President Farmajo calls for elections as allies withdraw support; Mogadishu to remain volatile – Somalia SITUATION UPDATE
Executive Summary:
President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo’s April 27 announcement that he will not pursue a two-year term extension is highly notable. With tensions escalating in Mogadishu and having lost support from allies, Farmajo likely had no other option but to back down on his desired term extension and to pursue elections.
However, it remains unclear how electoral stakeholders will proceed with inclusive dialogue and the implementation of the September 2020 electoral agreement after facing months of failed discussions over the same issues.
Given the extent of opposition and public anger toward Farmajo, any unfavorable outcome from the May 1 parliamentary sitting could elicit further backlash and demonstrations in Mogadishu. In turn, Farmajo may aim to subvert the narrative and blame the opposition for endangering national security. Such a scenario heightens the possibility of further violent clashes in the coming days.
Please be advised:
In the evening hours of April 27, President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo addressed the nation, announcing that he will not pursue a two-year term extension and will hold a special parliamentary session on May 1 to relaunch the electoral process.
Farmajo further called for the immediate resumption of unconditional dialogue between electoral stakeholders and reiterated his commitment to the September 2020 electoral agreement.
Earlier on April 27, Hirshabelle State President Ali Guudlawe and Galmudug State President Ahmed Kaliye, alias Qoor Qoor, withdrew their support for President Farmajo’s two-year term extension and called for the implementation of the September 17, 2020, electoral agreement along with the resumption of dialogue between electoral stakeholders.
Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble also issued a statement welcoming the announcement by Hirshabelle and Galmudug leaders and called for all five Federal Member States (FMS) to commit to renewed, inclusive dialogue and to prepare for elections.
Furthermore, PM Roble called for Somali National Army (SNA) and opposition force commanders to withdraw their troops from Mogadishu and to “cease all hostilities.”
Opposition presidential candidates including leader Abdirahman Abdishakur and former Presidents Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud also expressed support for these statements on social media.
The US Embassy in Mogadishu issued a statement on April 27 in support of these announcements, and called for President Farmajo to accept “a clear path to dialogue and peace.”
Meanwhile, in Mogadishu, pro-government and opposition security elements remain deployed across the city, with several neighborhoods throughout the Hodan, Hawlwadag, Shibis, and Yaqshid districts under the control of opposition forces. Residents, primarily from Hodan and Hawlwadag districts, reportedly continued to flee Mogadishu on April 27 fearing renewed clashes.
The capital reportedly remained calm on April 27, however, sources indicate that President Farmajo recalled additional pro-government forces to Mogadishu from Dhusamareb in Galmudug, Baladweyne in Hirshabelle, and Gedo Region in Jubaland to secure his position.
Assessment & Forecast:
With tensions rapidly escalating in Mogadishu, the statements by Hirshabelle and Galmudug Presidents, and the subsequent endorsement from PM Roble, have effectively united all five FMS against President Farmajo’s attempts to remain in power for an additional two years. Hirshabelle and Galmudug State Presidents had remained staunch supporters of Farmajo and his administration until this point, backing Farmajo’s position at repeated FGS-FMS discussions before and after the February 8 election deadline and initially supporting the Lower House of Parliament’s resolution to extend his term. However, with the opposition mobilizing extensive support from clan militias, police commissioners, and certain SNA units in recent days, and demonstrating their ability to successfully counter pro-government security elements in Mogadishu, it is plausible that the Hirshabelle and Galmudug leaders were pressured to either withdraw support for Farmajo or enter into armed conflict on his behalf.
While the exact circumstances that motivated their announcement remain unclear, it is possible that urgent negotiations among political figures and clan leaders facilitated by PM Roble convinced Qoor Qoor and Guudlawe that such action was necessary to defuse the situation in Mogadishu. Moreover, given PM Roble’s immediate expression of support for the Hirshabelle and Galmudug statements and his efforts to quell tensions in Mogadishu, it appears that he has significantly distanced himself from Farmajo in recent days. While PM Roble had previously attempted to maintain neutrality throughout the electoral impasse and repeatedly facilitated negotiations with Farmajo’s opponents including Jubaland and Puntland states and the Presidential Candidates Union (PCU), electoral stakeholders continued to perceive him as Farmajo’s closest ally. Therefore, his break with Farmajo is notable and could have also motivated Qoor Qoor and Guudlawe to do the same.
Having lost support from allies within the FGS, FMS, and from international partners like the US and EU, Farmajo likely understood that his current position was untenable, and thereby has no other option but to back down on his desired term extension and to resume the electoral process. FORECAST: However, despite the significance of his announcement, it’s unclear how electoral stakeholders will proceed with inclusive dialogue and the implementation of the September 2020 FGS-FMS electoral agreement after facing months of failed discussions over the same issues. For instance, although Parliament will likely rule to renew the electoral process on May 1, with the Lower House allied to Farmajo, the body could vote to delay elections for some time to provide for sufficient stakeholder dialogue, which in turn will allow Farmajo to remain in office for an indefinite extended period. Furthermore, although all parties reiterated their commitment to inclusive dialogue as a way forward to elections, the parties are likely to once again disagree on the conditions for negotiations as Farmajo has already called for “unconditional” talks while PCU members will likely demand Farmajo’s resignation before discussions move ahead. Ultimately however, Farmajo remains unlikely to resign, further entrenching the mistrust between all parties.
FORECAST: Given the potential for these same issues to derail renewed discussions and the electoral process, it is possible that international partners, particularly the US, will ramp-up pressure on stakeholders to agree to the conditions for negotiations. In this context, the US endorsement of the position adopted by Hirshabelle and Galmadug, is notable and may likely result in other international partners such as the EU, UK, and Norway endorsing the same position. While such a scenario further reduces Farmajo’s thus far relatively steady international support, it remains highly unlikely that international actors will intervene, apart from further threats, and the possible imposition of sanctions on specific FGS or FMS leaders, additional reduction of humanitarian and security aid.
FORECAST: In terms of the security environment, given that pro and anti-government forces remain deployed across Mogadishu, the security situation is poised to remain extremely volatile with a heightened risk for further clashes. Although some opposition contingents have reportedly withdrawn from various areas of the capital and may heed PM Roble’s call, given that additional pro-Farmajo SNA troops are slated to arrive in Mogadishu, opposition elements are likely to remain on high alert and prepared for potential confrontations. Additionally, given the extent of opposition and public anger toward Farmajo, any unfavorable outcome from the May 1 parliamentary sitting could elicit further backlash and opposition demonstrations in Mogadishu. Given this possibility, Farmajo is likely to aim to subvert the narrative, and blame opposition forces and protesters for endangering national security, and may use loyalist forces to repress the opposition. Such a scenario heightens the possibility of further violent clashes in the coming days.
Recommendations:
Those operating or residing in Mogadishu on April 28 and in the coming days should minimize movement throughout the city due to the potential for renewed clashes between pro-Farmajo and anti-Farmajo forces in multiple districts.
Those in Mogadishu are advised to consider organizing contingency and evacuation plans.
Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal provides momentum to regional reform – Horn of Africa Special Analysis Report
Gautham Ashok – MAX Security’s Senior Analyst for East Africa
And reviewed by:
Tzahi Shraga – MAX Security’s Chief Intelligence Officer, ret. LTC from the Israeli intelligence community
Rachel Jacob – MAX Security’s Regional Director of Intelligence, Sub-Saharan Africa Division
Executive Summary
Ethiopia’s unexpected move to implement the peace deal with Eritrea comes amid a series of reforms by new PM Abiy Ahmed that will improve the security of both countries, and the economic benefits of gaining access to Eritrean ports will likely ensure the peace’s durability.
Eritrea will take advantage of the opportunity to emerge from international isolation and re-establish political and economic relations with its neighbors, though the lack of internal reforms for its notoriously closed society is likely to drive domestic unrest and tensions along the border.
Djibouti’s regional position has weakened as its ports lose the near-monopolistic hold on Ethiopian trade and must hold on to its leases to foreign military bases to secure its economy, though these developments may undermine the government and raise the risk of civil unrest.
Somalia benefits from improved relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea in likely halting Eritrea’s support for al-Shabaab, as well as Ethiopia potentially recommitting more troops to Somalia in light of its military withdrawals from the Eritrean border.
As a whole, the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal will improve the stability of the Horn of Africa and increase opportunities for foreign investment and growth across the region.
Current Situation
On June 6, the Ethiopian government unexpectedly announced that it would fully implement the 2000 Algiers Agreement, ending Ethiopia’s war with Eritrea, as well as the subsequent 2002 Boundary Commission ruling that awarded contested territories, including the border town of Badme, to Eritrea.
During a joint meeting in Asmara on July 8, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki announced that they agreed to set up embassies in their respective countries and resume flights and direct phone connections. On September 11, the Ethiopian government announced that the armed forces of both Ethiopia and Eritrea would be shifted back from their shared border. Border points were later opened for trade and movement of people for the first time in 20 years.
On July 23, Eritrean President Isaias announced that nationwide compulsory conscription would last only for 18 months, instead of lifetime service, due to “changed dynamics” in the region.
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia signed a tripartite agreement to strengthen political, economic, social, and security ties on September 5 in a meeting in Asmara. They formed a joint committee to further coordinate on these matters.
On September 7, Eritrea and Djibouti agreed to normalize ties more than a decade after a border dispute at Cape Dumeira led to military clashes and the establishment of a peacekeeping operation.
Ethiopia
Since taking office in April, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed has taken a series of steps that have transformed the political map and begun to restore public trust in the government. PM Abiy ordered the release of thousands of political prisoners, met with the political opposition and civil society, invited previously exiled opposition groups to return to Ethiopia, and embarked on major institutional reforms, including in economic, security, and justice sectors. The most significant of these was the implementation of peace with Eritrea. The announcement, and quick moves toward reconciliation with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, underscores the shift that Abiy brought to the Ethiopian government and ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition. Although previous Ethiopian leaders had called for peace with Eritrea, no effort was made toward that end, and animosity between the leading Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean government from Eritrea’s liberation war meant there was little chance of progress. Abiy’s ascension, and that he is an Oromo and lacked much of the political constraints that weighed down previous Ethiopian leaders, likely made it much easier to restart relations with Eritrea.
Security Implications – One of the clearer benefits of revitalizing the 2000 Algiers Agreement is its effect on the security landscape. First and foremost, it reduces the potential for conflict along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border, which had flared up periodically, with the most recent exchange of fire in July 2017. Moreover, both Ethiopia and Eritrea have sponsored rebel groups in each other’s countries, with groups such as Patriotic Ginbot 7 and various Amhara militias receiving funding and supplies from Eritrea, including physical bases of support in Eritrean territory. FORECAST: Although it is likely that there will still be some measure of support by both countries to the others’ rebel groups, as they will continue to seek to limit their neighbors’ power as is seen across eastern Africa, this is likely to be substantially reduced. The reconciliation with Eritrea drastically reduces this threat inside Ethiopia, particularly as it has been coupled with efforts by PM Abiy to reach out to armed opposition groups and reintegrate them into civilian political life.
Political Indications – This was also an astute political maneuver by Abiy, which has largely worked. The new peace deal has widespread support in Ethiopia as well as the international community as a whole, and both of which are crucial to both consolidating his leadership and expanding Ethiopia’s influence. The contested town of Badme along the border saw isolated protests, but major protests that were expected out of Tigray Region, which takes up most of Ethiopia’s border with Eritrea, did not manifest. Apart from a series of statements demanding the government take into consideration the views of concerned stakeholders, the lack of public resistance from the TPLF further underscores their gradual sidelining in Ethiopian politics by Abiy and his Oromo party, the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO).
Economic Potential – Economically, the peace deal will give Ethiopia access to the underdeveloped Eritrean market and allow for exports to flow through the Red Sea. Ethiopia has relied on the ports of neighboring countries, especially Djibouti, to transit almost all of its bulky goods and services since the country became landlocked with the loss of Eritrea in 1993. This often incurred high prices, as Djibouti exploited its unique advantage as Ethiopia’s primary route to the sea. That these developments with Eritrea has led to the opening up of Eritrean ports and new plans to construct roads and railways between Ethiopia and the Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab underscores the economic motivations for peace. FORECAST: Using the Eritrean ports would allow Ethiopia more scope to ship its goods, as well as gain bargaining leverage with other ports it uses, particularly in Djibouti as well as more recently in Somaliland. This will expand Ethiopia’s options in drawing foreign investment, which would alleviate the country’s acute foreign exchange crisis. As a whole, these economic and financial interests are likely one of the key indicators that the peace deal with Eritrea will be durable.
Eritrea
Internal Developments – For decades, Eritrea has been a notoriously closed country, with authoritarian rule and little freedom of movement or information. The armed conflict and subsequent “no peace, no war” status quo with Ethiopia only exacerbated the situation in the country, as President Isaias utilized the external threats to consolidate internal control. The peace deal with Ethiopia, and subsequent steps to re-establish contact with their southern neighbor in terms of reopening border, represent positive developments for Eritrea’s intent to open up to the wider international community. However, there remains considerable doubt over whether these developments will translate into real political change within Eritrea. FORECAST: To this point, reports in October have indicated that high numbers of Eritreans are taking advantage of the new open borders to flee to Ethiopia, with nearly 10,000 crossing in a single month. Although bilateral relations have improved, the movement of people suggests that this has not been met with corresponding domestic reforms within Eritrea. The continued restrictive environment is likely to further drive the exodus of those in search of political and economic opportunity, though this increasing refugee population may put pressure on Ethiopia and cause tensions with Eritrea over the coming months.
President Isaias’s announcement that nationwide compulsory conscription would last only for 18 months instead of lifetime service due to “changed dynamics” in the region was highly unexpected. Isaias has used Ethiopia’s policies toward Eritrea as a means of strengthening his rule, presenting Ethiopia as an existential threat and blaming it for much of his restrictive policies. However, given Ethiopia’s gestures toward peace, Eritrea’s policies against its own people can no longer be fully justified. FORECAST: However, if and when the conscription time limit is implemented, soldiers who have been freed from conscription will likely to return to farms or seek employment in towns. However, one possible consequence is that, given mass unemployment is chronic problem in Eritrea, the discharging of hundreds of soldiers poses a threat to government stability. This threat is likely to grow, unless the government is able to mitigate it by directing the new civilians toward employment in the new sectors that will grow to accommodate the new Ethiopian investment.
Economic Potential – Given that the Eritrean economy has largely stagnated from 20 years of international isolation and UN sanctions for allegedly supporting militant organizations in Somalia, it is likely that the government finally acceded to using its geographical advantage to reinvigorate the economy. The revitalization of the Assab and Massawa ports will also be crucial to Eritrea’s ambitions of exporting potash, which is being mined in its Southern Red Sea Region and in Ethiopia’s Afar Region. Furthermore, the overall increased trade links to Ethiopia, currently Africa’s fastest growing economy, will serve as a reassurance for investors, as the economic ties will speak to the decreased risks of war. To this point, one important step in the process of bringing in Eritrea from its isolation has been the efforts by other East African countries to lobby the UN to lift economic sanctions. The joint appeal is likely to carry weight as it comes from countries such as Ethiopia and Djibouti, which were regarded as adversaries only months earlier.
Military Opportunities – In addition, it is likely that Eritrea hopes to become a key component of the region’s security architecture given that it is located on the Red Sea near the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a shipping choke-point used by oil tankers and other cargo vessels moving through the Suez Canal. The UAE has already used this geographical advantage to set up a military base in Assab, with additional bases representing another potentially lucrative source of income. FORECAST: If the Eritrean government does genuinely allow reforms and an improvement of its human rights record, it is possible that other countries could choose to establish military bases in Eritrea, as they have done in Djibouti, which could further boost the economy and consolidate Eritrea’s military and political power in the region.
Djibouti
Economic Ramifications – One major effect of the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement has been on neighboring Djibouti and its economic dependence on providing the landlocked Ethiopia with a port. Djibouti’s relative political stability and investor-friendly atmosphere have made it a regional hub for deep-sea shipping and has enjoyed a near-monopoly on moving goods to and from Ethiopia, with 95 percent of Ethiopian trade flowing through its ports. Profits from Ethiopian trade account for 1.5 billion USD annually and are a key source of government revenue, making the moves to develop Massawa and Assab ports in Eritrea is more or less catastrophic for Djibouti. This additionally comes alongside Ethiopian investment in Berbera Port in Somaliland, further diversifying its trade routes and weakening Djibouti’s position. This likely forced President Ismail Omar Guelleh’s hand in normalizing relations with Eritrea and restoring diplomatic ties. Although the Djibouti Embassy in Somalia had initially expressed surprise at Somalia’s call for UN sanctions on Eritrea to be lifted, Guelleh reversed course within six days to restore relations with Eritrea. This quick turnaround is suggestive of the Guelleh government’s understanding of the peace deal’s momentum and their unwillingness to remain isolated amid the region’s reconciliation.
FORECAST: With the thaw between Ethiopia and Eritrea increasing economic pressure, it is likely that Djibouti will increase its dependence on its other pillar, which is renting out land for foreign military bases. Djibouti has exploited its strategic coastline on the Red Sea to offer its territory for military bases, now hosting six foreign powers, including the US, France, Japan, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and China. However, this is also a delicate situation, as Djibouti allegedly upset the US when it allowed the construction of the Chinese base near the US’s facilities at Camp Lemonnier. This highlights the small country’s need to balance the extraction of as much value as possible from retning its land with keeping its client states content. Moreover, the emergence of Eritrea and its possible improving position within the international community could further undercut Djibouti’s position on the Red Sea.
Regional Relationships – An additional complication for Djibouti has been the involvement of Arab Gulf states in brokering peace in the Horn of Africa, with indications that the UAE played a major role in urging Eritrean President Isaias to accept Ethiopia’s overtures. Djibouti has seen its relationship with the UAE deteriorate since February, after the Djiboutian government canceled the contract of a Dubai-based company to operate its main container shipping terminal at Doraleh. The UAE took the matter to international arbitration, which ruled in the Dubai company’s favor, though Djibouti has refused to return the facility, stating that it does not recognize the arbitration court’s jurisdiction. This conflict raises further doubts over Djibouti’s reliability as an investment destination when the country is already at a somewhat precarious moment.
FORECAST: With that said, it is unlikely that Ethiopia will cease using Djibouti’s port facilities altogether as it would not want to be overly reliant upon Eritrea. However, this exposes Djibouti’s somewhat insecure position, as shipping and land lease profits directly supplement the President Guelleh’s tight political control over Djibouti. Moreover, it is also possible that other countries will grow to view Eritrea as a preferable location for their military bases and likewise terminate contracts with Djibouti. Speculation that the government is at risk of losing its key sources of income may undermine Guelleh’s leadership and increase the government’s vulnerability to popular grievances about corruption and repression. Civil unrest is relatively uncommon in Djibouti City at this time, with occasional protests occurring in Tadjourah. Given the already poor socioeconomic conditions in much of the country, this loss in revenue increases the overall risks of popular unrest.
Somalia
Potential Improvement in Security – The tripartite deal signed by Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia in September represents a major breakthrough in relations between the three countries. Somalia and Ethiopia have been historical enemies, while Somalia’s strained relations with Eritrea date back more than a decade. Eritrea reportedly provided funding, weapons, and training to al-Shabaab when it first formed in 2006, as Eritrea had hoped to encourage an anti-Ethiopia government in Somalia. This eventually led to the UN imposing sanctions on Eritrea, with Security Council monitoring indicating that Eritrea did not halt its support for al-Shabaab during the interim years. That Somalia asked for sanctions to be lifted in July underscores the thaw in relations that was further cemented by the signing of the agreement. FORECAST: More crucially, it is possible that Eritrea’s improved relations with Ethiopia will disincentivize Eritrea from supplying al-Shabaab in opposition to Ethiopia, which could have a positive effect on the Somali government’s struggle to defeat the militant group for control over the southern half of the country.
The implementation of the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea may also result in something of a shift on the ground in Somalia. Ethiopia has thousands of troops deployed in Somalia, both as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as well as part of a separate bilateral defense agreement with the Mogadishu government. In 2016, thousands of Ethiopian soldiers withdrew from central Somalia during a period of intense unrest in Ethiopia and were suspected to be re-deployed to suppress internal unrest at home. FORECAST: It is possible that with the withdrawal of forces from the Eritrean border that Ethiopia may recommit more of its military to its front lines in Somalia. This could be particularly key given that AMISOM is slated to begin its withdrawal in February 2019, which would leave critical gaps that the Somali military is yet unable to fill. In this context, the movement of troops would allow the Ethiopian government extra security against al-Shabaab, while also influencing further pro-Ethiopia policy in Mogadishu.
Regional, International Relations – Another likely reason for Somalia’s interest in normalizing ties with both Eritrea and Ethiopia is that it can viewed as a way to manage its ongoing tensions with the Arab Gulf states, which has caused a rift within Somalia’s own federal government as well as affected the financial investment it receives. Somalia has had strained relations with the UAE since April and has grown somewhat isolated as the only country in the region that is perceived as aligning with Qatar, a rival of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Eritrea and Ethiopia’s favor toward the UAE and Saudi Arabia has been clear with the establishment of the Gulf military bases in their countries as well as other economic deals. Ethiopia has already played a mediating role between Somalia and the UAE in recent months, which has resulted in financial benefits as the UAE agreed to give 1 billion USD to Ethiopia to ease its foreign currency shortages, after which Somalia signed an agreement for joint investment with Ethiopia to develop its ports. To this point, an improvement in ties with Ethiopia and Eritrea may ease Somalia’s reconciliation with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which could be financially lucrative and politically beneficial as Mogadishu seeks reconciliation within its government.
Recommendations
Travel to Addis Ababa may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance in crowded areas in high threat of non-violent personal property crime.
Travel to Asmara may continue while adhering to proper administrative procedures and following general security protocols.
Travel to Djibouti City may continue while adhering to standard security precautions regarding the risk of crime and civil unrest.
We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.
Appendix – Background
Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn abruptly resigned on February 15, announcing on state television that it would be necessary for reforms. Subsequently, on April 2, Abiy Ahmed was selected to be PM in a vote by the council of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). This became the first time in Ethiopia’s history that the ruler is an ethnic Oromo.
The EPRDF was formed in 1988 as a rebel group, and later transformed into a political coalition consisting of four ethno-regional political parties: the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO), Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM), and Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Of these, the TPLF was dominant, with the minority Tigrayans holding an outsize role in the government, military, and economy.
Following a 30-year war of independence, Eritrea voted for its independence in a referendum in 1993, after which Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) leader Isaias Afwerki came to power as the first, and only, president of Eritrea.
In 1998, border clashes between Ethiopian and Eritrean troops over the disputed town of Badme led to a full-scale war in which approximately 70,000 people were killed. A peace agreement was brokered in 2000 to cease hostilities as well as establish a commission to delimit the border.
Thus, in 2002, Ethiopia accepted “in principle” the ruling of the Boundary Commission ruling that the border village of Badme belonged to Eritrea, though nonetheless refused to hand over the disputed territory and withdraw its soldiers.
Subsequently, a policy of “no peace, no war” was adopted by Ethiopia, in which soldiers were permanently stationed at the shared border and in disputed areas, while diplomatic relations were severed. Although there were occasional and brief border skirmishes, this largely held true until 2018.
Risk of increased political, security instability as tensions escalate between Mogadishu, UAE over Somaliland port deal – Somalia Analysis
Executive Summary
A Dubai-based company’s sale of a stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland to Ethiopia in March triggered a political standoff between Somalia and the UAE that led to the two countries cutting military ties.
The severing of funding for the Somali National Army (SNA) and withdrawal of UAE trainers and equipment will have a serious impact on the SNA’s capacity to fight al-Shabaab and delay the withdrawal of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers.
Puntland and other regional states have continued to engage with the UAE separately as they receive funding and other benefits from the Gulf country, illustrating the weakness of Somali federalism as Mogadishu holds little leverage to force its constituent states to adhere to a unified policy.
Turkey and Qatar are likely to increase their presence in Somalia following these events, though Mogadishu will likely attempt to restore ties with the UAE. Given Somalia’s dependence on the Gulf countries for support, Mogadishu will attempt to maintain its official neutrality toward the Gulf rivals even as its states pursue their own policies.
We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.
Current Situation
On March 1, a Dubai-based company announced that it sold a 19 percent stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, of which it is a majority owner, to Ethiopia. In response, on March 12, the Somali Parliament in Mogadishu declared the deal to be “null and void” as the federal government was not consulted prior to signing.
Following weeks of turmoil and several military confrontations at the federal parliament, on April 8, Mogadishu airport authorities seized a private UAE aircraft and confiscated 9.6 million USD that was suspected to be directed toward several politicians involved.
The Ministry of Defense announced on April 11 that it would cut all military ties with the UAE, with the Somali government to take over the duties of training, funding, and redistributing the forces that were under the UAE’s payroll. This prompted the UAE to withdraw its military trainers and equipment from Mogadishu on April 16, with some reports that their forces withdrew from Bosaso, Puntland as well.
On April 21, Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas” traveled to the UAE for talks with the government to secure continued support for Puntland’s maritime police forces. Likewise, on May 7, Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe visited Abu Dhabi, where he criticized Mogadishu’s actions regarding the UAE.
Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” traveled to Doha, Qatar on May 13 where he met with the Qatari emir and foreign minister to hold discussions regarding “joint cooperation” between the two countries.
Assessments & Forecast
Security Consequences
Over recent months, Somalia and the UAE have been engaged in a political standoff following the March 1 Somaliland port deal. Mogadishu does not regard Somaliland as an independent state while Hargeisa does not recognize Somalia’s authority, though a number of countries and companies have pursued separate tracks of political negotiations and commercial deals with Mogadishu and Hargeisa. In this context, the UAE has acknowledged Somaliland as a de facto country as it sought to develop political and economic interests across the region. Mogadishu’s decision to cut military ties with the UAE as a retaliatory measure after the port deal and related political turmoil is particularly notable given the UAE’s entrenched involvement. This includes UAE-based companies controlling, developing, and operating strategically-situated ports and infrastructure, while the government also funds humanitarian and development projects as well as individual Somali political figures, all in efforts to advance the Gulf country’s interests.
One of the most significant developments was the UAE’s withdrawal of support to the Somali National Army (SNA). It is possible that Mogadishu did not fully consider the ramifications of severing its military ties but it came immediately, as the UAE withdrew its military trainers and halted financial support to 2,400 Somali soldiers, thought to constitute between a quarter to a fifth of the entire SNA.
FORECAST: Somalia has recurrent difficulties raising enough revenue to pay its security forces and it is likely that they will be unable to cover those soldiers’ salaries after the UAE’s withdrawal, which could result in violent protests or incidents by unpaid soldiers. This potential was demonstrated in Mogadishu on April 23 when former UAE-backed soldiers looted their former base, clashing with other SNA troops, and went on to sell hundreds of stolen firearms on the black market. This illustrates not only the fragmented nature of Somalia’s security forces, often trained by different foreign powers and answering to different clan or regional interests, but the impact of these divisions and ill-discipline on maintaining security in the country. UAE-supported soldiers were thought to be among the best-trained and equipped forces in the capital, and these changes will only make it harder for security forces to manage the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed groups.
FORECAST: This is also expected to impact the African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) plans for withdrawal from the country. Peacekeepers have already begun to draw down, with plans to fully exit by 2020, though their departure is contingent on conditions that include improvements in Somalia’s security situation and political development, as well as the SNA’s ability to replace AMISOM. This further highlights the UAE’s multifaceted role in Somalia, as it contributes to building the SNA’s capacity, which has an effect on the broad security of the country and the army’s ability to step in for the peacekeepers, as well as their interference in Somali politics and institution-building. Given this role, should the standoff between Somalia and the UAE continue, this will complicate AMISOM’s plans. While this is positive in the short-term given AMISOM’s capabilities in comparison to the SNA, international donors have already grown impatient with continually funding the peacekeeping operation and this may force the end of the mission before Somalia is prepared to take over.
Internal Political Implications
In addition to Mogadishu and Somaliland, the UAE is also heavily involved in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. There they signed a deal in April 2017 to develop and run the Port of Bosaso, alongside an agreement to create, fund, and train Puntland’s Maritime Police Force (PMPF). These financial and military benefits prompted Puntland’s president to publicly deviate from Mogadishu’s position and travel to Abu Dhabi in efforts to secure their continued support. His willingness to directly engage with a foreign government in defiance of the constitution that imbues only Mogadishu with the power to conduct foreign policy is another reflection of the limitations of Somali federalism and unification.
FORECAST: Moreover, Mogadishu has little leverage over Puntland and would likely not be able to persuade the region to bend to their position. As a result, Puntland is likely to continue pursue its independent policies while Mogadishu softens its rhetoric in order to reduce the internal rifts.
That the UAE would negotiate individually with Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland is consistent with the longstanding conceptualization of Somalia into the three regions. However, regional states in Somalia are likewise divided, and Jubaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Southwest states have all formed their own positions regarding the Gulf crisis and to which side they believe Somalia must be aligned. Much of this is derived from the funding Somali politicians receive from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey. While this has largely remained in the political sphere, one example of this manifesting in violence was the confrontation at the Somali parliament in April. This was, in part, driven by the parliament speaker’s opposition to the president and prime minister’s response to the Somaliland port deal, which he claimed was a result of their allegiances to Qatar.
FORECAST: Given that both sides of the Gulf crisis continue to fund Somali political figures and commercial interests, this is expected to remain a source of tension for the foreseeable future. While this may result in further violence between security forces backed by different factions, its effects will largely be political. However, this effect could seriously hinder the development of Somalia’s permanent constitution, the advancement of negotiations between the federal states and the central government, and the political progress necessary to make Somalia a viable state.
Effects on Foreign Policy
Given the impact on security and Somalia’s internal regional dynamics, it is likely that Mogadishu will pursue negotiations with the UAE to resolve their differences and restore relations. However, Qatar and Turkey likely view this as an opportunity to increase their involvement in the Horn of Africa and undermine their rivals. Qatar and Turkey have likewise sought to gain a foothold in the country in the past several years, with Turkey being one of the country’s largest donors and investors and Qatar securing its influence by funding Somali politicians, including President Farmajo. This underlines the position that Somalia is in due to its weak governance and reliance on foreign aid, vulnerable to the aims and goals of the international community, whether that is Western development and military intervention or competition between the Gulf rivals over their expanding influence in the region.
With the UAE remaining interested in Somalia despite recent events and Turkey and Qatar expected to increase their presence, it will be difficult for Mogadishu to maintain its officially neutral stance on the Gulf crisis.
FORECAST: Given Somalia’s dependence on these countries to fund and operate not only military training but critical infrastructure and services, including airports, seaports, and hospitals, they will likely continue to maintain this balancing act. However, the federal government will likely face growing diplomatic and economic pressure to choose a side, though it will also have to contend with internal pressure by its constituent states who will disagree. In this regard, even if Mogadishu continues to lean toward Qatar, the nature of Somalia’s weak federalism will mean that different regions and states will continue to maintain their own foreign policies and relations with either side of the Gulf rivalry.
Recommendations
We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.
If travel to southern Somalia is unavoidable, we advise remaining in the confines of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport complex.
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Executive Summary
A Dubai-based company’s sale of a stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland to Ethiopia in March triggered a political standoff between Somalia and the UAE that led to the two countries cutting military ties.
The severing of funding for the Somali National Army (SNA) and withdrawal of UAE trainers and equipment will have a serious impact on the SNA’s capacity to fight al-Shabaab and delay the withdrawal of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers.
Puntland and other regional states have continued to engage with the UAE separately as they receive funding and other benefits from the Gulf country, illustrating the weakness of Somali federalism as Mogadishu holds little leverage to force its constituent states to adhere to a unified policy.
Turkey and Qatar are likely to increase their presence in Somalia following these events, though Mogadishu will likely attempt to restore ties with the UAE. Given Somalia’s dependence on the Gulf countries for support, Mogadishu will attempt to maintain its official neutrality toward the Gulf rivals even as its states pursue their own policies.
We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.
Current Situation
On March 1, a Dubai-based company announced that it sold a 19 percent stake in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, of which it is a majority owner, to Ethiopia. In response, on March 12, the Somali Parliament in Mogadishu declared the deal to be “null and void” as the federal government was not consulted prior to signing.
Following weeks of turmoil and several military confrontations at the federal parliament, on April 8, Mogadishu airport authorities seized a private UAE aircraft and confiscated 9.6 million USD that was suspected to be directed toward several politicians involved.
The Ministry of Defense announced on April 11 that it would cut all military ties with the UAE, with the Somali government to take over the duties of training, funding, and redistributing the forces that were under the UAE’s payroll. This prompted the UAE to withdraw its military trainers and equipment from Mogadishu on April 16, with some reports that their forces withdrew from Bosaso, Puntland as well.
On April 21, Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas” traveled to the UAE for talks with the government to secure continued support for Puntland’s maritime police forces. Likewise, on May 7, Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe visited Abu Dhabi, where he criticized Mogadishu’s actions regarding the UAE.
Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” traveled to Doha, Qatar on May 13 where he met with the Qatari emir and foreign minister to hold discussions regarding “joint cooperation” between the two countries.
Assessments & Forecast
Security Consequences
Over recent months, Somalia and the UAE have been engaged in a political standoff following the March 1 Somaliland port deal. Mogadishu does not regard Somaliland as an independent state while Hargeisa does not recognize Somalia’s authority, though a number of countries and companies have pursued separate tracks of political negotiations and commercial deals with Mogadishu and Hargeisa. In this context, the UAE has acknowledged Somaliland as a de facto country as it sought to develop political and economic interests across the region. Mogadishu’s decision to cut military ties with the UAE as a retaliatory measure after the port deal and related political turmoil is particularly notable given the UAE’s entrenched involvement. This includes UAE-based companies controlling, developing, and operating strategically-situated ports and infrastructure, while the government also funds humanitarian and development projects as well as individual Somali political figures, all in efforts to advance the Gulf country’s interests.
One of the most significant developments was the UAE’s withdrawal of support to the Somali National Army (SNA). It is possible that Mogadishu did not fully consider the ramifications of severing its military ties but it came immediately, as the UAE withdrew its military trainers and halted financial support to 2,400 Somali soldiers, thought to constitute between a quarter to a fifth of the entire SNA.
FORECAST: Somalia has recurrent difficulties raising enough revenue to pay its security forces and it is likely that they will be unable to cover those soldiers’ salaries after the UAE’s withdrawal, which could result in violent protests or incidents by unpaid soldiers. This potential was demonstrated in Mogadishu on April 23 when former UAE-backed soldiers looted their former base, clashing with other SNA troops, and went on to sell hundreds of stolen firearms on the black market. This illustrates not only the fragmented nature of Somalia’s security forces, often trained by different foreign powers and answering to different clan or regional interests, but the impact of these divisions and ill-discipline on maintaining security in the country. UAE-supported soldiers were thought to be among the best-trained and equipped forces in the capital, and these changes will only make it harder for security forces to manage the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed groups.
FORECAST: This is also expected to impact the African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) plans for withdrawal from the country. Peacekeepers have already begun to draw down, with plans to fully exit by 2020, though their departure is contingent on conditions that include improvements in Somalia’s security situation and political development, as well as the SNA’s ability to replace AMISOM. This further highlights the UAE’s multifaceted role in Somalia, as it contributes to building the SNA’s capacity, which has an effect on the broad security of the country and the army’s ability to step in for the peacekeepers, as well as their interference in Somali politics and institution-building. Given this role, should the standoff between Somalia and the UAE continue, this will complicate AMISOM’s plans. While this is positive in the short-term given AMISOM’s capabilities in comparison to the SNA, international donors have already grown impatient with continually funding the peacekeeping operation and this may force the end of the mission before Somalia is prepared to take over.
Internal Political Implications
In addition to Mogadishu and Somaliland, the UAE is also heavily involved in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. There they signed a deal in April 2017 to develop and run the Port of Bosaso, alongside an agreement to create, fund, and train Puntland’s Maritime Police Force (PMPF). These financial and military benefits prompted Puntland’s president to publicly deviate from Mogadishu’s position and travel to Abu Dhabi in efforts to secure their continued support. His willingness to directly engage with a foreign government in defiance of the constitution that imbues only Mogadishu with the power to conduct foreign policy is another reflection of the limitations of Somali federalism and unification.
FORECAST: Moreover, Mogadishu has little leverage over Puntland and would likely not be able to persuade the region to bend to their position. As a result, Puntland is likely to continue pursue its independent policies while Mogadishu softens its rhetoric in order to reduce the internal rifts.
That the UAE would negotiate individually with Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland is consistent with the longstanding conceptualization of Somalia into the three regions. However, regional states in Somalia are likewise divided, and Jubaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Southwest states have all formed their own positions regarding the Gulf crisis and to which side they believe Somalia must be aligned. Much of this is derived from the funding Somali politicians receive from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey. While this has largely remained in the political sphere, one example of this manifesting in violence was the confrontation at the Somali parliament in April. This was, in part, driven by the parliament speaker’s opposition to the president and prime minister’s response to the Somaliland port deal, which he claimed was a result of their allegiances to Qatar.
FORECAST: Given that both sides of the Gulf crisis continue to fund Somali political figures and commercial interests, this is expected to remain a source of tension for the foreseeable future. While this may result in further violence between security forces backed by different factions, its effects will largely be political. However, this effect could seriously hinder the development of Somalia’s permanent constitution, the advancement of negotiations between the federal states and the central government, and the political progress necessary to make Somalia a viable state.
Effects on Foreign Policy
Given the impact on security and Somalia’s internal regional dynamics, it is likely that Mogadishu will pursue negotiations with the UAE to resolve their differences and restore relations. However, Qatar and Turkey likely view this as an opportunity to increase their involvement in the Horn of Africa and undermine their rivals. Qatar and Turkey have likewise sought to gain a foothold in the country in the past several years, with Turkey being one of the country’s largest donors and investors and Qatar securing its influence by funding Somali politicians, including President Farmajo. This underlines the position that Somalia is in due to its weak governance and reliance on foreign aid, vulnerable to the aims and goals of the international community, whether that is Western development and military intervention or competition between the Gulf rivals over their expanding influence in the region.
With the UAE remaining interested in Somalia despite recent events and Turkey and Qatar expected to increase their presence, it will be difficult for Mogadishu to maintain its officially neutral stance on the Gulf crisis.
FORECAST: Given Somalia’s dependence on these countries to fund and operate not only military training but critical infrastructure and services, including airports, seaports, and hospitals, they will likely continue to maintain this balancing act. However, the federal government will likely face growing diplomatic and economic pressure to choose a side, though it will also have to contend with internal pressure by its constituent states who will disagree. In this regard, even if Mogadishu continues to lean toward Qatar, the nature of Somalia’s weak federalism will mean that different regions and states will continue to maintain their own foreign policies and relations with either side of the Gulf rivalry.
Recommendations
We continue to advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying areas.
If travel to southern Somalia is unavoidable, we advise remaining in the confines of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport complex.
MAX Analysis Somalia: Factionalism within al-Shabaab unlikely to result in dissolution, as uptick in attacks underscores group’s sustained capabilities July 14, 2014
Current Situation
With the commencement of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan on June 29, a string of daily attacks attributed to the Islamist militant group, al-Shabaab, has been recorded throughout Mogadishu. Most notably, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the July 8 attack against Mogadishu’s Presidential Palace, commonly known as Villa Somalia, as militants managed to infiltrate the complex. Meanwhile, mounting reports have been released during the month of June indicating defections of al-Shabaab members, along with unconfirmed reports that a faction within the group is cooperating with Western and Somali Federal Government (FG) intelligence bodies.
On June 29, al-Shabaab issued a threat to escalate their operations throughout Mogadishu during Ramadan. Subsequently, an estimated 42 assassinations of individuals associated with the government have been recorded in the capital city.
Reports from June 8 indicate that Mohamed Saed Atom, a known warlord and principal supplier for al-Shabaab in Puntland, defected from the group and surrendered in Mogadishu to the Somali FG, which has welcomed his renunciation of violence. Atom stated that his decamping was prompted by the group’s leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane’s, excessive use of violence towards civilians and the manipulation of the Quran’s law to justify the group’s strategy.
Intelligence Analysis: Jihadist influences in Tanzania
“I pointed out to you the stars, and all you saw was the tip of my finger.” Today, this locally revered Tanzanian proverb should resonate deeply within the minds of anyone who fears the spread of Islamic extremism in Africa. On Tanzania’s island paradise of Zanzibar, the killing of a Catholic priest by Muslim extremists on February 23 points to series of mounting and long-ignored signals that the continent’s jihadist wave is expanding south and affecting security. Since October 2012, this traditionally tranquil tourism hub has been awash with sectarian strife. It began when a dispute between two local schoolchildren resulted in the defilement of a Koran, sparking outrage in Tanzania’s large Muslim community.At least four churches across the country were attacked in the aftermath, in what may just prove to be a watershed moment in Tanzania’s modern history.
In February 2013, religious tensions in Zanzibar continued to simmer due to a dispute over butchering rights, sparking titfor- tat attacks between Christians and Muslims, ultimately resulting in the beheading of one priest and the fatal shooting of another inside his own church. A self-proclaimed local al-Qaida branch calling itself “Muslim Renewal,” took credit for the shooting as its inaugural attack.Fourteen years before the Zanzibar unrest, Tanzania took center stage, with all fingers pointing at al-Qaida militants after a deadly bombing attack at the US embassy in Dar es-Salaam. This event, along with the bombing of the United States embassy in Nairobi, brought names like Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al- Zawahiri into the public sphere for the first time. Then-US president Bill Clinton responded by launching cruise missiles at al-Qaida bases in Sudan and Afghanistan. Despite the participation of local East Africans in the attacks, however, few concrete measures were taken to curb radicalization in the region.
Muslim residents of Zanzibar set fire to a Christian church.
By May 2012, the global jihad network would rear its ugly head in Tanzania once more, after a bombing attack occurred in the Kenyan capital, targeting a prominent shopping district. While blame was placed squarely on Somalia’s al-Shabaab, the arrest of a German national in Tanzania in connection to the attack largely went unnoticed. The man, reportedly of Turkish descent, had undergone training in al- Qaida camps in Pakistan. Continue reading Intelligence Analysis: Jihadist influences in Tanzania→
Travel to Nairobi: Is Al Shabaab still a threat?
Al Shabaab militants in southern Somalia. (AFP) The group has threatened to attack Kenya in response to its military incursion.
In October 2011, the Kenyan military began a major operation in neighboring Somalia to root out one of Africa’s most notorious militant groups- Al Shabaab. The invasion added Kenya to the growing list of nations which have become embroiled in the fight to stabilize the troubled Horn of Africa, after previous campaigns by Ethiopia, Uganda, and International peacekeepers failed to do so. While the invasion itself initially resulted in rapid gains for the Kenyan Defence Forces, fear quickly rose in Kenyan urban centers over the fears of a massive retribution attack by Al Shabaab militants.
Those fears are certainly justified, especially given the numerous threats made by Al Shabaab leaders. First and foremost, Al Shabaab cells in Somalia have succeeded in carrying out complex and coordinated mass-casualty attacks in Mogadishu time and time again. In addition, a massive suicide bombing on World Cup viewers in Uganda in which over 60 people perished is also attributed to the Islamist group which is believed to have taken revenge on Uganda for its prominent role in peacekeeping operations in Somalia. Lastly, there are a considerable number of Somali citizens living around Kenya, while many Somali-Americans have returned to their homeland where their dual citizenship was utilized to carry out attacks. Lastly, Kenya itself has suffered a significant amount of high-profile attacks by Al Qaeda linked militants in the past, including a 2003 hotel bombing in Mombasa and the infamous 1998 American embassy bombings. Continue reading Travel to Nairobi: Is Al Shabaab still a threat?→
