Intelligence Analysis: Iranian intentions following resumption of nuclear negotiations

On February 26-27, nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 resumed in Kazakhstan after an eight month deadlock, concluding with a pledge to continue talks in March and April, respectively.  On March 18, technical experts from both sides will meet in Istanbul, while high-level talks will be held weeks later on April 5-6 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Following the conclusion of talks, chief Iranian negotiator Saeed Jalili issued notably positive statements, calling the talks “a turning point,” and that a newly enhanced proposal offered by Western powers was “more realistic,” likely in reference to the previously rejected proposal offered in June 2012 talks in Moscow.

The proposal reportedly offered by Western powers included  an easing of sanctions on the trade of gold and other precious metals, in exchange for halting uranium enrichment to 20% levels. In an unprecedented move, the West dropped a longstanding demand that Iran close its heavily fortified enrichment facility at Fordow, while offering to allow Iran to keep a small portion of its 20% enriched uranium stockpile instead of transferring it to a third country for conversion. The proposal did not include any lifting of sanctions on Iran’s energy sector.

The enhanced proposal offered by the West in recent talks marks a considerable softening of their original position with regards to Iran’s ability to enrich uranium, an issue which thus far has remained a key hindrance to a negotiated agreement. Previously, Western powers and Israel have demanded the complete closure of the Fordow facility and the transfer of all 20% enriched uranium to a third party, after which it would be converted to civilian uses and returned to Iran. Allowing Iran to keep the Fordow facility open and maintain a small stockpile of 20% enriched uranium likely comes in response to Iran’s own conversion of its stockpile for use in a medical reactor. Iran is estimated to have taken these steps in order to stave off threats of a preventative strike by Israel, given that the stockpiling of 250kg of 20% enriched uranium would allow Iran to quickly produce a nuclear weapon. While the proposal does allow Iran to keep a small portion of its stockpile, it includes measures which would prevent the regime from stockpiling sufficient amounts for a nuclear device.

Despite the positive remarks given by Iran’s chief negotiator, prospects for a negotiated solution remain low under current conditions. The West’s softening of position, particularly regarding Iran’s enrichment rights was interpreted by Iran’s leadership domestically as a sign of weakness and defeat, particularly with regards to the effectiveness of sanctions. Meanwhile, Jalili’s positive statements to the West are likely aimed at breaking the coordination and resolve of the U.S. and its allies on the issue of sanctions and possible military action. By attempting to convince the West that Iran is serious about reaching a negotiated solution, the regime likely seeks to reduce the willingness of various Western states to implement additional, mutually consequential economic sanctions, while impacting their resolve to jointly agree on a possible military threat.

Furthermore, Saeed Jalili is a close confidant of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini, who at this time remains opposed to any negotiated agreement with the West. With mounting internal divisions within Iran, including within the leadership class, prolonging the nuclear crisis with the West allows Khameini to rally Iran behind an external issue. This strategy is highlighted by Jalili’s reluctance to formally acknowledge the West’s proposal itself, nor did any negotiations take place in Kazakhstan directly relating to it.  The proposal’s exclusion of an immediate lifting of energy sanctions is just one of several possible hindrances which could collapse upcoming rounds in negotiations.  The lifting of energy sanctions remains a key Iranian demand, in addition to maintiaining the right to enrich uranian.

Should upcoming high level talks in Almaty end without a major agreement or be prolonged, tensions over preventative military action are likely to increase. The U.S. and Israel remain wary of past Iranian attempts to stall negotiations as a means to advance their nuclear program, and statements emanating from both governments suggest that threats of military action may increase should the Almaty talks collapse.

Tensions over a military strike will likely increase should Iran embark on any significant advancement of its nuclear program during or after the negotiation process. Such actions include putting the Arak heavy water facility into full operational capacity, the installing and operating of advanced centrifuges in Natanz or Fordow, or the stockpiling of 20% enriched uranium to the amount of 250kg.

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