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Far-right militancy to increase in form of cells and lone-wolves – Europe Special Report

Executive Summary

A series of attacks and arrests linked to far-right individuals in Europe, as well as statistics and official statements from a number of European governments, underscore the threat as fast becoming the primary militant issue going forward.

Modern right-wing militancy has taken on a particularly transnational character, with online forums enabling communication and radicalization between countries.

Attacks in one country can easily spur similar copy-cat incidents in others due to social media and international news coverage.

Far-right militants come in two forms. Major cells will continue to form and operate but are more likely to be detected by security forces. Lone-wolves constitute the most significant threat but, in most cases, do not have the access to fire-arms of their American counterparts.

Far-right attacks are likely to grow in number across Western and Northern Europe, with migrant, religious, and political targets being specifically singled out.

Recommendations

Security plans should be updated to reflect the relevant threats associated with far-right militancy, including up-to-date training for staff, particularly regarding both the online and in-person profiles of attackers. Pay attention to differing threats from organized cells and lone-wolf individuals.

Public, private, and third sector organizations are advised to increase their awareness of threats on social media through the use of threat monitoring services. Increased awareness of an organization’s political footprint and perceptions from fringe online groups can help uncover potential violent actors and plots before they occur.

Institutions should increase their intelligence collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, and Deep & Dark web searches in order to understand the full spectrum of threats.

Immediately alert authorities of any suspicious behavior or items.

Background

The rise of far-right ideologies in Europe saw a milestone during the European Parliament elections in 2019 when a number of far-right, alt-right, or populist parties were some of the top-performing political groups. In France, Italy, and the UK, far-right or populist-right parties came top, with similar outcomes reported in a number of other countries, and populist right parties increasing their total share of the European Parliament by almost 30%.

On August 14, the German Interior Ministry released figures registering 8,605 “right-wing extremist” offenses in the first half of 2019. This was an increase by over 900 compared to the same period of 2018. The 8,605 crimes attributed to far-right groups or motives included 363 violent incidents, with at least 179 people injured. Some sources indicated that the actual number of incidents could be higher due to state police officials often classifying right-wing offenses as non-political in initial reports.

In addition, a number of major political and social developments occurred in Europe which increased and catalyzed far-right sentiments across the continent. These included the migrant and refugee crisis, perceptions of economic disparity, the increase in militant incidents attributed to the Islamic State, the growth of social media as the primary method of consuming media, and a rise in Euroscepticism, illustrated through Brexit. Broadly, this built on a disillusionment with the centrist and center-left politics which dominated large parts of the West for much of the last decade.

Concurrently, crimes attributed to anti-Semitic, Islamophobic, racist, xenophobic sentiments saw significant increases in a number of European countries in the previous decade. In Germany, the number of criminal incidents per year that were attributed to such sentiments increased by around 47% from 2007 to 2018. Similarly, in the UK, there was an increase of around 45% between 2011 and 2016, with the numbers further rising after Brexit.

A number of European governments have spoken out in recent months of the significantly increasing threat of far-right groups in the region. In July, the UK’s Home Office warned that right-wing extremists were forming the most significant group of militants in the country, while the far-right threat was included in the official terrorist warnings for the first time. In Germany, Interior Minister Horst Seehofer claimed that the June 2 shooting of a CDU politician should serve as a “wake-up call” for the country, arguing that “right-wing extremism is a serious danger for our free society.”

Assessments and Forecast

Transnationalization of the far-right through online forums

One development in the current state of the far-right is the transnational character it has taken on, largely through communications online and shared grievances among a number of Western countries. The transnational nature of a globally interconnected world, which has become a focus of many far-right talking points, meant that individuals who would be susceptible to far-right ideologies began feeling affected by similar issues throughout the world. It is through these shared issues that global echo chambers arose of far-right sympathizers who congregate online to discuss problems of immigration, conspiracies of Jewish power, white supremacy, and other extremist ideas.

Much of this transnational communication came through access to social media and online forums which either cater to such ideas or are unable to police the content. The rise of ‘meme culture’ bolstered this ideology, as users were able to radicalize new members by presenting extremist political ideas through cartoons and jokes, bypassing the negative connotations of neo-Nazism or fascism. Many of the more extreme members of the far-right online community have migrated to websites such as Gab and 8chan, which have little to no restrictions on content and, therefore, become hotbeds for far-right and neo-Nazi activity.

The global nature of news media has also increased the transnational nature of the far-right. As the ideology focuses on the preservation of the ‘white race,’ any incident in the world which is carried out in the name of this goal is highly praised by such communities, regardless of where the attack took place. In this regard, it is notable that two far-right attacks were recorded in the UK and one in Norway following the widespread sharing of news about the Christchurch attacks. Mass attacks in one country are highly likely to spur copycat attacks abroad in the following weeks, particularly in countries with similar cultural and linguistic backgrounds.

With regards to government action to stop far-right militancy, the transnational and loosely structured nature of online far-right activism means that, while security forces may be able to foil attacks, a government attempt to fight the ideology will be difficult. It is highly unlikely that any single government will be able to successfully undertake a deradicalization program without the help of the international community. With that, it is likely that this phenomenon will continue to expand in Europe, with various right-wing governments reluctant to fully engage in fighting the far-right, due to political benefits of discussing grievances such as immigration.

Organized Militant Cells

Organized militant groups represent the long-term progression of neo-Nazi cells, which have galvanized in popularity following a general increase in far-right sentiments and through far-right culture online. These cells often form doctrines based around neo-Fascist ideologies, historical revisionism, and frequently link to other subcultures such as local gangs, hooliganism, and fringe political parties. For the most part, many of these groups continue to look up to some form of National Socialism or local brand of extremist nationalism. Many have built strong online followings and grow their support through encrypted messaging apps, online forums, and social media.

These groups make up a large number of the far-right-linked arrests in Europe. Security forces often track members who have been involved in weapons smuggling. Furthermore, such groups are likely to have links with certain members of the military or far-right political parties in their respective country. This has largely played a role in helping groups with training, planning, and building networks. The groups, similar to many other extremist militant organizations, are often more popular among disenfranchised members of society, particularly focussing on young white males who feel abandoned by the political direction of their country, and Europe in particular.

It is important to note that much of the structure of modern far-right groups, including the online base, use of encrypted social media, knowledge of attack methods, and even choice of methods come from behavior learned from Islamist cells in Europe. Many of these groups strongly followed news about jihadism in Europe and likely used this template to help construct their own groups.

Far-right cells are more likely to attempt to carry out major attacks than lone-wolves, with goals of fundamentally changing or affecting the political system of Europe. Many foiled incidents have seen groups building large arms caches, looking to target high profile political or religious targets, meanwhile much of their rhetoric continues to have revolutionary themes. Future attack plans, whether successful or not, are likely to include attempts to build powerful IEDs or carry out multi-faceted and sophisticated attacks, involving a number of methods and targets. Far-right militant groups are likely to look to target individuals or institutions which they believe represent a specific threat to their ideology, including refugee centers, mosques and synagogues, minority leaders, and left-wing political figures or events.

Lone-Wolf Militants

As with the trend in other types of militancy, far-right militancy in Europe has also moved towards a lone-wolf angle. This likely comes from two main sources. First, lone-wolf attacks are much easier to carry out, as they avoid the high-risk communications between various different cell-members, which are more likely to alert security forces. Similarly, planning can be done alone and in secret. Second, the extremely visible trend of lone-wolf shootings with a far-right character in the USA, catalyzed, in part, by a dramatic increase in extremist and violent rhetoric online, has led to the radicalization of young, often mentally unstable men.

While lone-wolf attacks in Europe are unlikely to be as destructive as they are in the USA, largely due to the difficulty in obtaining firearms, they remain the most likely types of attacks. Unlike the attacks by larger militant cells, such attacks are likely to be unsophisticated and have lower impact. Many of the attacks may involve vehicular rammings, stabbings, or shootings with low-quality firearms.

Lone-wolf attacks are likely to be similarly targeted, looking to focus on individuals, institutions, or events which are particularly relevant to the far-right ideology, however, they are also likely to be far smaller and more local in character. It’s more probable that a lone-wolf will attack within their town or the area of their city, rather than traveling to the capital, in an attempt to carry out a major attack. This will likely increase the number of attacks happening in more peripheral areas in Europe.

Notable Militant Incidents

Attacks in 2019

Germany: A Christian Democratic Union (CDU) politician was shot dead on June 2, 2019, described by authorities as an ‘execution’ by a person who justified it based on the politician’s ‘pro-refugee’ stance. While details of the shooter were sparse in the days following the incident, far-right forums immediately began celebrating the shooter, attributing it as revenge for the politician’s support for migration. On June 15, a 45-year-old man was arrested in connection with the incident, with police confirming their suspicions of a far-right motive.

Germany: On January 1, 2019, an individual rammed his car into a crowd in Bottrop, western Germany in an attack suspected to be motivated by far-right ideologies. Among the people injured, seven were migrants, including two children. When the suspect was detained in Essen, after attempting to ram another set of pedestrians, he reportedly made racist remarks to police officers, with a member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party calling it an act of ‘right-wing violence’.

Norway: On August 10, one person was injured when an individual wearing a uniform and body armor entered a Mosque in Skui, just outside of Oslo, and shot at three congregants. The man entered with two shotguns and a pistol and was later arrested by police. He is believed to have been influenced by far-right ideologies.

UK: On March 15, 2019, Muslim individuals were attacked with hammers outside of east London mosque by three men who were said to have shouted Islamophobic abuse. The attack occurred a number of hours after the Christchurch attack in New Zealand, in which 51 Muslim worshipers were killed in two mosques.

Arrests in 2019

France: On June 11, French authorities arrested members of a neo-Nazi cell across the country, beginning in Grenoble with the arrest of a volunteer police officer who had been amassing weapons. The members had been planning to attack Jewish institutions and Muslim places of worship. Five members of the group were closely associated with neo-Nazi ideologies and were charged between September 2018 and May 2019. Among the targets was the annual dinner of the Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions (CRIF). Naming themselves ‘L’Oiseau Noir’ (Black Bird), they were charged under terror offenses and for being part of a militant conspiracy.

Greece: Greek police arrested a man they believed to be the leader of the far-right militant group ‘Krypteia’ on June 4. The detained individual worked as a professor and is expected to be charged with arson, possession of weapons, and threats. The group has previously been implicated in an arson attack on an Afghan community center in March 2018, for ‘firebombing’ a migrant center in Athens in April 2018, and setting fire to a migrant camp Nea Manolada, Ilia in June 2018. Separately, the group claimed to have carried out over 21 attacks in 2018 in a leaked email.

Italy: Multiple military weapons, including a functioning air-to-air missile, were seized from a far-right group in Turin, northern Italy, per July 15 reports. Additional raids took place in Forli, Milan, Novara, Pavia, and Varese in conjunction with Direzione Centrale della Polizia di Prevenzione (DCPP). It reportedly was conducted following an investigation into individuals with extremist ideologies who took part in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Three people were arrested including a former candidate for Senate for the far-right Forza Nuova. In addition to the weapons, authorities found large amounts of pro-fascist or Nazi memorabilia.

UK: Two teenage members of far-right groups from Leeds and west London were jailed on June 18 for calling for attacks on Prince Harry over his marriage to Duchess of Sussex Meghan Markle and minorities including non-white and Jewish people. The men, 18 and 19 years old, were part of the Sonnenkrieg Division, a far-right neo-Nazi group. An online blog run by one of the men included violent misogynistic content, including multiple calls for violent sexual assault, calling for readers to become ‘a machine of terror’. He was also found in possession of bomb-making instructions inspired by similar material used by militant Islamist groups. Both individuals were active online on the website Gab, which predominantly features a right-wing user base, designing propaganda to encourage militant attacks and to recruit members.

IS pledge video consistent with group’s decentralization into newer territories, will spur state crackdown – Azerbaijan Analysis

Executive Summary

A recent propaganda series from Islamic State (IS) included a pledge video from Azerbaijan to the group’s leader on July 2.

While the capabilities of IS-inspired cells in Azerbaijan are limited, there is a potential that this video may sustain increased online messaging among disaffected Sunni youth, with the latent chance of culminating in lone-wolf attacks by sympathizers.

The government will step up its crackdown on potential radicalization, particularly in the country’s north, on unlicensed Islamic schools nationwide, and step up its monitoring of social media.

Travel to Azerbaijan can continue while maintaining vigilance due to the latent risk of crime and militancy.

Please be advised

Islamic State (IS) media released a video as part of its “The Best Outcome is for the Righteous” series on July 2. The video features three individuals believed to be from Azerbaijan pledging allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi while calling on Muslims in the country to stage attacks.

In the video, the main speaker is identified as “Shaykh” Abu Yusuf al-Azeri. The individual provides an exposition of selected passages from the Hadith denouncing polytheism and calling for revenge for the alleged killing of Muslims.

In 2017, Azerbaijani State Security indicated that at least 900 citizens had traveled abroad and joined militant groups in Syria and Iraq. At least 250 have returned since, per independent estimates. State security officials also indicated in 2018 that dozens of Azerbaijanis have joined militant groups in the North Caucasus, while the number of those traveling to Afghanistan and Pakistan for the same purpose stands at 300.

Assessments

Video consistent with IS’ decentralization efforts, utilizing local appeal to push global message

The video gains significance when compared to the low frequency of official IS propaganda released involving Azerbaijan as the group’s on-ground presence in the country has been considerably muted. Given that it is the sixth in an ongoing series from the group’s affiliates across the globe, it stands to reason that this release is part of efforts by IS Central to increase propaganda in newer territories. This trend has grown since the release of a video featuring al-Baghdadi for the first time in five years in April. In Asia, the group’s recent declaration of Wilayats, or provinces, in India and Pakistan is consistent with these decentralization efforts. The media release is further notable as it is the only video in the series thus far which is not dedicated to a Wilayat but to a separate country. This may be an indication of IS’ long term ambitions in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus as it attempts to further its regional presence.

The video appears to be made by local radicalized individuals with links to IS Central, possibly through networks facilitated by Azerbaijani foreign fighters. In terms of content, the speaker does not make explicit references to President Ilham Aliyev or the perceived local suppression of Muslims, but instead touches on more universal Salafist doctrines and provides general exhortations for attacks against unbelievers. Given that this is one of the first major IS videos on Azerbaijan in recent years, it is likely intended to establish the broad outlines of IS’ creed for possible new audiences in Azerbaijan and serve as an entry point for future propaganda engagement. However, a reference to the government’s cooperation with regimes abroad, particularly Iran, reiterates the close adherence to IS’ sectarian ideology with regards to the Shiite majority state as well as “crusader” Western governments. The overlay of stock images of US forces and of President Aliyev in talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin during the video are intended to underscore this message. It is also notable that the video ends with a bay’ah or pledge in Azeri, as opposed to Arabic. This minimal use of Arabic, apart from subtitles, is also intended to maintain local appeal.

Northern Sunni communities to be target of messaging, may result in increased online activity by disaffected youth

Azerbaijani foreign fighters in Syria have typically come from the country’s conservative Sunni communities in cities such as Sumqayit, Shabran, and Qusar. Police reports have also mentioned Khachmaz, Zaqatala, Qax, Yevlax, Oguz, Quba, and Sheki as notable hotspots for recruitment in the past. Mostly being border areas, radical elements may have crossed over to Russian territories in Dagestan to collaborate with actors who are a part of IS’ Wilayat Kavkaz. That said, the establishment of an active Islamist operational presence locally in Azerbaijan has been limited as a result of close state monitoring and preemptive security operations against suspected cells.

In this context, the recent messaging may presage a revival in messaging and online chatter, particularly among disaffected Sunni youth in the northern districts who may see the video as an encouragement to oppose the Aliyev administration’s crackdown on radical Islamic doctrines. Returning foreign fighters and those who attempted to travel to Syria but failed will likely be key influencers in this trend. This was noted in 2018 when a local named Eldaniz Mammadov was arrested and tried for posting pro-IS propaganda on social media platforms; the suspect is believed to have traveled to Syria at an unspecified previous time.

State response to focus on potential for radicalization on social media, unauthorized religious schools

It is important to note that at present, identified IS-inspired cells still remain marginal in numbers and have not demonstrated the capability for staging major attacks in the country. However, the video will raise concerns regarding the risk of lone-wolf attacks by sympathizers. Issues such as the state-controlled introduction of Islam as a subject in schools and universities in April may serve as flashpoints for disaffection as more conservative communities view this as an effort by the government to marginalize doctrines it perceives to be radical while increasing its hold on systems of religious education. As part of its crackdown, the Aliyev administration will likely step up its monitoring of suspected radicalized individuals across the country, making a series of arrests over the coming months.

The focus of the crackdown will include the closures of unauthorized Islamic theological schools and the detentions of Sunni Islamic scholars trained abroad as part of its continued efforts to prevent the influence of perceived external theology in the country. Measures will also include a scale-up of social media monitoring and tighter security along the country’s northern border to prevent the movement of radicalized individuals towards IS-linked interests in the North Caucasus. Tighter scrutiny into the movement of firearms and explosives material, particularly via smuggling networks in the north, is also expected to follow. Areas such as Khachmaz and Qusar Districts will particularly draw the focus on the security apparatus, given the operations of Sunni extremist groups such as the Khachmaz Jamaat.

The government is also liable to step up its coordination with neighboring states on counter-militancy strategies. Typically, the Aliyev administration has used counter-militancy as a means to forge common ground with economic allies, such as Turkey and Russia. The country is also an ally in NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan, providing airspace to cargo transportation for peacekeeping operations. The mention of Iran in the video and IS’ sectarian orientation will raise concerns regarding the possibility for plots targeting the country’s Shiite-majority. Such intentions, while not IS-linked, have been noted among Sunni extremists who have previously sought to target Shiite places of worship, such as the Meshedi Dadash Mosque in Baku. Closer security coordination between Tehran and Baku and a crackdown on smuggling networks along the southern border can also be expected in the foreseeable future.

Recommendations

Travel to Azerbaijan can continue while maintaining vigilance due to the latent risk of crime and militancy.

Avoid posting content that may be perceived as controversial or anti-state when operating or residing in the country due to the risk of prosecution.

Avoid all travel to border areas near the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region due to continued ceasefire violations and the risk of conflict.

IS attack against Tazirbu police station on November 23 indicative of increase in militant group’s ranks, capabilities in Libya – Libya Analysis

Executive Summary

The modus operandi of the November 23 attack against the Tazirbu police station is very similar to the October 28-29 Islamic State (IS)-claimed attack against a police station in al-Fuqaha, Jufra District. The scale of these attacks, combined with the short time span within which they occurred make them highly noteworthy.

This shift in IS strategy from localized small-scale attacks across Libyan territory towards more focused large-scale attacks against towns in southern Libya, which witness lower security presence, indicates that the militant group has to some degree managed to reinforce its ranks as well as rebuild its capabilities over the past year.

Similar to the al-Fuqaha attack, IS militants kidnapped ten people, including government officials and security personnel from Tazirbu. IS’ increased focus on kidnappings can be attributed to its interest in using the abductees as bargaining chips for ransom. This would allow the group to replenish its revenues, purchase supplies and weaponry, and ramp up its operations in Libya.

We advised against all travel to the southern outlying areas of Libya at this time due to the general lack of governance and security protocols in this region, which makes it conducive for militant activity and attractive targets for attacks.

Current Situation

According to reports, suspected IS militants aboard ten armed vehicles launched an attack targeting a police station in Tazirbu, located in the Kufra District, during the night hours of November 23.
At least nine civilians and policemen were killed, and 15 were wounded as a result of the attack.
Reports further indicate that the militants kidnapped at least ten people, including the Mayor of Tazirbu and a member of the municipal council, and fled the scene.
The Libyan National Army (LNA) has diverted forces from other parts of Kufra District towards the town of Tazirbu to secure it.

Assessments & Forecast

The modus operandi, target, and location of the attack suggest that it was carried out by IS militants. The Sunni jihadist militant group recently conducted a very similar attack against the al-Fuqaha police station, located in the Jufra District, during the overnight hours of October 28-29. The scale of these two attacks, along with the short time span within which they occured make them highly noteworthy. In the time period between IS’ complete loss of territories in Libya in December 2016 and October 2018, the majority of the militant group’s attacks had been relatively small-scale as well as spread out over a long period of time and territory. The majority of these attacks utilized suicide vehicle-borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) against security checkpoints or small-scale raids against police stations. For instance, the July 24 raid against the al-Uqaylah police station killed two LNA soldiers and wounded three others, while the June 2 raid against the al-Qunan police station killed one civilian and wounded five others.

Over the past year, IS was likely operating in groups of 10-12 fighters in the country. This allowed its militants to avoid attracting security forces’ attention and move relatively undetected across a larger swathe of territory. The lack of sufficient personnel and weaponry may have compelled IS to operate in this manner, which, in turn, had an impact upon their ability to launch larger-scale attacks. The recent attacks in al-Fuqaha and Tazirbu may indicate that IS has managed to bolster its ranks, partly through militants fleeing the group’s territorial losses in Syria and Iraq and partly through new recruits who now consider Libya as a more attractive arena. This has allowed IS to concentrate its forces towards launching larger-scale attacks against entire towns, rather than just security checkpoints or isolated government infrastructure, for example, in Tripoli in May and September as well as in Misrata in October 2017.

While, on the one hand, this indicates that IS has managed to rebuild its capabilities in Libya to some degree since its loss of territories to Misrata forces in December 2016, the location of the recent attacks suggest that these capabilities are still limited. Although al-Fuqaha and Tazirbu are both located within LNA-held territories, the towns witness relatively lower security presence as compared to areas located further north in the Sirte Basin and the Oil Crescent. The security forces of southern towns are largely comprised of local militias, who maintain small armed fighting units that are neither well-equipped nor well-trained. Therefore, it is possible that IS decided to focus its efforts in southern Libya, as this would increase the militant group’s chances of success.

As witnessed in the attack on the al-Fuqaha police station, the focus on conducting kidnapping of government officials and security forces stands out in the recent incident. Unconfirmed reports from November 10 indicated that IS is seeking to negotiate the release of four out of the ten hostages abducted in the attack on al-Fuqaha. If confirmed, this would suggest that through such kidnappings-for-ransom, the Sunni jihadist militant group is aiming to replenish its revenues, which, in turn, would allow it to purchase supplies and weaponry to ramp up its operations in Libya. This would also explain the recent kidnapping of the Mayor of Tazirbu, who by the prerogative of his position within society would demand a higher ransom. Aside from the ransom, such an abduction allows IS to project the Libyan authorities as incapable of securing its own civilians, thereby allowing the group to showcase its relatively higher capabilities.
FORECAST: IS will claim responsibility for the attack over the coming hours, as its scale will allow the militant group to significantly raise its profile in Libya. Meanwhile, the LNA will divert forces towards Tazirbu in order to secure the town over the coming hours and days. It will increase security protocols in Kufra District, which may include increased security checkpoints along main roads. The LNA may also tighten security along Libya’s southern borders with Sudan and Chad, as the porosity of these borders allows militant organizations to engage in the cross-border movement of fighters, supplies, and weaponry. While this may facilitate LNA forces in gathering vital intelligence and intercepting IS convoys, it will also provide the militant group with additional targets for attacks. On a more strategic level, the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may utilize this attack to highlight the LNA’s inability to secure its held territories and attempt to leverage this in its political negotiations with the latter.

Recommendations

It is advised to defer all travel to Tripoli and Benghazi at this time due to ongoing violence, threats against foreigners, and the risk of a broad deterioration of security conditions. We advise at this time that those remaining in Tripoli and Benghazi should initiate contingency and emergency evacuation plans due to deterioration in the security situation. Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary and contingency support plans.

For those remaining in Tripoli, we advise to avoid nonessential travel to the outskirts of the city, particularly the Janzour and Tajoura neighborhoods, as well as to the Mitiga and Tripoli International Airports, given that these are focal points of ground clashes in the city.

Avoid the immediate vicinity of government buildings, police stations, media outlet offices, and political party and militia headquarters, given that these locales have been targeted by militia groups in the past and recently by militants, and thus remain at increased risk for violence and unrest.

Westerners, particularly US citizens, operating in Libya are advised to maintain a low profile and exercise heightened vigilance in light of prevailing anti-Western sentiment and increasing attacks against foreigners.

Nationwide, take precautions to mitigate the risk of being targeted for kidnapping. Refrain from traveling in luxury vehicles and maintain a generally low profile. Routinely alter travel routes and refrain from divulging sensitive itinerary information to strangers.

New military campaign in North Sinai likely linked to upcoming March 2018 presidential elections – Egypt Analysis

Current Situation

On February 9, the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAAF) Spokesperson announced the commencement of a large-scale “comprehensive” military operation to “eliminate all terrorist elements” across the country, called “Operation Sinai 2018”, with special emphasis placed on the Sinai Peninsula, Nile Delta, and Western Desert. The Spokesperson also announced an increase of the country’s alert level due to the operations.

As part of the of the campaign, the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) intensified the frequency of its airstrikes targeting militant hideouts throughout North Sinai Governorate, especially in the Rafah-al-Arish-Sheikh Zuweid triangle and Central Sinai District. The Egyptian Navy increased its activity along Sinai’s coastal region, while heightened security protocols were recorded at ports and border crossings. Security forces also increased presence in the vicinity of vital infrastructure and installations. Reports from February 9 indicate that civilian Suez Canal crossings from mainland Egypt to the Sinai, including by vessel and through tunnels, have been closed to civilian traffic due to the military campaign.

On March 8, the EAAF Spokesperson stated that Operation Sinai 2018 had yielded the deaths of 105 Islamic State (IS)-affiliated Wilayat Sinai fighters and the arrests of hundreds of the group’s militants, and that 16 soldiers had also been killed since the beginning of the campaign. The Spokesperson also announced that the EAAF destroyed 1,907 hideouts and weapon storehouses.

Assessments & Forecast

The Egyptian government has achieved partial success in containing militancy threats over the past year, with a reduction in the overall number of attacks. However, the persistence, albeit reduced frequency, of attacks in North Sinai Governorate and mainland Egypt likely motivated this recent operation, demonstrating efforts to mitigate threats from multiple groups, particularly the IS-affiliate Wilayat Sinai. The large-scale attack at a mosque in North Sinai’s Bir al-Abd on November 24, 2017, which killed over 300 people, also likely triggered the operation, and it took a period of months to prepare and mobilize for the current operation.

However, considering the timing of its commencement and execution, the primary motivation for the military campaign is likely political and connected to the upcoming March 2018 presidential elections, in which President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi is the leading candidate. President al-Sisi likely initiated the operations in order to boost his status among the Egyptian populace and project an image of power, stability, and intensified efforts to tackle the threat of militancy. Al-Sisi also likely timed the operation to deflect domestic and international criticism away from the election’s perceived lack of legitimacy and toward the issue of counter-terrorism, following the withdrawal or arrest of most of his electoral opponents over the past several weeks. To a lesser but still significant degree, the operation was also likely launched to draw attention away from Egypt’s poor economic conditions and towards a different public issue, namely militancy, and measures taken by authorities to tackle it.

The operations also follow international media reports about Israeli airstrikes against Wilayat Sinai in North Sinai in recent years. The Egyptian government likely intends to use the operations to demonstrate their sovereignty over North Sinai Governorate and their ability to mitigate militant threats with their own forces. This is particularly likely in light of the heightened criticism regarding al-Sisi’s close cooperation with Israeli authorities vis-a-vis the threat of militancy stemming from Wilayat Sinai elements.

Strategically, the nationwide campaign aims largely at isolating Wilayat Sinai militants in North Sinai Governorate. The reported closure of Suez Canal crossings to the movement of civilians, as well as the intensified activity by the Egyptian Navy along the Sinai coastal region, are meant to prevent reinforcements and smugglers from aiding Wilayat Sinai militants, thus putting further pressure on the Sunni jihadist militant group in North Sinai Governorate. The heightened security measures in the vicinity of vital infrastructure and installations likely were put in place to prevent reprisal attacks by militants, which in turn, would embarrass the Egyptian authorities.

FORECAST: The EAAF will likely continue implementing a strategy aimed at further isolating Wilayat Sinai militants in their aforementioned strongholds of Central Sinai Distinct and the Rafah-al-Arish-Sheikh Zuweid triangle. By carrying out simultaneous assaults on these two areas, the EAAF likely seeks to fix militants in their positions, preventing them from reinforcing the two respective areas or conducting attacks to the rear of security forces. The intensified aerial bombardments are meant to hamper militant movements, which in turn, may impede their ability to regroup or conduct attacks in order to force the deployment of Egyptian troops away from the frontlines. Furthermore, tighter inspection is liable to be enforced between Egypt and Gaza at the Rafah border crossings.

Israel permitted Egypt to deploy a large amount of forces into Sinai, as according to the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, Israeli permission is required for such a move. This highlights the increased coordination between the two countries, as they both perceived Wilayat Sinai as a strategic threat. In order to complicate and discourage the security coordination between the two countries, Wilayat Sinai may target southern Israel with rocket fire over the coming days and weeks. While in the short-term, the number of Wilayat Sinai attacks may decrease, given precedent of previous operations by the EAAF in North Sinai Governorate, over the coming months the Sunni jihadist militant group will likely renew its elevated activity in the region. The group will likely lower its profile in order to facilitate this, which would enable it to regroup and carry out multiple attacks against Egyptian security forces.

Recommendations

Travel to Cairo and Alexandria may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations.

Avoid all travel to the North Sinai Governorate and border areas with Libya, Sudan, and Israel due to the persistent risk for militant attacks, kidnappings, and general lawlessness.

We further advise to avoid nonessential travel to the Southern Sinai Peninsula, while maintaining heightened vigilance in the Suez Canal Zone, the Upper Nile area, and the Nile Delta region due to an increased risk of unrest and the heightened risk of militant attacks. Before traveling to Sharm al-Sheikh, confirm that flight operations are continuing and have not been impacted by recent militant threats.

As a general security precaution, remain vigilant in areas surrounding and avoid the immediate vicinity of government installations, police stations, and religious centers, particularly churches, as these locations remain under elevated threat of militant attacks. When traveling in central squares, or in areas with persistent police deployments, avoid the immediate vicinity of security forces, particularly fixed traffic booths, as such personnel and facilities have increasingly come under attack by militant elements.