Tag Archives: Syria

How countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt cutting ties with Qatar is likely to influence the region – Middle East & N. Africa Analysis

Current Situation

During the morning hours of June 5, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the UAE announced the cutting of all diplomatic ties with Qatar.  The Hadi-led government in Yemen, as well as Libya’s anti-Islamist House of Representatives (HoR) similarly announced the severing of diplomatic ties with Qatar on the same day. The first four countries issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Qatari diplomats to evacuate their respective nations, while similarly issuing an ultimatum to all other Qatari citizens to leave within two weeks. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the UAE announced that they had closed their airspace for Qatari aircrafts, and that all flights by airliners from these countries to Qatar were suspended. Qatari naval vessels will also not be allowed to use the countries’ seaports to anchor, while land travel between Qatar and Saudi Arabia will be limited to non-Qatari nationals only.

Additional measures implemented against Qatar include the expelling of the country from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and its anti-Islamic State (IS) coalition in Syria. These measures were implemented based on accusations that Qatar is “supporting and financing extremist groups” across the region, as well as encouraging sectarianism and subversive elements operating in the abovementioned countries. Meanwhile, Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that the accusations are “absolute fabrications” and “proves that there are premeditated intentions to cause damage to Qatar”.

How countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt cutting ties with Qatar is likely to influence the region - Middle East & N. Africa Analysis | MAX Security
Map of countries affected by travel restrictions on Qataris

Assessments & Forecast

Severing ties may hurt Qatar economically, push its policy towards more pro-Iranian approach; limited impact on regional conflicts

While the new development is unlikely to have any effect on Qatar’s and any of the other impacted countries’ security conditions in the short term, we assess that this measure may lead to multiple local and regional ramifications over the coming months. For instance, approximately 90 percent of Qatar’s imports of food products are transferred through land from Saudi Arabia. Thus, in light of the border closure between the two countries, Doha will likely be forced to divert a large amount of resources in developing its maritime trade, including in the form of improving its seaport infrastructure, as now its imports via sea are liable to be enhanced significantly. Moreover, given the high-profile nature of the event, there remains a possibility that the turn of events will impact global markets, and particularly the oil sector, as it may be perceived as a source of instability across this oil-rich region.

These new developments may also impact expatriates, including Westerners operating in Qatar and the GCC, particularly given the suspension of flights between the GCC countries and Qatar and the closure of the land border with Saudi Arabia. In light of the likely increase in logistical difficulties in traveling between Qatar and the above-mentioned countries, exacted upon expatriates by the measures, it is likely to damage Qatar’s national economy. Though the impact on GCC residents seeking to enter Qatar is yet to be determined, it cannot be ruled out that Qatar will implement punitive measures and ban GCC citizens and residents from entering the country.

The partial isolation of Qatar may affect several conflicts and political rivalries across the region. With regards to Iran, Doha is liable to improve its bilateral relations and economic ties with Tehran, as now Qatar would be compelled to compensate for its political and economic setback. Moreover, in Yemen, in the short-term, Qatar’s absence from the Saudi-led coalition may slightly reduce the latter’s on-the-ground capabilities in fighting against the Iranian-backed Shiite Houthis. However, given Qatar’s already limited role in the coalition, as well as the aforementioned arms deal with the US, in the medium to long-term the Saudi-led coalitions is unlikely to be significantly impacted by Qatar’s absence from the coalition.

In Syria, in light of the already heightened internal divisions between rebel factions, it remains possible that this new development will further exacerbate tensions between rebel groups supported by Qatar on one side, and factions backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. Should the event indeed lead to an economic recession in Qatar, their supported factions on-the ground would suffer from a shortage of resources, thus forcing them to disband or merge into other factions. With this in mind, should scenarios eventually materialize, it would potentially tip the scale towards the pro-government forces in the Syrian conflict.

In Libya, the development may constitute a boost to the HoR and its allied Libyan National Army (LNA), given their conflict with the pro-Islamist General National Congress (GNC) and its affiliated militias, which are partially supported by Qatar. That said, Qatar’s direct involvement in this conflict has significantly waned in recent years, particularly since the March 2016 arrival of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to the designated capital of Tripoli, and therefore any implications on the conflict will remain limited.

Cutting ties with Qatar likely linked to global, regional developments involving Iran, new US administration

Today’s development comes amidst years of tensions between Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Egypt on one side, and Qatar on the other, surrounding multiple issues, chiefly the latter’s alleged direct involvement in the internal affairs of countries throughout the region. This is particularly relevant to Qatar’s long-standing support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked political elements across the Middle East and North Africa, as the countries in this Saudi-led alliance view the Islamist organization is a subversive element and a threat to their respective governments. Additional contentious issue include Qatar’s overall positive relations with Iran, as opposed to that of the other Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), with the exception of Oman, which remain strong adversaries of Tehran. This is highlighted by numerous past economic agreements between Tehran and Doha in recent years, such as the agreement from February 2014 to create a joint free trade and economic zones between the two countries. A further issue that contributed to the strained relations with Qatar throughout the years is the cooperation of the Qatari-based news outlet al-Jazeera, which had been accused by the aforementioned countries of attempting to undermine their, as well as their regional allies’, governments.

That said, despite these strained relations, Qatar and the other GCC countries’ relations can be characterized over the past several years by intermittent escalation and rapprochement between the sides. For instance, on December 9, 2014, Qatar agreed as part of a GCC summit, to establish a regional police force in order to improve coordination regarding drug trafficking, money laundering, and cybercrime, as well as announced its “full support to al-Sisi-led government in Egypt”. This followed Saudi officials’ March 9, 2014 threats to impose sanctions against Qatar, including in the form of sea blockade, in light of Doha’s persistent support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked elements across the region. However, the complete cutting of diplomatic relations between the aforementioned Saudi-aligned countries is highly notable given its wide scale and scope, as it includes significant restrictions on Qatar and its citizens.

We assess that this escalation is linked to global and regional geo-political developments, largely with regards to Iran and the new Donald Trump administration in the US. With this in mind, in recent years, under the Obama administration, relations between Saudi Arabia and its allies on one side, and Washington on the other, were oftentimes strained due to the US’ perceived efforts to approach Tehran, which was likely viewed by Riyadh as coming at its expense. In light of the aforementioned normal relations between Qatar and Iran, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries were likely felt compelled to prevent Qatar from approaching the Islamic Republic too much, as this would have significantly undermined their sense of security and regional interest.

Since President Trump’s inauguration, Washington increased its anti-Iranian rhetoric, while at the same time strengthened its ties with Saudi Arabia. This is highlighted by the May 15 UAE-US defense agreement, as well as the 350 Billion USD agreement between Riyadh and Washington involving an arms deal, and Saudi investments in the US. Thus, there remains a potential that the recent visit of President Trump to Saudi Arabia in late May, as well as the US’ growing support for Saudi Arabia and its allies, motivated the Kingdom to implement these measures, as part of the shared interest with the US in tackling Iran and its allies’ influence throughout the region. With this in mind, given Saudi Arabia’s decreasing need for Qatar’s cooperation on security and political support amidst the ongoing rivalry with Shiite Iran, it is likely that Saudi Arabia assessed that it is no longer obligated to maintain positive bilateral relations with Qatar, prompting this development.

The development comes amidst a diminishing political influence of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organization across the Middle East and North Africa over the past two years. In this context, it remains possible that Saudi Arabia no longer felt compelled to maintain good relations with Qatar, following the reduction of the threat stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood, as opposed to previous Saudi attempts to pressure Qatar to abandon their support for the Islamist organization in return for the improvement of relations with the other GCC countries.

Recommendations

Travel to Qatar may continue as normal while adhering to cultural norms and avoiding making any statements critical of the Qatari Emir and government officials, despite the aforementioned new restrictions. That being said, those operating in Qatar over the coming days and weeks are advised to stock up on food and basic products, due to the possibility that these will be in shortage due to the declared measures. Those operating throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and particularly in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar are advised to remain cognizant of developments and potential effects on travel and business continuity given the current lack of full information regarding the various restrictions that will be in effect. This is particularly relevant for the possibility of unexpected border closures between the relevant countries over the coming days and weeks.

 

This report was written by:
Asaf Day – MAX Security’s Senior Intelligence Manager, Middle East & North Africa

US missile strikes against Syrian airbase in Homs Province likely symbolic; military conflict between US, Syria remains unlikely – Syria Analysis

Current Situation

US military operation

The US Department of Defense (DoD) has stated that two US naval destroyers stationed in the eastern Mediterranean Sea launched a total of 59 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) at Syria’s Sharyat Airbase, located approximately 25 km southeast of Homs City, at 04:40 (local time) on April 7.
According to the DoD, “the TLAMs targeted aircraft, hardened aircraft shelters, petroleum, logistical storage, ammunition supply bunkers, air defense systems, and radars”.
Additionally, the DoD further stated that the operation was conducted in response to a chemical weapons attack on April 4 in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib Governorate, which the US intelligence services assessed was conducted by Syrian Arab Air Force (SAAF) aircraft from the Sharyat Airbase. The DoD claimed that the base had been used to store chemical weapons, though the chemical weapons storage units were not among the specific targets stated by the department. Additionally, Russian forces were stationed at the base.
Moreover, the DoD stated that Russia was notified of the operation before it had commenced, which was meant to “minimize risk to Russian and Syrian personnel stationed at the airfield.”

Results and international reaction

According to reports, at least six Syrian military personnel were killed in the airstrikes. While multiple reports state that Syrian leadership had removed some of its aerial fleet in advance of the TLAMs’ launching, additional reports indicate that at least 15 Syrian aircraft were destroyed during the operation. In response, a spokesperson for the Syrian army reportedly described the missile strike as an act of “flagrant aggression.”
According to reports citing Russian officials, the Kremlin considered the US operation as “ an act of aggression against a sovereign state,” thus “violating the norms of international law.” Furthermore, Russian defense officials reportedly stated that military cooperation with its US counterparts, specifically that relating to the movement of their aircraft in Syrian airspace, has been suspended as a response to the US missile strikes. Moreover, a spokesperson for Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the US operation represented a “significant blow” to US-Russian relations.
Additionally, a spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry reportedly condemned the operation, claiming that the missile strikes would lead to “the strengthening of failing terrorists” throughout the region.
That said, multiple Western nations, including the UK, France, and Germany, reportedly voiced support for the US operations, perceiving it as a “proportional response” to the Syrian government’s alleged chemical attack. In addition, the Israeli government reportedly “fully supports” the US operation, while Turkey reportedly viewed the missile strikes as a “positive response” to the Syrian government’s actions, and called for “safe zones in Syria without further delay.”

US missile strikes against Syrian airbase in Homs Province likely symbolic; military conflict between US, Syria remains unlikely - Syria Analysis | MAX Security

US missile strikes against Syrian airbase in Homs Province likely symbolic; military conflict between US, Syria remains unlikely - Syria Analysis | MAX Security

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Assessments & Forecast

US operation likely symbolic, as opposed to being conducted for tactical advantages, and aimed to limit diplomatic fallout with Russia in order to prevent political and military backlash

This event is highly notable given that this is the first occasion on which the US military has conducted an attack against government-controlled targets in Syria, thus marking a significant change in US policy towards Syrian leadership. Furthermore, the high number of TLAMs launched is particularly significant, as this indicates that the US sought to inflict heavy damage to the airbase, as the use of this number of missiles, which feature a heavy payload, would render the airbase as unusable.
In this context, while this US operation was intended to cause physical damage to the airbase, it was also likely one of symbolic nature, as opposed to an effort at gaining a tactical advantage or military gains, namely given that the DoD stated that the planes that conducted the April 4 chemical attack in Idlib Governorate originated at Sharyat Airbase. This likelihood is further bolstered by the fact that the missile strike, while reducing Syria’s capabilities by air in the immediate area, does not significantly hinder the Syrian Army’s operations in the country overall. Although, the US maneuver likely limits the potential for the Syrian government to launch chemical attacks from Sharyat in the short term. Furthermore, it is important to note that the US military avoided hitting the chemical weapons stores likely in order to prevent the potential consequences of chemicals then being released into the air, thus causing unintended casualties in the vicinity.
Moreover, the US’s notification of Russian authorities prior to the strike likely demonstrates that the US sought to limit the diplomatic fallout between itself and Russia by avoiding sustaining casualties to Russian and allied Syrian military personnel. While bilateral tensions between the US and Russia have likely been strained, as would have been anticipated by US authorities, the situation would have been further exacerbated if Russian military personnel had been killed in the operation, or if a higher casualty count among Syrians had resulted. Thus, the likely aim of the US government was to avoid such implications, and instead, keep the missile strike in the framework of an act of retaliation against the chemical attack.

Motivations for US missile strikes likely political, including efforts by President Trump to distinguish himself from policies of Obama administration, and to demonstrate distance with Russian leadership

Through directing such an operation, the administration of US President Donald Trump is likely attempting to advance specific political objectives, as opposed to solely projecting an image of military might. Firstly, the president likely seeks to indicate that the US government maintains a low level of tolerance for Syrian actions that it perceives as war crimes and human rights violations, as those witnessed in the April 4 incident. In this context, such actions contrast greatly to the policies of former US President Barack Obama, who in August 2012 had established a “red line” regarding the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government, but hesitated on acting once such attacks were ultimately conducted. Thus, given that Trump had widely criticized Obama for this inaction, the US President likely seeks to present himself as active in similar situations, responding against such perceived violations as took place on April 4.
Furthermore, in light of vast media attention being given to alleged ties between the Trump administration and Russian leadership, the move may have also been an effort by the former to demonstrate distance between itself and the latter, as the missile strike clearly opposed Russian interests in Syria. While the move was likely not intended at damaging bilateral relations between the two countries, as mentioned above, the maneuver does indicate the US government’s willingness to engage in policies that contradict the objectives of Russian authorities, thus shedding new light on the perception of Russian influence on US affairs.
With this in mind, the April 7 developments likely establish a new precedent, namely that the US will respond militarily to possible further war crimes and human rights violations by Syrian leadership affecting the civilian population. Furthermore, this US operation was likely launched at least in part to reassure the US’s Middle Eastern allies, who largely oppose the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, that the US is willing to take military action in Syria against Assad. Overall, the missile strikes indicate the Trump administration’s increasing willingness to invoke more forcible measures in Syria and throughout the region to fulfill its own national security interests.

While military conflict between US, Russia, and Syria remains unlikely, on-the-ground fighting in country likely to be impacted as rebels and jihadist militants take advantage of disarray

Given that both the US and Russian governments likely seek to avoid a large-scale military confrontation with one another, as well as the Syrian government’s preoccupations in the ongoing civil war, we assess that the US missile strikes are unlikely to trigger armed conflict between the US on one side, and the Russian and Syrians on the other. While the Assad government likely desires to retaliate against the US missile strikes, such a move could be highly detrimental to the Syrian government, as the US military response to such retaliation would likely cause significant damage to Syrian infrastructure and personnel. Furthermore, as the US government has demonstrated an increased willingness to work with Russian leaders, particularly following the loosening of US sanctions on Russia on February 2, Russian authorities are likely attempting to avoid the potential backlash of a military conflict with the US, thus limiting the potential of military retaliation.
That said, the missile strikes are likely to impact on-the-ground fighting in Syria between the government on one side and rebels and jihadist militants on the other, potentially benefiting the latter in the short term. Given that the US operation caused significant damage to Syrian infrastructure in Homs Province, the rebels are likely to benefit from the move, as the Syrian aircraft in this area was likely used to target rebels in the general region. Thus, rebel forces may attempt to take advantage of the situation tactically, by consolidating positions north of Homs City, and potentially launching offensives against the Syrian Army in the coming days. Furthermore, the US operation has the potential to alter the Syrian government’s willingness to engage in large air raids against rebel-populated areas given the potential for backlash, thus potentially benefiting rebel forces throughout the country.
In addition, jihadist militants, namely Islamic State (IS), are likely to attempt to take advantage of the disarray caused by the US operation and attempt to make further gains in the region. Such instances have already been witnessed on April 8, when pro-Syrian government media reported that IS launched an offensive in the eastern Homs countryside, hours after the US missile strikes. In addition, given the disruptions in coordination between US and Russian forces regarding the targeting of IS positions throughout Syria, IS may capitalize on such interruptions in order to strengthen its footholds in the country. Overall, the potential for gains by rebel forces and IS against the Syrian government remains heightened in the coming days, namely as the Syrian government attempts to recover from the US missile strikes. That said, while an uptick in hostilities may be recorded in specific areas, particuarly Homs Province, we assess that the US operation is not likely to increase the threat level to foreign businesses operating in the region and in neighboring countries at this time.

Recommendations

We advise against all travel to Damascus and Aleppo, given the general threat of indiscriminate aerial bombardment and artillery shelling from government forces as well as attacks by various militant groups. Attacks by rebel forces may include the use of rocket propelled grenades, suicide bombings, and mortar attacks.

Those remaining in Damascus should ensure that contingency and emergency evacuation plans are updated due to the potential for a further deterioration in the security situation. Additionally, those remaining in Damascus are advised to avoid all travel to outlying areas of the city given the persistent threat of militancy.

Those continuing to operate or reside in Aleppo are advised to minimize movement in the city and its surroundings, given the frequency and broad nature of fighting in the city.

Avoid all travel to outlying areas and cities including Homs, Hama, and Idlib due to persistent fighting and heightened risk of kidnapping targeting foreigners, particularly in combat zones and rebel held areas.

Those seeking to enter Syria are advised to confirm the status of their crossing points and final destinations, remaining aware of recent kidnapping incidents and the nature of military forces deployed in those areas.

 

Special Report: The growing potential for militant chemical attacks, and how you can prepare

Executive Summary

In light of the recent events in Syria, where on April 4 the Assad regime is alleged to have used sarin gas to attack a rebel-controlled town in the Idlib Province, killing nearly 100 people and wounding hundreds more, it is necessary to review the possibility of chemical attacks by militant groups or individuals in non-conflict zones.
While being considered a “red line” in the past, use of chemical weapons in recent years did not result in significant ramifications, prompting more widespread use.
Growing media coverage amidst lack of response likely fueled this process, despite negative public opinion.
Militant groups likely to expand use of crude chemical weapons in near future, mostly for psychological effects, while attempting to deploy military grade weapons in non-conflict regions.
With this in mind, as a security manager, it is necessary to review protocols for dealing with such incidents to ensure that your offices and employees are as prepared as possible.

Historical Use and Normalization of Chemical Weapons

Following the conclusion of the World War II, the use of chemical warfare, along with biological warfare, was perceived as a “red line” by most of the countries worldwide, and second in severity only to the deployment of nuclear weapons. However, despite this perception, such weapons were at periods used without significant ramifications to the parties responsible, with the most notable example being the deployment of chemical weapons by the Iraqi government during the war with Iran, and most prominently the 1988 Halbaja attack, which reportedly saw the use of blister, nerve and possibly blood agents.
This fact led to a waning of the perception of possible consequences as a result of initiating a chemical attack, prompting various actors who maintained, or obtained large stockpiles of weapon-grade chemical weapons to being less constrained in their use. Furthermore, western militaries made legal use of chemical weapons in conventional warfare, mainly of white phosphorus to conceal movement, which at times nonetheless had lethal effects in the area of deployment.
As the media continually developed over time, these incidents received more coverage than in the past, however despite of the overall negative public attention such incidents typically did not result in significant negative implications. Instead, the increased media attention, along with general lack of accountability likely prompted a growing number of actors to employ chemical warfare due to the high lethality rates, cost effectiveness and psychological effects. These developments led to an almost normalization and acceptance of the use of such unconventional weapons, which is best exemplified by indications that the Islamic State (IS) conducted at least 52 different chemical attacks in Iraq and Syria, as per a report issued in late 2016. The Syrian government also has used chemical weapons on numerous occasions, most recently on April 4 in a rebel-controlled area of the Idlib Province, with nearly 100 people killed and 200 wounded.

Potential Applications by Militant Groups, Individuals

While thus far most of the applications of chemical warfare were in conflict areas, they are not strictly limited to there. There are precedents of militants attempting to or making successful use of chemical agents in attacks, mostly in an unsophisticated capacity, with the most prominent example being two successful attack in 1994-1995 in Japan using Sarin nerve agents. Furthermore, there were attempts to integrate chemical and biological agents into suicide bombings, mostly by Palestinian militants during the Second Intifada in 2000-2005.
As components needed to construct crude chemical weapons, mainly of the relatively less effective choking agents such as chlorine, can be extracted from everyday materials, it is likely that militants will continue pursuing implementing such elements in their attacks. As these are liable to be mostly crude, they will not necessarily cause attacks to be more lethal in their immediate effect. However militants will seek to capitalize on the psychological effects associated with the use of such weapons, especially as these are considered unconventional and attract significant more public attention given the perception of chemical weapons being more dangerous than conventional weapons.
Special Report: The growing potential for militant chemical attacks, and how you can prepare | MAX Security
Nonetheless, the growing battlefield application vis-a-vis instability of regimes that had chemical weapons stockpiles, particularly in the Middle East, increases the potential that militant groups will be able to deploy military grade weapons in an attack removed from current battlefields. If such an attack will materialize, its effects and lethality will be significantly larger than the crude devices mentioned before, however given the high profile and complexity of delivering and using a military grade weapon, such an attack remains at a lower likelihood.
Additionally, IS in particular is known to have capabilities for self-manufacturing of chemical weapons, leading to two additional threats. First, the possibility that rockets with chemical warheads will be fired at areas adjacent to IS-controlled territory in Iraq and Syria and other conflict zones, given proliferations of those means. Furthermore, and posing a higher risk, is the possibility that one of the experts employed in IS’s chemical warfare program will return to his home state, where he will implement his knowledge and expertise to conduct a domestic large scale chemical attack.
As the use of chemical warfare remains rare, all countries facing this risk are either under-skilled or not prepared at all in the prevention, mitigation and treatment. While given the increase in the threat of application of chemical weapons resources may be invested into improving capabilities, this process may be prolonged and not fully effective even when completed, thus contributing the larger potential effects.

Implications for Security Managers

Chemical attacks can bring about a large amount of casualties, although the chances and likelihood for an attack of such scale remain low. That being said, you still must be able to instruct your employees on the best ways to react in various scenarios. In this context, there are a number of measures that both individuals and firms can take to prepare for a possible chemical attack, and to equip employees with the best possible information and behavioral recommendations.

To best prepare your employees and office, it is advised to:

  1. Create a procedure and plan for employee behavior in case of a chemical attack, and instruct employees on such procedures.
  2. Mention the possibility of such a scenario during your periodic employees’ awareness training in order to mentally prepare them.
  3. Ensure supply of sufficient first aid tools in the office, including first aid kits with surgical masks and atropine syringes.

If a chemical attack takes place in your vicinity, it is recommended to do several things, and employees should be instructed in such protocol:

  1. Identify the location of the attack and remove yourself from that area as quickly as possible, avoiding the contaminated area if feasible and moving upwind of the site. If it is not possible to avoid the impacted area, shelter in place, moving to a higher floor.
  2. Cover your nose and mouth, using a surgical mask or handkerchief if a gas mask is not available. Additionally attempt to cover exposed skin on the arms and legs. If you do become exposed to an agent, once in a safe area, remove any impacted clothing and wash yourself thoroughly with soap.
  3. If you are outside, it is advised find clean air, either by removing yourself from the area or going inside a nearby building.
  4. If you are in a building in the vicinity of an attack, it is advised to close all windows and doors and shut all ventilation, including central heating or air conditioning systems, while seeking shelter in an internal room and sealing the room with plastic and duct tape.
  5. Remain cognizant of authorities’ warnings and instructions.

MAX Security provides awareness training and crisis contingency planning.

Notable Chemical Weapons Developments Worldwide

Special Report: The growing potential for militant chemical attacks, and how you can prepare | MAX Security

Special Report: The growing potential for militant chemical attacks, and how you can prepare | MAX Security

Special Report: The growing potential for militant chemical attacks, and how you can prepare | MAX Security

Special Report: The growing potential for militant chemical attacks, and how you can prepare | MAX Security

Special Report: The growing potential for militant chemical attacks, and how you can prepare | MAX Security

Syria & Lebanon Special Report: Air defense disposition and regional impacts

Executive Summary

  • Recent engaging of Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft by surface-to-air missile launched from Syria is indicative of the remaining, albeit limited capabilities of the Syrian Air Defense Forces (SyADF).
  • Moreover, it likely points to a shift in the Syrian government’s approach to perceived violations of its sovereignty by Israel, taking a more proactive and aggressive military stance, likely due to recent successes and strong backing from Russia.
  • As the IAF’s volume of operations is unlikely to be hindered by this reemerging threat, similar incidents are liable to occur in the coming months. While not posing a direct threat, these still pose a very limited indirect threat to civil aviation, particularly in Israel’s northern areas.

Background: Syria

Prior to 2011, Syria maintained a strong air defense force – the Syrian Air Defense Forces (SyADF). Its  reference threats were primarily from Israel and to a lesser degree from Turkey, featuring a possible conflict with a superior air force, and lending to an investment in assets that would offset their enemies’ advantages, namely surface-to-air missiles. This was set up as a layered defense, with a variety of stationary, mobile, and man-portable systems allowing to cover the greatest possible ranges while offering redundancy and survivability of assets in case these systems would be targeted.

Following the commencement of the Syrian civil war, the Syrian government’s reference threat changed from that posed by a neighboring conventional military to that posed by domestic paramilitary forces that strictly rely on land warfare in regular and irregular fighting scenarios, namely rebels and militants. This induced a change in the Syrian Armed Forces’ force structure and resource allocations, which placed the SyADF at a lower priority compared to other forces deemed more valuable to the new type of conflict. Additionally, large numbers of the SyADF platforms were captured or destroyed by rival forces throughout the conflict, significantly damaging its capabilities. That being said, the SyADF was not disbanded and was still maintained as a fighting force, however not to a comparable level to that of the pre-war era.

Relevant systems:

Stationary: SA-2, SA-5 – maximum range 240 km.
Semi-mobile: SA-3 – maximum range 35 km.
Semi-mobile: Russian operated in Syrian territory: SA-23 – maximum range 250 km.
Mobile: SA-6, SA-8, SA-9, SA-11, SA-13, SA-17, SA-19, SA-22 – maximum range 35 km.
Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS): SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, SA-18, SA-24- maximum range 5 km.

Syria & Lebanon Special Report: Air defense disposition and regional impacts | MAX Security

Background: Hezbollah

Historically, Hezbollah, due to its status as an organization committed to guerilla warfare in the military sphere and the difficulties associated with operating high-profile weapons system resulting from Israel’s longstanding aerial superiority over Lebanon, was not able to acquire surface-to-air platforms. Instead, the organization made efforts to acquire man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), which are of lower profile however also have significantly limited capabilities.

That said, due to Hezbollah’s large-scale intervention in the Syrian conflict in support of the government, the organization increasingly adopted conventional tactics and weapons systems, including being trained and gaining experience in the operation of surface-to-air missile systems. Additionally, operating in Syria made it more difficult for Israel to acquire the same level of intelligence and take comparable measures against Hezbollah as it does in Lebanon. As a result, Hezbollah constantly makes significant efforts to acquire mobile surface-to-air systems in order to offset Israel’s relative advantages against the group, in preparation for a future possible broad conflict between the sides. Such mobile systems have reduced ranges compared to the stationary ones, but also require less infrastructure and support to operate, and have a lower profile increasing the survivability rate.

In this context, there are unconfirmed reports that the group was able to acquire an SA-8 and according to reports, the IAF foiled several Hezbollah attempts to acquire SA-17s, however it cannot be ruled out that such an attempt was successful at some point in time. Additionally, even if acquired by Hezbollah, it remains possible that such systems are still in Syria, and were not yet deployed to Lebanon. Lastly, there are unconfirmed reports that Iran had exported Shahab Thaqeb platforms, a copy of the chinese HQ-7, to Hezbollah.

Relevant systems:

Mobile: SA-8, SA-17, Shahab Thaqeb- maximum range 8/25 km.
MANPADS: SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, SA-18, QW-1, Misagh-1, Misagh-2 maximum range 5.2 km.

Assessments & Forecast

The remaining capabilities of the SyADF, limited as they currently are, were portrayed in the recent firing of an SA-5 against an Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft on March 17. This retaliatory action is notable as the overwhelming majority of previous airstrikes against pro-Syrian government targets that were attributed to the IAF, as recent as November 30 2016, did not encounter any direct countermeasures by the SyADF.

Furthermore, the incident comes amidst ongoing general positive momentum for the Syrian government and its allies (including Hezbollah) in the ongoing Syrian conflict, which yielded several strategic successes. This likely contributed to a shift in the Syrian government’s position regarding what it perceives as a violation of its sovereignty by Israel, placing it as a “red line” which warrants immediate countermeasures, possibly followed by a more calculated retaliation, which Israel likely preempted in a subsequent airstrike on March 19. The calculated nature of events are further evident in the immediate summoning of the Israeli ambassador by Russia, which backs the Syrian government, as well as the seeming coordination with the Syrian Foreign Minister, who sent letters to the UN’s Secretary General and President of the Security Council accusing Israel of violating Syrian sovereignty and UN resolutions. Moreover, this serves as indication of the strong support lent to the Syrian government by Russia, which is a major factor contributing to the aforementioned shift in strategy.

With this in mind, further similar incidents in which IAF aircraft are engaged by the SyADF following airstrikes against targets in Syria are likely to occur in the coming weeks and months, following the aforementioned shift in the Syrian government’s strategy. This is particularly likely since the IAF is liable to maintain its current strategy of limited scale and scope operations in Syria in order to prevent Hezbollah from acquiring what Israel perceives as “game changing” weapons systems, or to eliminate fighters perceived as planning direct military action against Israel, both of which designated as “red lines” by Israel. To a lesser extent such a response may be conducted by Hezbollah should they be able to acquire relevant weapons systems, given the strong cooperation between the Syrian government and Hezbollah, as well as due to the IAF’s use of Lebanese airspace to conduct at least some of its airstrikes in Syrian territory. However, Hezbollah is more likely to retain such valuable assets for use as a strategic surprise in a possible future round of hostilities with Israel and not to expose them and thus risk losing them in what Hezbollah perceives as a less important scenario.

However, the new situation may entail further complication between Russia and Israel, given the former’s staunch support for the Syrian government, in which Russian forces currently in theater will confront IAF aircraft should the letter be perceived as posing a strategic threat to the Syrian government and Russian regional interests. Such a scenario would not be unprecedented, as Russian aircraft reportedly scrambled in the past to confront IAF aircraft in or near Syrian airspace, most recently as April 2016. While so far such incidents did not result in hostilities between Russian and Israeli forces, a recurrence of IAF airstrikes in Syria facing ground fire, as is currently expected, contributes to growing tensions between Israel and Russia, and through that the possibility, albeit a low-likelihood one, of direct hostilities between the sides, most likely as result of a spiral of mistakes and/or miscommunication.

Taken as a whole, at this time any possible firing of a surface-to-air missile from Syrian territory in response to an IAF airstrike is liable to target IAF military aircraft. However, while not posing a direct threat, such events will pose an indirect threat to civil aviation in the region to a limited degree. This is due to the fact that in case a missile misses its designated target due to maneuvering or countermeasures, and is not intercepted as was the case in the latest incident, the missile may automatically lock on and engage the nearest available target, regardless of if it is military or civilian. At the current state of affairs the Syrian government is uninterested in an escalation with Israel and thus the SyADF is unlikely to engage aircraft over central Israel, despite potentially having the capabilities to do so, as this too will be considered a “red line” by Israel, and therefore such a risk is limited to the northern areas of the country.

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This report was written by:

Tzahi Shraga – MAX Security’s Chief Intelligence Officer, ret. LTC from the Israeli intelligence community

Oded Berkowitz – MAX Security’s Associate Director of Intelligence, Middle East & North Africa

 

MAX Analysis Morocco: Threat of regional militancy and local jihadist presence in Syria, Iraq likely to require bolstered security measures August 24, 2014

Current Situation

Over the past weeks, borange alert oth Moroccan and foreign authorities have increasingly warned of an uptick in militant threats, starting from the announcement of a state of high alert by the Moroccan Interior Ministry on July 9, reportedly in response to the militant threat presented by the Islamic State (IS) against Morocco. As of July 2014, Morocco’s national intelligence agency reportedly estimates that there are about 1,500 Moroccan nationals operating in Iraq and Syria. Of these, an estimated 30 percent are former convicts who served time under anti-terrorism laws.
  • The July 9 decree included an order to regional governors to heighten security measures within their jurisdictions, an expanded security presence at vital installations throughout the country, and the launching of a public relations campaign to warn Moroccans against the potential security threat. Also on July 9, Morocco heightened its security protocols at its international airports following a recommendation from the American government.
  • Additionally, on July 18, an “orange alert” was declared for all American-owned restaurants operating in Morocco in anticipation of a possible militant attack. On July 21, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) updated its travel advice for Morocco, warning of an “increased threat of terrorism.” The FCO cited Moroccan authorities’ warnings of an increased threat connected to Moroccan national militants operating in Syria and Iraq. 

Continue reading MAX Analysis Morocco: Threat of regional militancy and local jihadist presence in Syria, Iraq likely to require bolstered security measures August 24, 2014

Syria: Opening of expatriate voting on May 28, June 3 presidential elections underline increasing stability in regime-held areas of Syria

On May 28, polls opened at Syrian embassies around the region for expatriate voting for the country’s presidential elections, and will remain open to 19:00 (local time) in each country. Syrians living in Syria are slated to vote on June 3, however elections will only be held in government-held areas of the country. Incumbent President Bashar al-Assad is challenged by two relatively unknown candidates, Maher Abdel Hafij Hajjar and Hassan Abdullah al-Nuri. Twenty-four candidates registered for the elections, however, only Assas, Hajjar, and al-Nuri, were approved by the Supreme Constitutional Court based on criteria outlined in a recently passed electoral law.
  • At the time of writing on May 28, heavy traffic has been reported in Beirut, Lebanon, resulting from the significant influx of Syrians to the city to vote in the polls. Congestion has particularly been reported in the cities southern suburbs. Lebanon presently hosts
    Syria Flag
    Syrian Flag

    over 1 million Syrian refugees.

  • In Jordan, a heavy security presence has been reported in the vicinity of the Syrian Embassy. On May 26, Amman declared Syrian’s Ambassador to Jordan persona non grata, ordering his departure from the country within 24 hours. In response the Jordanian Charge d’Affaires was expelled from Damascus. However, Jordan has indicated that Syria will be permitted to appoint a new ambassador, and that elections would not be disrupted. Syria’s ambassador was expelled after “repeated insults to Jordan and its leadership, institutions and citizens”. Jordan presently hosts over 600,000 Syrian refugees.
  • The UAE, as well as France, Germany, and Belgium have barred the elections from taking place. Over 30,000 Syrians living in the UAE registered to vote. Semi-official media sources in Syria have indicated that at least 200,000 Syrians abroad are slated to vote at 39 different embassies. 

Continue reading Syria: Opening of expatriate voting on May 28, June 3 presidential elections underline increasing stability in regime-held areas of Syria

Strategic Analysis: Impact of Iranian covert activity on the interim nuclear agreement

They say old habits die hard. For Iran’s elite Quds Force, the secretive external branch of the Revolutionary Guard, the habits of subversion and mafia-style revenge against the Islamic Republic’s adversaries may never die at all.  The actions of these self-described promoters of the Islamic Revolution may just determine whether the smiles, handshakes, and twitter posts of President Rouhani signal an end to Iran’s destabilizing meddling in the Middle East — or are a mere diversion from the unrelenting sectarian aims of the regime’s true power brokers.

Qassim Solemani, the head of the IRGC-QF
Qassim Solemani, the head of the IRGC-QF

With the eyes of the world still sharply focused on Iran’s behavior following the clinching of an interim nuclear agreement with the P5+1, the restraint of the Quds Force is already being tested.

A New Turning Point?

On November 19, just as Tehran’s negotiating team arrived in Geneva to hammer out the last details of that agreement, the Iranian embassy in southern Beirut was hit by a devastating double suicide bombing attack. Twenty-three people were killed, including Iran’s cultural attaché and several other nationals whose identities and affiliations have not been disclosed.

On the surface, the attack could be construed as part of an ongoing campaign by Syrian rebel sympathizers to target pro-Assad regime elements in Lebanon, preceded by two other indiscriminant bombings in Hezbollah-dominated suburbs of the city in recent months.

But both Hezbollah and Iranian officials red-flagged this attack for its notable sophistication, indicating the hand of a far more capable foreign power. According to their claims, the attackers knew the location of the ambassador’s office and his itinerary that day, with the second bomber using sophisticated explosives meant to detonate upwards rather than horizontally in order to collapse the building. Continue reading Strategic Analysis: Impact of Iranian covert activity on the interim nuclear agreement

Strategic Analysis: Lebanese-Israeli border tensions marked by erosion of UN resolution 1701

Lebanon
Hezbollah has claimed responsibility for a recent bombing attack near the Israeli border.

On the seven-year anniversary of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah claimed responsibility for an August 7 explosion in the Israeli-Lebanese border area, near the town of Labboune. That day, at least one explosive device injured four Israeli soldiers, who were accused by Lebanese parties and UNIFIL of crossing into Lebanese territory during a patrol in an un-demarcated area of the border.

Lebanese media outlets and politicians asserted that the IDF crossed both the technical fence and the international border, which do not coincide in some areas. Initial reports indicated that the troops were hit by a landmine which may have been a remnant from previous conflicts. The IDF has since declined to comment on the details of the incident, including whether or not troops entered Lebanese territory or whether the attack was intentional. Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah had prior knowledge of an upcoming Israeli incursion, leading their operatives to plant explosive devices. He ended with what would some consider an ominous warning: “This operation will not be the last; we will not be lenient with those who violate our land. Whenever we feel that the Israelis have entered Lebanese soil, we will act.” The truth about what actually happened on August 7 may forever be disputed, but it remains clear that Hezbollah still seeks to avoid a conflict with Israel — despite Nasrallah’s seemingly confident claim of responsibility. Continue reading Strategic Analysis: Lebanese-Israeli border tensions marked by erosion of UN resolution 1701

Using Chemical Weapons to Break the Stalemate in Syria

Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad’s stepped up military efforts – new Russian anti-aircraft missiles; imported fighters from Lebanon and Iran; and lately, increased use of chemical weapons – are having their desired effect. Today, Syria‘s main opposition group announced it will not take part in peace talks even as the regime appears to be gaining in military strength.

Syrian rebels fight with gas masks in Damascus.
Syrian rebels fight with gas masks in Damascus.

Particularly disturbing are reports of the Assad regime’s increased use of chemical weapons. Since March, the trickle of reports has become a flash flood. What’s now clear is that Mr. Assad, absent outside intervention, is willing to make the use of unconventional weapons more conventional as he seeks to end his government’s military stalemate with rebels.

On May 26, rebel fighters and civilians in the Damascus suburbs of Harasta, Qaboun, and Jobar reported that numerous residents suffered from respiratory problems, nausea, and other symptoms of chemical nerve agents. Three people were reportedly killed in the suspected attack while at least 70 others were reported injured. Recently-posted video footage from the area portrayed both Syrian rebels and military troops fighting with gas masks. Continue reading Using Chemical Weapons to Break the Stalemate in Syria

Intelligence Analysis: The Kurd’s shifting role in the Syrian conflict

“Deal with your friends as if they will become your enemies tomorrow, and deal with your enemies as if they will become your friends tomorrow.” It’s a proverb passed along through Kurdish generations — and a telling pretext to the Kurdish strategy in today’s conflict in Syria. In recent weeks, this once dormant player has awoken from its slumber, and may just provide Syria’s desperate rebels with a much needed boost to break their deadlock with the Assad regime.

Reports indicate that YPG militiamen and Syrian rebels have agreed to share control of the strategic Sheikh Maqsood District of northern Aleppo, cutting off regime supply routes to a hospital, prison, and other key positions. Rebel fighters entered the district largely unopposed on March 31. On April 6, the Syrian military bombarded Kurdish neighborhoods in northern Aleppo, killing 15 people in a likely response to this new arrangement. The following day, Kurdish militiamen attacked a Syrian military checkpoint in the city, killing five troops.

PYD supporters at a funeral for a deceased member.
PYD supporters at a funeral for a deceased member

Further east, Syrian military units attacked a checkpoint manned by Kurdish militiamen in the northeastern city of Qamishli on April 4. Hours later, militiamen from the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) attacked two Syrian military positions on the outskirts of Qamishli. The attacks resulted in a number of deaths on both sides and marked the first such incident to occur in the predominantly Kurdish Hasakah Province since the Syrian military withdrew from the region’s urban centers in the summer of 2012.

Continue reading Intelligence Analysis: The Kurd’s shifting role in the Syrian conflict