Tag Archives: Abu Sayyaf

IS-linked media validation after IED attack in Isulan, Mindanao on August 28 may inspire further local militant plots – Philippines Alert

Please be advised

At least two people are reported to have been killed and 34 others wounded in an IED blast that took place along a highway in Isulan town in Sultan Kudarat Province, Mindanao on August 28. The Islamic State (IS)-linked Amaq News Agency reported the incident, while also stating that 3 Filipino soldiers were killed in the incident.

Authorities are believed to have defused two other IEDs after the initial blast, which took place as local residents were commemorating the local Hamungaya harvest thanksgiving festival. Local officials have indicated that the IS-linked Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) were behind the incident.

Security was previously raised across the southern region of Mindanao on August 3 after the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) claimed that IS-affiliated Abu Sayyaf group was plotting militant attacks in the aftermath of the July 31 vehicular IED attack in Basilan.

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Assessments

The incident is indicative of the continued risk of militancy, specifically from explosives-based plots, in Mindanao. The fact that IS-affiliated groups such as BIFF and Abu Sayyaf have been able to stage intermittent attacks in civilian areas across the southern region despite facing concerted AFP operations indicates the high degree of operational sustainability that they continue to possess. Their increased activity also appears in tandem with the IS’ reframing of its network of global affiliates in late July, with the East Asia affiliate now being referred to as a Wilayat or a Province.

The staging of the IED attacks during a festival is indicative of attempts to attract increased public attention, especially if the blast in a relatively crowded spot had resulted in a higher death toll, as seemingly intended. However, the fact that the Amaq report only references casualties among security personnel signals the transnational group’s intention to be perceived positively among locals, potentially to attract recruits. These forms of messaging, despite the lack of accuracy, can be expected to provide on-ground validation to groups like BIFF and Abu Sayyaf, sustaining the risk of continued low-level explosives plots in the southern Mindanao region over the near term.

Recommendations

Travel to Metro Manila may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols given the latent threat of militancy, crime, and unrest.

We advise against all travel to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Sur, and the Sulu Archipelago, including the islands of Basilan, Jolo, Tawi Tawi, given the high threat of militancy, criminality as well as the elevated risk of kidnapping of foreign travelers. Those continuing to operate in Mindanao are advised to limit movement outside major cities such as Davao and General Santos.

Remain cognizant of your surroundings, including any suspicious behavior of individuals, which may include a person wearing winter clothing during warm weather and/or seemingly wandering around, as well as items that look out of place, such as bags or containers.

Immediately alert authorities of any suspicious behavior or items.

Ensure that places of stay are properly secured, alter travel routes, and avoid disclosing sensitive itinerary information to unknown individuals.

How ongoing fighting in Marawi & international participation in conflict suggest regional militant nexus – Philippines Analysis

Current Situation

On June 23, an AFP spokesperson stated that following the initial rounds of heavy fighting in Marawi that began on May 23, only Bangolo, Marinaut, Raya Madaya and Lilod remain contested. Overall, the AFP estimates that approximately 225 militants and 50 soldiers have been killed since the operation commenced, along with another 26 civilians. A brief eight-hour ceasefire between the AFP and Maute fighters occurred in Marawi on June 25, during which time delegates met to discuss the issue with the remaining hostages in the city, believed to still be numbering at around 150.

Meanwhile, Isnilon Hapilon, a senior figure in the siege and leader of the Islamic State (IS)-linked Abu Sayyaf group, is believed to have fled the city as of June 24. Reports indicating the death of senior commander Omar Maute and chief financier Mahmud bin Ahmad, a Malaysian national, remain unverified. These potential losses, as well as intelligence suggesting infighting and divisions among the remaining leadership, has led the AFP to label the remaining militant force as “crumbling” on June 26, and that victory is “irreversible”.

In addition to the involvement of 21 Malaysian individuals, a leaked Philippine intelligence report from June 24 indicated the presence of 28 Indonesians, 26 Pakistanis, four “Arabs”, three Bangladeshis, one Indian-Singaporean, and one Singaporean during the course of the siege. Reports from June 14 also showed the presence of US forces outside of Marawi, which an AFP spokesman later clarified as serving a non-combat operational assistance role, largely related to reconnaissance. On June 23, further reports surfaced over Australia offering to send more surveillance aircrafts to Mindanao to aid AFP efforts.

Philippine Vice President Leni Robredo visited camps set up outside of Marawi for displaced persons on June 26, with President Rodrigo Duterte remaining in an unknown location or personal state for six days, fueling renewed speculation by the press that he was suffering health problems. On June 17, President Duterte made an appearance after an absence that had also been six days long, reportedly responding with a vulgar joke after reporters asked him about the state of his health.

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Assessments & Forecast

Despite projected confidence from AFP, no timeline for complete victory has been defined

It continues to remain difficult to gauge overall progress by the AFP in retaking the city. While only four areas remain in contention, fighting has been present there since around the opening days of the offensive. Moreover, the considerable presence of hostages will continue complicating efforts to fully drive out the militants as forces continue to consolidate in these remaining districts. Further compounding these issues, the AFP statements suggesting strong confidence for a dissolving militant hierarchy and an imminent victory appear to rely on unverified information. Although there are no indicators that the AFP will not eventually clear out the city, similar statements of imminence have been previously made regarding Marawi that have yet to be realized, and as such, are not accurate indicators of on-the-ground progress.

Additionally, as the AFP continues to make headway, the risk of infiltration into surrounding territories becomes elevated. The AFP has made a number of statements over the weeks suggesting an acute awareness of this fact, likely meaning that security deployments to the immediate areas around Marawi will continue to be bolstered over the coming weeks. That being said, Hapilon’s reported exfiltration suggests that security gaps nonetheless exist to be exploited.

Meanwhile, President Duterte is known to be an energetic and forceful figure, and his continued absence in the face of this exhaustive crisis remains highly conspicuous. The Palace has remained tight-lipped over President Duterte’s frequent disappearances over the month of June and with Duterte himself offering little information to the press, this may prove to be damaging to his popularity and brand, which has continually emphasized his strongman character. However, the issue of his inconsistent appearances is unlikely to have an impact on military operations in Marawi, as the AFP is relatively compartmentalized from the central government.

Involvement of foreign fighters underscores expansion of regional militant nexus

The involvement of foreign fighters in the siege reconfirms our ongoing assessment of a regional militant nexus of IS sympathizers and fighters using the poorly-policed eastern Malaysian and Indonesian waters to move to and from the Philippines’ Sulu Archipelago. However, the involvement of individuals from as far as Pakistan and Bangladesh suggest that this nexus is more far-reaching than has been initially anticipated. Whereas traveling to fight in Syria and Iraq becomes more dangerous, especially considering the mounting losses that IS faces in the Middle East, it increasingly appears that aspiring militants may choose to instead travel to fight in Southeast Asia, and namely in the Philippines, where a relatively strong infrastructure already exists.

Moreover, the realization of a larger, potentially global militant convergence may be in part responsible for the participation of the US and Australian forces, who are likely eager to limit the growing trend. At this point, the actual extent of the involvement of Australian and US forces is unclear, especially after photographs emerged allegedly depicting unidentified Americans carrying combat gear but wearing civilian clothing. This is likely in line with the government’s desire to control the narrative of the conflict and project capabilities that they may not necessarily possess independently, in line with similar posturing that has been witnessed over the past month.

Recommendations

Travel to Metro Manila may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols given the latent threat of militancy, crime, and unrest. We continue to advise against all travel to Lanao del Sur (including Marawi),the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Cotabato, Lanao del Norte,, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Siburgay, Zamboanga del Sur, and the Sulu Archipelago, including the islands of Basilan, Jolo, Tawi Tawi, given the high threat of militancy and the elevated risk of kidnapping of foreign travelers. Avoid nonessential travel to all of Mindanao. If business is essential on the island of Mindanao, we advise to minimize movement in areas outside of major cities and maintain heightened vigilance .

How militants arrested in Java raids highlights cooperation between regional militant groups -Indonesia Analysis

Current Situation: Militants Arrested in Java Raids

According to March 24 reports, authorities claim to have arrested eight suspected militants and killed at least one with links to transnational militant group Islamic State (IS) in a series of raids along the outskirts of Jakarta this week, including in Cilegon, Banten on March 23. The most recent raids reportedly took place in Pandeglang, Banten and in Bekasi, West Java, in which a suspected financier of the IS-claimed Jakarta attack in January 2016 was arrested. The man was reportedly linked to militant networks in the southern Philippines.

Police identified the militant shot dead in the March 23 raid as Nanang Kosim; an individual believed to have attended meetings of the Indonesia-based Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) militant group in Batu, Malang in East Java in November 2016. Authorities claim that Nanang had assisted a militant identified as Abu Asybal to evade police detection following his involvement in the January 2016 attack. Nanang is also believed to have been supplying JAD with assault rifles from the Philippines, and plotting to eventually shift their militant base from Poso, Central Sulawesi to Halmahera in North Maluku. During the arrests, police reportedly seized some explosive-making materials including fertilizers, sulfur and nails.

Furthermore, counter-militancy authorities claim that Indonesian militant Iwan Darmawan, currently sentenced to death for his role in the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, directed the procurement of rifles while incarcerated at the Nusakambangan maximum security prison in Central Java. Darmawan is believed to have directed a JAD militant to make several trips to the southern Philippines to procure weapons and to make contact with Isnilon Hapilon, the leader of the IS-affiliated Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, although the time of the directive remains unclear.

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Assessments & Forecast

FORECAST: While the extent and nature of links between the Abu Sayyaf group and JAD remain unknown, the developments suggest a relatively high degree of coordination, especially in aiding JAD elements in Indonesia. JAD is known to operate using local, independent cells to conduct attacks in and around Jakarta, and for using lesser sophisticated explosives like pressure-cooker bombs. In this context, JAD’s attempts to procure more sophisticated weaponry from Abu Sayyaf suggest a reorientation of their focus toward more ambitious attacks. This was evident in the reported uncovering of explosive material during the aforementioned raid.

The desire for increased cooperation may be a reaction to a notable uptick in counter-militancy raids carried out by Indonesian security forces over past months. In light of growing pressure against militant cells in major urban centers, increased cooperation with Abu Sayyaf would allow JAD to better develop safe havens and supply channels in the restive Celebes Sea, where militant groups operate with far greater impunity. It is likely in this context that JAD was attempting to shift their base of operations to the more peripheral area of North Maluku’s Halmahera area, allowing them direct access to the waters. FORECAST: Further, establishing a more consolidated presence in these areas may compel security forces to divert a significant amount of manpower and resources to these isolated areas in order to dislodge the group. This would likely leave major urban centers more vulnerable, alleviating pressure on local cells and allowing for more space to conduct attacks.

Recommendations

Travel to Jakarta may continue at this time while maintaining heightened vigilance throughout the city given the now increased risk of militancy. Those operating or residing in Jakarta are advised to maintain heightened vigilance in the vicinity of government buildings, transportation hubs, iconic public areas, military bases, restaurants, high-value soft targets, shopping centers, and religious centers including mosques and churches, as they remain potential targets for militant attacks.

Philippines Alert: Islamic State claims ‘soldiers of caliphate’ killed 40 AFP troops in Basilan while AFP reports one dead; indicates IS Asia pivot

TYPE OF INCIDENT	► Militancy
AFFECTED AREA	► Sulu, Basilan, Philippines
RISK LEVEL & SEVERITY	► EXTREME
STRENGTH OF SOURCE	► Confirmed

Focal points in Sulu Archipelago

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Please be advised:

The Islamic State (IS) issued a statement on July 9 claiming that 40 soldiers from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were killed in clashes with ‘soldiers of the caliphate’ on Basilan Island in the Sulu Archipelago over the past nine days, as the group states that fighting is still ongoing between its affiliate groups and the AFP. The group also claimed to have captured two checkpoints from the AFP. However, according to AFP claims, only one soldier was killed and six others injured as troops engaged in fire with Abu Sayyaf units, comprising of approximately 130 gunmen, near the Sulu town of Patikul.
Reports from June 24 indicate the release of an IS video encouraging radicalized Southeast Asians to go to the Philippines. A man identified by Malaysian authorities to be Mohd Rafi Udin, a Malaysian national believed to be in Syria, stated that those who could not reach Syria should take up arms against “worshippers of the cross” in Philippines and resist the “deceptive tactics” of President elect Rodrigo Duterte.
Meanwhile on July 8, President Rodrigo Duterte commented that he does not view Abu Sayyaf as a criminals, claiming that they were driven to radicalization by the failed peace process between the Moro Islamist movements in the southern Philippines and the government in Manila. Reports on July 6 indicate that airstrikes and ground operations were launched against Abu Sayyaf and its leader Isnilon Hapilon in Tipo-Tipo, Basilan Province on July 3.

Original claim taken from Islamic State media

Assessments

The conflicting numbers claimed by IS and the AFP are indicative of an ongoing propaganda struggle between both sides in the wake of the July 3 offensives against the militant group’s affiliate Abu Sayyaf. While IS claims remain unconfirmed, the recent video calling for radicalized Southeast Asians to join the fight in the Philippines, as a an alternative to joining the IS cadre in Syria, indicates a series pivot towards Southeast Asia by IS high command in the Middle East, using local affiliates. Furthermore, the use of the phrase ‘soldiers of the caliphate’, indicates that IS see Abu Sayyaf members as fighting for the Islamic State to create a global caliphate and not just as an allied group. In line with that objective, the group may likely continue to release controversial media to bolster local participation within its affiliates and increase its operational presence in the region, while continuing to carry out attacks against AFP forces. Moreover, the fighing in Sulu, as well as ongoing reports of Abu Sayyaf kidnappings in the region, serve to illustrate an intensity in the group’s regional operations.
Despite the known operational capabilities of Abu Sayyaf, and the declared IS support for the group, it remains unclear how much direct communication there is on a regualr basis between Sulu and Islamic State high command in Iraq-Syria. Nonetheless, the aforementioned fighting and claim are indicative of a significant Islamist militant threat in the Sulu Archipelago. Furthermore, following AFP’s seeming inability to eradicate Abu Sayyaf in the area as well as Duterte’s comments that indicated some level of empathy for the members of the group, despite IS affiliation, it remains unclear what strategy his administration will adopt towards the group; whether a continuation of the current offensives in Basilan or attempts to negotiate. In that regard, we assess that clashes between the AFP and Abu Sayyaf are likely to continue rendering the areas around the Sulu Archipelago at an extreme risk of militancy.
Finally, given past precedent noted in the Middle East, we can assess that following the IS call for militants not to travel to Syria, but to relocate to the Philippines, in order to help Abu Sayyaf in Southeast Asia, it is likely that there will be a significant influx of foreign fighters to the region over the coming months. This assessment is underscored by increases in foreign fighters in the Sinai and Libya, following IS calls for recruits.

Recommendations

Travel to Metro Manila may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols given the latent threat of militancy, crime, and unrest.
We advise against all travel to the Sulu Archipelago, including the islands of Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi Tawi, over the coming days and weeks, given the high threat of militancy and ongoing clashes between Abu Sayyaf and the AFP.

Reading a complicated geopolitical map requires information and analysis

Unforeseen developments can and do disrupt business, derail plans, and even jeopardize personal safety for Multi-National Corporations operating in potential danger zones on the geopolitical map.

But it is a mistake to equate unforeseen circumstances with unforeseeable ones. Even in highly volatile regions such as Indonesia, a major area of operation for numerous MNCs, the fact that disruptive events are sometimes not foreseen shouldn’t be taken as evidence that they can’t be. In most instances, they actually can be anticipated – and negative consequences can be mitigated – as long as companies have comprehensive Intelligence services to light the way.

Indonesia offers a case in point. MNCs have long been drawn to the island nation for its rich natural resources and strategic location, and the country has become even more attractive in recent years with its expanding economy and large consumer base. But there are significant risks, both manmade and natural, that go along with the advantages of doing business there. Civil unrest, crime, extremist violence, and extreme weather, all factor in on Indonesia’s geopolitical map.

In June, for example, both humans and nature created risks for businesses. The kidnapping of seven Indonesian sailors by the Islamic militant group Abu Sayyaf, the fourth such act of piracy in three months, exemplified the insecurity and economic damage that militants cause, and led the Indonesian government to extend a moratorium on coal shipments to the Philippines. In the same week, at least 24 people lost their lives in Central Java, as severe rainstorms resulted in fierce floods and landslides that devastated the area and brought activity to a halt.

Both events had economic and commercial consequences. But neither had to be “unforeseen.” That’s where timely, insightful, and accurate Intelligence comes in.

Only the right information leads to the right decision

For an MNC operating in Indonesia, or any other volatile country, having ready access to relevant, up to date Intelligence regarding potential threats of any nature is an essential part of doing business. Of course, the specific Intel services needed will vary from company to company and from location to location (Indonesia is composed of more than 13,000 islands, for example, so no one-size solution fits all circumstances).

Extensive experience and good intuition can be important attributes for decision-makers in sensitive places and situations, MAX Chief Intelligence Officer, Mr. Tzachi Shraga, explains. “But this is not enough when justifying critical decisions. With strong intelligence to back your decision, you’re on the safe side,” he says.

In broad terms, solid Intelligence services include the collection, analysis, and synthesis of comprehensive data and information that is then shared with the company’s security management personnel and key decision-makers. The reports generated are designed to thoroughly familiarize companies with every potential hindrance, interruption, or threat to security or business continuity.

Depending on client needs, the services can focus on Intelligence briefings, travel security information, or a custom Intel report geared to address specific defined needs. For businesses requiring ongoing services, a Regional Intel Subscription Package establishes a deep familiarity with a given area as a baseline and detailed updates and assessments to maintain up-to-the-minute Intel going forward.

Subscriber reports provide both macro and micro views, from region-wide developments spanning the geopolitical map to localized trends and incidents, from strategic summaries of large-scale political or cultural factors to local details such as changing traffic patterns or anything that can have an impact on business operations.

Intelligence, of course, is not generally an end in itself. Carefully tailored Intel services can interface with contingency planning and inform the development and implementation of a range of related security services. These include but aren’t limited to Master Security Plans, vulnerability assessments, hotel security reviews, event security management, and executive protection.

High-quality Intel delivers the tools to navigate a tricky geopolitical map

Information is powerful. But that truth comes with a caveat when it comes to Intel services: it takes the right information at the right time to equip decision-makers to respond to any contingency they might face. That means companies should select Intel services that are responsive and readily tailored to their own specific needs, by offering appropriate reports for each client.

Some of the reports that high-quality Intel services can provide include:

Tactical Intelligence Reports, or ‘Tacticals’, featuring real-time reporting on potentially disruptive events from bad weather to local strikes or other labor actions, all the way up to major security threats like terrorist activity or political instability. Tacticals are targeted to a specific locale and are focused reports that can help guide day-to-day business decisions.
Intelligence Alerts give businesses on-the-spot information about major events or impending events that are or could be game-changers, from natural disasters, extremist attacks, armed conflict, mass protests, or other events that undermine stability.
Intelligence Analyses give clients details about any incidents or trends that are occurring in a specific area, along with insightful assessments and practical recommendations for how companies can best proceed in the face of the threats.

This list only scratches the surface, of course, as Intel services are necessarily tailored to each specific company and situation. But in all of their possible configurations and permutations they aim for the same basic goal, as noted above – eliminating those “unforeseen” risks and giving companies the foresight they need to prepare for and respond to whatever disruptive contingencies they might face.

Read more posts like this in Max Security Blog.