Tag Archives: Egypt

How countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt cutting ties with Qatar is likely to influence the region – Middle East & N. Africa Analysis

Current Situation

During the morning hours of June 5, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the UAE announced the cutting of all diplomatic ties with Qatar. The Hadi-led government in Yemen, as well as Libya’s anti-Islamist House of Representatives (HoR) similarly announced the severing of diplomatic ties with Qatar on the same day. The first four countries issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Qatari diplomats to evacuate their respective nations, while similarly issuing an ultimatum to all other Qatari citizens to leave within two weeks. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the UAE announced that they had closed their airspace for Qatari aircrafts, and that all flights by airliners from these countries to Qatar were suspended. Qatari naval vessels will also not be allowed to use the countries’ seaports to anchor, while land travel between Qatar and Saudi Arabia will be limited to non-Qatari nationals only.

Additional measures implemented against Qatar include the expelling of the country from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and its anti-Islamic State (IS) coalition in Syria. These measures were implemented based on accusations that Qatar is “supporting and financing extremist groups” across the region, as well as encouraging sectarianism and subversive elements operating in the abovementioned countries. Meanwhile, Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that the accusations are “absolute fabrications” and “proves that there are premeditated intentions to cause damage to Qatar”.

How countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt cutting ties with Qatar is likely to influence the region - Middle East & N. Africa Analysis | MAX Security — Map of countries affected by travel restrictions on Qataris

Assessments & Forecast

Severing ties may hurt Qatar economically, push its policy towards more pro-Iranian approach; limited impact on regional conflicts

While the new development is unlikely to have any effect on Qatar’s and any of the other impacted countries’ security conditions in the short term, we assess that this measure may lead to multiple local and regional ramifications over the coming months. For instance, approximately 90 percent of Qatar’s imports of food products are transferred through land from Saudi Arabia. Thus, in light of the border closure between the two countries, Doha will likely be forced to divert a large amount of resources in developing its maritime trade, including in the form of improving its seaport infrastructure, as now its imports via sea are liable to be enhanced significantly. Moreover, given the high-profile nature of the event, there remains a possibility that the turn of events will impact global markets, and particularly the oil sector, as it may be perceived as a source of instability across this oil-rich region.

These new developments may also impact expatriates, including Westerners operating in Qatar and the GCC, particularly given the suspension of flights between the GCC countries and Qatar and the closure of the land border with Saudi Arabia. In light of the likely increase in logistical difficulties in traveling between Qatar and the above-mentioned countries, exacted upon expatriates by the measures, it is likely to damage Qatar’s national economy. Though the impact on GCC residents seeking to enter Qatar is yet to be determined, it cannot be ruled out that Qatar will implement punitive measures and ban GCC citizens and residents from entering the country.

The partial isolation of Qatar may affect several conflicts and political rivalries across the region. With regards to Iran, Doha is liable to improve its bilateral relations and economic ties with Tehran, as now Qatar would be compelled to compensate for its political and economic setback. Moreover, in Yemen, in the short-term, Qatar’s absence from the Saudi-led coalition may slightly reduce the latter’s on-the-ground capabilities in fighting against the Iranian-backed Shiite Houthis. However, given Qatar’s already limited role in the coalition, as well as the aforementioned arms deal with the US, in the medium to long-term the Saudi-led coalitions is unlikely to be significantly impacted by Qatar’s absence from the coalition.

In Syria, in light of the already heightened internal divisions between rebel factions, it remains possible that this new development will further exacerbate tensions between rebel groups supported by Qatar on one side, and factions backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. Should the event indeed lead to an economic recession in Qatar, their supported factions on-the ground would suffer from a shortage of resources, thus forcing them to disband or merge into other factions. With this in mind, should scenarios eventually materialize, it would potentially tip the scale towards the pro-government forces in the Syrian conflict.

In Libya, the development may constitute a boost to the HoR and its allied Libyan National Army (LNA), given their conflict with the pro-Islamist General National Congress (GNC) and its affiliated militias, which are partially supported by Qatar. That said, Qatar’s direct involvement in this conflict has significantly waned in recent years, particularly since the March 2016 arrival of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to the designated capital of Tripoli, and therefore any implications on the conflict will remain limited.

Cutting ties with Qatar likely linked to global, regional developments involving Iran, new US administration

Today’s development comes amidst years of tensions between Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Egypt on one side, and Qatar on the other, surrounding multiple issues, chiefly the latter’s alleged direct involvement in the internal affairs of countries throughout the region. This is particularly relevant to Qatar’s long-standing support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked political elements across the Middle East and North Africa, as the countries in this Saudi-led alliance view the Islamist organization is a subversive element and a threat to their respective governments. Additional contentious issue include Qatar’s overall positive relations with Iran, as opposed to that of the other Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), with the exception of Oman, which remain strong adversaries of Tehran. This is highlighted by numerous past economic agreements between Tehran and Doha in recent years, such as the agreement from February 2014 to create a joint free trade and economic zones between the two countries. A further issue that contributed to the strained relations with Qatar throughout the years is the cooperation of the Qatari-based news outlet al-Jazeera, which had been accused by the aforementioned countries of attempting to undermine their, as well as their regional allies’, governments.

That said, despite these strained relations, Qatar and the other GCC countries’ relations can be characterized over the past several years by intermittent escalation and rapprochement between the sides. For instance, on December 9, 2014, Qatar agreed as part of a GCC summit, to establish a regional police force in order to improve coordination regarding drug trafficking, money laundering, and cybercrime, as well as announced its “full support to al-Sisi-led government in Egypt”. This followed Saudi officials’ March 9, 2014 threats to impose sanctions against Qatar, including in the form of sea blockade, in light of Doha’s persistent support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked elements across the region. However, the complete cutting of diplomatic relations between the aforementioned Saudi-aligned countries is highly notable given its wide scale and scope, as it includes significant restrictions on Qatar and its citizens.

We assess that this escalation is linked to global and regional geo-political developments, largely with regards to Iran and the new Donald Trump administration in the US. With this in mind, in recent years, under the Obama administration, relations between Saudi Arabia and its allies on one side, and Washington on the other, were oftentimes strained due to the US’ perceived efforts to approach Tehran, which was likely viewed by Riyadh as coming at its expense. In light of the aforementioned normal relations between Qatar and Iran, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries were likely felt compelled to prevent Qatar from approaching the Islamic Republic too much, as this would have significantly undermined their sense of security and regional interest.

Since President Trump’s inauguration, Washington increased its anti-Iranian rhetoric, while at the same time strengthened its ties with Saudi Arabia. This is highlighted by the May 15 UAE-US defense agreement, as well as the 350 Billion USD agreement between Riyadh and Washington involving an arms deal, and Saudi investments in the US. Thus, there remains a potential that the recent visit of President Trump to Saudi Arabia in late May, as well as the US’ growing support for Saudi Arabia and its allies, motivated the Kingdom to implement these measures, as part of the shared interest with the US in tackling Iran and its allies’ influence throughout the region. With this in mind, given Saudi Arabia’s decreasing need for Qatar’s cooperation on security and political support amidst the ongoing rivalry with Shiite Iran, it is likely that Saudi Arabia assessed that it is no longer obligated to maintain positive bilateral relations with Qatar, prompting this development.

The development comes amidst a diminishing political influence of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organization across the Middle East and North Africa over the past two years. In this context, it remains possible that Saudi Arabia no longer felt compelled to maintain good relations with Qatar, following the reduction of the threat stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood, as opposed to previous Saudi attempts to pressure Qatar to abandon their support for the Islamist organization in return for the improvement of relations with the other GCC countries.

Recommendations

Travel to Qatar may continue as normal while adhering to cultural norms and avoiding making any statements critical of the Qatari Emir and government officials, despite the aforementioned new restrictions. That being said, those operating in Qatar over the coming days and weeks are advised to stock up on food and basic products, due to the possibility that these will be in shortage due to the declared measures. Those operating throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and particularly in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar are advised to remain cognizant of developments and potential effects on travel and business continuity given the current lack of full information regarding the various restrictions that will be in effect. This is particularly relevant for the possibility of unexpected border closures between the relevant countries over the coming days and weeks.

This report was written by:
Asaf Day – MAX Security’s Senior Intelligence Manager, Middle East & North Africa

Disenfranchised Muslim Brotherhood militant groups – Egypt Analysis

Executive Summary:

Of the several militant groups that operate in mainland Egypt, the two most active ones currently are the Hasam Movement and Liwaa al-Thawra, both composed of disenfranchised Muslim Brotherhood elements.
While these are overtly two separate entities, there are many similarities between the groups that point to a joint origin, as well as possibly ongoing cooperation.
Regardless, both groups proved to be of high and growing capabilities, and are thus likely to attempt to continually expand their operations throughout mainland Egypt and conduct more sophisticated attacks targeting governmental locales, individuals perceived to be associated with the government, as well as security forces.
Travel to Cairo and Alexandria may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations.

Ideology & Goals of Disenfranchised Muslim Brotherhood Groups

Both the Hasam Movement and Liwaa al-Thawra subscribe in essence to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, and set as an objective to remove the “regime of the military coup” and replace it with what they perceive as the democratically elected and legitimate Muslim Brotherhood-led government, similar to the model of the June 2012-July 2013 government.
However, one distinct difference between these groups and the current official Muslim Brotherhood leadership is the approach towards the application of violence. While the official stance of the current leadership of the Brotherhood movement is that it should be a “peaceful and democratic organization”, the approach of the militant groups is to sanction measured violence in the context of achieving the political movement’s overall objectives.
In this context, while given the organizations’ structures and their opaqueness, the characteristics of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the militant groups remain unclear, there are two likely possibilities, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
First, the dichotomy could be a manifestation of an internal struggle between an “old guard” that adheres to the guidelines of avoiding the use of deadly force, and a “new guard” that grew frustrated with the perceived inability to achieve the political goals strictly using non-violent means, prompting it to change strategies.
The second option is that the disconnect between the political movement and the various militant groups is maintained at an overt level only, in order to avoid causing a delegitimization of the whole Muslim Brotherhood movement. However, in this scenario, there would be at least a limited covert direct communication and subordination system. Should this be the case, it would mean that the entities in effect serve as a political and military wing of the organization, even if this structure is only accepted by parts of the overall movement.

Strategy & Evolution

Naturally, both Hasam Movement and Liwaa al-Thawra’s modus operandi and target selection are derived from their ideology and strategic goals. The militant groups target government facilities and personnel perceived to be associated with the government, as well as members of the judiciary. This is due to the perception that they are an integral part of the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, given their role in sentencing members of the group to prolonged incarcerations and even to death. Additionally, the main target of attacks are member of security forces, as they are perceived as those executing the will of the “illegitimate regime”, and are the main operational threat posed to the militant groups.
As a result of this, the groups are less likely to target Westerners, Western institutes and strategic facilities. The main reason for this is that their vision is to ultimately restore complete control over Egypt while causing as little damage to its infrastructure and core as possible, as they will need these elements, along with foreign tourism and investment, to more easily govern the state in the future. That said, it cannot be ruled out that the radicalization process that caused their creation will persist should the groups fail to reach their objectives, prompting them to conduct high profile attacks and attacks against soft targets out of desperation, however this remains a remote possibility at this time. Nonetheless, despite currently discreetly targeting state actors and attempting to avoid civilian casualties, some of the attacks by the groups caused collateral damage, thus indicating that they are willing to accept causing at least limited civilian casualties in order to achieve their goals.

Furthermore, both Hasam and Liwaa al-Thawra’s capabilities were relatively high to start, as shown by their own published videos depicting their training, as well as by their attacks which at times are aimed at high-value targets. This is further indicated by the claims of responsibility for these attacks, depicting mostly advanced surveillance and intelligence collection techniques, as well as tactical proficiency. This itself serves as an indication that members of the group have previous training and experience, which may be due to previous membership in now defunct militant groups, such as Popular Resistance in Giza, Revolutionary Punishment, or even Ajnad Misr. This may also indicate that the groups have attracted former members of the security establishment, who became disillusioned with the state of affairs of post-revolution Egypt, and applied their skills in the ranks of these militant groups.
Additionally, while both groups showed relative high capabilities since inception in July-August 2016, these have continued to progress with time, from very limited scale operations such as assassinations, to larger scale and more sophisticated attacks, such as vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs). While Hasam is the slightly more veteran of the groups, the fact that the development in capabilities of both groups overlapped may serve as an indication of direct cooperation.

Links between Hasam & Liwaa al-Thawra

In addition to the aforementioned, media publications by both groups highlight the similarities and connections between them:
Videos issued by the respective groups show emphasis on similar tactics and using similar techniques: Assassinations, drive-by shootings, IED making, assembly and activation, firing ranges with small arms fire and shoulder fired rocket launchers, small unit tactics- including combined and coordinated attacks by several small forces.

Disenfranchised Muslim Brotherhood militant groups - Egypt Analysis | MAX Security — Shooting range and sentry takedown training by Hasam (left) and Liwaa al-Thawra (right)

Moreover, and in addition to the aforementioned similarities in modus operandi of the attacks themselves, the claims of responsibility by the respective groups use similar graphics and put an emphasis on the intelligence collection and surveillance element prior to conducting the mission, as well as of the battle damage assessment phase after the attack is conducted.

Furthermore, while never issuing a joint statement thus far, following the December 11, 2016 suicide bombing in a Coptic church in Cairo which was later claimed by the Islamic State (IS), both Hasam and Liwaa al-Thawra issued separate statements condemning the attack less than 15 minutes apart. Both statements used similar rhetoric, offering condolences to the victims and their families, stating that targeting “innocent Egyptians” should not be accepted, and that the only legitimate targets are those associated with the “corrupt government”.

Lastly, following two of the overall three attacks conducted thus far by Liwaa al-Thawra, the Hasam Movement issued congratulatory messages through their official media branch, affirming the positive connections between the groups.

Future Projections

Previous attacks conducted by both of the groups show that they are not constrained to a specific area of the mainland, and have the ability to operate throughout large parts of it. As the respective groups are likely not large, given the still relative low frequency of their attacks, this is a further indication of their operational capabilities. As a result, regional cells are probably dispatched between different locales to attack notable targets, in likely addition to local cells capitalizing on coincidences to attack targets of opportunity which are typically of lesser quality. This would also account for the large number of attacks in and around Cairo, due to the city’s significance and the fact that it offers more quality targets.

As the at least positive connection, and at most direct cooperation between Hasam and Liwaa al-Thawra had been affirmed, it remains possible that the two groups made a conscious decision, or were directed by a possible higher level leadership to remain separate. Such a conduct would reduce the risks posed to either of the groups in case cells of a different group are compromised, as information extracted from these will not threaten fighters, assets and plans of the other group. Such procedures and protocols increase the likelihood of survivability of each group, and significantly reduce the potential that they both will be fully eliminated, at least within close time proximity.
The element of survivability had proven to be vital for both groups given their limited sizes and resources. Similarly, the fluctuations in their activities, along with the spread of their operations can also be associated with reducing their profile in order to evade the high intensity security operations waged against both groups. Thus, militants will go into hiding or completely escape the area, wait until immediate ramifications by security forces expire, or will exploit a weakness in their system, and then resume offensive operations.
While such operations witnessed successes, killing militants from both Hasam and Liwaa al-Thawras in actions that were confirmed by the respective groups, the fact that the groups remain operational and even have expanded their operations is a testament to their overall high capabilities. With this in mind, while both groups may alternately limit their operations, particularly given the ongoing nationwide state of emergency, overall they are liable to seek to further expand their operations by conducting more notable attacks against high profile targets over the coming months. While security forces may foil some of these operations, given precedent at least some of these are likely to successful materialize. Furthermore, despite this desire to expand, both Hasam and Liwaa al-Thawra remain small in size and limited in resources, and given their proven experience and proficiency will be cautious of overstretching and overexposing themselves, thus any possible expansion in operation is liable to be measured.

Recommendations

Travel to Cairo and Alexandria may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations.

Avoid all travel to the North Sinai Governorate and border areas with Libya, Sudan, and Israel due to the persistent risk for militant attacks, kidnappings, and general lawlessness.

We further advise to avoid nonessential travel to the Southern Sinai Peninsula, while maintaining heightened vigilance in the Suez Canal Zone, the Upper Nile area, and the Nile Delta region due to an increased risk of unrest and the heightened risk of militant attacks. Before traveling to Sharm al-Sheikh, confirm that flight operations are continuing and have not been impacted by recent militant threats.

In Cairo, maintain heightened vigilance and continue to allot extra time for travel due to possible delays emanating from increased security deployments, checkpoints, and closures throughout the capital.

As a general security precaution, remain vigilant in areas surrounding and avoid the immediate vicinity of government installations, police stations, and religious centers, particularly churches, as these locations remain under elevated threat of militant attacks. When traveling in central squares, or in areas with persistent police deployments, avoid the immediate vicinity of security forces, particularly fixed traffic booths, as such personnel and facilities have increasingly come under attack by militant elements.

Sinai Bedouins: A Regime Gambit against Islamic State in Egypt?

Recently, media outlets throughout Egypt raved about the creation of a new paramilitary force in the Sinai Peninsula meant to help the Egyptian Armed Forces tackle the growing security threat of the Islamic State’s Wilayat Sinai (formerly known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis). This new force allegedly united 30 Bedouin tribes on May 10, to form the “Sinai Tribal Federation”, or STF, and was meant to provide volunteer intelligence about the militant group’s activities.

The creation of the STF was preceded by several acts of animosity between Wilayat Sinai and mainly members of the Tarabin tribe, including localized harassment, and tit-for-tat killings of militants and tribesman. These every-day run-ins gradually escalated, causing the Tarabin tribe to stage a large scale raid on a Wilayat Sinai stronghold south of Sheikh Zuweid on April 26, as well as to issue a one million Egyptian Pound (EGP) bounty for the killing of Wilayat Sinai’s leader, Shady al-Meneiey, who may have fled to Gaza. On the day of the STF’s creation, Wilayat Sinai kidnapped, raped, and beheaded a woman of the Tarabin tribe, leaving her body with a warning against any cooperation with the Egyptian regime.

Despite sensational media reports subsequently heralding the end of the troubles in the Sinai Peninsula, the STF had very little actual effect on the ground as of yet, and is expected to have even less in the future. Throughout the two months that have passed since its formation, the STF has had only one direct confrontation with Wilayat Sinai, when on May 23 it arrested three militants carrying weapons and explosives, and turned them into police custody. While it is true that the force was meant less to carry the everyday burden of counter-militancy operations in the Sinai Peninsula, and more to provide quality intelligence information by covert means, results on the ground bring into question whether there were any contributions in this field as well.

For example, during the night of June 9-10, members of Wilayat Sinai were able to bombard the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO) airfield in El Gorah with mortar shells and surface-to-surface rockets. Despite the attack not being particularly impactful, it represented an escalation in the group’s activities by directly attacking a multinational force in the Sinai Peninsula, as well as an increase in its capabilities, as it was the first time that it deployed rockets in an attack against targets on Sinai soil. This latter point, combined with reports of a possible infiltration from Gaza the night before, affirms that the group is still able to move across the Sinai-Gaza border to bring men and material. All this combined points very clearly to a massive failure on the strategic intelligence level, of which the STF was deemed to be a major pillar.

With this in mind, Bedouin-army and Bedouin-militant relationships in the Sinai Peninsula are likely based more on personal interests and tribal cost-benefit analysis, rather than on any ideological reasons. These tribal interests are derived from a number of factors that can lead tribes to support either the military or militants such as Wilayat Sinai. This includes on the one hand, a long period of mistreatment of the Bedouins by the current Egyptian regime (and its similar predecessor), while additionally, tribes may fear that opposing the militants will risk the tribe’s safety and means of livelihood. On the other hand, tribes such as the Terabin hold ongoing blood feuds with militants, while smuggling activities upon which they depend have been threatened by Wilayat Sinai’s activities.

As a result, while it is possible that additional low-scale, or passive resistance to Wilayat Sinai exists among the Bedouin tribes, the general animosity towards the regime is probably higher, leading the locals to support the militants. This trend is expected to continue, unless the Egyptian regime will be able to significantly change the local Bedouins view of it, and therefore be able to recruit their support. That said, such a change will likely require years and significant governmental reforms in order to be successful, with little impact expected in the immediate time frame. Until that time, the Egyptian government will likely continue to find it increasingly difficult to counter Wilayat Sinai’s momentum through the STF.

Oded Berkowitz is a senior intelligence analyst at MAX security, specializing in the North African region. Oded holds a B.A in Political Science and Middle Eastern StudIes and is currently pursuing graduate studies in Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security, while also serving as an infantry captain in the Israel Defense Forces.

Arab Spring 2011: Crisis support & evacuation

Evacuation of foreign students stranded in rural area in Egypt

January, 2011: Amidst a breakdown in public services and increasingly uncertain political and security situation unfolding nationwide, dozens of foreign entities from a variety of sectors requested evacuation simultaneously from Egypt. With many security providers overwhelmed and unprepared for requests of evacuation, MAX Security facilitated the safe evacuation of hundreds of expats based in the Middle East and North Africa.

One of the more challenging assignments was evacuating 38 U.S. university students and faculty, who were stranded near an archaeological site hundreds of miles from Cairo.

Solution provided

Within 12 hours, MAX Security implemented its evacuation procedure, providing ground security and transportation through our local contacts, led by the Max Egypt team with the official assistance of the Egyptian military.
In conjunction with real time intelligence support from Max’s intelligence division, the students and faculty were transported by land routes to a local airport. Max also chartered a private aircraft, placed on standby, in the event that commercial flights were halted.
The client contacts were briefed frequently throughout the process, providing updates every step of the way.

Result: Successful crisis response and evacuation to safety

The student group and their staff were evacuated safely and quickly from an outlying area in Egypt. The support provided guaranteed the safety and security of the personnel and saved the client potential financial loses and legal exposure.

Sinai Bedouins: A Regime Gambit against Islamic State in Egypt?

By: Oded Berkowitz

MAX Analysis Egypt: January attack by militant group Wilayat Sinai underscores increased capabilities February 24, 2015

Executive Summary

The January 29 coordinated and simultaneous attack against multiple targets in northern Sinai, by the militant organization Wilayat Sinai, highlights an ongoing shift in militant tactics, as well as an upgrading of their capabilities and the potential for additional attacks.
Meanwhile, renewed accusations that the Muslim Brotherhood was involved in the attack and subsequent crackdowns on the group will likely continue to create a divide in the organization over the use of violence to “retaliate” against alleged police and military brutality.
This divide will likely perpetuate near-daily militant attacks across Egypt, while carrying with it the risk of further expanding the operational areas of “Wilayat Sinai” to Muslim Brotherhood strongholds and other regions across the country.
We advise against nonessential travel to Cairo and Alexandria at the time due to the persistent risk of militant attacks and civil unrest in major cities. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations.

Current Events in Egypt
On January 29, the Islamic State (IS) affiliate in Sinai, Wilayat Sinai (formerly known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis), carried out multiple coordinated attacks on several targets in Sheikh Zuweid, Rafah, and al-Arish, with the main attack carried out in the latter. In al-Arish, reports indicate that militants attacked the Egyptian Armed Forces’ 101 Battalion headquarters, as well as multiple other targets, including a local hotel, various checkpoints, and the security directorate. Militants used multiple car bombs, in addition to mortars and gunfire to overwhelm local security forces. Reports indicate that at least 32 people were killed and 100 injured. Wilayat Sinai claimed to have used more 100 fighters in the attack, as well as three explosives-laden vehicles, while claiming to have staged the attack during the night hours so as to “minimize” civilian casualties.

Additionally Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a public statement regarding the January 29 attacks and unrest, vowing to defend Egypt’s Sinai against “terror” and stating, “I have said it before and I will say it again, we are fighting the strongest secret organization of the last two centuries,” likely referring to the Muslim Brotherhood. Reports indicate that al-Sisi also created a new military entity to combat militancy in Sinai, following a meeting held by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Al-Sisi reportedly named General Osama Roshdy, the current head of the Third Army, as the head of the entity and promoted him to Lieutenant-General.
Meanwhile, following the attack in Sinai, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement in English declaring, “We unequivocally condemn all acts of violence” and reaffirming the group’s “commitment to peaceful and political civil resistance”. However, the group also released an article on January 27, quoting Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, urging its supporters to “prepare” for a new phase where “we summon all our strength and evoke the meaning of Jihad”. The statement also refers to the Secret Apparatus, a paramilitary operation created by al-Banna to fight the British mandate in the 1920s. The Muslim Brotherhood distanced itself from the organization on several occasions, and the existence of the organization remains subject to controversy. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a document using the statement to show the Muslim Brotherhood’s alleged “double speak”.
A Turkish-based television channel, affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement, aired a statement coming from the “Revolutionary Youth” issuing an ultimatum to all foreign nationals in Egypt during the morning hours of January 31. According to the ultimatum, all foreign citizens should leave Egypt by February 11, all foreign companies operating in Egypt should close down by February 20, and all foreign diplomats should leave and close down their embassies by February 28. In addition, the warning was extended to all tourists planning to visit Egypt, saying they should cancel their plans as they are not welcome. According to the broadcast, whoever chooses to ignore the warning will be targeted.
The statement was then condemned by the Muslim Brotherhood in English; however, no such condemnation was issued in Arabic. The Egyptian authorities have reportedly requested that Turkey halt broadcasting the channel; however, unconfirmed reports suggest that no official complaint was lodged in Turkey at this time.

Assessments: Attack in al-Arish underscores heightened militant capabilities, while highlighting possibility for additional attacks in coming months

While attacks in the Sinai Peninsula have been carried out on a near-daily basis, the recent attack in al-Arish is notable as it underscores militants’ increased capabilities despite ongoing military operations and the deployment of troops in the Sinai Peninsula. A similar attack was carried out in Sheikh Zuweid on October 24, with militants detonating a car bomb at a heavily protected checkpoint near the city, placing roadside bombs near the site to prevent reinforcements from arriving and then storming the checkpoint with several vehicles and simultaneously firing rocket propelled grenades (RPG). Such attacks underscore militants’ ability to gather intelligence, predict Egyptian military tactics, and carry out multi-stage attacks meant to overwhelm the main military strongholds in the peninsula.
In this context, the October 24 and January 29 attacks underscore a shift in militant tactics. Militants had thus far used “hit-and-run” attacks against the Egyptian military, using either car bombs, roadside bombs, localized mortar or rocket attacks, or RPG and shooting attacks. However, the October 24 and January 29 attacks demonstrate militants’ ability to efficiently use a combination of all of these techniques to maximize casualties. Furthermore, the attack on January 29 underscores militants’ ability to drag the Egyptian military into hours-long ground clashes, as well as their willingness to directly confront the military. Such tactics, which are also riskier for militants, are likely a direct result of the increased militarization of northern Sinai, as militants need to use heavier firepower to attack highly defended military positions. Furthermore, it is possible, in light of the group’s allegiance to IS, that several tactics developed and used in Syria and Iraq were learned by Wilayat Sinai from IS.
Despite statements from the military promising a harsh response and claiming the attack was the result of military successes in Sinai, the multi-layered attack likely raised doubts over the efficiency of the Egyptian military’s counterinsurgency campaign in Sinai. In this context, the attack followed a January announcement of the extension of the three-month long state of emergency in Sinai, which was initially declared in the aftermath of the October 24 attack, for an additional three months, as well the launching of the “second phase” in the establishment of a buffer zone with Gaza. With this in mind, the timing of the attack highlights the possibility that militants sought to demonstrate the failure of such measures, while further capitalizing on discontent among locals stemming from these measures. Finally, in light of the main target of the attack, the 101 Battalion headquarters, considered to be one of the most secured and fortified military bases in Sinai, the militants may have sought to “shame” the Egyptian military, and thus heighten the chances for a disproportionate crackdown on the peninsula, and on Islamists in general in the country. Such a crackdown is further likely, in turn, to alienate the local population and legitimize further attacks.
Overall, we assess that the militancy threat will likely remain elevated in northern Sinai, in light of the persistent clashes reported after the attack. However, heavy military deployments in this specific area of the Sinai Peninsula, may also encourage militants to relocate and stage attacks in other locations of the peninsula and, to a lesser extent, of the country. In this context, while the positioning of militants in the triangle between al-Arish, Rafah, and Sheikh Zuweid was likely strategic for the group in light of the smuggling of weapons to and from the Gaza Strip, increased military pressure on smuggling activities likely have prompted the group to develop other tactics.
These may include, for instance, the use of boats to smuggle weapons and militants, given that despite the maritime blockade on the peninsula, the Egyptian navy’s capacities remain limited when compared to its ground counterpart. The group may thus attempt to develop ties with Bedouin tribes in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula, while previous upticks in military activities in northern Sinai have also resulted in militants fleeing to other parts of the country. As a result, we assess that in addition to the militancy threat in northern Sinai, the coming months may see an uptick in Wilayat’s Sinai activity in southern Sinai, as well as in the Nile Delta and potentially at the border with Libya.

Assessments: Sinai attack, resulting crackdowns on Brotherhood likely to perpetuate divide in organization

In light of the declarations made by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, as well as past attacks in Egypt since the ouster of former President Mohammed Morsi, the crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood will likely be widened following the attack in Sinai, as has previously been witnessed. In this context, while this trend is not new, the continuing accusation and crackdown has likely created a divide inside the organization between those who continue to advocate for peaceful protests to denounce the regime and those who advocate “self-defense” in light of the security forces’ use of violence to disperse the protesters.
In addition, to increase pressure for the group to legitimize “self-defense”, several elements, namely the mass arrest of most of the Brotherhood’s leadership in Egypt, its relocation outside the country, and changes inside the organization, have further intensified this divide. This is further underscored by unconfirmed reports that the Brotherhood held two-month worldwide elections that led to leaders of the youth movement as well as reformist movements assuming a broader role, suggesting that new leaders are seeking to reform the group.
Should the group’s leadership in Turkey or in other countries maintain its policy of nonviolence, it bears the risk of being increasingly sidelined and losing its remaining influence over the group’s supporters on the ground. On the other hand, should it decide to shift its stance and overtly promote violent actions, even those deemed to be “self-defense”, the group will likely face increased pressure both inside and outside Egypt, as the military-backed regime will likely use such statements against it. This likely explains the current ambiguity of the Brotherhood’s statements, and the fact that condemnations of violence have been made in English but not in Arabic. The recent statement on the Brotherhood-affiliated channel as well as the article advocating violence likely stem from this divide. Such a divide may further increase the chances that members of the group will leave if they do not agree with the group’s line, or that they will feel that attacks are justified, in light of recent aforementioned statements.

Assessments: Near-daily militant attacks likely to continue, while IS-affiliated group may take advantage of internal Brotherhood divide to further expand operational areas

Overall, we assess the attack in al-Arish will likely prompt an uptick in violence in Egypt, both in Sinai and across the country, as a result of the likely impending crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, and, as aforementioned, in light of precedent. Such violence will likely continue to materialize in continued IED attacks against the country’s security forces, infrastructure, and transportation system. However, as indicated by an uptick in attacks and threats against foreign companies, such attacks may increasingly expand to civilian targets deemed to be legitimate if they are deemed as “collaborating” with the regime.
Moreover, we assess that low-level militant groups may increasingly serve as a gateway for disenchanted and former members of the organization to join the other more radicalized groups. While prior to the ouster of Mohammed Morsi, the ideological gap between the Muslim Brotherhood and militants groups, such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis at the time, was significant, disillusioned members of the organization can now gradually radicalize by passing from group to another, given the wide variety of groups using violence, including local Popular Resistance Committees that often claim IED attacks against security forces, the Ajnad Misr militant group, and finally Wilayat Sinai.
Furthermore, as several elements of the Brotherhood may leave it and become increasingly radicalized, the operational areas of Wilayat Sinai in Egypt may expand to officially include a group in mainland Egypt. Regardless, the recruitment of disillusioned former members of the Brotherhood, as well as the fact that several members of the group may flee from Sinai to the Nile Delta, the border with Libya, or Libya itself, may increase the potential for sophisticated attacks to be witnessed in these areas other the coming months, as well as in major cities such as Cairo and Alexandria.

MAX Analysis Egypt: January attack by militant group Wilayat Sinai underscores increased capabilities February 24, 2015

Executive Summary

The January 29 coordinated and simultaneous attack against multiple targets in northern Sinai, by the militant organization Wilayat Sinai, highlights an ongoing shift in militant tactics, as well as an upgrading of their capabilities and the potential for additional attacks.
Meanwhile, renewed accusations that the Muslim Brotherhood was involved in the attack and subsequent crackdowns on the group will likely continue to create a divide in the organization over the use of violence to “retaliate” against alleged police and military brutality.
This divide will likely perpetuate near-daily militant attacks across Egypt, while carrying with it the risk of further expanding the operational areas of “Wilayat Sinai” to Muslim Brotherhood strongholds and other regions across the country.
We advise against nonessential travel to Cairo and Alexandria at the time due to the persistent risk of militant attacks and civil unrest in major cities. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel recommendations.

Additionally Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a public statement regarding the January 29 attacks and unrest, vowing to defend Egypt’s Sinai against “terror” and stating, “I have said it before and I will say it again, we are fighting the strongest secret organization of the last two centuries,” likely referring to the Muslim Brotherhood. Reports indicate that al-Sisi also created a new military entity to combat militancy in Sinai, following a meeting held by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Al-Sisi reportedly named General Osama Roshdy, the current head of the Third Army, as the head of the entity and promoted him to Lieutenant-General.
Meanwhile, following the attack in Sinai, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement in English declaring, “We unequivocally condemn all acts of violence” and reaffirming the group’s “commitment to peaceful and political civil resistance”. However, the group also released an article on January 27, quoting Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, urging its supporters to “prepare” for a new phase where “we summon all our strength and evoke the meaning of Jihad”. The statement also refers to the Secret Apparatus, a paramilitary operation created by al-Banna to fight the British mandate in the 1920s. The Muslim Brotherhood distanced itself from the organization on several occasions, and the existence of the organization remains subject to controversy. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a document using the statement to show the Muslim Brotherhood’s alleged “double speak”.
A Turkish-based television channel, affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement, aired a statement coming from the “Revolutionary Youth” issuing an ultimatum to all foreign nationals in Egypt during the morning hours of January 31. According to the ultimatum, all foreign citizens should leave Egypt by February 11, all foreign companies operating in Egypt should close down by February 20, and all foreign diplomats should leave and close down their embassies by February 28. In addition, the warning was extended to all tourists planning to visit Egypt, saying they should cancel their plans as they are not welcome. According to the broadcast, whoever chooses to ignore the warning will be targeted.
The statement was then condemned by the Muslim Brotherhood in English; however, no such condemnation was issued in Arabic. The Egyptian authorities have reportedly requested that Turkey halt broadcasting the channel; however, unconfirmed reports suggest that no official complaint was lodged in Turkey at this time.

Assessments: Attack in al-Arish underscores heightened militant capabilities, while highlighting possibility for additional attacks in coming months

While attacks in the Sinai Peninsula have been carried out on a near-daily basis, the recent attack in al-Arish is notable as it underscores militants’ increased capabilities despite ongoing military operations and the deployment of troops in the Sinai Peninsula. A similar attack was carried out in Sheikh Zuweid on October 24, with militants detonating a car bomb at a heavily protected checkpoint near the city, placing roadside bombs near the site to prevent reinforcements from arriving and then storming the checkpoint with several vehicles and simultaneously firing rocket propelled grenades (RPG). Such attacks underscore militants’ ability to gather intelligence, predict Egyptian military tactics, and carry out multi-stage attacks meant to overwhelm the main military strongholds in the peninsula.
In this context, the October 24 and January 29 attacks underscore a shift in militant tactics. Militants had thus far used “hit-and-run” attacks against the Egyptian military, using either car bombs, roadside bombs, localized mortar or rocket attacks, or RPG and shooting attacks. However, the October 24 and January 29 attacks demonstrate militants’ ability to efficiently use a combination of all of these techniques to maximize casualties. Furthermore, the attack on January 29 underscores militants’ ability to drag the Egyptian military into hours-long ground clashes, as well as their willingness to directly confront the military. Such tactics, which are also riskier for militants, are likely a direct result of the increased militarization of northern Sinai, as militants need to use heavier firepower to attack highly defended military positions. Furthermore, it is possible, in light of the group’s allegiance to IS, that several tactics developed and used in Syria and Iraq were learned by Wilayat Sinai from IS.
Despite statements from the military promising a harsh response and claiming the attack was the result of military successes in Sinai, the multi-layered attack likely raised doubts over the efficiency of the Egyptian military’s counterinsurgency campaign in Sinai. In this context, the attack followed a January announcement of the extension of the three-month long state of emergency in Sinai, which was initially declared in the aftermath of the October 24 attack, for an additional three months, as well the launching of the “second phase” in the establishment of a buffer zone with Gaza. With this in mind, the timing of the attack highlights the possibility that militants sought to demonstrate the failure of such measures, while further capitalizing on discontent among locals stemming from these measures. Finally, in light of the main target of the attack, the 101 Battalion headquarters, considered to be one of the most secured and fortified military bases in Sinai, the militants may have sought to “shame” the Egyptian military, and thus heighten the chances for a disproportionate crackdown on the peninsula, and on Islamists in general in the country. Such a crackdown is further likely, in turn, to alienate the local population and legitimize further attacks.
Overall, we assess that the militancy threat will likely remain elevated in northern Sinai, in light of the persistent clashes reported after the attack. However, heavy military deployments in this specific area of the Sinai Peninsula, may also encourage militants to relocate and stage attacks in other locations of the peninsula and, to a lesser extent, of the country. In this context, while the positioning of militants in the triangle between al-Arish, Rafah, and Sheikh Zuweid was likely strategic for the group in light of the smuggling of weapons to and from the Gaza Strip, increased military pressure on smuggling activities likely have prompted the group to develop other tactics.
These may include, for instance, the use of boats to smuggle weapons and militants, given that despite the maritime blockade on the peninsula, the Egyptian navy’s capacities remain limited when compared to its ground counterpart. The group may thus attempt to develop ties with Bedouin tribes in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula, while previous upticks in military activities in northern Sinai have also resulted in militants fleeing to other parts of the country. As a result, we assess that in addition to the militancy threat in northern Sinai, the coming months may see an uptick in Wilayat’s Sinai activity in southern Sinai, as well as in the Nile Delta and potentially at the border with Libya.

Assessments: Sinai attack, resulting crackdowns on Brotherhood likely to perpetuate divide in organization

In light of the declarations made by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, as well as past attacks in Egypt since the ouster of former President Mohammed Morsi, the crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood will likely be widened following the attack in Sinai, as has previously been witnessed. In this context, while this trend is not new, the continuing accusation and crackdown has likely created a divide inside the organization between those who continue to advocate for peaceful protests to denounce the regime and those who advocate “self-defense” in light of the security forces’ use of violence to disperse the protesters.
In addition, to increase pressure for the group to legitimize “self-defense”, several elements, namely the mass arrest of most of the Brotherhood’s leadership in Egypt, its relocation outside the country, and changes inside the organization, have further intensified this divide. This is further underscored by unconfirmed reports that the Brotherhood held two-month worldwide elections that led to leaders of the youth movement as well as reformist movements assuming a broader role, suggesting that new leaders are seeking to reform the group.
Should the group’s leadership in Turkey or in other countries maintain its policy of nonviolence, it bears the risk of being increasingly sidelined and losing its remaining influence over the group’s supporters on the ground. On the other hand, should it decide to shift its stance and overtly promote violent actions, even those deemed to be “self-defense”, the group will likely face increased pressure both inside and outside Egypt, as the military-backed regime will likely use such statements against it. This likely explains the current ambiguity of the Brotherhood’s statements, and the fact that condemnations of violence have been made in English but not in Arabic. The recent statement on the Brotherhood-affiliated channel as well as the article advocating violence likely stem from this divide. Such a divide may further increase the chances that members of the group will leave if they do not agree with the group’s line, or that they will feel that attacks are justified, in light of recent aforementioned statements.

Assessments: Near-daily militant attacks likely to continue, while IS-affiliated group may take advantage of internal Brotherhood divide to further expand operational areas

Overall, we assess the attack in al-Arish will likely prompt an uptick in violence in Egypt, both in Sinai and across the country, as a result of the likely impending crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, and, as aforementioned, in light of precedent. Such violence will likely continue to materialize in continued IED attacks against the country’s security forces, infrastructure, and transportation system. However, as indicated by an uptick in attacks and threats against foreign companies, such attacks may increasingly expand to civilian targets deemed to be legitimate if they are deemed as “collaborating” with the regime.
Moreover, we assess that low-level militant groups may increasingly serve as a gateway for disenchanted and former members of the organization to join the other more radicalized groups. While prior to the ouster of Mohammed Morsi, the ideological gap between the Muslim Brotherhood and militants groups, such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis at the time, was significant, disillusioned members of the organization can now gradually radicalize by passing from group to another, given the wide variety of groups using violence, including local Popular Resistance Committees that often claim IED attacks against security forces, the Ajnad Misr militant group, and finally Wilayat Sinai.
Furthermore, as several elements of the Brotherhood may leave it and become increasingly radicalized, the operational areas of Wilayat Sinai in Egypt may expand to officially include a group in mainland Egypt. Regardless, the recruitment of disillusioned former members of the Brotherhood, as well as the fact that several members of the group may flee from Sinai to the Nile Delta, the border with Libya, or Libya itself, may increase the potential for sophisticated attacks to be witnessed in these areas other the coming months, as well as in major cities such as Cairo and Alexandria.

Intelligence Analysis: The Kurd’s shifting role in the Syrian conflict

“Deal with your friends as if they will become your enemies tomorrow, and deal with your enemies as if they will become your friends tomorrow.” It’s a proverb passed along through Kurdish generations — and a telling pretext to the Kurdish strategy in today’s conflict in Syria. In recent weeks, this once dormant player has awoken from its slumber, and may just provide Syria’s desperate rebels with a much needed boost to break their deadlock with the Assad regime.

Reports indicate that YPG militiamen and Syrian rebels have agreed to share control of the strategic Sheikh Maqsood District of northern Aleppo, cutting off regime supply routes to a hospital, prison, and other key positions. Rebel fighters entered the district largely unopposed on March 31. On April 6, the Syrian military bombarded Kurdish neighborhoods in northern Aleppo, killing 15 people in a likely response to this new arrangement. The following day, Kurdish militiamen attacked a Syrian military checkpoint in the city, killing five troops.

PYD supporters at a funeral for a deceased member. — PYD supporters at a funeral for a deceased member

Further east, Syrian military units attacked a checkpoint manned by Kurdish militiamen in the northeastern city of Qamishli on April 4. Hours later, militiamen from the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) attacked two Syrian military positions on the outskirts of Qamishli. The attacks resulted in a number of deaths on both sides and marked the first such incident to occur in the predominantly Kurdish Hasakah Province since the Syrian military withdrew from the region’s urban centers in the summer of 2012.

Continue reading Intelligence Analysis: The Kurd’s shifting role in the Syrian conflict →

Strategic Analysis: Egypt’s uphill battle for economic recovery

“The purpose is to reassure them that what we agreed on last time is still there, and nothing has changed,” so declared an Egyptian government spokesman after announcing that an IMF delegation would return to Cairo to revive talks on a crucial 4.8 billion USD loan agreement aimed at salvaging Egypt’s economy. Change, however, would be the subtlest word to describe the botched facelift the country underwent since the IMF’s last visit on November 20. After weathering a month of bitter civil unrest, President Morsi successfully strong-armed an Islamist-backed constitution into law on December 25. In doing so, he left gaping wounds across Egyptian society and exposed his own politically perilous path to restoring the economy.

On December 9, while Islamists and liberals were engaged in pitched battles over the draft constitution outside of the Presidential palace, Mr. Morsi was confronted by his own political backers in the Muslim Brotherhood over a new economic program aimed at appeasing IMF loan conditions. As part of the plan, sales taxes on commodities ranging from steel to soft drinks would be raised, while subsidies on fuel and electricity would be reduced. In less than 12 hours after the list of tax increases was published on Morsi’s Facebook page, the government retracted the proposal and asked the IMF to postpone the loan agreement.

Continue reading Strategic Analysis: Egypt’s uphill battle for economic recovery →

Strategic Analysis: Reprecussions of Chinese investments in the Nile River Basin

“He who rides the sea of the Nile must have sails woven of patience.” So noted British novelist William Golding a century ago; and his saying has clearly taken root in Beijing today. Under the radar of the Western world, China has discreetly established its influence among Africa’s emerging powerhouses, setting its sights on the continent’s most contested resource: the Nile River. Amidst the decline of Egypt and the rise of Ethiopia, Beijing has managed to manipulate a long-brewing conflict between two major African powers to its benefit, slowly replacing the West as the continent’s new kingmaker.

In recent months, China has ruffled feathers from Lake Victoria to Alexandria with its aggressive funding and building of dams in Ethiopia, an aggressive contender for regional hegemony. In August 2012, Kenyan environmental activists urged China to withdraw a 500 million USD investment in Ethiopia’s Omo river dam, charging that energy produced by the dam would result in the draining of Kenya’s Lake Turkana. While it’s no surprise that the activists’ calls failed to ring alarm bells on the banks of the Potomac or Thames, China’s dam building has undoubtedly caught the attention of the West’s allies along the Nile.

Graphic display of Ethiopia’s GERD project.

In September 2012, the whistleblower website Wikileaks exposed a 2010 message by Egypt’s ambassador to Lebanon stating his country’s intention to attack the Chinese-funded Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile River, the Nile River’s primary artery. That same year, Ethiopia sparked an uproar amongst its Arab neighbors to the north by disregarding a 1929 agreement originally imposed by British colonial rulers that gave Egypt control of 90% of the Nile’s water and veto power over any dam projects which could hamper water supplies.

Continue reading Strategic Analysis: Reprecussions of Chinese investments in the Nile River Basin →