The Dubai police issued a warning on May 8 against groups who intentionally puncture car tires and proceed to steal money from the car owner as they repair the damage. At least two cars have been targeted over the past two months as the owners withdrew large sums of money from banks in Dubai.

The explosion took place at the ladies lavatory in the Faculty of Law building injuring two students and one employee. We assess this attack is connected to a recent influx of similar explosions in Istanbul, likely initiated by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to spread fear among the public. It is possible that this specific attack was in retaliation to the killing of five PKK members –including two women – in the eastern province on May 8.

The first protest is slated for 16:30 local time in front of the Muqataa, the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) main offices, over the deteriorating health conditions of the Palestinian hunger-striking prisoners. The second protest is called for by West Bank University staff in the wake of the PA’s lack of funds to improve working conditions.

While the first protest reflects the prolonged effect of the prisoners issue on the Palestinian society, the second protest mirrors the effect of the economic hardships on the mindset amongst the Palestinians.

On May 8 dozens of people protested against the government’s failure to construct an alternative bridge to the now inactive Jal al-Dib bridge by blocking the Beirut-Jounieh highway. The protesters caused major traffic jams along the important route. The protesters, residents of Metn, claimed they would continue blocking the road till an appropriate exit and entry system to their town from Jal al Dib is built. The protest is one of many demonstrations that have recently taken place over the populace’s discontent with public services and infrastructure. More protests of the sort cannot be ruled out in the near term.

King Abdullah II reiterated yesterday, May 7, that he is determined to commence parliamentary elections at the end of the year. It is likely a response to resigned Prime Minister Awn Al-Khasawneh who claimed that the Monarchy and the intelligence apparatus stopped him from carrying out political reforms. Meanwhile, the Islamic Action Front has warned the new government that it would react if the government fails to address the ongoing economic hardships. The IAF is likely capitalizing on the ongoing economic hardships in order to incite protests and fuel simmering civil discontent. It is likely that this trend will persist in the near term.

Dozens of protesters temporarily cut-off the highway in the northern Sinai Peninsula near Al-Arish in demand that Egypt put pressure on Israel to release its Egyptian prisoners. In another incident, approximately 2000 employees of the Beshay steel company blocked the Cairo-Alexandria desert highway, demanding improved employment conditions. In Cairo students from Az-Zahr University blocked the road in front of their institution, demanding the release of fellow students who were arrested during last week’s protests in Abbassiya district. The economic and political tensions in Egypt are likely to continue in the foreseeable term, resulting in protests. Moreover, these incidents further highlight the ongoing volatile situation in outlying areas of the country.

A protest concluded today in the vicinity of the Ministry of Justice building in Manama’s diplomatic district. Social media sources reported that women staged a sit-in there in protest of today’s trial of opposition activists that began at 10:00 local time. Their cases have been suspended for two-weeks. Also, a seemingly fake bomb was placed in the middle of an intersection in Juffair, in addition to fires set in the road. The suspected dummy device and the fires reportedly blocked the road for an hour or so. Another demonstration commenced this afternoon at 1600 local time in Diraz. Another march is planned for 1900 local horus in Sitra, which has the potential for erupting in clashes between security forces and protesters.

Travel to Manama’s business and diplomatic districts can continue as normal, while avoiding all protests and gatherings as a basic security precaution. In addition, we advise against all non-essential travel to Shiite villages, such as Diraz, outside the capital due to potential clashes between security forces and protesters.

Jalal al-Blaidy, leader of Ansar al-Sharia, speaks to Yemeni soldiers upon their release in Jaar, Abyan Province (AFP)

Recent weeks have seen a heating up of the fight against cells of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operating in the southern provinces of Yemen. During the unrest that began in the 2011 uprising, the Islamists succeeded in making considerable gains both on the battlefield against the lackluster troops of the military and in captured territory that was to form the new Arabian caliphate. However in the past month, the administration of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi appears to have turned the tide, inflicting heavy casualties on the militants and retaking lost territory as was seen the battle for Lawder that left over 200 militants dead from the fighting.

These victories can be chalked up to a combination of renewed determination on the part of the government, partial resolution of internal political spats with remnants of the former regime, increased military involvement of the United States, and perhaps most interestingly a stepping up of the local tribes in the south who have been deeply affected by the fighting.      

What can possibly be inferred from the numerous cases where tribesmen have picked up arms against the militants is that AQAP has perhaps pushed too far. As in any form of insurgency, the Islamists are dependent on a modicum of public support in order to survive. This can be for either logistical, recruiting or a host of other basic needs if the organization hopes to continue their activities against the government. Their killing of local leaders who have openly criticized them was possibly the line that was crossed, can be clearly viewed as a strategic error for which they must now compensate for.

To that end, the recent release of 73 captured Yemeni soldiers on April 29 supposedly out of respect for the tribal leaders involved in the negotiations can be taken as an attempt to placate the residents of the south and adjust their image to the public. The men have made a point of vocalizing the decent treatment that they received at the hands of their captors. Freeing the soldiers, especially in such numbers is atypical of the militants who have built a reputation for their ferocity. Ansar al-Sharia, the largest AQAP affiliate has been reported to have executed hundreds of captured military personnel, leaving their decapitated bodies strewn around the south. It should not be forgotten that just days before the men were allowed to return home, the militants had threatened to kill ten a day until their demands were met. At this point, it is too early to determine the genuine reasons behind the release.  

As the Islamists find themselves becoming increasingly unpopular, the question remains as to whether damage control is still an option. The people of the south have grown weary of the conflict and yearn for a return to normalcy. If given the choice between the radical remnants of AQAP or that of the government promising them reforms, then it is fair to assess that the people will continue to side with the government in the push against the militants. This is not to say that the Islamists are on their last legs. Yemen is likely to see months of hard fighting, and the survival of an active militant movement for the years to come. However for now, it would seem that a shift has occurred that many hope will lead the country back to the path of stability and recovery.

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Supporters of banned Salafi presidential candidate, Hazem Salah Abu Ismail demonstrate in Cairo (Getty Images)

The latest bloodshed in Cairo underscores worrying trends and emerging realities regarding Egypt’s internal security and political future. The recent clashes in the vicinity of Cairo’s Abbasseya Square illustrate the readiness of prominent political groups to forcefully impose their views, demands, and ideologies as they battle for the country’s new identity. Sadly for Egypt, this process has just begun and is not likely to end anytime soon; indeed, the bloody volatility in Egypt has not subsided since the events of January 2011.

Under these circumstances – from a security point of view – what is most important to note here is how the volatile political situation directly translates into an erosion of the security condition on the ground. Violence in downtown Cairo is often centered on political disputes, involving opposing factions, who are more prone to resolve their differences by force, as they believe this the most optimum course of action to achieve their goals.

While protests and scuffles are daily routines in the post-Mubarak Egypt, more violent and deadly skirmishes are relatively less frequent, yet are a recurring phenomenon every few months. In reference to a timeline: security forces stormed and cleared out Tahrir square in August of last year. In October, demonstrators clashed with military police outside the Maspero building in Cairo, killing some 25 people. In November, clashes in Tahrir Square between security forces and an influx of protesters killed some 23 people. Also, clashes between rival football clubs – and political rivals – killed some 79 people in early February. This was followed by an escalation in protests in front of the Ministry of Interior in Cairo, which led to five-days of stone-throwing skirmishes in the streets surrounding the government building. In all the above cases, the clashes were politically motivated or involved politically oriented factions who were fighting for the supremacy of their respective agendas. To that point, in a majority of these cases – it was liberal protesters, not Islamists, who battled with security personnel.

In that sense, the killing of 14 people in Abbasseya on May 2 was merely the latest incident in a string of violent clashes, which are unlikely to subside anytime soon. As opposed to previous cases of unrest, this was the first time that ‘unidentified men’ loyal to the ruling Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), attacked a group of mainly Salafi-Islamists who had been protesting outside the building over the disqualification of their presidential hopeful, Hazem Salah Abu-Ismail.

This is likely the first indication that the secularly-oriented military is gearing up for the true battle for Egypt: the one with radical Islamists.    

Military supporters, angry with Salafist intentions and their apathy towards Egypt’s military rulers, most likely attacked their Islamist rivals as a show of strength and to force the abandonment of the ongoing protests in front of the Ministry of Defense. No less worrying however, is the fact that their opponents are not timid when it comes to escalating the violence as well.

With that in mind, both SCAF and the Salafis are merely supporting actors in Egypt’s larger picture. The most dominant force in the struggle for the identity of post-revolutionary Egypt remains the Muslim Brotherhood. Their predominance is noted by all parties, who are all seeking to pry them into their own ideological spheres. The Salafis, mainly the al-Noor party, are vying to pull the Brotherhood into adopting a more hard-line Islamist approach, while the military, in addition to leftist and liberal parties strive to bring the party to a more moderate and less ideological platform. Unfortunately for the West and those hopeful for a new and pluralist Egypt, liberal groups will not have much of an impact in swaying the Brotherhood, given their marginal status in the Egyptian political system. The radical Salafis on the other hand, are likely to have greater successes, while the military too has yet to say its final word.

Under these circumstances, protests are likely to continue in the coming weeks, especially ahead of the coming elections for the republic’s presidency. The elections will signal an end to the first stage of the transitional period following Mubarak’s ouster, however by no means are Egypt’s troubles over. Egypt has been ruled by a handful of dictators since its independence from Great Britain in the first half of the 20th century, but the mind-set of enforcing political opinions upon others has not disappeared and is unlikely to anytime soon. For this reason, even after elections are over, violence may still be used to influence rivals, settle disputes, and impose political prowess.  The outcome of such fighting holds a gloomy future for a country which not long ago was the leader of the Arab world.

To receive analysis on how political situations affect the security environment, click here.