relationship with any country”.

Implications

  • On January 8-9, Saudi Arabia and the UAE reopened their air, land, and sea borders with Qatar.
  • Bahrain and Egypt reopened their airspace to Qatari flights on January 11 and 13, respectively.
  • According to a January 20 report citing Egyptian intelligence sources, a Qatari foreign ministry official pledged at a meeting that Qatar would not interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs and would change its state-funded media outlet’s orientation towards Egypt. A Qatari official denied the meeting had taken place.
  • Although the terms and conditions for the restoration of relations have not been disclosed, reports indicate that Qatar will withdraw all its lawsuits at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against its three Gulf neighbors and that all parties committed to stopping their “media campaigns” against each other.

Background

On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt announced the imposition of a land, sea, and air blockade against Qatar, and the severing of all trade and diplomatic ties with the latter. The four blockading countries also referred to as the Saudi-led or Saudi-aligned bloc, initiated the dispute based on accusations that Qatar was providing support to “extremist” elements in the Middle East, interfering in their internal affairs, and maintaining close ties with Iran. Qatar’s Foreign Minister issued a statement on the same day to denounce “unjustified” measures that are “based on baseless unfounded allegations”. On June 23, 2017, the Saudi-led bloc issued a list of 13 demands that Qatar had to fulfill within ten days to lift the blockade. The demands included Doha’s curbing of its ties with Iran, the removal of the Turkish presence from its territory, the shutting down of a prominent Qatar government-owned news outlet, and the payment of reparations for “loss and life and other financial losses caused by Qatar’s policies in recent years”. The Qatari government rejected all the demands, which it perceived as “limiting Qatar’s sovereignty, and outsourcing its foreign policy.”

Assessments & Forecasts

The ability to circumvent the blockade has placed Qatar in the position of strength

  1. Overall, Qatar has been largely successful in overcoming the economic and political challenges induced by the official blockade and diplomatic isolation by the Saudi-led bloc since 2017. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Qatar is one of the world’s most affluent countries, with a GDP of 184.5 billion USD in 2019. Its wealth mainly stems from its natural gas reserves, which has made the country the world’s largest exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Qatar has, for instance, signed various deals during the blockade, making it a major supplier of LNG to some Asian countries’ growing markets, such as Vietnam, Bangladesh, and, more recently, Singapore, with whom Qatar signed an agreement in November 2020 to supply up to 1.8 million tonnes of LNG per year from 2023. The revenue generated by the gas exports has enabled the Qatari government to cushion the adverse effect of the blockade. Qatar has also diversified its trading partners outside the Gulf region by opening several new shipping routes to compensate for the revenue losses as well as to ensure the supply of essential commodities. Thus, overall, Qatar’s strategy of leveraging its wealth to build new economic partnerships has enabled it to reduce the blockade’s financial impact and project power to the international audience.
  2. The rift with the Saudi-led countries allowed countries like Turkey and Iran to step in by providing material support, which has led to the strengthening of ties between Qatar and these countries. During the early weeks of the diplomatic dispute, Iran sent a significant amount of essential goods to alleviate the risk of food shortages and opened its airspace for Qatari flights that were no longer allowed to fly over Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE. Turkey created an air bridge for needed supplies and enhanced its strategic and military ties by deploying Turkish troops and holding military exercises in Qatar.
  3. However, Qatar’s deepened relations with Turkey and Iran did not signal a shift away from its long-standing close partnership with the US, particularly in the defense and security spheres. Qatar is, for instance, home to the largest US military installation in the Middle East region. The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on combating militant financing in July 2017, and the establishment of a “Strategic Dialogue” in January 2018 are illustrative of the continuity of the relations between Doha and Washington during the dispute. Qatar was therefore able to mitigate its regional isolation by deepening its relations with regional and international actors, which provided Doha both with the material and political support needed to confront the Saudi-led pressure.

Restoration of ties constitutes diplomatic achievement for Qatar, liable to boost the economy

  1. Qatar’s demonstrated resilience to circumvent the blockade has therefore placed Doha in a position of strength vis-a-vis the Saudi-led bloc. This is further bolstered by the lack of stipulations to the “al-Ula Declaration”, which implies that the Saudi-aligned states did not gain major concessions from Qatar, especially pertaining to the 13 demands put forth by Riyadh and its allies. Moreover, the deepening of ties with Turkey and Iran during the last few years, which were factors for the Saudi-led bloc to initiate the dispute, highlights Qatar’s resolve to resist pressure from external actors to alter its foreign policy. Against this backdrop, the Saudi-led bloc’s decision to restore ties with Qatar without extracting compromises from the latter constitutes a notable diplomatic achievement for Doha.
  2. FORECAST: The end of the dispute will pave the way for renewed cooperation between Qatar and the Saudi-led bloc over the coming weeks and months, particularly on the economic front. This will include public sector collaboration and extend to increased opportunities for cooperation between private entities based in these countries. The lifting of the blockade will thus likely have a positive impact on Qatar’s economy as it will reestablish bilateral and regional trade, which was high prior to the blockade. This is illustrated by the fact that approximately 60 percent of Qatar’s imports, especially food supplies, reportedly emanated from the boycotting states. Qatar will thus likely seek to reach new economic and trade agreements to stimulate the flow of goods and investments with its Saudi and Emirati neighbors. Qatar and the Saudi-led bloc will particularly seek to boost mutual investments, especially amid a decrease in their government revenues due to the fall in global oil prices and COVID-19-induced restrictions on business and travel restrictions.
  3. In this context, increased cooperation between Qatari and the Emirati companies in the construction sector may be witnessed to assist Doha’s infrastructure projects ahead of the FIFA World Cup 2022. With regards to Egypt, Qatari companies will likely continue their investment ventures in the real estate and tourism sectors, as evidenced by the opening on January 8 of a luxury hotel in Cairo owned by a Qatari real estate investment firm. With respect to Saudi Arabia, given that Riyadh was reportedly its main supplier of food commodities prior to the dispute, Doha will likely seek to boost its trade exchanges in the agro-food sectors with Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the reopening of borders, albeit depending on the containment of the COVID-19 pandemic, will boost tourism, which Qatar has sought to develop as part of its economic diversification efforts to reduce its dependence on gas revenues.
  4. Furthermore, the easing of tensions and logistical difficulties in traveling between Qatar and the aforementioned countries will likely serve to boost investor confidence. During the blockade, the Qatari authorities took several measures aimed at attracting foreign investment, such as easing visa requirements and allowing full foreign ownership of companies across all sectors. FORECAST: Therefore, Qatari authorities will likely continue their efforts to make the Qatari market more lucrative to foreign investors. This is particularly in the light of the upcoming FIFA World Cup 2022, which Doha seeks to utilize as a platform to bolster its international outreach and standing. To this effect, the authorities will continue to appeal to international investors in the sectors related to various services, infrastructure, and real estate, to support their long-term efforts to diversify its largely gas-dependent economy. Overall, the lifting of the blockade will likely boost intra-GCC trade and investment, providing a certain impetus to Qatar’s economy over the coming year. However, this will not lead to a shift in Qatar’s long-term strategy to incentivize foreign investors.

Detente with the Saudi-led bloc unlikely to alter Qatar’s foreign policy

  1. During the years of the rift, Qatar has implemented an active and independent foreign policy to bolster its regional influence, which included engagement with a broad range of regional actors and support for Islamist groups. These policies, such as Qatar’s ties with Iran and its support for Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have been antithetical to the interests of its Gulf neighbors. For instance, the UAE is largely hostile to political Islam. This is due to its perception that Islamist groups, particularly those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, have triggered unrest and revolutions across the region as a launchpad to political power. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Iran, who are considered leaders of the Sunni and Shiite branches of Islam, respectively, have been engaged in a rivalry for power and influence in the region for decades and the Kingdom is thus suspicious of countries that maintain close ties with Tehran, holding the latter responsible for destabilizing the region’s security. This also manifests in Riyadh’s approach to the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, which administers the Gaza Strip. Over recent years, Saudi Arabia has conducted arrests of dozens of Palestinians in the Kingdom who have been accused of having links to Hamas.
  2. These examples illustrate the breadth of differences between Qatar and its allies and interests on one side and the Saudi-aligned bloc on the other. FORECAST: However, given that Qatar’s Foreign Minister stated on January 7 that the thaw in relations “has no effect on our relations with any country” and there is no such stipulation in the “al-Ula Declaration” insisting on policy change in exchange for the resumption of ties, it is unlikely that Doha will alter its foreign policy over the coming months. It will thus maintain its own independent and active agenda, despite this overtly clashing with that of the countries it has recently reconciled with.
  3. With regards to Iran, Doha has primarily been driven by pragmatic interests and a desire not to alienate Tehran. One of the major reasons for this is because Qatar’s ties to Iran are critical in protecting its natural resources, as the countries share the largest gas field in the world, which is called the North Dome/South Pars. Therefore, given Qatar’s reliance on natural gas to generate revenue, the shared management of the gas field and the maintenance of cordial relations with Iran are essential to Qatar’s economic interests.
  4. FORECAST: In this context, Qatar is unlikely to downgrade relations with Iran over the coming months as this would jeopardize its economic growth. More so, Qatar’s close ties with the US and positive relations with Iran may enable Doha to act as an intermediary for the incoming US President Joe Biden, who has expressed his willingness to engage in dialogue with Tehran. This is further bolstered by Qatar’s role of maintaining relations with opposing actors, rendering it a facilitator for indirect negotiations and back-channel communications. This is evidenced by Qatar’s coordination with Israel to provide funding for the Gaza-based Hamas, and its reported role in fostering peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban.
  5. Additionally, Doha also shares a relatively strong alliance with Turkey. In addition to Ankara’s pivotal material support for Qatar during the blockade, Doha has invested heavily in the Turkish economy, amounting to approximately 22 billion USD in 2019, amid the latter country’s recent economic crisis. The alliance is also rooted in the convergence of the two countries’ geopolitical, military, and ideological interests, as illustrated by their support for the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, and more broadly their long-standing support for Muslim-Brotherhood-linked elements throughout the region, and other Islamist groups, such as Hamas. Moreover, while there is a lack of significant evidence of overt support, both Ankara and Doha are thought to enjoy some level of influence over the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated al-Islah Party in Yemen, which is deemed to be the primary security destabilizer by UAE-backed groups, such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC). FORECAST: In this context, given the depth of their bilateral relations, coupled with the convergence of their foreign policy goals in the Middle East region, Doha is unlikely to curtail its ties with Ankara over the coming year.

Conflicting interests, ideological differences to perpetuate tensions between Qatar and the Saudi-led bloc

  1. Overall, distrust between Qatar and the Saudi-led bloc is liable to persist, as illustrated by the UAE’s Foreign Minister, who stated on January 7 that although the “al-Ula Declaration” constitutes “a good start”, Abu Dhabi has “issues with rebuilding trust”. Moreover, the lack of reference to the initial factors that led the Saudi-aligned states to cut ties with Qatar in the “al-Ula Declaration”, including the curbing of Doha’s relations with perceived destabilizing actors such as Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood and the shutting down of a prominent Qatar government-owned news outlet, suggests that the root causes of the dispute have likely not been addressed.
  2. The end of the dispute may also be an initiative by the Saudi leadership to project its intention to end intra-GCC divisions and promote regional reconciliation in a bid to gain favor with the new US President Joe Biden-led administration. This may partly be because Biden has vowed to “reassess” the US’s relationship with Riyadh due to the Kingdom’s crackdown on perceived dissidents and involvement in allegedly exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.
  3. Moreover, it is also in Saudi Arabia’s interest to strengthen the GCC as a united bloc prior to the potential commencement of US-Iran talks related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or a new agreement with Iran over the coming months. This may allow the Kingdom to partly influence Doha’s stance regarding the Iran nuclear deal and US-imposed sanctions on Iran. This may be behind MbS’ statement that “we need to unite our efforts to…confront the challenges that surround us”, pointing primarily to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program and alleged support for “terrorist activities”.
  4. FORECAST: In this context, going forward, one of the main contentious issues will remain Qatar’s ties with Iran as well as Turkey. Given that the Saudi-led bloc views Iran’s and Turkey’s regional influence as a threat, Doha’s pragmatic relations with the two countries will continue to constitute a fault line in the long term. In addition to this, Qatar’s support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked elements will remain a lingering point of contention because the Saudi-led bloc, particularly the UAE, perceive such elements as subversive and as a threat to its national security. More broadly, the pursuit of conflicting interests, such as countering Iranian and Turkish influence, ideological differences, and competitive dynamics across the Middle East region will continue to set Qatar and the Saudi-aligned states apart.

Recommendations

  1. Travel to Qatar may continue as normal while adhering to cultural norms and avoiding making any statements critical of the Qatari Emir and government officials.
  2. Additionally, refrain from photographing or filming working and housing conditions of migrant workers in the country, as such actions may draw confiscation of equipment by security forces or possible detainment.
  3. Remain cognizant of the continued potential for tensions between Qatar and the Saudi-led bloc, which may result in punitive measures or increased scrutiny of individuals expressing support for the other party.

Risk of increased political, security instability as tensions escalate between Mogadishu, UAE over Somaliland port deal – Somalia Analysis

Executive Summary

A Dubai-based company’s sale of a stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland to Ethiopia in March triggered a political standoff between Somalia and the UAE that led to the two countries cutting military ties.

The severing of funding for the Somali National Army (SNA) and withdrawal of UAE trainers and equipment will have a serious impact on the SNA’s capacity to fight al-Shabaab and delay the withdrawal of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers.

Puntland and other regional states have continued to engage with the UAE separately as they receive funding and other benefits from the Gulf country, illustrating the weakness of Somali federalism as Mogadishu holds little leverage to force its constituent states to adhere to a unified policy.

Turkey and Qatar are likely to increase their presence in Somalia following these events, though Mogadishu will likely attempt to restore ties with the UAE. Given Somalia’s dependence on the Gulf countries for support, Mogadishu will attempt to maintain its official neutrality toward the Gulf rivals even as its states pursue their own policies.

We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.

Current Situation

On March 1, a Dubai-based company announced that it sold a 19 percent stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, of which it is a majority owner, to Ethiopia. In response, on March 12, the Somali Parliament in Mogadishu declared the deal to be “null and void” as the federal government was not consulted prior to signing.

Following weeks of turmoil and several military confrontations at the federal parliament, on April 8, Mogadishu airport authorities seized a private UAE aircraft and confiscated 9.6 million USD that was suspected to be directed toward several politicians involved.

The Ministry of Defense announced on April 11 that it would cut all military ties with the UAE, with the Somali government to take over the duties of training, funding, and redistributing the forces that were under the UAE’s payroll. This prompted the UAE to withdraw its military trainers and equipment from Mogadishu on April 16, with some reports that their forces withdrew from Bosaso, Puntland as well.

On April 21, Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas” traveled to the UAE for talks with the government to secure continued support for Puntland’s maritime police forces. Likewise, on May 7, Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe visited Abu Dhabi, where he criticized Mogadishu’s actions regarding the UAE.

Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” traveled to Doha, Qatar on May 13 where he met with the Qatari emir and foreign minister to hold discussions regarding “joint cooperation” between the two countries.

Assessments & Forecast

Security Consequences

Over recent months, Somalia and the UAE have been engaged in a political standoff following the March 1 Somaliland port deal. Mogadishu does not regard Somaliland as an independent state while Hargeisa does not recognize Somalia’s authority, though a number of countries and companies have pursued separate tracks of political negotiations and commercial deals with Mogadishu and Hargeisa. In this context, the UAE has acknowledged Somaliland as a de facto country as it sought to develop political and economic interests across the region. Mogadishu’s decision to cut military ties with the UAE as a retaliatory measure after the port deal and related political turmoil is particularly notable given the UAE’s entrenched involvement. This includes UAE-based companies controlling, developing, and operating strategically-situated ports and infrastructure, while the government also funds humanitarian and development projects as well as individual Somali political figures, all in efforts to advance the Gulf country’s interests.

Risk of increased political, security instability as tensions escalate between Mogadishu, UAE over Somaliland port deal - Somalia Analysis | MAX Security

Click here to see Map Legend

One of the most significant developments was the UAE’s withdrawal of support to the Somali National Army (SNA). It is possible that Mogadishu did not fully consider the ramifications of severing its military ties but it came immediately, as the UAE withdrew its military trainers and halted financial support to 2,400 Somali soldiers, thought to constitute between a quarter to a fifth of the entire SNA.

FORECAST: Somalia has recurrent difficulties raising enough revenue to pay its security forces and it is likely that they will be unable to cover those soldiers’ salaries after the UAE’s withdrawal, which could result in violent protests or incidents by unpaid soldiers. This potential was demonstrated in Mogadishu on April 23 when former UAE-backed soldiers looted their former base, clashing with other SNA troops, and went on to sell hundreds of stolen firearms on the black market. This illustrates not only the fragmented nature of Somalia’s security forces, often trained by different foreign powers and answering to different clan or regional interests, but the impact of these divisions and ill-discipline on maintaining security in the country. UAE-supported soldiers were thought to be among the best-trained and equipped forces in the capital, and these changes will only make it harder for security forces to manage the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed groups.

FORECAST: This is also expected to impact the African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) plans for withdrawal from the country. Peacekeepers have already begun to draw down, with plans to fully exit by 2020, though their departure is contingent on conditions that include improvements in Somalia’s security situation and political development, as well as the SNA’s ability to replace AMISOM. This further highlights the UAE’s multifaceted role in Somalia, as it contributes to building the SNA’s capacity, which has an effect on the broad security of the country and the army’s ability to step in for the peacekeepers, as well as their interference in Somali politics and institution-building. Given this role, should the standoff between Somalia and the UAE continue, this will complicate AMISOM’s plans. While this is positive in the short-term given AMISOM’s capabilities in comparison to the SNA, international donors have already grown impatient with continually funding the peacekeeping operation and this may force the end of the mission before Somalia is prepared to take over.

Internal Political Implications

In addition to Mogadishu and Somaliland, the UAE is also heavily involved in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. There they signed a deal in April 2017 to develop and run the Port of Bosaso, alongside an agreement to create, fund, and train Puntland’s Maritime Police Force (PMPF). These financial and military benefits prompted Puntland’s president to publicly deviate from Mogadishu’s position and travel to Abu Dhabi in efforts to secure their continued support. His willingness to directly engage with a foreign government in defiance of the constitution that imbues only Mogadishu with the power to conduct foreign policy is another reflection of the limitations of Somali federalism and unification.

FORECAST: Moreover, Mogadishu has little leverage over Puntland and would likely not be able to persuade the region to bend to their position. As a result, Puntland is likely to continue pursue its independent policies while Mogadishu softens its rhetoric in order to reduce the internal rifts.

That the UAE would negotiate individually with Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland is consistent with the longstanding conceptualization of Somalia into the three regions. However, regional states in Somalia are likewise divided, and Jubaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Southwest states have all formed their own positions regarding the Gulf crisis and to which side they believe Somalia must be aligned. Much of this is derived from the funding Somali politicians receive from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey. While this has largely remained in the political sphere, one example of this manifesting in violence was the confrontation at the Somali parliament in April. This was, in part, driven by the parliament speaker’s opposition to the president and prime minister’s response to the Somaliland port deal, which he claimed was a result of their allegiances to Qatar.

FORECAST: Given that both sides of the Gulf crisis continue to fund Somali political figures and commercial interests, this is expected to remain a source of tension for the foreseeable future. While this may result in further violence between security forces backed by different factions, its effects will largely be political. However, this effect could seriously hinder the development of Somalia’s permanent constitution, the advancement of negotiations between the federal states and the central government, and the political progress necessary to make Somalia a viable state.


Risk of increased political, security instability as tensions escalate between Mogadishu, UAE over Somaliland port deal - Somalia Analysis | MAX Security

Effects on Foreign Policy

Given the impact on security and Somalia’s internal regional dynamics, it is likely that Mogadishu will pursue negotiations with the UAE to resolve their differences and restore relations. However, Qatar and Turkey likely view this as an opportunity to increase their involvement in the Horn of Africa and undermine their rivals. Qatar and Turkey have likewise sought to gain a foothold in the country in the past several years, with Turkey being one of the country’s largest donors and investors and Qatar securing its influence by funding Somali politicians, including President Farmajo. This underlines the position that Somalia is in due to its weak governance and reliance on foreign aid, vulnerable to the aims and goals of the international community, whether that is Western development and military intervention or competition between the Gulf rivals over their expanding influence in the region.

With the UAE remaining interested in Somalia despite recent events and Turkey and Qatar expected to increase their presence, it will be difficult for Mogadishu to maintain its officially neutral stance on the Gulf crisis.

FORECAST: Given Somalia’s dependence on these countries to fund and operate not only military training but critical infrastructure and services, including airports, seaports, and hospitals, they will likely continue to maintain this balancing act. However, the federal government will likely face growing diplomatic and economic pressure to choose a side, though it will also have to contend with internal pressure by its constituent states who will disagree. In this regard, even if Mogadishu continues to lean toward Qatar, the nature of Somalia’s weak federalism will mean that different regions and states will continue to maintain their own foreign policies and relations with either side of the Gulf rivalry.

 


Risk of increased political, security instability as tensions escalate between Mogadishu, UAE over Somaliland port deal - Somalia Analysis | MAX Security

Recommendations

We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.

If travel to southern Somalia is unavoidable, we advise remaining in the confines of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport complex.

How countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt cutting ties with Qatar is likely to influence the region – Middle East & N. Africa Analysis

Current Situation

During the morning hours of June 5, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the UAE announced the cutting of all diplomatic ties with Qatar.  The Hadi-led government in Yemen, as well as Libya’s anti-Islamist House of Representatives (HoR) similarly announced the severing of diplomatic ties with Qatar on the same day. The first four countries issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Qatari diplomats to evacuate their respective nations, while similarly issuing an ultimatum to all other Qatari citizens to leave within two weeks. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the UAE announced that they had closed their airspace for Qatari aircrafts, and that all flights by airliners from these countries to Qatar were suspended. Qatari naval vessels will also not be allowed to use the countries’ seaports to anchor, while land travel between Qatar and Saudi Arabia will be limited to non-Qatari nationals only.

Additional measures implemented against Qatar include the expelling of the country from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and its anti-Islamic State (IS) coalition in Syria. These measures were implemented based on accusations that Qatar is “supporting and financing extremist groups” across the region, as well as encouraging sectarianism and subversive elements operating in the abovementioned countries. Meanwhile, Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that the accusations are “absolute fabrications” and “proves that there are premeditated intentions to cause damage to Qatar”.

How countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt cutting ties with Qatar is likely to influence the region - Middle East & N. Africa Analysis | MAX Security
Map of countries affected by travel restrictions on Qataris

Assessments & Forecast

Severing ties may hurt Qatar economically, push its policy towards more pro-Iranian approach; limited impact on regional conflicts

While the new development is unlikely to have any effect on Qatar’s and any of the other impacted countries’ security conditions in the short term, we assess that this measure may lead to multiple local and regional ramifications over the coming months. For instance, approximately 90 percent of Qatar’s imports of food products are transferred through land from Saudi Arabia. Thus, in light of the border closure between the two countries, Doha will likely be forced to divert a large amount of resources in developing its maritime trade, including in the form of improving its seaport infrastructure, as now its imports via sea are liable to be enhanced significantly. Moreover, given the high-profile nature of the event, there remains a possibility that the turn of events will impact global markets, and particularly the oil sector, as it may be perceived as a source of instability across this oil-rich region.

These new developments may also impact expatriates, including Westerners operating in Qatar and the GCC, particularly given the suspension of flights between the GCC countries and Qatar and the closure of the land border with Saudi Arabia. In light of the likely increase in logistical difficulties in traveling between Qatar and the above-mentioned countries, exacted upon expatriates by the measures, it is likely to damage Qatar’s national economy. Though the impact on GCC residents seeking to enter Qatar is yet to be determined, it cannot be ruled out that Qatar will implement punitive measures and ban GCC citizens and residents from entering the country.

The partial isolation of Qatar may affect several conflicts and political rivalries across the region. With regards to Iran, Doha is liable to improve its bilateral relations and economic ties with Tehran, as now Qatar would be compelled to compensate for its political and economic setback. Moreover, in Yemen, in the short-term, Qatar’s absence from the Saudi-led coalition may slightly reduce the latter’s on-the-ground capabilities in fighting against the Iranian-backed Shiite Houthis. However, given Qatar’s already limited role in the coalition, as well as the aforementioned arms deal with the US, in the medium to long-term the Saudi-led coalitions is unlikely to be significantly impacted by Qatar’s absence from the coalition.

In Syria, in light of the already heightened internal divisions between rebel factions, it remains possible that this new development will further exacerbate tensions between rebel groups supported by Qatar on one side, and factions backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. Should the event indeed lead to an economic recession in Qatar, their supported factions on-the ground would suffer from a shortage of resources, thus forcing them to disband or merge into other factions. With this in mind, should scenarios eventually materialize, it would potentially tip the scale towards the pro-government forces in the Syrian conflict.

In Libya, the development may constitute a boost to the HoR and its allied Libyan National Army (LNA), given their conflict with the pro-Islamist General National Congress (GNC) and its affiliated militias, which are partially supported by Qatar. That said, Qatar’s direct involvement in this conflict has significantly waned in recent years, particularly since the March 2016 arrival of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to the designated capital of Tripoli, and therefore any implications on the conflict will remain limited.

Cutting ties with Qatar likely linked to global, regional developments involving Iran, new US administration

Today’s development comes amidst years of tensions between Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Egypt on one side, and Qatar on the other, surrounding multiple issues, chiefly the latter’s alleged direct involvement in the internal affairs of countries throughout the region. This is particularly relevant to Qatar’s long-standing support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked political elements across the Middle East and North Africa, as the countries in this Saudi-led alliance view the Islamist organization is a subversive element and a threat to their respective governments. Additional contentious issue include Qatar’s overall positive relations with Iran, as opposed to that of the other Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), with the exception of Oman, which remain strong adversaries of Tehran. This is highlighted by numerous past economic agreements between Tehran and Doha in recent years, such as the agreement from February 2014 to create a joint free trade and economic zones between the two countries. A further issue that contributed to the strained relations with Qatar throughout the years is the cooperation of the Qatari-based news outlet al-Jazeera, which had been accused by the aforementioned countries of attempting to undermine their, as well as their regional allies’, governments.

That said, despite these strained relations, Qatar and the other GCC countries’ relations can be characterized over the past several years by intermittent escalation and rapprochement between the sides. For instance, on December 9, 2014, Qatar agreed as part of a GCC summit, to establish a regional police force in order to improve coordination regarding drug trafficking, money laundering, and cybercrime, as well as announced its “full support to al-Sisi-led government in Egypt”. This followed Saudi officials’ March 9, 2014 threats to impose sanctions against Qatar, including in the form of sea blockade, in light of Doha’s persistent support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked elements across the region. However, the complete cutting of diplomatic relations between the aforementioned Saudi-aligned countries is highly notable given its wide scale and scope, as it includes significant restrictions on Qatar and its citizens.

We assess that this escalation is linked to global and regional geo-political developments, largely with regards to Iran and the new Donald Trump administration in the US. With this in mind, in recent years, under the Obama administration, relations between Saudi Arabia and its allies on one side, and Washington on the other, were oftentimes strained due to the US’ perceived efforts to approach Tehran, which was likely viewed by Riyadh as coming at its expense. In light of the aforementioned normal relations between Qatar and Iran, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries were likely felt compelled to prevent Qatar from approaching the Islamic Republic too much, as this would have significantly undermined their sense of security and regional interest.

Since President Trump’s inauguration, Washington increased its anti-Iranian rhetoric, while at the same time strengthened its ties with Saudi Arabia. This is highlighted by the May 15 UAE-US defense agreement, as well as the 350 Billion USD agreement between Riyadh and Washington involving an arms deal, and Saudi investments in the US. Thus, there remains a potential that the recent visit of President Trump to Saudi Arabia in late May, as well as the US’ growing support for Saudi Arabia and its allies, motivated the Kingdom to implement these measures, as part of the shared interest with the US in tackling Iran and its allies’ influence throughout the region. With this in mind, given Saudi Arabia’s decreasing need for Qatar’s cooperation on security and political support amidst the ongoing rivalry with Shiite Iran, it is likely that Saudi Arabia assessed that it is no longer obligated to maintain positive bilateral relations with Qatar, prompting this development.

The development comes amidst a diminishing political influence of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organization across the Middle East and North Africa over the past two years. In this context, it remains possible that Saudi Arabia no longer felt compelled to maintain good relations with Qatar, following the reduction of the threat stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood, as opposed to previous Saudi attempts to pressure Qatar to abandon their support for the Islamist organization in return for the improvement of relations with the other GCC countries.

Recommendations

Travel to Qatar may continue as normal while adhering to cultural norms and avoiding making any statements critical of the Qatari Emir and government officials, despite the aforementioned new restrictions. That being said, those operating in Qatar over the coming days and weeks are advised to stock up on food and basic products, due to the possibility that these will be in shortage due to the declared measures. Those operating throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and particularly in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar are advised to remain cognizant of developments and potential effects on travel and business continuity given the current lack of full information regarding the various restrictions that will be in effect. This is particularly relevant for the possibility of unexpected border closures between the relevant countries over the coming days and weeks.

 

This report was written by:
Asaf Day – MAX Security’s Senior Intelligence Manager, Middle East & North Africa

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Executive Summary

A Dubai-based company’s sale of a stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland to Ethiopia in March triggered a political standoff between Somalia and the UAE that led to the two countries cutting military ties.

The severing of funding for the Somali National Army (SNA) and withdrawal of UAE trainers and equipment will have a serious impact on the SNA’s capacity to fight al-Shabaab and delay the withdrawal of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers.

Puntland and other regional states have continued to engage with the UAE separately as they receive funding and other benefits from the Gulf country, illustrating the weakness of Somali federalism as Mogadishu holds little leverage to force its constituent states to adhere to a unified policy.

Turkey and Qatar are likely to increase their presence in Somalia following these events, though Mogadishu will likely attempt to restore ties with the UAE. Given Somalia’s dependence on the Gulf countries for support, Mogadishu will attempt to maintain its official neutrality toward the Gulf rivals even as its states pursue their own policies.

We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.

Current Situation

On March 1, a Dubai-based company announced that it sold a 19 percent stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, of which it is a majority owner, to Ethiopia. In response, on March 12, the Somali Parliament in Mogadishu declared the deal to be “null and void” as the federal government was not consulted prior to signing.

Following weeks of turmoil and several military confrontations at the federal parliament, on April 8, Mogadishu airport authorities seized a private UAE aircraft and confiscated 9.6 million USD that was suspected to be directed toward several politicians involved.

The Ministry of Defense announced on April 11 that it would cut all military ties with the UAE, with the Somali government to take over the duties of training, funding, and redistributing the forces that were under the UAE’s payroll. This prompted the UAE to withdraw its military trainers and equipment from Mogadishu on April 16, with some reports that their forces withdrew from Bosaso, Puntland as well.

On April 21, Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas” traveled to the UAE for talks with the government to secure continued support for Puntland’s maritime police forces. Likewise, on May 7, Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe visited Abu Dhabi, where he criticized Mogadishu’s actions regarding the UAE.

Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” traveled to Doha, Qatar on May 13 where he met with the Qatari emir and foreign minister to hold discussions regarding “joint cooperation” between the two countries.

Assessments & Forecast

Security Consequences

Over recent months, Somalia and the UAE have been engaged in a political standoff following the March 1 Somaliland port deal. Mogadishu does not regard Somaliland as an independent state while Hargeisa does not recognize Somalia’s authority, though a number of countries and companies have pursued separate tracks of political negotiations and commercial deals with Mogadishu and Hargeisa. In this context, the UAE has acknowledged Somaliland as a de facto country as it sought to develop political and economic interests across the region. Mogadishu’s decision to cut military ties with the UAE as a retaliatory measure after the port deal and related political turmoil is particularly notable given the UAE’s entrenched involvement. This includes UAE-based companies controlling, developing, and operating strategically-situated ports and infrastructure, while the government also funds humanitarian and development projects as well as individual Somali political figures, all in efforts to advance the Gulf country’s interests.

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One of the most significant developments was the UAE’s withdrawal of support to the Somali National Army (SNA). It is possible that Mogadishu did not fully consider the ramifications of severing its military ties but it came immediately, as the UAE withdrew its military trainers and halted financial support to 2,400 Somali soldiers, thought to constitute between a quarter to a fifth of the entire SNA.

FORECAST: Somalia has recurrent difficulties raising enough revenue to pay its security forces and it is likely that they will be unable to cover those soldiers’ salaries after the UAE’s withdrawal, which could result in violent protests or incidents by unpaid soldiers. This potential was demonstrated in Mogadishu on April 23 when former UAE-backed soldiers looted their former base, clashing with other SNA troops, and went on to sell hundreds of stolen firearms on the black market. This illustrates not only the fragmented nature of Somalia’s security forces, often trained by different foreign powers and answering to different clan or regional interests, but the impact of these divisions and ill-discipline on maintaining security in the country. UAE-supported soldiers were thought to be among the best-trained and equipped forces in the capital, and these changes will only make it harder for security forces to manage the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed groups.

FORECAST: This is also expected to impact the African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) plans for withdrawal from the country. Peacekeepers have already begun to draw down, with plans to fully exit by 2020, though their departure is contingent on conditions that include improvements in Somalia’s security situation and political development, as well as the SNA’s ability to replace AMISOM. This further highlights the UAE’s multifaceted role in Somalia, as it contributes to building the SNA’s capacity, which has an effect on the broad security of the country and the army’s ability to step in for the peacekeepers, as well as their interference in Somali politics and institution-building. Given this role, should the standoff between Somalia and the UAE continue, this will complicate AMISOM’s plans. While this is positive in the short-term given AMISOM’s capabilities in comparison to the SNA, international donors have already grown impatient with continually funding the peacekeeping operation and this may force the end of the mission before Somalia is prepared to take over.

Internal Political Implications

In addition to Mogadishu and Somaliland, the UAE is also heavily involved in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. There they signed a deal in April 2017 to develop and run the Port of Bosaso, alongside an agreement to create, fund, and train Puntland’s Maritime Police Force (PMPF). These financial and military benefits prompted Puntland’s president to publicly deviate from Mogadishu’s position and travel to Abu Dhabi in efforts to secure their continued support. His willingness to directly engage with a foreign government in defiance of the constitution that imbues only Mogadishu with the power to conduct foreign policy is another reflection of the limitations of Somali federalism and unification.

FORECAST: Moreover, Mogadishu has little leverage over Puntland and would likely not be able to persuade the region to bend to their position. As a result, Puntland is likely to continue pursue its independent policies while Mogadishu softens its rhetoric in order to reduce the internal rifts.

That the UAE would negotiate individually with Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland is consistent with the longstanding conceptualization of Somalia into the three regions. However, regional states in Somalia are likewise divided, and Jubaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Southwest states have all formed their own positions regarding the Gulf crisis and to which side they believe Somalia must be aligned. Much of this is derived from the funding Somali politicians receive from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey. While this has largely remained in the political sphere, one example of this manifesting in violence was the confrontation at the Somali parliament in April. This was, in part, driven by the parliament speaker’s opposition to the president and prime minister’s response to the Somaliland port deal, which he claimed was a result of their allegiances to Qatar.

FORECAST: Given that both sides of the Gulf crisis continue to fund Somali political figures and commercial interests, this is expected to remain a source of tension for the foreseeable future. While this may result in further violence between security forces backed by different factions, its effects will largely be political. However, this effect could seriously hinder the development of Somalia’s permanent constitution, the advancement of negotiations between the federal states and the central government, and the political progress necessary to make Somalia a viable state.


Effects on Foreign Policy

Given the impact on security and Somalia’s internal regional dynamics, it is likely that Mogadishu will pursue negotiations with the UAE to resolve their differences and restore relations. However, Qatar and Turkey likely view this as an opportunity to increase their involvement in the Horn of Africa and undermine their rivals. Qatar and Turkey have likewise sought to gain a foothold in the country in the past several years, with Turkey being one of the country’s largest donors and investors and Qatar securing its influence by funding Somali politicians, including President Farmajo. This underlines the position that Somalia is in due to its weak governance and reliance on foreign aid, vulnerable to the aims and goals of the international community, whether that is Western development and military intervention or competition between the Gulf rivals over their expanding influence in the region.

With the UAE remaining interested in Somalia despite recent events and Turkey and Qatar expected to increase their presence, it will be difficult for Mogadishu to maintain its officially neutral stance on the Gulf crisis.

FORECAST: Given Somalia’s dependence on these countries to fund and operate not only military training but critical infrastructure and services, including airports, seaports, and hospitals, they will likely continue to maintain this balancing act. However, the federal government will likely face growing diplomatic and economic pressure to choose a side, though it will also have to contend with internal pressure by its constituent states who will disagree. In this regard, even if Mogadishu continues to lean toward Qatar, the nature of Somalia’s weak federalism will mean that different regions and states will continue to maintain their own foreign policies and relations with either side of the Gulf rivalry.

 


Recommendations

We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.

If travel to southern Somalia is unavoidable, we advise remaining in the confines of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport complex.