By Dan R.

The discovery of natural gas off the shores of Cyprus and Israel in the eastern Mediterranean has marked the beginning of a new chapter in the Middle East conflict. Reports began to surface last week, claiming that Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, will discuss the stationing of Israeli fighter jets at a Cypriot airbase on his visit to the island nation on February 16. If such reports prove to be accurate, the event has the potential to be a revolutionary strategic alliance. However, the aforementioned discussions may in fact be purely an Israeli negotiating tactic in an effort to bridge the rift between it and its former ally Turkey. The Middle East is widely known as the staging ground for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, there is a lesser known conflict, greatly overshadowed by that between Israel and her Arab neighbors – that which involves Turkey and Cyprus. The conflict between Turkey and Cyprus, like the Arab-Israeli, also has a history of bloody confrontation on religion, ethnicity, territory and recognition. However, the aspect that reaches headlines above all others is the ongoing dispute over natural gas deposits that lay off the Cypriot southern coast. The discovery launched a thus far rhetorical battle over drilling rights between Greek Cyprus and Turkey as the patron of the Greek Republic’s breakaway Turkish Cypriot counterpart. American-operated natural gas exploration site Noble Ferrington Israel has developed and maintained several natural gas drilling and pumping platforms in the eastern Mediterranean Sea in its Exclusive Economic Zone. Moreover, Israeli companies, such as Delek, own a significant share of drilling platforms in Cyprus. Israel thus, likely sees the natural gas reserves as a strategic asset that is vital to ensure Israel’s economic and energy independence. Israel is well known for its determination and dedication with regard to the protection of its interests positioned outside its borders. That said, the stationing of a permanent air force operation base on foreign soil would essentially be a revolution in Israeli military affairs. If the reports are true, this will be the first time that Israel will deploy IDF airmen outside the borders of Israel (not including Palestinian territories), a step that would likely require legislative action. When examining the tactical, operational, and strategic military benefits for a deployment of fighter jets in Cyprus, one would have to assess the constant parameters, like the distance from drilling and pumping platforms, coupled with reaction and flight time. Upon their inspection, one would discover that the distance to such drilling installations from either the Cypriot or Israeli air bases is negligible. The similar distances thus make the disproportion in reaction and flight time only a matter of a few seconds, and therefore, providing no significant tactical, operational, or strategic benefits. However, after dismissing the aforementioned, a greater hidden agenda must be examined. The deployment of Israeli aircrafts on Cypriot soil has considerable weight on the diplomatic, political, and rhetorical aspects of the deteriorated relations between Turkey and Israel. Since the Gaza flotilla incident, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel declined to a point that the Turks made threats to take military action against any threat on a second flotilla. This unfortunate turn of events lead to the reaffirmation of the strategic security relations between Israel, Greece and Cyprus; essentially forming a de facto military alliance. The formation of a pact between such states that feel threatened by Turkish maneuvering can serve to act as the counter weight to Turkish regional aspirations. As a united front, the new alliance would not likely accept or fall in line with Ankara’s dictates. Furthermore, the Turkish government refuses to recognize natural gas partnership of Israel and Greek Cyprus as long as it comes at the expense of the breakaway Turkish Republic on the island nation. The simple mention of the deployment of Israeli fighter jets may alone be perceived by Turkey as a threat to its regional hegemonic objectives. Such a veiled Israeli threat may in fact provide Turkey the realization that good relations with Israel would likely benefit those objectives in the long term. Should relations once again begin to warm, Israel would likely reexamine their need to station its fighter jets on Cypriot waters, thus allowing Turkey to continue its hegemonic goals and restoring the relative power balance that existed in the region.

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Syria’s military is escalating its offensive on the country’s Sunni rebels; however the violence in Syria is not likely to end in the near future, even if Assad is ousted. To that point, Damascus has been unable to implement a strategy capable of ending the eleven-month Sunni uprising, likewise the opposition has yet to oust the regime from power.

Syria’s sectarian fault-lines have been drawn for centuries and the opposition has been unsuccessful in diminishing the importance of such divisions. Most importantly, they failed to convince Assad’s forces to defect en mass, thus Syria’s military remains a cohesive, effective, and motivated fighting force. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda’s recent call for jihad against the Alawite regime will be unhelpful in persuading minorities to abandon it. Furthermore, Damascus has prepared for an internal Sunni uprising for over four decades and while many are quick to predict Assad’s demise, his ouster would not end the sectarian conflict in Syria. Ultimately, the conflict’s sectarian character, which is often overlooked, along with several other important factors is leading to a long and bloody civil war in Syria.

The Alawites - a distinct religious sect – are the backbone of the Assad regime. As a consequence of various historical and political factors, they along with Syria’s other minorities determined that influence in the military offered the most favorable course to enhance their overall well-being in the country. Direct political and military influence is seen as the best way to offset the Sunni Arab majority. Pointing to their domination of the military, some 80% of the officer positions in the military are held by Alawites, although they make up just 10% of the general population. The Sunnis on the other hand, have been largely marginalized or absent from important positions within the armed forces and the government.

Opposing the regime is the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA) which is composed of recent defectors from the country’s armed forces. However, most defectors are Sunnis who held lower-ranking positions or served in non-elite units. Their numbers are growing, but they are outgunned, outnumbered, decentralized, and becoming increasingly divided. They have seized a few small and isolated cities, yet they mostly remain on the defensive.

The second major factor leading to a prolonged war of attrition is the government’s hesitance to use its entire arsenal. Assad’s year-long crackdown has claimed some 8,000 lives, yet surprisingly his repression has been carefully calibrated. To put this number into perspective, Hafez al-Assad – the current president’s deceased father – killed five-times that number in the city of Hama alone during a swift operation to crush a 1982 Muslim Brotherhood rebellion. The operation lasted just 26 days.

Contrary to the UN sanctioned intervention in Libya, Assad believes the international community is willing to tolerate the current level of violence in Syria and will not resort to direct military involvement. It is important to note that Assad has largely refrained from deploying Syria’s air force and missile arsenals. Unlike in 1982, Assad calculates that the heavy use of the air force and ballistic missiles would ultimately bring about foreign intervention and directly threaten the regime’s viability. Damascus is likely to utilize its strategic weaponry only after determining that the positive benefits of their usage would outweigh the negative.

On the diplomatic front, a UN resolution seeking to end the bloodshed was expectantly vetoed by Moscow and Beijing. Nonetheless, hours before the vote and knowingly under intense media and foreign scrutiny, Assad launched his deadliest assault yet. The offensive in Homs, which is still ongoing, has killed thousands and was a clear message to the international community that the regime is far from finished.

Another contributing factor is that the Assad regime is not without its allies. Damascus continues to receive support from Russia, China, Iraq, Iran and Lebanon. The commander of Iran’s Al-Quds force is reportedly serving in Syria’s war-room and Hezbollah and Iranian forces are actively fighting along-side Assad’s forces. For the opposition, recently failed diplomatic initiatives are likely to compel Western and Sunni Arab states to begin a campaign of covert arming, funding, and training of rebel forces. This would be a major development, but for the short term the opposition will remain merely capable of slowly bleeding Assad’s military.

With neither side able to achieve a total-victory in the short-term, the situation is likely to foment a continued breakdown of the Syrian state as a cohesive and full-functioning entity. Areas with a heavy minority presence will remain loyal to the ruling regime. While predominately Sunni areas opposed to Assad’s rule will continue attempts to establish bridgeheads for a further insurgency. Besides organized fighting, communal warfare between rival sects is likely to increase in towns and cities of mixed populations. Moreover, should the security situation deteriorate to a point of no-return, the Assad government could resort to withdrawing to its historical power-base in the mountains of northwest Syria and attempt to re-establish an independent Alawite state there.

Most analysis regarding the Syrian war continues to gloss over the sectarian issues which are at the heart of this conflict. The country’s Sunnis have come too far and achieved too much to simply abandon their cause outright. Also, their defeat would subsequently put them at the mercy of an even more ruthless and dictatorial regime. With revolutionary fervor and Islamist sentiments gripping the region, they likely feel now is their best chance to remove the forty-plus year Alawite domination of Syria.

On the other side, being an unprotected minority in the Middle East is often a painful reality which the Alawites, Druze, Christians, and Kurds know all too well. These groups have been protected by the Assad regime for decades and is not something they take for granted. With that being considered, Alawites have legitimate fears that their entire existence is in jeopardy, and will continue their fight to protect it. With neither side willing to give in, Syrians are entrenching for a long and bloody civil war.

By Jay R.

The collapse of Africa’s most populous nation into civil war may hinge on the stability of one unsuspecting middle belt city

Nigeria’s Middle Belt region is where the country’s Christian south and Muslim north come to a head. This convergence of religion manifests in the capital Abuja, where the equally represented populations are generally tolerant of one another. In the nearby city of Jos whose societal make up is starkly similar to the capital, religious intolerance is brewing tension to a dangerous boiling point.

Security forces rush to intervene in sectarian clashes in Jos

Over the last twenty years, Jos has been plagued by sectarian violence which has claimed thousands of lives while displacing many others. In 2010, week-long riots resulted in the death of hundreds of locals and the destruction of churches and mosques alike. This steady campaign of attacks against places of worship has made chances of reconciling these populations a seemingly insurmountable feat. The people of Jos may not yet be cognizant of this fact, but the deteriorating security situation in the rest of Nigeria may have a far more tragic impact in a place with a deeply rooted history of intolerance.

Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim north has become increasingly engulfed in a violent campaign by fundamentalist violence. On January 20, Nigeria’s second city of Kano was devastated by a wave of bombings by Boko Haram Jihadists against military, police, and government installations, killing upwards of 250 people. Continuous attacks like these, along with a previous Boko Haram warning for all Christians to leave the northern states, have incited nearly 35,000 people to flee southward thus far.

These newly created refugees, who are leaving with such panic and haste that they are not bothering to bring their most valuable of possessions with them, are making way for Jos. Positioned just outside of the Muslim north, Jos provides a convenient safe haven for Christian refugees as they journey towards the friendlier south. As many of those refugees opt to remain in Jos, they threaten to alter the delicate sectarian balance in the city, paving the way for shattering the city’s hard-won peace.

Given Jos’ recent history of violence, it remains clear that fierce and deadly riots may erupt from even seemingly insignificant altercations. In 2001, the appointment of a Muslim resident as the Local Coordinator to Eradicate Poverty, sparked outrage from the Christian community, which led to mass rioting and destruction. The skyrocketing death toll of those riots forced the local morgue to dig mass graves to compensate for the lack of space. The 2001 riots are a testament that Christians of Nigeria are not akin to sheep being led to the slaughter. Amidst the recent escalation in the country’s north, Christian residents have already been stockpiling arms, becoming increasingly disillusioned from the government’s willingness and capability to protect them.

Just as the Muslims carry out attacks against Christians and their places of worship in the north, the Christians are expected to respond forcefully and aggressively. In Jos, the new Christian arrivals from the north may look to seek revenge on those who made them flee, and the Muslim community of Jos may be their most viable target. Increasing fear of marginalization amongst the city’s Muslims only plays to the hands of Boko Haram extremists, who undoubtedly see Jos as a key target in their campaign to destabilize the country. As with much of Nigeria’s Muslims, many citizens of Jos already identify with the group for its stated goals of toppling the government for its widespread corruption, albeit through replacing it with a regime based on Shariah law. While the city has until now been spared from Boko Haram’s wrath, it remains’ clear that the Jos’s Muslims will eventually be forced to display where their loyalty truly lies.

Given its geopolitical position and contemporary politics, the city of Jos is in many ways a microcosm for the whole of Nigeria. As such, Jos’ descent into sectarian violence may be the first indicator for the collapse of stability in the nation’s crucial beltway area, which has until now been spared from such turmoil. Should widespread violence hit Jos, it will only be a matter of time before other mixed cities in the area take note, eventually threatening peace in the political center of Abuja. In a striking, if not tragic coincidence, Christian citizens of Jos refer to their town as “Jesus our savior.” If the city’s history is any indicator, Jos will need its savior now more than ever, as the stability of Africa’s most populous nation may just hang in the balance.

If you would like more information on prospects for stability in Nigeria, click here.

Reforming much-hated security forces are the first step in resolving the Island nation’s sectarian conflict before it deteriorates further.

As Bahrain braces for the year anniversary of the outbreak of its protest movement, worrying trends are beginning to emerge in the activity of its Shia-led activist groups. Since February 14 2011, the opposition’s modus operandi consisted of mostly civil disobedience acts aimed at drawing the world’s attention to the inequality facing the Shia majority. In past months however, activists have stepped up acts of violence, mainly aimed at security forces, whose alleged brutality has come to symbolize their oppression at the hands of the Sunni monarchy. 

An opposition activist runs from riot police in Bahrain.

On January 24, opposition groups launched a campaign dubbed “the Rebel’s grip” aimed at expelling the regime’s security forces from Shia villages in the central and northern parts of the Island. The campaign comes days after a prominent Shia cleric issued a particularly scathing sermon, calling for supporters to assault any security personnel suspected of attacking female protesters.  The opposition’s rage towards security forces comes after a year of high profile incidents involving protesters’ deaths as a result of police brutality. Many of these incidents were caught on video, spread through social media and ingrained in the minds of activists.  

Regardless of whether their motives are justified or not, the opposition’s shift toward violence presents a real threat to the prosperity of a nation which seeks to shift from natural resources to international trade and commerce as its future source of revenue.   In an effort to quell this discontent, the regime launched the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) which recommended reforming the police force as a primary step towards reconciliation. In early January 2012, public security chief Tariq Al Hassan announced the implementation of “community policing” programs in which 500 officers would be recruited in order to police their own communities.

These programs are likely the result of consultations with recently enlisted Western experts, who have themselves been part of the trend of community policing which has swept forces from Los Angeles to London in recent decades.  This policy was born out of the realization that trust and coordination between the police and the communities they serve is a critical factor in preserving order.  It remains clear that such reforms are crucial to restoring stability in Bahrain, given the ever-widening gap of trust between police and Shia residents.

Unfortunately for the Bahraini government however, community policing is not a quick fix for the Island’s problems and therefore must be implemented holistically and patiently in order to achieve real results.  Ground level reforms already proposed will not be successful in winning hearts and minds unless the police leadership makes it clear to the people that their perceptions of the police are indeed important.  Performance surveys gauging the impact of new programs, meetings with community leaders, and increased transparency regarding officer misconduct are all proven methods which have helped improve public opinion of police forces in Europe and elsewhere. 

In addition, Bahraini security forces must place special emphasis on appealing to the new generation of Shia youth and garnering their trust. Police must learn about quality of life issues in Shia villages, penetrating schools and setting up programs aimed at cooperatively solving these problems.

Lastly, the Bahraini police must accept and compensate for the factors that are currently tarnishing their image and effectively preventing them from fulfilling their role in preserving order.  As seen in the past year, the primary factor is the issue of police brutality- a trend particularly difficult to stem while persistent riots require a forceful response in order to be dispersed.  As such, a two pronged effort is required to nip the bud of what has become a central issue in the Bahraini discourse. Firstly, a dependable and transparent internal affairs division must be established within the force. Second, the Public Security Ministry must work to coordinate and approve peaceful demonstrations, even those taking place in high profile areas of the capital. 

It is at this point that the success of community policing in Bahrain is dependent upon the government’s overall willingness to commit to reconciliation with willing opposition groups, including the staunchly opposed Al Wefaq organization.  In a nation where mistrust between the government and the people is deeply entrenched along sectarian lines, the former’s choice in allowing the latter to demonstrate is truly the hardest step.  Indeed, the concept of a liberal policing policy in a region known for absolutist rule may seem laughable to many skeptics. However, it was likely those same skeptics who laughed at the possibility of free elections in former dictatorships like Tunisia, or the power of the common man in Egypt. 

As such, community policing indeed provides the opportunity for the Bahraini government to engage in its own revolutionary act, by proactively ensuring stability by restoring trust between the people and the police.  As exhibited elsewhere in the region, they may not have a choice.  

What’s next for Bahrain? Click here to get the inside scoop. 

By Daniel N.

Despite the media’s love affair with the anti-SCAF activist movement, the Egyptian revolution has already been secretly decided.

Traffic returns to Cairo's Tahrir Square after thousands gathered for events marking the January 25 anniversary.

After the tense buildup to the anniversary of the revolution, Egypt’s new ruling elite can breathe a sigh of relief. While tens of thousands of liberal activists swarmed Tahrir Square agains
t the military leadership, they failed to rehash the nationwide anger which led to the ousting of Hosni Mubarak on January 25 of last year.  It seems clear that after a year of political unrest, sectarian violence, civil strikes, and economic turmoil, the majority of Egyptians have opted to ensure their security, even if it means forgoing the original goals of the revolution. This security has been achieved by the emergence of a new balance of power, carefully negotiated against the backdrop of parliamentary elections between the Muslim Brotherhood and the ruling military council. 

This shadowy agreement first became evident in November 2011, when liberal activists engulfed Downtown Cairo in rioting, threatening stability before the onset of parliamentary elections. While the media flocked to Mohammed Mahmoud Street to capture romantic images of stone-throwing youth, Muslim Brotherhood leaders secretly met with SCAF officials to decipher a way to end the violence in a mutually beneficial manner.

It was during these behind the scenes meetings that the two parties allegedly reconciled their previous differences of the nature of Egypt’s constitution, agreeing in turn to each do their part to ensure stability in the country.  As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood would agree to support the SCAF’s timetable for transfer of power, pledging to refrain from contributing to any protest movement which may arise.  For its part, the SCAF agreed to allow what would be a Brotherhood dominated parliament to decipher the constitution while reportedly ensuring a presidential system which would ensure the military’s continued influence in government.

As reports of the agreement began to stream in through local media, the Muslim Brotherhood staunchly denied their participation. However, the course of their actions since November provide a telling indicator that Egypt’s most influential faction is now in cahoots with increasingly unpopular military council.   When riots flared again in December 2011, the Brotherhood came out in support of the SCAF’s timetable for presidential elections, going against calls made by liberal politicians. Just as Egypt appeared divided over the SCAF-induced celebratory nature of the revolution’s anniversary, the Muslim Brotherhood openly held supportive rallies in Tahrir Square opposite thousands of secular and liberal activists who were calling for its removal from power.  

Given the media’s fascination with Egypt’s seemingly continuous revolution, one would think that the Muslim Brotherhood’s support of the much-hated SCAF would detract from its popularity. The Brotherhood’s subsequent success in parliamentary elections and ever growing popularity proves that the Egyptian reality is not constant with the media’s portrayal.

In reality, the Brotherhood’s agreement with the SCAF did not draw the ire of the average Egyptian for the simple fact that much of the population simply wishes for a restoration of security.  The instability and uncertainty in the wake of Mubarak’s ousting has not only put many Egyptians out of work, but has also caused many residents to fear for their personal safety in a growing security vacuum. As such, the outrage of the educated liberal elite over issues like imprisoned bloggers has continuously failed to resonate with a population which is finds itself struggling to survive.  In their eyes, the destabilizing violence caused by these groups’ pursuit of liberal-democratic governance has only contributed to their hardship, effectively becoming more of a nuisance than a legitimate struggle.

The Brotherhood, like the average Egyptian, still views the military as the only entity capable of keeping the country afloat. For a group which desperately needed such security for its rise to power during the lengthy polling period, an agreement to cooperate with the SCAF was clearly a well calculated move.

As Egypt moves forward into the second year since of its rebirth, liberal activist groups are likely to continue drawing media attention through colorful demonstrations in Tahrir Square. Outside of Cairo meanwhile, the average Egyptian has reconciled with the idea that ensuring personal security under a military-influenced government is preferable to the prolonged instability that comes from pursuit of liberal democracy.

Since Mubarak’s ousting, the liberal activists who first took to the streets to spark the uprising have consistently claimed that the revolution has been stolen from under their noses. Embodying that sentiment is their latest protest on January 27 which has been dubbed “Friday of Anger.” Their anger however, need not lie with the military government or the Muslim Brotherhood. As with any undemocratic regime, the SCAF continues to rule not in spite of the Egyptian people, but with their compliance.

Concerned about Egypt’s prospects for stability? Click here.

by Jay R.

The status quo in Cyprus does not provide the needed atmosphere for reuniting the island. 

Cyprus remains divided under Turkish and Greek influences.

After decades of partition, Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders are set to meet once again at Greentree Estate in Long Island, New York, under United Nations auspices.  So, one must ask, after decades-long negotiations, why should we expect a different outcome after the two-day talks beginning on January 23? The answer, we probably should not. 

As many experts on conflict resolution will say, the most appropriate atmosphere for resolution is that both sides are a party to a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) – a condition in which neither side feels that it can gain from the current situation.  Looking at the disparity that exists between Greek and Turkish Cyprus, it is clear that the status quo is more viable for Greek Cypriots over their Turkish counterparts. 

Despite the decades-long separation, Greek Cypriots have seen very few motivating factors that would lead them to desire the resolution of the conflict as quickly as possible.  In the last decade alone, Greek Cyprus has joined the European Union, ascended to controlling defense issues for the regional alliance, and is slated to assume its presidency this coming July. Furthermore, the island-nation has discovered natural gas deposits of its southern coast and has plans to exploit them with regional neighbors Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, and Greece, thus providing de facto international acceptance of those activities.

The only deterrent for Greek Cyprus is the continuing rhetoric of a cantankerous Turkey. The Turkish government under Reycap Erdogan has been quite vocal in its disapproval of Greek Cypriot exploits that in recent history it has gone so far to threaten cutting relations with the European Union and attacking Greek-Cypriot drilling sties in the Mediterranean Sea. However, such a deterrent has not proven to be sufficient, as Greek Cyprus has continued on its course unabated. 

The situation of Turkish Cyprus, however, is quite dissimilar. The Turkish Cypriots situation persists as an unrecognized breakaway territory in the view of the international community with the exception of Turkey – the only country that maintains diplomatic relations, while sustaining a military presence there as well. Such a situation has provided the Turkish Cypriots with only limitations and restrictions on much needed international aid, trade, and travel. The effects of such limitations have afforded the breakaway territory with a crumbling infrastructure and an increasingly disgruntled citizenry. Just this week, attempts to privatize the electrical and telecommunication industries of the islands, led to strikes, which literally shrouded half of Turkish-Cyprus in darkness.

With such a situation, one would think that Turkish Cypriots would be quite motivated to reunify with their Greek brethren, and they very well might be. However, the fact that Turkey is so deeply entrenched in Turkish-Cypriot polity, the ability for Turkish Cypriots to express true will is likely reduced. Furthermore, the Cyprus issue is a matter of national pride for Turkey, as it exists as a proxy battle with their longtime adversaries in Greece. As Turkey continues to assert its influence throughout the region, it is unlikely they will cede their position in this area. 

Meanwhile, Greek Cyprus forges ahead. It does so under the original Cypriot constitution, which provides for shared rule with Turkish Cypriots. This setting has manifested in vacant seats and positions within the Cypriot government that are reserved for Turkish citizens of the island. 

Such vacancies can be viewed as a message to the Turkish Cypriots. The message: Greek Cyprus is stable and successful; you may join us when you are ready, and your seats at the table are awaiting you. 

For all that has been said herein, the condition is likely not ripe for a Cyprus reunification. Simply stated, Greek Cyprus does not have the needed incentive to make the wide-ranging concessions that would foster a resolution. The next question should be, will the situation within Turkish Cyprus become so untenable that it will be forced into resolution, rather than coming from a position of equal strength? This may be the fact as the semblance of disparity is far too great to see how reunification is plausible at this time.

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By Jay R.   

Sectarian-fueled insurgency, secessionist movements, and widespread discontent amongst the population are just some of the issues facing Nigeria’s first truly democratically elected leader. 

Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathon

After his election, there was great hope for President Goodluck Jonathon amongst the populace. He was elected with 57% of the vote, after receiving significant support from the Nigeria’s youth, a key demographic in a nation whose average age is 19.  To them he represented a change from the past and would bring Nigeria to realize its true potential as Africa’s most populous nation with a plethora of oil and mineral resources.

It is clear now however, that charisma alone is not sufficient to rule a country that is so deeply rooted with sectarian divide and government corruption.  Jonathan’s obstacles were evident from the beginning when on that Election Day in April 2011, the predominantly Muslim northern states erupted in violent response to Jonathan’s success, leaving hundreds of people dead in the streets. 

It was not simply the election of a Christian southerner that led the Muslim north to vent their dismay. Nigeria’s ethno-religious divides are so numerous that attempting to account for them all would be impractical and nearly impossible, but the divide between Christian and Muslim is now the most apparent of all. 

Jonathan presides from the Presidential Complex, situated in the provincial capital Abuja, purposely affixed in the country’s center to not show deference towards the Christian south or the Muslim north. But, in this locale, the federal government has the best vantage point to see the various conflicts erupting around it.

From the Muslim north’s Borno State, the Islamist militant group, Boko Haram, has resurged in recent weeks, showing its newfound ability to launch sophisticated attacks with a reach that spans the entire country. This reappearance has shaken the Christian population as their neighborhoods and places have fallen under threat of attack.

In response, President Jonathan, enacted a state of emergency, and shut the nation’s borders as it was now clear that the group was receiving funds and training from Al Qaeda elements elsewhere on the continent. While this swift action appears to be the most appropriate response, it will likely not aid the deteriorating security situation in the long term. 

While founded only recently, Boko Haram has already managed to infiltrate all levels of the Nigerian government, security apparatus and military, whether it be card-carrying members or sympathizers of the group. Nevertheless, such infiltration has made combating the group a nearly insurmountable feat. Reports indicate that military patrols purposely avoid areas in which they know Boko Haram to be operating. Thus, whether it is fear of confrontation, or actual collusion, Boko Haram has nearly free reign for its operations in the Muslim north. 

South of Abuja, towards the Niger Delta – the hub of Nigeria’s vast oil and mineral resources, the local population has become further enraged by Jonathon’s policies. This rise, it must be mentioned, did not appear with Jonathan’s election, but has been a persistent problem since the 1970s, when Nigeria allowed international energy companies to exploit the land and the people of the Niger Delta, which unchecked has resulted in catastrophic circumstances for the native people and their land. 

This situation spawned the rise of militant secessionist movements from the local populations in the Delta regions, who now take part in destroying oil infrastructure, while kidnapping foreign oil workers. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has been the most active of such groups and frequently carries out the aforementioned attacks. The situation in the Niger Delta is another primary reason that Nigeria cannot realize its full potential and it does not appear that the government plans to remedy this issue in the short term. 

Nigerian government officials firmly believe in the idea of “prebendalism”, in which they are entitled to profit directly from the nation’s resources. Such direct control over the revenues of the oil industry, which accounts for approximately 95% of Nigeria’s export business, has not created sufficient desire amongst bureaucrats for overhauling the system, which in turn has come at the expense of the entire population. 

Through their “prebendalist” ideas, government officials have accumulated hundreds of billions of dollars for their personal wealth. Therefore, when the government attempted to slash the fuel subsidy earlier this month, the one benefit Nigerians attain from their oil wealth, it incited tens of thousands of people to take to the street. 

It is widely known that Nigeria cannot afford to maintain its fuel subsidy as it costs the country $8 billion per year to maintain. However, when you have a populace that is bearing the brunt of government corruption and mismanagement over the one viable resource that could bring the country out of a situation where poverty and unemployment is rampant, there is sure to be outcry from the public and in tern, diminished support for President Jonathon. 

President Jonathan, representative of change through some progressive ideas not seen in the country since its independence decades ago, is likely a man before his time. The amount of institutionalized corruption and sectarian divide will provide for a mountainous challenge to achieve real reform in what has become Africa’s most strategically important nation.

Concerned about stability in Sub-Saharan Africa? Click here.  

By Daniel N.

In the absence of collective nationalism, the transitional government must buy the loyalty of renegade militias with resources it may not have.

Libya's new flag.

Libya is currently undergoing a critical phase of its transition process, as the recognized government (NTC) attempts to assert its power over the country. The focal point of these efforts lies at the reformation of the Libyan national military. In post Gaddafi-Libya, this feat requires garnering the trust of powerful tribal militias, many of whom are reluctant to relinquish their hard-fought positions acquired during the civil war. 

Efforts to establish a national military reached a crucial phase in January, when the NTC named Yussef Al-Mangush as chief of staff.  The appointment has since been rejected by two powerful coalitions of tribal militias; the Thwars coalition, which includes the Misrata and Zintan factions; and the Cyrenaica Military Council (CMC), composed of militias in eastern Libya.

The NTC’s continued failure to reign in these tribes has translated into an extremely tense security situation, primarily in Western Libya. While sporadic clashes between factions continue in and around the capital of Tripoli, outlying areas of the country are showing continued signs of lawlessness. Such lawlessness is highlighted by frequent firefights with Tunisian border guards near the Ras Ajdir crossing, as well as the development of smuggling routes into neighboring Algeria, many of which are operated by Al Qaeda-linked militants.

In the capital, militias continue to make their presence felt, constantly harassing NTC officials at government buildings including courthouses and municipal installations. On January 3, Misrata militiamen attacked an old intelligence compound in the center of the city, seeking to rescue a comrade arrested by a rival faction. Four men were killed in the hours-long gun battle that ensued, as fighters used heavy weapons including rocket propelled grenades and heavy machine guns.

The January 3 clashes in Tripoli highlight the significant threat posed by a failure to reign in renegade militias.  In Tripoli itself, the NTC’s two loyal militias which have been tasked with security are significantly outnumbered and outgunned by the Misrata and Zintan forces.  With the realization that forceful disarmament is futile, the NTC has committed to negotiating with these militias, offering them more influence in the future government in exchange for their loyalties. Until now, such efforts by the NTC have not been successful. The appointment of a defense minister from the Zintan militia and his deputy from Misrata, have failed to garner the support of their respective tribes.

Meanwhile, the NTC’s military chief appointment has effectively rehashed an old altercation with Cyrenaica Military Council (CMC) tribes which began in July 2011, before the fall of Tripoli. This rift occurred when rebel commander General Fatah Yunis (Who hailed from a CMC tribe), was murdered in Benghazi. Yunis’s tribe accused the NTC of orchestrating his murder, but vowed to forgo demanding justice until the revolution had ended. 

In addition to the inherent mistrust between various tribes who fought against Gaddafi, restoration of the economy is a key factor in restoring stability. Renegade militias are wary that disbanding their militias will put leave their young fighters without a source of income. As such, the NTC must not only work to restore national revenues, but convince these various tribes that they will all receive their fare share of resources. The Zintan and Misrata militias in particular have been extremely hesitant, as they feel that they should be allotted more resources given their central role in capturing Tripoli and ousting Gaddafi.

Libya’s efforts to restore its economy are currently based on resuming and ensuring oil production, in addition to receiving Gaddifi-regime funds frozen since the beginning of the revolution.  Ensuring a continued flow of oil will become increasingly challenging, given that Libya’s vast drilling and pipeline infrastructure runs across tribally divided areas.

As foreign corporations resume their operations, tribal forces in these areas will become increasingly emboldened to use their strategic positions as leverage to demand more resources from the transitional government. In addition, there is a likelihood that extremist Islamist elements will seek to attack Libya’s vulnerable pipeline infrastructure in order to offset reconstruction efforts and foment stability. Al Qaeda leaders in both the region and in central Asia have already warned that their operatives had already infiltrated Libya under these aims.

Failure to rebuild the Libyan economy will cause significant setbacks in current progress achieved by the NTC, mainly with regard to public services. While high recruitment rates and a resumption of the education system are positive factors, these achievements will be short-lived if the government fails to ensure compensation for these civil servants.

As seen in recent weeks, political influence and resources – not nationalism – will be sufficient for enticing renegade militias to contribute to the rebuilding process. These militias only stand to gain from the current stalemate, as they understand that its prolongation only detracts from the NTC’s much needed legitimacy in the eyes of the world. As such, the NTC may find itself forced to make painful political concessions to these groups, as it has neither the money to buy their loyalty, or the firepower to coerce it.  Failure to make these concessions threatens Libya’s future as a functioning nation-state, and compromises everything its citizens have fought so hard to achieve.  

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By Daniel N.

One unsuspecting Bekaa Valley village has become the focal point of the battle for perceptions of the Syrian conflict.

Lebanese soldiers stand guard near the Syrian border. (El Riyadh)

Immediately after another deadly suicide bombing ripped through central Damascus on Friday, the Assad Regime, the Syrian opposition, and their allies abroad unloaded accusations as to the identity of the perpetrators. While opposition’s assertion of a regime-orchestrated conspiracy has fallen on deaf ears around the world, this latest bombing certainly bolsters Assad’s claim that radical Al Qaeda-linked militants have joined the ranks of collective struggle to topple him.  Regardless of the actual perpetrators, both Assad and the opposition understand that perceptions of Syria descending into sectarian chaos only further cement the international community’s hesitation to expedite his ousting. At the base of Assad’s claims lies the town of Arsal, a sleepy village in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, whose unsuspecting citizens have become embroiled in a heated debate which may just decide the outcome of the Syrian conflict.

Arsal was catapulted into the global spotlight immediately after twin car bombings struck Damascus on December 23, 2011. After the attacks, Syrian officials based their claims of Al Qaeda involvement on statements made days prior by Lebanese Defense Minister Fayez Ghosn, who stated that Jihadists were infiltrating into Syria through illegal border crossings. Ghosn claimed that Arsal, a Sunni village of 40,000 people located 35 kilometers from the Syrian border, had become a hotbed for these activities. The statements sparked outrage amongst Arsal’s residents, who claimed that there was little evidence to suggest that the town was harboring Al Qaeda extremists. While village elders admitted that some local mosques were known as bastions of fundamentalism, they enjoyed little influence over the town’s residents.  In the days that followed, Arsal became the focal point of a heated debate in Lebanon over the existence of Al Qaeda extremists in the country. 

In the broader context, Arsal’s plight has come to highlight the fact that Lebanon is becoming increasingly entangled in the conflict in neighboring Syria. Arsal, like many other villages which dot the northeast border, has become a safe haven for Syrian dissidents fleeing Assad’s crackdown in nearby flashpoint cities like Homs and Hama. The mostly Sunni residents of these villages strongly sympathize with their counterparts in Syria, connecting their struggle against Assad’s Alawite regime with their own ethnic tensions vis-à-vis Lebanon’s powerful Shia parties. This assistance has prompted the Syrian military to penetrate into Lebanon on multiple junctures, killing residents and capturing dissidents who recently fled. In addition, many villagers charge that plainclothed men (likely Hezbollah operatives) have kidnapped Syrian activists and taken them across the border into the regime’s custody.   

Lebanon’s March 14 opposition, which represents the country’s anti-Assad Sunnis and Christians, has insisted that Ghosn’s accusations against Arsal exemplify the reality that the cabinet is now acting on behalf of the Syrian regime.  Indeed, the accusations have been construed as an insult to a nation which has struggled to rebrand itself as a civil and sovereign nation after years of civil war and foreign occupation. Even Prime Minister Miqati, who’s party allied itself with Hezbollah to form the ruling coalition has distanced himself from Ghosn’s charges, albeit has failed to take a firm stance in opposition.

Back in Damascus, the Assad regime has continued to exploit the latest suicide attack by alluding to its long-standing accusation that the Syrian opposition has been infiltrated by extremist elements.  As such, the regime will likely turn once more to its allies in the Lebanese government to sell its version of the story, urging them to officially concede that Al Qaeda militants have indeed infiltrated from their territory into Syria.

Should the Lebanese government adopt this position, it would constitute a serious blow to the image of the Syrian opposition, as a (seemingly) sovereign entity would confirm to the world that fears regarding sectarian consequences of a post-Assad Syria are indeed justified. Assad’s camp knows all too well that the mere thought of a destabilized Syria on the doorstep of a recovering Iraq is more than enough to deter the international community from taking any actions against him, no matter how heinous his crackdown has become.

The March 14 opposition has already warned that such an announcement rivals would only serve to drag Lebanon even further into the Syrian conflict by implicating its already enraged Sunni populace with involvement with extremist activity. Meanwhile, the residents of Arsal are likely watching developments in both Damascus and Beirut with utmost concern, plotting their response to a possible renewed onslaught of accusations regarding their alleged extremist ties. Little do they know that upholding the image of their once-sleepy hamlet may prove to be a critical factor in ousting one of the region‘s most wicked dictatorships.  

What’s in store for Lebanon? Ask our analysts!