CMA signs preliminary peace agreement in Algiers, Algeria May 2015

Mali Analysis: CMA suspends participation in Algiers Accord peace process, unlikely to impact overall stability

Executive Summary:

  • A letter declaring suspension of participation in the Algiers Accord monitoring committee due to factors including a lack of progress and repeated ceasefire violations, was released by The Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA).
  • The CMA’s concerns are to a large extent legitimate. As such, the decision to suspend participation is likely political in nature, and intended to pressure the Malian government and other signatories to the Algiers Accord to improve implementation of the agreement’s terms, following an extended period of stagnation.
  • In this context, the CMA is likely to rejoin the process in the coming weeks or months once their demand for a mediated dialogue has been met. Furthermore, their withdrawal is unlikely to presage a notable increase in Mali’s already significant volatility.
  • Travel to Bamako may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding criminal activity and potential militancy.

Mali Analysis: CMA suspends participation in Algiers Accord peace process, unlikely to impact overall stability | MAX Security

Current Situation: CMA Suspends Participation in Algiers Accord

  • The Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) has suspended its participation in the Algiers Accord monitoring committee and all of its subcommittees, according to a letter dated December 19, and signed by the organization’s president, Alghabass Ag Intalla. The Algiers Accord, which is intended to settle all disputes between the separatist and pro-government organizations, was signed by the CMA leadership on June 20, 2015, whilst the Malian government and the pro-government Imghad and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA) signed on May 15.
  • The decision is said to be predicated on a number of factors, including an absence of progress in the implementation of the terms of the Accord over the past 18 months; repeated ceasefire violations by pro-government armed groups, with attacks on CMA positions, human rights violations, and forced displacement of local populations; a resurgence in violence links to drug trafficking and terrorism; the proliferation of armed groups encouraged and trained by the government; and the failure of the international community to encourage respect for the terms of the Algiers Accord. The document further calls for a high level meeting in the presence of international mediators in order to save the Accord and preserve the credibility of the process and the actors involved.
  • In a statement posted on social media, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), one of the core groups under the CMA umbrella, announced that it will continue to participate in security aspects of the peace process, specifically the Operational Coordination Mechanism (MOC) and the Technical and Security Committee (CTS). The former measure involves the conduct of joint patrols including Malian Army troops, CMA fighters, and members of GATIA, whilst the latter provides a forum for the discussion of security issues. The CMA also reaffirmed its commitment to the implementation of an MOC in Gao Region on December 16, prior to the release of the statement.
  • The CMA previously suspended their participation in the monitoring committee on August 23, in response to the presence of GATIA forces in the city of Anefis. These forces later withdrew from the town on September 16, and the committee subsequently reformed.
  • Intalla, who is secretary general of the HCUA and formerly a member of the Ansar Dine militant organization and, was appointed as president of the CMA on December 17, taking over from Bilal Ag Acherif of the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The position rotates between the heads of the CMA’s constituent elements, and Intalla is slated to hold the post for a period of six months.

Assessments & Forecast:

  1. The assertion by the CMA that the implementation of the Algiers Accord has witnessed little progress is not unfounded. The grievances which have contributed to the development of separatist sentiment in the center and north of the country, including a dearth of investment or economic development flowing from the capital in the south, and insufficient political autonomy, have remained largely unaddressed. This was recently crystallized in the CMA’s decision to boycott the November 20 municipal elections, which was due in large part to the failure of the Malian government to implement interim authorities to manage the administrative regions of Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, Taoudenit, and Menaka. Furthermore, the establishment of an authority in Gao which was slated for July 15 catalyzed unruly protests in the city on July 12 due to perceptions that it was unrepresentative of the population, leaving three dead and at least thirty injured. Meanwhile, the security measures attached to the Algiers Accord have been slow to materialize. This is not to say that no such measures have been carried out, for instance joint patrols involving French Barkhane forces and CMA members were recorded in Kidal in later October. The CMA itself has also been in part responsible for delays, as noted above with the establishment of the MOC in Gao, yet the process as a whole has seen limited progress. Finally, clashes continue to be recorded between CMA and GATIA forces in the vicinity of the city of Kidal, and beyond. Most recently, on December 1 elements of the two organizations clashed between the towns of Tessit and Intillit in the Gao Region, leaving a least one dead and a dozen injured as GATIA fighters allegedly seized a CMA base in Marsi, located approximately 30km from Intillit. With these broad dynamics in mind, the decision by the CMA to suspend its participation in the Accord is unsurprising.
  2.  It is highly likely that Intalla’s appointment as president of the CMA served as the immediate catalyst for the suspension, particularly in light of the short time period between him taking on the role, and the issuance of the letter. Intalla, whilst not explicitly or openly hostile towards the Malian government, has been vocal in his concern regarding the delays to the implementation of the agreement. He has reportedly attributed measure of this inactivity to “biased” understandings of the terms of the Algiers Accord and individuals who wish to actively disrupt the process in order to serve their own agendas, and recently asserted that there has been an uptick in attacks targeting the CMA. Thus, the letter is directly representative of his established position, and is likely intended as an attempt to pressure the government and GATIA following a prolonged period of stagnation.
  3. FORECAST: We assess that it is likely that the CMA will rejoin the Algiers peace process within the coming weeks or months. Firstly, the letter itself offers something of a solution to the current impasse, with the demand for a high-level, internationally mediated, meeting in order to “save” the agreement. Secondly, the move to suspend participation is not unprecedented. The CMA’s previous withdrawal, whilst admittedly predicated on a more limited grievance, extended only as long as GATIA forces remained in Anefis. In this context, it is possible that the decision to hold a meeting corresponding to the CMA’s demands may resolve the situation, though this will in turn likely be contingent on the outcomes reached. Thirdly, the HCUA’s sustained participation in joint security measures is encouraging, and demonstrates that the peace process has not been abandoned entirely. That the measure has been undertaken by one of the CMA’s core groups, and the president’s own organization, further strengthens this assessment. Finally, and more broadly, the Accord, despite its current failings, provides an established framework, and has resulted in the development of key institutions, for the provision of development and stability in Mali’s restive center and north. Moreover, significant political capital has been invested into the agreement by the CMA, the Malian government, and GATIA, which risks being undermined by a prolonged or volatile suspension of participation. It is therefore within the interests of all involved to make a concerted effort to reintegrate the CMA into the process.
  4. FORECAST: With this in mind, it appears unlikely that the CMA’s decision will have a noteable destabilizing effect on Mali’s already highly volatile security environment. Intermittent attacks by elements affiliated with GATIA are liable to take place regardless of the CMA’s disposition towards the Accords, and we do not anticipate that the suspension will provide a specific driver for additional attacks, particularly given that GATIA does not appear to benefit from the CMA’s withdrawal. Similarly, militant activity in Mali has thus far not been noticeably affected by the progress of the Algiers Accord, or the lack thereof. The CMA, meanwhile, has been shown to be prone to fracturing in the past as a result of ethnic divisions or perceptions of the coalition’s infirmity. Given that the majority of these groups typically declare their intention to enforce the implementation of the agreement, there exists an underlying potential that the suspension could presage a rift, yet as the decision was likely intended to move the agreement forward, fragmentation appears unlikely. By the same same token, the possibility of splintering, whilst limited, provides an additional impetus for the CMA to resume participation in the accords. Even in the event that a faction does break away, such instances have not been accompanied by notable reprisals or other instances of violence in the past. In this context, and given the expected limited time frame of the CMA’s withdrawal, we do not anticipate an increase in violence associated with the CMA’s decision.

Recommendations:

  1.  Travel to Bamako may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding criminal activity and potential militancy.
  2. We advise against all travel to northern and central Mali, as well as border regions, at this time given the threats from militant and rebel groups operating in the area, as well as ongoing ethnic tensions.