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Boko Haram’s abduction, subsequent release of 104 schoolgirls in Dapchi likely to increase group’s notoriety, legitimacy among locals – Nigeria Analysis

Executive Summary

Militants attacked a government school in Dapchi village, Burasari Local Government Area (LGA) in Yobe State and abducted 110 students and two other children on February 19.

Following extensive negotiations with the Nigerian government that resulted in the safe return of 104 of the schoolgirls and the other two children after one month in captivity, Boko Haram has been able to once again garner international attention and portray themselves as a viable threat in Nigeria’s northeastern region despite extensive counterinsurgency operations.

In light of the upcoming general elections in 2019, the girls’ safe return has been projected by President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration as a triumph, which seems to have paved the way for the government’s appeasement stance toward the insurgency.

However, the incident has highlighted the administration’s propaganda of exaggerated success against the militant group and is poised to create backlash in the form of domestic and international criticism for Buhari’s policies concerning the insurgency.

We continue to advise against all travel to the northeastern Nigerian states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, given the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency and extreme insecurity in the region.

Current Situation

Militants attacked a government school in Dapchi village, Burasari Local Government Area (LGA) in Yobe State and abducted 110 students and two other children on February 19.

President Muhammadu Buhari issued a statement on February 24 expressing his concern about the abduction, claiming that the situation was a “national disaster”. On the same day, the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP) issued a counterstatement blaming Buhari for issuing exaggerated statistics suggesting that Boko Haram had been completely decimated, a situation that they claim put unsuspecting citizens in danger.

On March 12, Borno State authorities announced the closure of all boarding schools in 25 out of the 27 state’s LGAs due to the threat of Boko Haram militants conducting additional abductions. This came in wake of President Buhari’s decision to engage in negotiations for the release of the schoolgirls.

During the early morning hours of March 21, 106 abductees, including 104 schoolgirls and the two additional children, were dropped off in the middle of Dapchi by their captors, who also warned the locals against sending the girls to Western-style schools. While five of the remaining abductees reportedly died due to exhaustion, one Christian girl remains in the militants’ custody. The Nigerian government characterized the release as “unconditional”, though some sources citing locals indicate that authorities did free several militants who joined the kidnappers, while other sources suggest that the Nigerian government had paid a ransom to secure the girls’ release.

On March 23, while receiving the released girls in Abuja, President Buhari announced that his government was ready to grant amnesty to Boko Haram members who were ready to accept unconditional surrender.

Meanwhile, on April 1, at least 29 people were killed, including six militants, in a multi-pronged Boko Haram attack on Akikaranti, Bille Shuwa, and Bale-Galtimari communes surrounding Borno State capital, Maiduguri, coinciding with the Christian Easter holiday.

Assessments & Forecast

Assessments: Following extensive counterinsurgency operations targeting Boko Haram strongholds, group attempts to reassert presence, garner international, domestic attention

Despite subsequent large-scale security operations targeting well-documented militant strongholds such as the Sambisa Forest and Lake Chad shores in Nigeria’s northeastern region, the militants successfully launched the well-planned abduction of the Dapchi girls. Indeed, this incident resembles Boko Haram’s April 2014 attack on a school in Chibok, Borno State, when 276 girls were kidnapped. The Chibok attack resulted in an extensive international outcry, triggered by a domestic campaign started by the families of the Chibok girls. The #BringBackOurGirls movement put the Boko Haram conflict in the international spotlight, particularly when the former US First Lady Michelle Obama endorsed the campaign. In this context, the Dapchi attack was likely motivated by the prospect of achieving similar notoriety. Additionally, the attack came in response to security forces’ triumphant claims of the near-destruction of the militant group’s presence in the region. Through the Dapchi attack, the militants debunked such claims and reasserted their continued operational capabilities across the country’s northeast.

The Dapchi abductions rendered a successful outcome for the militants. While the federal government characterized the negotiations and the subsequent release of the hostages as completely “unconditional”, it contradicted local reports of the authorities’ release of several militants. Such conflicting reports align with previous allegations against authorities for releasing militants and paying ransom for militants, with the latest incident being the February 10 release of three lecturers from the University of Maiduguri, along with ten police officers abducted by Boko Haram last year. Under these circumstances, the suspected hefty ransom payment will likely be utilized by the militants to enhance and develop their operational capabilities in the region, which may have been hampered, to some extent, by the counterinsurgency operations.

Indeed, the government’s repeated payment of ransoms without any resistance is poised to encourage the militant group to carry out similar large-scale kidnappings. Such a concern was further emphasized by the Borno State authorities’ decision to shut down boarding schools across 25 of the 27 LGAs. Furthermore, the release of militants as part of the ransom payment reintroduces experienced and well-trained fighters to the ranks of the militant group, increasing their operational capabilities. This is further highlighted in the latest Boko Haram multi-pronged attack on April 1 that was reportedly coordinated by Shuaibu Moni, a top Boko Haram commander who was released by the government to facilitate the return of 82 Chibok girls in May 2017. Moni had previously appeared in a Boko Haram video on March 7 taunting the Nigerian security forces and threatening to launch additional attacks.

The theatrical grandeur of the return of the abductees as the militants drove into the center of Dapchi hailed as heroes by the local population for safely bringing back their girls was likely a symbolic attempt by the group to embolden its authority in the region. This sheds light on the militant group’s propaganda aimed towards gaining the locals’ trust and consolidate their influence in their areas of operation. As the militants shook hands with the locals and warned them against the return of the girls to schools for Western education, they compelled the latter to adhere to the militant group’s Islamist ideologies. Through the dramatic aspects of the event, the militants effectively portrayed themselves as legitimate actors in the region, with more control than the federal government in Abuja. Given the communities’ grievances against Abuja, as they continue to feel disregarded and neglected by the government, such an image of Boko Haram is poised to render the locals more susceptible to getting recruited by the militant group. Amidst the ongoing insurgency, these circumstances increase the possibility of better cooperation between the local communities and the militants, with the former providing shelter and engaging in economic transactions with the militants for their own survival.

Assessments: With 2019 elections nearing, Buhari makes strategic shift toward developing appeasement stance to overcome Boko Haram insurgency

Since President Buhari came into office in 2015, negotiations with Boko Haram in their kidnap-for-ransom schemes have become a recurring phenomenon, which includes the 2016 release of 21 Chibok girls and another 82 released in May 2017. Such a stance toward the militant group likely stems from large-scale international and domestic attention that these incidents received. Buhari has attempted to make good on his electoral promise of combating Boko Haram in contrast to the perceived failure of former President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration to effectively defeat the militant group. However, Buhari’s administration has also projected a stronger government resistance to the insurgency, which has led to a distorted perception of success over Boko Haram militancy in Nigeria. Continued militant attacks have highlighted the government’s propaganda in displaying exaggerated data regarding the success of counterinsurgency operations and falsely claiming the defeat of the militant group. This may, to a certain extent, reduce Buhari’s international and domestic credibility.

With Nigeria’s presidential elections slated to take place in 2019, such an approach by Buhari for the safe release of abductees is poised to become his legacy. To further add to his administration’s successes against the insurgency, following the Dapchi events, Buhari appears to have embarked towards an appeasement stance with the latest amnesty deal. It is likely that through these propositions Buhari seeks to strategically portray to the international community his efforts for a peaceful resolution in parallel to the continuation of counterinsurgency operations. Under these circumstances, it is likely that Buhari will attempt to negotiate with the militant group to reduce attacks in exchange for reduced military actions in the northeastern region.

However, the administration’s conciliatory attitude towards the militants may be perceived by some as weak, with negative implications particularly by security forces, which may have a detrimental impact on the fighting morale of the soldiers who are endangering their lives in battle. FORECAST: As such, any attempts by Buhari to negotiate with the militants to reduce attacks in light of the upcoming elections, as well as the latest amnesty deal, may add to Nigeria’s security agencies’ frustration concerning the ongoing nine-year long insurgency and weaken their determination to actively combat it. Additionally, Buhari’s administration is poised to receive substantial criticism from opposition political parties for their weakened stance towards the insurgency and their propaganda of exaggerating military successes, as evidenced by the opposition People’s Democratic Party’s (PDP) statement denouncing the Dapchi deal.

FORECAST: Buhari’s latest amnesty deal offered to Boko Haram is quite similar to an opportunity offered by former President Jonathan in 2013, which Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau outright declined. As such, it seems unlikely that Boko Haram will accept the latest deal, particularly given that the government does not seem to have any substantial negotiating leverage. Furthermore, the latest April 1 multi-pronged Boko Haram attack continues to highlight that the group remains capable of executing sophisticated large scale attacks in their traditional sphere of influence. Given the group’s resilience in remaining a viable threat in Nigeria’s northeastern region despite the large-scale counter-militancy measures, a persistence of the conciliatory approach by the government is liable to be detrimental to their interests.

Recommendations

Travel to Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance and following heightened security protocols regarding criminal and militant activity.

We continue to advise against all travel to the northeastern Nigerian states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, given the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency and extreme insecurity in the region.

We advise to avoid all travel to areas of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad within the Lake Chad Region given the high risk of militancy.

Cameroon Analysis: Will Anglophone strikes continue in coming weeks amid grievances from Western Cameroonians?

Current Situation: Anglophone strikes

Since early November 2016, the Anglophone regions of Western Cameroon, namely the country’s Northwest and Southwest regions have been experiencing increased tensions over the community’s perceived social and cultural marginalization by the largely Francophone state. Although the tensions have been long, this particular period was triggered by lawyer Anglophone strikes, denouncing the appointment of unqualified Francophone magistrates, not familiarized with common law across Western Cameroon. Soon afterwards, the teachers’ unions joined in, as they protested against the imposition of French in Anglophone schools. Since then, we witnessed frequent protests and strikes by such elements throughout these regions, with the former often turning unruly.

Meanwhile, in early December, and in response to the perceived unwillingness of the Cameroonian State to address their demands these unions, along with a wide array of Anglophone civil society groups created CACSC, leading to the ongoing wave of ghost town strikes. Such Anglophone strikes have been widely adhered to across the Southwest and Northwest regions as evidenced on January 16-17, 23-24 and February 6, 11. The strikes have been largely peaceful, in alignment with CACSC’s spirit, nonetheless several isolated instances of unrest have been recorded, namely, the reported attack by disgruntled youth against Francophone schools in Limbe, Southwest Region on January 17.

On January 17, the Cameroonian government banned CACSC, subsequently arresting the latter’s leaders. Also on January 17 the Cameroonian government reportedly imposed restrictions on internet access in the Anglophone regions, which are still ongoing as of the time of writing. Additionally, the Cameroonian government has allegedly threaten with sanctions to any media outlet advocating for secession or federalism.

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Assessments & Forecast

Since the establishment of the Federal Republic of Cameroon in 1961, joining the largely english speaking regions of Western Cameroon with the newly formed French Speaking Cameroon, the country was established as a bilingual state. However in practice, the country has been largely run and dominated by the French-speaking majority, which accounts for eight of the country’s ten regions and 80 percent of the population. This tendency has been gradually institutionalized, especially since the government system was changed from a federation into a unitary state in 1972, and has been consolidated during the rule of longstanding President Paul Biya. This lack of institutionalized bilingualism, has created amongst the english speaking population of Western Cameroon an environment of perceived social and cultural marginalization by the Francophone State. Such marginalization has been translated not only by an increased use of French in both the educational and legal system, but also by the absence of Western Cameroonians in senior government positions. In addition, the use of French as the country’s main language has created employment obstacles for anglophone citizens. Thus, especially alienating the youth across the Northwest and Southwest Regions vis-a-vis the state, creating a hotbed for civil discontent, not witnessed in the region since the calls by the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) of independence more than two decades ago. Such grievances have set the ground for the ongoing “ghost town” campaign.

This entrenched sense of marginalization allowed an initial movement of Anglophone teachers and lawyers unions seeking for social demands, to evolve into political demands that would enhance the bilingual character of the nation, particularly the reestablishment of federalism. In this context, the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) has emerged as the most prominent organization amongst the Anglophone movement calling for federalism and further recognition from the largely Francophone state. With a strategy of civil disobedience through the implementation of a series of “ghost town” Anglophone strikes across Northwest and Southwest Cameroon, CACSC has succeeded in installing the debate about the reestablishment of federalism both in the national spectrum and in the international arena, as the Anglophone problem has gained momentum in the international media and intellectual spheres across the globe.

While the organization has highlighted the peaceful stance of its campaign, several isolated episodes of violence have been recorded amid their strikes, such as the clashes recorded in Ndop, Northwest Region on February 10 leaving two protesters killed. Additional organizations, such as the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) have taken a more radical stance advocating for secession, calling for the establishment of the Anglophone self-proclaimed Republic of Ambazonia. As a continuation of their separatist ideology since the organization’s establishment in 1995. In this regard, several splinter groups and disgruntled youths have engaged in violent acts amid the Anglophone strikes, namely, attacks against non-compliant organizations, particularly French-speaking schools and scuffles with security forces.

Such a stance has the potential to hinder the Anglophone strikes camping, which as of the time of writing has enjoyed wide adherence and public support, given that it could generate public animosity towards the civil movement and most importantly provide justification for crackdowns by security forces. FORECAST: Nonetheless, given that such groups are likely to remain a minority voice amongst the Anglophone camp, CACSC sponsored “ghost town” strikes are likely to continue in the coming weeks, with an elevated level of adherence across the english-speaking regions.

President Paul Biya’s tight grip on power with the help of a robust political apparatus and the support of the Army has allowed him to rule the country since 1982, being the second longest-ruling leader in the whole continent still in power. In this context, the emergence of a civil disobedience campaign in the Anglophone Regions, which constitutes the stronghold of the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) party, marks an unusual political challenge for Biya’s regime. Thus, Yaounde has taken a hardline stance vis-a-vis the Anglophone movement as evidenced by the imposition of a ban against CACSC and the subsequent arrest of its leaders on January 17 over “terrorism” charges. Also the government imposed internet disruptions across the Southwest and Northwest Cameroon on January 17, which are still ongoing as of the time of writing, jeopardizing life and business continuity in Western Cameroon. This measure has drawn wide international criticism as prominent humanitarian organizations have labeled such policy as a sign of increased authoritarianism by the Cameroonian regime.

Consequently, the Cameroonian government has continuously framed Anglophone activists as criminals, while stressing the united and indivisible character of Cameroon and threatening media outlets of advocating for Federalism or secession. This intransigent posture underscores the perceived political backlash that eventual concessions to the Anglophone minority could have on a national level, where additional regions may see such concessions as a sign of the regime’s weakness, subsequently destabilizing the government. In this regard, as evidenced in the government’s rhetoric, Yaounde is particularly against the implementation of a federal system. Since the Cameroonian regime is based on the unified character of the country, with Paul Biya as the primary element of such unification, a federal system might create the environment for democratic expressions to emerge on the regional level, consequently, setting the ground for political criticisms that could eventually lead to substantial challenges for the regime.

FORECAST: While the government established a Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism in order to address the Anglophone grievances, such efforts are unlikely to represent significant changes on the ground. Moreover, given the aforementioned potential challenges, Yaounde is likely to maintain their animadversion towards the implementation of a federal system, preserving the unitary character of the state. Thus, CACSC sponsored “ghost town” Anglophone strikes are likely to continue in the coming weeks, with an elevated level of adherence across the english-speaking regions. Nonetheless, if CACSC does not succeed to render real compromise from Yaounde in the foreseeable future, the strike campaign may lose its current momentum. Indeed, the great economic toll that such manifestations are having in the already deprived economy of Western Cameroon, coupled with the increased pressure exerted by parents in light of the continued teachers’ Anglophone strikes, are likely to hinder the adherence, and subsequently the success of such campaigns in coming months.

Recommendations

Travel to Douala and Yaounde can continue while adhering to heightened security precautions regarding armed criminal activity. Those operating or residing in Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest regions are advised to allot for intermittent disruptions to business continuity, and maintain heightened vigilance, given the underlying potential for unrest arising from the aforementioned Anglophone strike campaign.

MAX Analysis Nigeria: Chadian deployment records positive momentum against Boko Haram militants, February 3, 2015

Executive Summary

Chad’s military deployment to northern Nigeria and Cameroon has yielded a quick succession of defeats for Boko Haram’s militants, given the Chadian soldiers’ superior training, discipline, and supplies.
While Chad is focused on securing its border and interests along Lake Chad, longer term momentum against Boko Haram will necessitate an expansion of the commitment by regional forces to aid the Nigerian military’s counterinsurgency.
Travel to Abuja and Lagos can continue while maintaining heightened vigilance and following heightened security measures regarding criminal and militant activity.

Current Situation on the Nigerian Border with Chad & Cameroon
Starting on January 27, Chadian military troops, including contingents of armored vehicles and air force, have been engaging forces of the Islamist militant sect Boko Haram in the Nigerian towns of Malam Fatori and Gamboru, along the northeastern borders of Borno State. Reports on February 2 indicate that Nigerian military officials claim to have recaptured the towns of Abadam, Malam Fatori, Gamboru, Mafa and Marte, with the assistance of local vigilantes and regional forces of the Multinational Joint Task Force (JTF).

In recent months, there has been an increase in Boko Haram’s insurgency along the Chadian border. This includes a large scale paramilitary mobilization against Malam Fatori and other communities in the Abadam Local Government Area (LGA) in November 2014, in which the militants were able to gain control of the area. On January 3, a militant force captured the town of Baga and adjacent communities, reportedly killing at least 150 people.
A substantial Chadian force, said to number 2,500 soldiers, has reportedly deployed to Cameroon’s Extreme North Region in recent weeks. Reports on January 29 indicated that the force was positioned in the city of Fotokol, across the border from the Nigerian town of Gamboru, which is under militant control.
Boko Haram staged coordinated paramilitary attacks against Maiduguri, Borno State capital, on January 24-25 and February 1. Both attacks were repelled by Nigerian security forces in the city.

Assessments: Chadian deployment of troops targets immediate interests, incurs positive momentum against Boko Haram, yet long term paradigm shift necessitates prolonged commitment

The recent Chadian deployment has been propelled by the surge of Boko Haram activity near its border. While Boko Haram was active in the vicinity of the Chadian border, particularly in Malam Fatori, prior to the Baga attack ,the majority of the militants’ operational effort concentrated along the borders with Cameroon and Niger. In contrast, the militant attack in Baga was directed at a base of the multinational JTF, in which Chadian and Cameroonian forces were allegedly slated to be positioned. The attack garnered widespread international attention as it was rumored to have killed 2,000 people and was described by an international NGO as the militants’ deadliest attack thus far. According to recent reports, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that as many as 15,000 Nigerian refugees have arrived in Chad. Elevated militancy in such close proximity to its border inevitably threatens Chadian interests in the oil abundant Lake Chad, while the direct assault on multinational JTF installations exposed the inadequacy of Chad’s standing deployment in Nigeria. Together, we assess that these considerations propelled Chad to commit greater force to the regional counterinsurgency campaign.
With this in mind, in the short term the Chadian deployment is likely to focus on securing the country’s immediate interests along the border. This assessment is further corroborated by the first locales targeted by the new force in Malam Fatori and Gamboru, which represent the northern and southern militant strongholds capping Lake Chad. Following from this, we assess that the next target for Chadian efforts will be Baga and potentially the town of Monguno which was captured by militants on January 24-25, still within approximately 50 km from the border. In so doing, the Chadian forces would have secured the immediate vicinity of Lake Chad. Revamped Chadian presence in the area as part the multinational JTF may also suffice to maintain relative security near the border in the short and medium term.
Over and above securing its border area, the Chadian deployment has the potential to drastically alter the strategic balance in the conflict with Boko Haram. Chadian forces are regarded as well-trained, disciplined and supplied, and have proven capable in counterinsurgency campaigns elsewhere in the continent, most notably in northern Mali. In contrast, the Nigerian military struggled to contain the expansion of Boko Haram, with multiple reports indicating that Nigerian soldiers fled during clashes with the militants. Moreover, the Chadian deployment has already prompted renewed discussion of a greater regional force, said to total 7,500 troops. Should such a force be able to undermine the presence of Boko Haram along Nigeria’s northeastern borders, they will cut off cross border supply and smuggling routes for the group which have been essential for its sustained insurgency.
As a result of the recent Chadian deployment, the counterinsurgency campaign in Nigeria already enjoys a positive momentum, with Boko Haram militants driven out from several key stronghold over the past few days. This comes in the face of prolonged momentum enjoyed by the group. However, the extent to which this positive momentum can be translated into a paradigm shift in the conflict still remains to be seen. Largely, we assess that such a paradigm shift will depend on Chad’s commitment to contribute substantial resources, both of manpower and equipment, to fight Boko Haram outside the immediate proximity of its border with Nigeria on Lake Chad. This is likely to incur greater costs on the Chadian forces and yield smaller rewards in the short term. As such, should Chad effectively secure its border area it may choose to avoid a more prolonged campaign deep into Borno State.
In the meantime, the Chadian deployment affects the decision making process of both Boko Haram and the Nigerian government. For the militants, we assess that the two repelled large scale offensives on Maiduguri have been propelled by the imminent Chadian mobilization as the group recognizes that near term direct confrontations with the Chadian military will challenge the group’s territorial control. Thus, Boko Haram is likely to continue to try and secure strategic locations in Borno State, chiefly the capital, as well as fortify its existing strongholds. The Nigerian Federal Government will likely seek to capitalize on the current positive momentum against the militant group ahead of the February 14 presidential elections. As most of the Chadian effort is concentrated in the north of Borno State, Nigerian forces are likely to target militant strongholds in northern Adamawa and southern Borno, potentially making their way towards the city of Gwoza. Such a campaign is likely to be prolonged, and its success will necessitate an ongoing commitment of Chad and other regional countries.
Finally, while such a paradigm shift in the conflict may undermine Boko Haram’s paramilitary campaigns, the sect is likely to maintain resilient militant capabilities. Boko Haram is deeply entrenched in the northeast with both local support networks and operational infrastructure, and has proven able to adjust and diversify its modus operandi in light of evolving strategic landscapes. Moreover, the sect may be inclined to demonstrate its resilient abilities by executing high profile attacks in key locations outside its core theater of operations in northeast Nigeria. Thus, we assess that in spite of the recent increased regional counterinsurgency campaign, Boko Haram militancy is likely to continue over the coming months.

Nigeria: Boko Haram continues effective insurgency in Borno State despite international intervention, emergence of local vigilantes [May 18, 2014]

“Bring Back Our Girls” protests have drawn international attention to the abduction of school girls from Chibok Government Girls’ Secondary School in Borno State by the Boko Haram Islamist militant group. The governments of the U.S., the U.K., France, China, and Israel have sent military and counterinsurgency teams to aid Nigeria in its fight against Boko Haram. Despite the recent counter offensives launched in cooperation with international forces and the surfacing of local vigilante groups, the Islamic militant group continues to operate successfully in the outlying areas of Borno State by rapidly adapting its tactics. The group has effectively targeted outlying villages and gained control of crucial access points throughout the State.

Boko Haram soldier

On May 7, Boko Haram militants attacked Gamborou Ngala town, located on the border between Cameroon and Nigeria, in the Ngala Local Government Area (LGA) of Borno State, reportedly killing 300 locals. Meanwhile, a further attack was recorded on the same day in Askira LGA where an additional 125 civilians were killed.
Citizens of Rann town in the Kala-Balge Local government Area (LGA) in Borno State repelled a Boko Haram attack on May 13, reportedly killing 200 militants.
On May 17, Boko Haram militants killed at least 29 civilians in a market located in Ngurosoye Village, Bama Local Government Area (LGA), 56 kilometers from Maiduguri, in the northeastern Borno State. In addition, 40 civilians were killed a result of a further attack in the village of Dalwa-Masuba in the Damboa Local Government Area (LGA) of Borno State on the same day.
According to Amnesty International, Boko Haram attacks were responsible for over 1,200 deaths in 2013. An Amnesty report issued on March 30 of this year reports that at least 1,500 have been killed in Boko Haram-related violence in the first three months of 2014 alone.

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Strategic Analysis: Military re-shuffle in Nigeria unlikely to stifle Boko Haram

Since the beginning of January, there has been a notable increase in the frequency of Boko Haram activities in Borno State, one of the three northeastern states of Nigeria currently under the state of emergency, along with Yobe and Adamawa. These increased attacks have sparked an exodus of thousands of locals from the area to Cameroon and Niger. Meanwhile, President Jonathan announced the appointment of an entirely new military defense staff in mid-January and the creation, under U.S. guidance, of new special forces units for the north.

In mid-January, the creation of an Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) was announced. This special operations unit will reportedly be partially trained and equipped by the United States and is expected to have deployments in the north in addition to other at-risk areas in the country.

The high frequency of Boko Haram’s attacks in Borno throughout January indicates the group’s significant capabilities in spite of increased counterinsurgency operations in the state since May 2013. Despite the successful raid against a Boko Haram base in Damboa, this incident marks the only reported preemptive strike against the group by security forces in recent weeks. The attacks in January have been indicative of two categories of attacks: high profile operations against strategic targets in Maiduguri and attacks against isolated villages in the northeastern, border regions of Borno. Continue reading Strategic Analysis: Military re-shuffle in Nigeria unlikely to stifle Boko Haram →