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Risk of increased political, security instability as tensions escalate between Mogadishu, UAE over Somaliland port deal – Somalia Analysis

Executive Summary

A Dubai-based company’s sale of a stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland to Ethiopia in March triggered a political standoff between Somalia and the UAE that led to the two countries cutting military ties.

The severing of funding for the Somali National Army (SNA) and withdrawal of UAE trainers and equipment will have a serious impact on the SNA’s capacity to fight al-Shabaab and delay the withdrawal of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers.

Puntland and other regional states have continued to engage with the UAE separately as they receive funding and other benefits from the Gulf country, illustrating the weakness of Somali federalism as Mogadishu holds little leverage to force its constituent states to adhere to a unified policy.

Turkey and Qatar are likely to increase their presence in Somalia following these events, though Mogadishu will likely attempt to restore ties with the UAE. Given Somalia’s dependence on the Gulf countries for support, Mogadishu will attempt to maintain its official neutrality toward the Gulf rivals even as its states pursue their own policies.

We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.

Current Situation

On March 1, a Dubai-based company announced that it sold a 19 percent stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, of which it is a majority owner, to Ethiopia. In response, on March 12, the Somali Parliament in Mogadishu declared the deal to be “null and void” as the federal government was not consulted prior to signing.

Following weeks of turmoil and several military confrontations at the federal parliament, on April 8, Mogadishu airport authorities seized a private UAE aircraft and confiscated 9.6 million USD that was suspected to be directed toward several politicians involved.

The Ministry of Defense announced on April 11 that it would cut all military ties with the UAE, with the Somali government to take over the duties of training, funding, and redistributing the forces that were under the UAE’s payroll. This prompted the UAE to withdraw its military trainers and equipment from Mogadishu on April 16, with some reports that their forces withdrew from Bosaso, Puntland as well.

On April 21, Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas” traveled to the UAE for talks with the government to secure continued support for Puntland’s maritime police forces. Likewise, on May 7, Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe visited Abu Dhabi, where he criticized Mogadishu’s actions regarding the UAE.

Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” traveled to Doha, Qatar on May 13 where he met with the Qatari emir and foreign minister to hold discussions regarding “joint cooperation” between the two countries.

Assessments & Forecast

Security Consequences

Over recent months, Somalia and the UAE have been engaged in a political standoff following the March 1 Somaliland port deal. Mogadishu does not regard Somaliland as an independent state while Hargeisa does not recognize Somalia’s authority, though a number of countries and companies have pursued separate tracks of political negotiations and commercial deals with Mogadishu and Hargeisa. In this context, the UAE has acknowledged Somaliland as a de facto country as it sought to develop political and economic interests across the region. Mogadishu’s decision to cut military ties with the UAE as a retaliatory measure after the port deal and related political turmoil is particularly notable given the UAE’s entrenched involvement. This includes UAE-based companies controlling, developing, and operating strategically-situated ports and infrastructure, while the government also funds humanitarian and development projects as well as individual Somali political figures, all in efforts to advance the Gulf country’s interests.

Risk of increased political, security instability as tensions escalate between Mogadishu, UAE over Somaliland port deal - Somalia Analysis | MAX Security

Click here to see Map Legend

One of the most significant developments was the UAE’s withdrawal of support to the Somali National Army (SNA). It is possible that Mogadishu did not fully consider the ramifications of severing its military ties but it came immediately, as the UAE withdrew its military trainers and halted financial support to 2,400 Somali soldiers, thought to constitute between a quarter to a fifth of the entire SNA.

FORECAST: Somalia has recurrent difficulties raising enough revenue to pay its security forces and it is likely that they will be unable to cover those soldiers’ salaries after the UAE’s withdrawal, which could result in violent protests or incidents by unpaid soldiers. This potential was demonstrated in Mogadishu on April 23 when former UAE-backed soldiers looted their former base, clashing with other SNA troops, and went on to sell hundreds of stolen firearms on the black market. This illustrates not only the fragmented nature of Somalia’s security forces, often trained by different foreign powers and answering to different clan or regional interests, but the impact of these divisions and ill-discipline on maintaining security in the country. UAE-supported soldiers were thought to be among the best-trained and equipped forces in the capital, and these changes will only make it harder for security forces to manage the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed groups.

FORECAST: This is also expected to impact the African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) plans for withdrawal from the country. Peacekeepers have already begun to draw down, with plans to fully exit by 2020, though their departure is contingent on conditions that include improvements in Somalia’s security situation and political development, as well as the SNA’s ability to replace AMISOM. This further highlights the UAE’s multifaceted role in Somalia, as it contributes to building the SNA’s capacity, which has an effect on the broad security of the country and the army’s ability to step in for the peacekeepers, as well as their interference in Somali politics and institution-building. Given this role, should the standoff between Somalia and the UAE continue, this will complicate AMISOM’s plans. While this is positive in the short-term given AMISOM’s capabilities in comparison to the SNA, international donors have already grown impatient with continually funding the peacekeeping operation and this may force the end of the mission before Somalia is prepared to take over.

Internal Political Implications

In addition to Mogadishu and Somaliland, the UAE is also heavily involved in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. There they signed a deal in April 2017 to develop and run the Port of Bosaso, alongside an agreement to create, fund, and train Puntland’s Maritime Police Force (PMPF). These financial and military benefits prompted Puntland’s president to publicly deviate from Mogadishu’s position and travel to Abu Dhabi in efforts to secure their continued support. His willingness to directly engage with a foreign government in defiance of the constitution that imbues only Mogadishu with the power to conduct foreign policy is another reflection of the limitations of Somali federalism and unification.

FORECAST: Moreover, Mogadishu has little leverage over Puntland and would likely not be able to persuade the region to bend to their position. As a result, Puntland is likely to continue pursue its independent policies while Mogadishu softens its rhetoric in order to reduce the internal rifts.

That the UAE would negotiate individually with Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland is consistent with the longstanding conceptualization of Somalia into the three regions. However, regional states in Somalia are likewise divided, and Jubaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Southwest states have all formed their own positions regarding the Gulf crisis and to which side they believe Somalia must be aligned. Much of this is derived from the funding Somali politicians receive from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey. While this has largely remained in the political sphere, one example of this manifesting in violence was the confrontation at the Somali parliament in April. This was, in part, driven by the parliament speaker’s opposition to the president and prime minister’s response to the Somaliland port deal, which he claimed was a result of their allegiances to Qatar.

FORECAST: Given that both sides of the Gulf crisis continue to fund Somali political figures and commercial interests, this is expected to remain a source of tension for the foreseeable future. While this may result in further violence between security forces backed by different factions, its effects will largely be political. However, this effect could seriously hinder the development of Somalia’s permanent constitution, the advancement of negotiations between the federal states and the central government, and the political progress necessary to make Somalia a viable state.


Risk of increased political, security instability as tensions escalate between Mogadishu, UAE over Somaliland port deal - Somalia Analysis | MAX Security

Effects on Foreign Policy

Given the impact on security and Somalia’s internal regional dynamics, it is likely that Mogadishu will pursue negotiations with the UAE to resolve their differences and restore relations. However, Qatar and Turkey likely view this as an opportunity to increase their involvement in the Horn of Africa and undermine their rivals. Qatar and Turkey have likewise sought to gain a foothold in the country in the past several years, with Turkey being one of the country’s largest donors and investors and Qatar securing its influence by funding Somali politicians, including President Farmajo. This underlines the position that Somalia is in due to its weak governance and reliance on foreign aid, vulnerable to the aims and goals of the international community, whether that is Western development and military intervention or competition between the Gulf rivals over their expanding influence in the region.

With the UAE remaining interested in Somalia despite recent events and Turkey and Qatar expected to increase their presence, it will be difficult for Mogadishu to maintain its officially neutral stance on the Gulf crisis.

FORECAST: Given Somalia’s dependence on these countries to fund and operate not only military training but critical infrastructure and services, including airports, seaports, and hospitals, they will likely continue to maintain this balancing act. However, the federal government will likely face growing diplomatic and economic pressure to choose a side, though it will also have to contend with internal pressure by its constituent states who will disagree. In this regard, even if Mogadishu continues to lean toward Qatar, the nature of Somalia’s weak federalism will mean that different regions and states will continue to maintain their own foreign policies and relations with either side of the Gulf rivalry.

 


Risk of increased political, security instability as tensions escalate between Mogadishu, UAE over Somaliland port deal - Somalia Analysis | MAX Security

Recommendations

We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.

If travel to southern Somalia is unavoidable, we advise remaining in the confines of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport complex.

Security awareness for business continuity management

Security awareness training: a building block for business continuity management against extremist threats

Who ever thought that a day at the office would have to be a day spent thinking about the possibility of terrorism, in addition to the normal demands of business?

Probably not most employees of Multinational Corporations doing business in far-flung corners of the globe. While MNCs have always maintained operations in volatile countries and regions, it’s simply an inescapable reality today that the potential for violent extremism has never been greater – and few targets are as appealing to a terrorist as an MNC. That means that employees can never let their guard down, and neither can the companies responsible for both employee safety and security, and business continuity management.

The situation in Kenya is one case in point

While the country’s Jubilee Alliance of thirteen smaller political factions represents a sweeping effort to unite the often fractious nation and consolidate President Kenyatta’s power, it shows little chance of ending violent political and tribal opposition anytime soon. For the many MNCs doing business in Kenya, typically headquartered in Nairobi or Mombasa but with operations throughout the country, safety and business continuity threats ranging from militancy to crime, civil unrest, and other disruptions are an ongoing concern. Both al-Shabaab, the notorious perpetrators of the 2013 mass killings at Kenya’s upscale Westgate Mall, and IS remain active in recruiting and training Kenyan youths for extremist violence, and the threat of future attacks persists.

Knowing that is a first step in guarding against potentially catastrophic disruptions, of course. But MNCs in Kenya, or any hotspot on the globe, also need to prepare in advance for any potential business continuity risks. That means equipping employees with the training they need both to recognize a threat before it evolves into a crisis and to respond appropriately when an emergency actually does unfold, according to Mr. Ital Dar, Chief Consulting Officer at MAX, where employee security training is seen as a cornerstone of crisis prevention and response for MNCs. “Once a large-scale incident or an emergency scenario hits an organization, the main task is to go back to normal as soon as possible,” he said, “and security managers must ask themselves: what are the required measures we need to take in order to so?”

The caveat is, they need to ask the question and find the answers not only in the thick of crisis, but also well before.

Employee security awareness training is key to minimizing risks

You can’t really separate the issue of employee safety from business continuity, or vice versa. The one depends on the other, and the only way to ensure that they are both adequately safeguarded is to provide comprehensive employee security awareness training. Typically for MNCs, that entails enlisting the expertise of knowledgeable consultants, who then tailor employee training sessions to the specific site and circumstances of each office in order to localize the training around specific risks and the most likely business continuity scenarios.

The training is site-specific and classroom-based, and is augmented by not only movies, PowerPoint presentations, discussions and lectures, but also by classroom drills and simulations to provide experiential learning as well as academic context.

Quality employee security awareness training covers a lot of ground

Experts such as MAX Security’s Mr. Ital Dar emphasize that such realistic simulations are critically important in preparing employees to know how and when to respond to a perceived threatening situation. By definition, and by their very nature, terror attacks come quickly and unexpectedly, but it is still possible – in fact necessary – to prepare employees with the tools and experience to assess even the most fluid situation as it happens and make level-headed decisions based on their prior training and planning.

While the particulars of a training regimen should always be tailored to each company and location, a broad outline of topics that need to be addressed can apply to MNCs operating in any location that a heightened terror threat is present. These include delving into relevant threat scenarios, assessing the location of an attack and reacting accordingly to minimize loss, and using the facility itself as a defensive resource, as when a shooting is occurring in one part of the building.

Additionally, and again at an experiential level, training should focus heavily on how to plan for an attack or other threat before it occurs. In such a training module, employees work toward devising a response plan that incorporates clearly defined crisis management and emergency response goals and roles, and then they effectively deconstruct and reconstruct the plan in a tabletop exercise in which they identify and rectify any gaps and missteps in the original plan.

Whatever other topics are covered in the training sessions of any particular MNC, the issue of business continuity management remains central, of course. For that reason, no security awareness training is complete if it doesn’t look to post-event issues and actions, as well as pre-event planning and training on how to respond in the moment. As soon as an event subsides, the aim of any business has to be to return to normal operations as soon as possible. Advance training, planning, and role-playing is an essential tool for meeting those challenges as well, including hands-on exercises that help to identify possible snags and anticipate optimal solutions for if and when they arise.

Business continuity risk assessment begins with training

It’s an unfortunate fact of life that no business – certainly no MNC operating in a volatile land – can take security for granted. Not in the 21st century. And not in a country like Kenya, where deep-seated political rivalries, tribal and ethnic divisions, persistent war and terrorism in neighboring states, and the unwelcome presence of some of the most destructive terror groups in the world today, make threats to business operations a very real and present danger.

Against that backdrop, MNCs are likely to conclude that high-quality employee security awareness training is one of the best tools they have at hand to reduce the always-present threat to business continuity.

 

Read more posts like this in our Security Blog.

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Executive Summary

A Dubai-based company’s sale of a stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland to Ethiopia in March triggered a political standoff between Somalia and the UAE that led to the two countries cutting military ties.

The severing of funding for the Somali National Army (SNA) and withdrawal of UAE trainers and equipment will have a serious impact on the SNA’s capacity to fight al-Shabaab and delay the withdrawal of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers.

Puntland and other regional states have continued to engage with the UAE separately as they receive funding and other benefits from the Gulf country, illustrating the weakness of Somali federalism as Mogadishu holds little leverage to force its constituent states to adhere to a unified policy.

Turkey and Qatar are likely to increase their presence in Somalia following these events, though Mogadishu will likely attempt to restore ties with the UAE. Given Somalia’s dependence on the Gulf countries for support, Mogadishu will attempt to maintain its official neutrality toward the Gulf rivals even as its states pursue their own policies.

We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.

Current Situation

On March 1, a Dubai-based company announced that it sold a 19 percent stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, of which it is a majority owner, to Ethiopia. In response, on March 12, the Somali Parliament in Mogadishu declared the deal to be “null and void” as the federal government was not consulted prior to signing.

Following weeks of turmoil and several military confrontations at the federal parliament, on April 8, Mogadishu airport authorities seized a private UAE aircraft and confiscated 9.6 million USD that was suspected to be directed toward several politicians involved.

The Ministry of Defense announced on April 11 that it would cut all military ties with the UAE, with the Somali government to take over the duties of training, funding, and redistributing the forces that were under the UAE’s payroll. This prompted the UAE to withdraw its military trainers and equipment from Mogadishu on April 16, with some reports that their forces withdrew from Bosaso, Puntland as well.

On April 21, Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas” traveled to the UAE for talks with the government to secure continued support for Puntland’s maritime police forces. Likewise, on May 7, Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe visited Abu Dhabi, where he criticized Mogadishu’s actions regarding the UAE.

Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” traveled to Doha, Qatar on May 13 where he met with the Qatari emir and foreign minister to hold discussions regarding “joint cooperation” between the two countries.

Assessments & Forecast

Security Consequences

Over recent months, Somalia and the UAE have been engaged in a political standoff following the March 1 Somaliland port deal. Mogadishu does not regard Somaliland as an independent state while Hargeisa does not recognize Somalia’s authority, though a number of countries and companies have pursued separate tracks of political negotiations and commercial deals with Mogadishu and Hargeisa. In this context, the UAE has acknowledged Somaliland as a de facto country as it sought to develop political and economic interests across the region. Mogadishu’s decision to cut military ties with the UAE as a retaliatory measure after the port deal and related political turmoil is particularly notable given the UAE’s entrenched involvement. This includes UAE-based companies controlling, developing, and operating strategically-situated ports and infrastructure, while the government also funds humanitarian and development projects as well as individual Somali political figures, all in efforts to advance the Gulf country’s interests.

Click here to see Map Legend

One of the most significant developments was the UAE’s withdrawal of support to the Somali National Army (SNA). It is possible that Mogadishu did not fully consider the ramifications of severing its military ties but it came immediately, as the UAE withdrew its military trainers and halted financial support to 2,400 Somali soldiers, thought to constitute between a quarter to a fifth of the entire SNA.

FORECAST: Somalia has recurrent difficulties raising enough revenue to pay its security forces and it is likely that they will be unable to cover those soldiers’ salaries after the UAE’s withdrawal, which could result in violent protests or incidents by unpaid soldiers. This potential was demonstrated in Mogadishu on April 23 when former UAE-backed soldiers looted their former base, clashing with other SNA troops, and went on to sell hundreds of stolen firearms on the black market. This illustrates not only the fragmented nature of Somalia’s security forces, often trained by different foreign powers and answering to different clan or regional interests, but the impact of these divisions and ill-discipline on maintaining security in the country. UAE-supported soldiers were thought to be among the best-trained and equipped forces in the capital, and these changes will only make it harder for security forces to manage the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed groups.

FORECAST: This is also expected to impact the African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) plans for withdrawal from the country. Peacekeepers have already begun to draw down, with plans to fully exit by 2020, though their departure is contingent on conditions that include improvements in Somalia’s security situation and political development, as well as the SNA’s ability to replace AMISOM. This further highlights the UAE’s multifaceted role in Somalia, as it contributes to building the SNA’s capacity, which has an effect on the broad security of the country and the army’s ability to step in for the peacekeepers, as well as their interference in Somali politics and institution-building. Given this role, should the standoff between Somalia and the UAE continue, this will complicate AMISOM’s plans. While this is positive in the short-term given AMISOM’s capabilities in comparison to the SNA, international donors have already grown impatient with continually funding the peacekeeping operation and this may force the end of the mission before Somalia is prepared to take over.

Internal Political Implications

In addition to Mogadishu and Somaliland, the UAE is also heavily involved in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. There they signed a deal in April 2017 to develop and run the Port of Bosaso, alongside an agreement to create, fund, and train Puntland’s Maritime Police Force (PMPF). These financial and military benefits prompted Puntland’s president to publicly deviate from Mogadishu’s position and travel to Abu Dhabi in efforts to secure their continued support. His willingness to directly engage with a foreign government in defiance of the constitution that imbues only Mogadishu with the power to conduct foreign policy is another reflection of the limitations of Somali federalism and unification.

FORECAST: Moreover, Mogadishu has little leverage over Puntland and would likely not be able to persuade the region to bend to their position. As a result, Puntland is likely to continue pursue its independent policies while Mogadishu softens its rhetoric in order to reduce the internal rifts.

That the UAE would negotiate individually with Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland is consistent with the longstanding conceptualization of Somalia into the three regions. However, regional states in Somalia are likewise divided, and Jubaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Southwest states have all formed their own positions regarding the Gulf crisis and to which side they believe Somalia must be aligned. Much of this is derived from the funding Somali politicians receive from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey. While this has largely remained in the political sphere, one example of this manifesting in violence was the confrontation at the Somali parliament in April. This was, in part, driven by the parliament speaker’s opposition to the president and prime minister’s response to the Somaliland port deal, which he claimed was a result of their allegiances to Qatar.

FORECAST: Given that both sides of the Gulf crisis continue to fund Somali political figures and commercial interests, this is expected to remain a source of tension for the foreseeable future. While this may result in further violence between security forces backed by different factions, its effects will largely be political. However, this effect could seriously hinder the development of Somalia’s permanent constitution, the advancement of negotiations between the federal states and the central government, and the political progress necessary to make Somalia a viable state.


Effects on Foreign Policy

Given the impact on security and Somalia’s internal regional dynamics, it is likely that Mogadishu will pursue negotiations with the UAE to resolve their differences and restore relations. However, Qatar and Turkey likely view this as an opportunity to increase their involvement in the Horn of Africa and undermine their rivals. Qatar and Turkey have likewise sought to gain a foothold in the country in the past several years, with Turkey being one of the country’s largest donors and investors and Qatar securing its influence by funding Somali politicians, including President Farmajo. This underlines the position that Somalia is in due to its weak governance and reliance on foreign aid, vulnerable to the aims and goals of the international community, whether that is Western development and military intervention or competition between the Gulf rivals over their expanding influence in the region.

With the UAE remaining interested in Somalia despite recent events and Turkey and Qatar expected to increase their presence, it will be difficult for Mogadishu to maintain its officially neutral stance on the Gulf crisis.

FORECAST: Given Somalia’s dependence on these countries to fund and operate not only military training but critical infrastructure and services, including airports, seaports, and hospitals, they will likely continue to maintain this balancing act. However, the federal government will likely face growing diplomatic and economic pressure to choose a side, though it will also have to contend with internal pressure by its constituent states who will disagree. In this regard, even if Mogadishu continues to lean toward Qatar, the nature of Somalia’s weak federalism will mean that different regions and states will continue to maintain their own foreign policies and relations with either side of the Gulf rivalry.

 


Recommendations

We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.

If travel to southern Somalia is unavoidable, we advise remaining in the confines of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport complex.

MAX Analysis Somalia: Factionalism within al-Shabaab unlikely to result in dissolution, as uptick in attacks underscores group’s sustained capabilities July 14, 2014

Current Situation

With the commencement of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan on June 29,  a string of daily attacks attributed to the Islamist militant group, al-Shabaab, has been recorded throughout Mogadishu. Most notably, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the July 8 attack against Mogadishu’s Presidential Palace, commonly known as Villa Somalia, as militants managed to infiltrate the complex. Meanwhile, mounting reports have been released during the month of June indicating defections of al-Shabaab members, along with unconfirmed reports that a faction within the group is cooperating with Western and Somali Federal Government (FG) intelligence bodies.

  • On June 29, al-Shabaab issued a threat to escalate their operations throughout Mogadishu during Ramadan. Subsequently, an estimated 42 assassinations of individuals associated with the government have been recorded in the capital city.
  • Reports from June 8 indicate that Mohamed Saed Atom, a known warlord and principal supplier for al-Shabaab in Puntland, defected from the group and surrendered in Mogadishu to the Somali FG, which has welcomed his renunciation of violence. Atom stated that his decamping was prompted by the group’s leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane’s, excessive use of violence towards civilians and the manipulation of the Quran’s law to justify the group’s strategy.

Continue reading MAX Analysis Somalia: Factionalism within al-Shabaab unlikely to result in dissolution, as uptick in attacks underscores group’s sustained capabilities July 14, 2014

Max Security Analysis Kenya: President Kenyatta’s government under increased pressure over rising threat of militancy amidst growing ethno-political animosity. June 22, 2014

Kenya
Kenyan soldier after the explosion
In the aftermath of the June 15-16 militant attacks in Mpeketoni, Lamu County, which left more than 60 people dead, belligerent political and ethnic rhetoric has sharply risen between President Uhuru Kenyatta’s government and the opposition Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD). Moreover, the US State Department issued a travel warning on June 19, alerting US nationals of the risks of travel to Kenya while restricting its staff from all travel to the coastal counties of Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu, and the coastal portion of Tana River County. On June 20, Kenya’s Interior Ministry asserted that its security forces killed five suspected militants armed with AK-47 rifles in the Mpeketoni area, although an estimated 50 assailants took part in the attacks on June 15-16, most of whom are presumed to still be at large.
  • The Somali militant group al-Shabaab’s spokesman, Sheikh Abdulaziz Abu Musab, reportedly claimed responsibility for the Mpeketoni attacks through the group’s Somali radio channel, Andalus FM. The man alleging to be Abdulaziz Abu Musab stated that the “Mujahideen who carried out the Mpeketoni attack are all safe,” and that they killed 70 “enemies” while denying previous rumors of abductions.
  • Witness statements indicate that the Mpeketoni assaults were conducted by predominantly Somali speaking assailants allegedly carrying al-Shabaab flags. The attackers specifically targeted non-Muslim males, mainly of the Kikuyu tribe, as well as people watching the World Cup. The Kenyan government has subsequently urged citizens to watch the competition at home instead of in “crowded and unprotected open places.”
  • However, President Kenyatta refuted al-Shabaab’s claim of responsibility, and instead implicitly accused opposition leader Raila Odinga and his CORD faction of the attacks, which were allegedly aimed at sparking instability and ethnic tensions. In response, Odinga rejected these allegations, stating that the Mpeketoni attacks are a result of the Jubilee government’s inability to curb growing militancy.
  • On June 19, a pro al-Shabaab social media account that Kenyan police allege claimed responsibility for the attacks was closed down. The account’s owner, Ishmael Omondi, who is a Kenyan national, was arrested in Nairobi, and subsequently released following questioning.
  • The attacks have had deep political ramifications, and the opposition CORD’s rally slated for June 21 in Nakuru County, as part of Odinga’s campaign for national dialogue, was reportedly cancelled following the discovery of hate leaflets. The leaflets urged Odinga’s local Luo tribe to vacate the Rift Valley region or face consequences. Subsequently, the government has banned all political or tribal rallies in the town of Naivasha, Nakuru County, out of fear of ethnically motivated violence.
  • George Aladwa, the former Nairobi Mayor and Nairobi County Chairman for Raila Odinga’s party Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) was reportedly arrested on June 21, allegedly after calling for the swearing in of Odinga as President on July 7 (Saba Saba Day), if the government refuses national dialogue.
  • Additionally, nine Senators and MPs affiliated with CORD were summoned on June 20 by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) over allegations of hate speech. 

Continue reading Max Security Analysis Kenya: President Kenyatta’s government under increased pressure over rising threat of militancy amidst growing ethno-political animosity. June 22, 2014

Kenya: Uptick in militant attacks underlines security forces’ inability to effectively combat militancy, fresh radicalization of Muslim youth [May 13, 2014]

A wave of bombings has taken place in Nairobi and Mombasa since the beginning of May, leaving seven people dead. The attacks are the manifestation of the growing threat of militancy in the country and underline the backlash from failed counter-militancy operations in Kenya as well as the ongoing successful military campaign of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) against al-Shabaab. Moreover, security officials warned on May 13 of fake messages circulating through text messages and social media regarding false alarms for militant attacks, which is indicative of a growing public obsession with and fear of the threat of militancy.

  • On May 3, coordinated attacks occurred in Mombasa, the country’s most important port city and a locale popular among foreign tourists. The first bomb attack targeted the Reef Hotel in the Nyali area of Mombasa, leaving only property damage. The second attack was conducted by unknown militant who threw a grenade at a gathering of people at a local bus station, leaving four people dead. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.
  • During the evening hours of May 4, twin bomb attacks on public transportation buses in northeast Nairobi killed three people and injured at least 86. Both buses were scheduled to travel outside of the capital along the Thika Superhighway and were reportedly blown up by the use of remotely detonated explosive devices.
  • On May 2, security forces engaged an estimated 30 militants, killing two, as the insurgents, armed with firearms and explosives, attempted to launch an attack on the Mandera power station in northeast Kenya . The incident occurred a day after a similar reported attack against a power station in nearby Wajir County.
  • Garissa County police forces and Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) thwarted a possible attack during the afternoon hours of May 5, after detonating a grenade noticed by bystanders at the Boystown Primary School playground.
  • In the aftermath of the recent attacks, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta declared that the ongoing security crackdown in the country carried out by security forces against al-Shabaab affiliated militants will be intensified in order to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Continue reading Kenya: Uptick in militant attacks underlines security forces’ inability to effectively combat militancy, fresh radicalization of Muslim youth [May 13, 2014]

Travel to Nairobi: Is Al Shabaab still a threat?

Al Shabaab militants in southern Somalia. (AFP) The group has threatened to attack Kenya in response to its military incursion.

By Max Security’s Intelligence Department 

In October 2011, the Kenyan military began a major operation in neighboring Somalia to root out one of Africa’s most notorious militant groups- Al Shabaab. The invasion added Kenya to the growing list of nations which have become embroiled in the fight to stabilize the troubled Horn of Africa, after previous campaigns by Ethiopia, Uganda, and International peacekeepers failed to do so. While the invasion itself initially resulted in rapid gains for the Kenyan Defence Forces, fear quickly rose in Kenyan urban centers over the fears of a massive retribution attack by Al Shabaab militants.

Those fears are certainly justified, especially given the numerous threats made by Al Shabaab leaders. First and foremost, Al Shabaab cells in Somalia have succeeded in carrying out complex and coordinated mass-casualty attacks in Mogadishu time and time again. In addition, a massive suicide bombing on World Cup viewers in Uganda in which over 60 people perished is also attributed to the Islamist group which is believed to have taken revenge on Uganda for its prominent role in peacekeeping operations in Somalia.  Lastly, there are a considerable number of Somali citizens living around Kenya, while many Somali-Americans have returned to their homeland where their dual citizenship was utilized to carry out attacks. Lastly, Kenya itself has suffered a significant amount of high-profile attacks by Al Qaeda linked militants in the past, including a 2003 hotel bombing in Mombasa and the infamous 1998 American embassy bombings. Continue reading Travel to Nairobi: Is Al Shabaab still a threat?