Since the beginning of January, there has been a notable increase in the frequency of Boko Haram activities in Borno State, one of the three northeastern states of Nigeria currently under the state of emergency, along with Yobe and Adamawa. These increased attacks have sparked an exodus of thousands of locals from the area to Cameroon and Niger. Meanwhile, President Jonathan announced the appointment of an entirely new military defense staff in mid-January and the creation, under U.S. guidance, of new special forces units for the north.
In mid-January, the creation of an Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) was announced. This special operations unit will reportedly be partially trained and equipped by the United States and is expected to have deployments in the north in addition to other at-risk areas in the country.
The high frequency of Boko Haram’s attacks in Borno throughout January indicates the group’s significant capabilities in spite of increased counterinsurgency operations in the state since May 2013. Despite the successful raid against a Boko Haram base in Damboa, this incident marks the only reported preemptive strike against the group by security forces in recent weeks. The attacks in January have been indicative of two categories of attacks: high profile operations against strategic targets in Maiduguri and attacks against isolated villages in the northeastern, border regions of Borno.
As the majority of the January attacks in Borno have occurred in outlying villages, it may be assessed that the group is taking advantage of the lack of security presence in these rural areas in order to stage easier attacks than in more secured areas such as Maiduguri and other more urban centers. Although the attacks in these insecure locales do not demonstrate the militants’ ability to carry out high profile attacks, they serve the purpose of reinforcing the group’s psychological intimidation tactics against the local population. It is important for the group’s local reputation that it continue to carry out such attacks as they dissuade residents of the area from cooperation with government and security forces and also serve to retaliate against communities that are suspected of already cooperating with the government. The flight of thousands of refugees out of the north in such a short period indicates the psychological force of Boko Haram’s intimidation tactics. Thus, Boko Haram can conceal its operations and potentially secure its ability to infiltrate areas without concern of locals informing on their whereabouts, strength, or supply routes.
The frequency of Boko Haram’s attacks on these outlying regions also increases the perception that the group retains control over areas in the north, which creates an impression of the group’s residual strength in spite of concentrated security operations. Consequently, the reputation of the Nigerian security forces operating in the north is brought into question, as it appears that they have been unable to significantly stem Boko Haram activities. These frequent attacks in insecure locations help to mask the fact that, although the group is not defeated, its ability to stage mass casualty attacks in more populated areas of Borno has been significantly curbed by the state of emergency, as evidenced by the sharp decrease in such attacks since May of last year.
Nevertheless, in the past two months, Boko Haram has carried out three successful attacks against high profile targets in Borno: in December 2013, the group attacked two major military installations in Maiduguri and Bama, resulting in dozens of casualties and destruction of military vehicles; in January 2014, 43 died in a bomb blast in central Maiduguri outside of the state television headquarters. Although such attacks remain infrequent, they demonstrate that the group retains some capabilities to carry out sophisticated attacks against high profile and sensitive locations. They also create a negative backlash for Nigerian security forces, which seem unable to adequately monitor and prevent the group’s activities.
Despite the aforementioned sharp decrease in mass casualty attacks in urban centers, including frequent suicide car bombings before the commencement of the state of emergency, the group could potentially attempt to return to these tactics in the coming months. In addition to the mid-January car bombing in Maiduguri, in late 2013 several raids against Boko Haram camps uncovered explosive devices, including ones disguised as ordinary objects for use in such attacks. These raids indicate that the group is taking preparations to carry out such attacks.
Military transition a window of opportunity for attacks
The appointment of the new defense staff is in compliance with the Federal High Court’s ruling in July 2013 that the previous defense staff was appointed unconstitutionally as the National Assembly had not confirmed the appointments. Although the court’s decision had been announced six months ago, Jonathan had not acted to comply with the ruling until now. Thus, the government may have specifically chosen to finally comply with the court’s decision due to other pertinent considerations. The appointment of the new defense staff at this point may be an attempt to deflect an uptick in criticism against Jonathan’s administration for the ongoing insurgency in the north against Boko Haram following the recent mass casualty attack in Maiduguri as well as the attacks against military bases in December. This move is likely meant to illustrate Jonathan’s strong commitment to countering the insurgency in the north as the one year anniversary of the commencement of the state of emergency approaches in May 2014.
As Jonathan intends on running for reelection in 2015, he likely realizes the need to deal a significant blow to Boko Haram in order to improve his reelection chances by showing his competence as the country’s leader. Furthermore, as Jonathan’s government currently faces challenges from intra-party dissent, including defections of key members, these staff changes may have been instituted to increase support within the ruling party as the new appointment choices may have been based on political considerations. The fact that the new chief of defense, Alex Badeh, hails from the critical northern state of Adamawa, may indicate an attempt to cement support for Jonathan’s ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in this state, amidst the defections of northern governors and politicians to the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC).
Yet, on the basis of several considerations, the new defense staff will be unable to immediately increase and improve operations against Boko Haram. First of all, the appointments have been made as morale within the military is said to be at an all time low, owing to ongoing attacks on bases and barracks as well as a reported delay in the payment of soldiers’ wages. Many senior generals who were passed up for promotion are expected to tender their resignations in the coming days, leading to further changes in the military hierarchy. The military’s preoccupation with internal power reshuffles and potential struggles between different military factions are likely to distract the military from its singular focus on fighting the Boko Haram insurgency. Furthermore, any changes in the military strategy against Boko Haram will take time to implement. Thus, Boko Haram will be astute enough to seize advantage of the military’s temporary weakness and lack of focus to continue operations and potentially launch further high profile attacks in the northeastern states.
Additionally, as some factions and officers within the military have likely felt disenfranchised by the recent reshuffle in the ranks, Boko Haram may also seek to infiltrate the military in order to strengthen its ability to monitor security operations against them. We have already assessed that Boko Haram has cultivated connections within the military, given the group’s demonstrated ability to launch sophisticated attacks on secure installations as well as seemingly preemptive attacks against the military. Such attacks strongly indicate that the group has been able to act on insider information, which indicates some level of infiltration into or cooperation with individuals within the security establishment. Furthermore, the fact that the vast majority of military operations against Boko Haram have been retaliatory rather than preemptive further underscores the likelihood that Boko Haram has a informants within the military. Thus, the current reshuffling presents an ideal opportunity for Boko Haram to strengthen its network of informants within dissatisfied members of the military. Additional similar ties would consequently limit the military’s ability to carry out successful preemptive operations against the group.
Continued spillover into Cameroon likely
At face value, the formation of the new special forces units, the Army Special Operations Command (NASOC), as well as Jonathan’s talks with his Cameroonian counterpart indicate additional government efforts to improve security measures in the north to combat Boko Haram. While these measures may serve to increase confidence amongst the Nigerian population, there are fundamental impediments and deficiencies to both initiatives.
The reported U.S. involvement in helping to train and equip NASOC indicates a notable increase in direct U.S. military cooperation with Nigerian security forces. Yet, given precedent, U.S. involvement is likely to remain limited due to legal restrictions against U.S. military cooperation with potentially dubious human rights issues. Allegations of human rights violations by the Nigerian security forces have heretofore restricted U.S. involvement, and thus the current slated cooperation could potentially be suspended should questionable humanitarian behavior of the Nigerian military prevail. Thus, U.S. involvement will likely remain limited in the coming months.
Meanwhile, security cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria may serve to decrease Boko Haram’s ability to operate along the shared border as well as cracking down on Boko Haram’s established rear bases in Cameroon. However, the improvement of security between Cameroon and Nigeria could have blowback effects within Nigeria’s wider northern region, as well as Niger, as Boko Haram fighters being driven out of Cameroon will need to establish new rear bases. The increasing risk of destabilization for Niger’s border regions is underscored by Boko Haram attacks in January on villages along Niger’s border. As villagers have alleged that there is almost no security presence in this region, with the nearest police posts dozens of kilometers away, Boko Haram is likely to take advantage of these security weaknesses to increasingly move into the area as it it forced out of Cameroon.
Although there are unconfirmed reports of a possible initiative to improve monitoring and close the border between Niger and Nigeria, there is currently no formal confirmation for this plan. Meanwhile, Nigerian security forces are unlikely to possess sufficient numbers or equipment to comprehensively improve security along this border while simultaneously increasing security operations along the Cameroonian border and maintaining operations throughout the expanse of the northeastern states. Meanwhile, in addition to increasing operations along Niger’s border, there is potential for Boko Haram to regroup and increase movements in other Nigerian border states such as Jigawa, Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba where security forces maintain a weaker presence.
A fundamental restriction to security initiatives in the north is the amount of money that will be devoted to these operations. The government is not likely to be able to divert sufficient funding to defeat this ongoing insurgency during the upcoming season of presidential campaigns in which President Jonathan will likely face tough competition and will need to gain support throughout the entire country. A simultaneous issue with the lack of funds is the fact that little additional money is likely to be devoted to development projects in the north. The structural poverty, low levels of education, and perceived inequality in development of the north versus the south are some of the core issues that originally contributed to Boko Haram’s growth and initial support within the disenchanted northern population. Thus, as the government continues to fail to address these socioeconomic issues, Boko Haram will continue to be able to entice new recruits into its movement as well as finding sympathy amongst some northerners, which will allow it to conceal itself amongst the population.
